July 5, 2001

PRESIDING JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion ofthe court:

In July 2000, petitioner, Jimmie Lee Schlemm, filed apro se petition for writ of habeas corpus (735 ILCS 5/10-101through 10-137 (West 1998)), alleging that his imprisonment wasunlawful and seeking his release from the Illinois Department ofCorrections. The trial court later denied the petition. Petitioner appeals, and we affirm.

In December 1978, a jury convicted petitioner of twocounts of murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 9-1) and twocounts of concealment of a homicide (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch.38, par. 9-3.1). The trial court later sentenced him to 38 yearsin prison on each murder conviction and 10 years in prison oneach concealment conviction, with all sentences to run consecutively. Petitioner appealed, arguing, in part, that the courterred by (1) imposing consecutive sentences, and (2) imposingextended prison terms on the two concealment convictions. Peoplev. Schlemm, 82 Ill. App. 3d 639, 641, 402 N.E.2d 810, 812 (1980). This court affirmed petitioner's convictions but reduced the 10-year extended prison terms to 5-year prison terms on each concealment conviction. Schlemm, 82 Ill. App. 3d at 651, 402 N.E.2dat 819.

In July 2000, petitioner filed a pro se petition forwrit of habeas corpus, alleging that (1) the consecutive sentences imposed on the murder and concealment of a homicideconvictions were unlawful because those crimes were committedagainst the same person, and (2) the consecutive sentencesimposed on all of petitioner's convictions were unlawful becausethe murders and the concealing of those murders arose out of thesame course of conduct. The trial court subsequently denied thepetition upon determining that (1) if the petition was consideredas a petition for postconviction relief under the Post-ConvictionHearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 through 122-8 (West 1998)),it was not timely filed, and (2) petitioner was not entitled tohabeas corpus relief, pursuant to section 10-124 of the Code ofCivil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/10-124 (West 1998)).

This appeal followed.

II. THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF THE
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner argues that the trial court erred by denyinghis petition for writ of habeas corpus. Specifically, he contends that (1) his consecutive sentences were unconstitutionalunder Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 147 L. Ed. 2d435, 455, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2362-63 (2000), because they werebased on the following factors, which were never presented to thejury for its determination: (a) the witnessing of one victim'smurder by the other victim, and (b) defendant's exceptionallybrutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty; (2)consecutive sentences were improperly imposed on (a) his convictions for concealment of a homicide, and (b) all of his convictions because the murders and the concealing of those murdersarose out of the same course of conduct; and (3) on directappeal, this court wrongly concluded that the sentences imposedon the concealment convictions should run consecutively to thesentences imposed on the murder convictions. We disagree.

Habeas corpus relief is limited solely to the groundsspecified in section 10-124 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/10-124 (West1998)). Barney v. Prisoner Review Board, 184 Ill. 2d 428, 430,704 N.E.2d 350, 351 (1998). That section provides as follows:

"If it appears that the prisoner is incustody by virtue of process from any courtlegally constituted, he or she may be discharged only for one or more of the followingcauses:

1. Where the court has exceeded thelimit of its jurisdiction, either as to thematter, place, sum[,] or person.

2. Where, though the original imprisonment was lawful, nevertheless, by some act,omission[,] or event which has subsequentlytaken place, the party has become entitled tobe discharged.

3. Where the process is defective insome substantial form required by law.

4. Where the process, though in properform, has been issued in a case or undercircumstances where the law does not allowprocess to issue or orders to be entered forimprisonment or arrest.

5. Where, although in proper form, theprocess has been issued in a case or undercircumstances unauthorized to issue or execute the same, or where the person having thecustody of the prisoner under such process isnot the person empowered by law to detain himor her.

6. Where the process appears to havebeen obtained by false pretense or bribery.

7. Where there is no general law, norany judgment or order of a court to authorized the process if in a civil action, norany conviction if in a criminal proceeding. No court, on the return of a habeas corpus,shall, in any other matter, inquire into thelegality or justice of a judgment of a courtlegally constituted." 735 ILCS 5/10-124(West 1998).

See Hughes v. Kiley, 67 Ill. 2d 261, 267, 367 N.E.2d 700, 702(1977) (a writ of habeas corpus is available only to obtain therelease of a prisoner (1) who has been incarcerated under ajudgment of a court that lacked jurisdiction of the subjectmatter or the person of the prisoner, or (2) where some occurrence after the prisoner's conviction entitles him to release). A petition for writ of habeas corpus may not be used to reviewproceedings that do not exhibit one of the defects set forth inthe statute, even though the alleged error involves a denial ofconstitutional rights. Barney, 184 Ill. 2d at 430, 704 N.E.2d at351; see People ex rel. Lewis v. Frye, 42 Ill. 2d 311, 313, 247N.E.2d 410, 411 (1969) (petitioner's allegations that (1) he wasnot granted a pretrial hearing to determine his sanity although abona fide doubt existed, and (2) the State had not proved hissanity beyond a reasonable doubt were not subject to review inhabeas corpus proceedings).

Reviewing petitioner's pro se claims of error in thelight most favorable to him, we conclude that they are notsubject to review under section 10-124 of the Code. Petitionerdid not raise any issue regarding jurisdiction or allege anypostconviction event that would entitle him to release. Petitioner's claims that his consecutive sentences were unconstitutional or were otherwise imposed in error are simply not cognizable under section 10-124. See People ex rel. Bright v. Twomey, 4Ill. App. 3d 365, 368, 279 N.E.2d 538, 540 (1972) (affirmingdismissal of the petitioner's habeas corpus petition and concluding that his claims that he was "suffering from an unconstitutional sentence *** will not, even if valid, entitle him torelief under the provision of the Habeas Corpus Act"); see alsoPeople v. Swiderski, 65 Ill. App. 3d 153, 154, 382 N.E.2d 628,629 (1978) (federal decisions do not constitute a postconvictionevent that would entitle a prisoner to release). We thereforehold that the trial court did not err by dismissing the petitionfor writ of habeas corpus.

We note that petitioner does not challenge the trialcourt's denial of his petition as an untimely filedpostconviction petition. Instead, he claims that the courtshould not have addressed his habeas corpus petition as apostconviction petition filed under the Act. Contrary to petitioner's claim, the court properly considered the petition underthe Act. See People v. Sturgeon, 272 Ill. App. 3d 48, 54, 649N.E.2d 1385, 1388 (1995) (Steigmann, J., specially concurring)(when petitioners seek to attack their criminal convictions byway of a pro se writ of habeas corpus or section 2-1401 petition(735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 1998)), the trial court should initiallyconsider the petition under the Act).

For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court'sjudgment.

Affirmed.

KNECHT, J., concurs.

COOK, J., specially concurs.

A sentence which does not conform to a statutoryrequirement is void, and that defect may be raised at any time. People v. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d 107, 113, 658 N.E.2d 445, 448 (1995). I concur, not because petitioner's petition for postconvictionrelief was not timely filed, or because petitioner's petition didnot conform strictly to the requirements of section 10-124 of theCode, but because I am not persuaded that the sentence here was avoid sentence. If the sentence were void, it could be attackedin an untimely postconviction petition (see In re Marriage ofStefiniw, 253 Ill. App. 3d 196, 202, 625 N.E.2d 358, 363 (1993)(void judgment may be attacked without complying with timerequirements of section 2-1401)) or in a habeas corpus petition. See People v. Brazee, 316 Ill. App. 3d 1230, 1234, 738 N.E.2d646, 649 (2000) (a void sentence may be attacked by habeas corpusat any time, even where it is argued that defendant has waivedconsideration of the issue).