JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court:

In June 2003, plaintiff, Ronald Scotti, an IllinoisDepartment of Corrections (DOC) inmate, filed a pro se petition formandamus against defendant, Anne R. Taylor, chairman of the PrisonerReview Board. Three days later, the trial court sua sponte dismissedthe petition for failure to state a cause of action.

Scotti appeals, arguing that the trial court erred bydismissing his petition because it stated a cause of action. Wereverse and remand.

In his June 2003 mandamus petition, Scotti alleged thatTaylor failed to comply with section 3-5-1(b) of the Unified Code ofCorrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/3-5-1(b) (West 2002)), in that aportion of his good-conduct credit had been revoked and he was notprovided with the factual information that was relied upon by DOC andthe review board in making the determination to revoke it. He alsoalleged that his due process rights were violated by Taylor's failureto provide him with the factual basis for the revocation of his good-conduct credit. As relief, Scotti sought an order compelling Taylorto (1) comply with section 3-5-1(b) of the Code by providing him withthe factual information underlying the revocation of his good-conductcredit and (2) restore his good-conduct credit.

Scotti attached to his mandamus petition (1) a copy of asentence-calculation worksheet showing that in February 2003, onemonth of his good-conduct credit was revoked; and (2) a copy of aMarch 7, 2003, grievance filed by Scotti, alleging that (a) DOC orthe review board failed to comply with section 3-5-1(b) of the Code(730 ILCS 5/3-5-1(b) (West 2002)) and (b) the only document hereceived after his revocation hearing was the aforementionedsentence-calculation worksheet. A written response dated March 11,2003, appears in the section of the grievance form designated for agrievance counselor's response and states as follows: "Record officesupervisor indicates they do not have the information requested."

On June 23, 2003, the trial court dismissed Scotti'smandamus petition in a docket entry, which states as follows:

"The [c]ourt, having examined the submissionsof [Scotti] wherein he complains about revocation of certain good time as a result of certain disciplinary proceedings. The [c]ourtfinds that [Scotti] has wholly failed to statea cause of action in mandamus. Therefore, thiscause is hereby dismissed."

This appeal followed.

Scotti argues that the trial court erred by dismissing hismandamus petition. We agree.

We review de novo a trial court's dismissal of a complaintfor failure to state a cause of action. Bajwa v. Metropolitan LifeInsurance Co., 208 Ill. 2d 414, 421, 804 N.E.2d 519, 525 (2004). Such dismissal will be held proper only if it clearly appears that noset of facts can be proved under the pleadings which will entitledthe plaintiff to recover. Bajwa, 208 Ill. 2d at 421, 804 N.E.2d at525.

"Mandamus relief is an extraordinary remedy to enforce, as a matter of right, the performance of official duties by a public official where the official is not exercising discretion. A court will not grant a writ of mandamus unless the petitioner can demonstrate aclear, affirmative right to relief, a clearduty of the official to act, and clear authority in the official to comply with the writ. The writ will not lie when its effect is tosubstitute the court's judgment or discretionfor the official's judgment or discretion. Mandamus relief, therefore, is not appropriateto regulate a course of official conduct or toenforce the performance of official duties generally." Hatch v. Szymanski, 325 Ill. App. 3d736, 739, 759 N.E.2d 585, 588 (2001).

Section 3-5-1(b) of the Code provides, in pertinent part,as follows:

"If [DOC] or the [review board] makes a determination under this Code which affects thelength of the period of confinement orcommitment, the committed person and hiscounsel shall be advised of factual informationrelied upon by [DOC] or [the] [b]oard to makethe determination ***." 730 ILCS 5/3-5-1(b)(West 2002).

In addition, the Supreme Court has held that under the principles ofdue process, prisoners are entitled to the following process indisciplinary proceedings: (1) notice of the disciplinary charges atleast 24 hours prior to the hearing; (2) when consistent withinstitutional safety and correctional goals, an opportunity to callwitnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense; and (3) awritten statement by the fact finder of the evidence relied on andthe reasons for the disciplinary action. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418U.S. 539, 563-66, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935, 955-56, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 2978-79(1974).

In Mason v. Snyder, 332 Ill. App. 3d 834, 842, 774 N.E.2d457, 463-64 (2002), this court held that trial courts have theauthority to "utilize their discretion in dealing with 'professionallitigants' who inappropriately burden the court system withnonmeritorious litigation" by sua sponte striking mandamus petitionsthat the courts find to be "frivolous and without merit." In soholding, we also encouraged trial courts to set forth in the recordtheir analysis when "utilizing this administrative tool," given thatthis court would be reviewing the court's decision without thebenefit of argument from the defendant. Mason, 332 Ill. App. 3d at843, 774 N.E.2d at 464.

Although we adhere to our holding in Mason--that trialcourts have the authority to sua sponte dismiss a DOC inmate'sfrivolous mandamus petition--in this case, we are unable to discernfrom the record the basis for the court's decision to dismissScotti's mandamus petition. Scotti's petition alleges that he wasnever informed of the factual basis for the revocation of his good-conduct credit, as is required by (1) section 3-5-1(b) of the Code(730 ILCS 5/3-5-1(b) (West 2002)) and (2) the United StatesConstitution. He attached to the petition documentation of (1) therevocation of his good-conduct credit and (2) his grievance, showingthat when he sought the pertinent information, he was informed thatthe record office did not have it. As relief, Scotti sought, inpart, an order directing Taylor to provide him with the pertinentfactual information in accordance with section 3-5-1(b) of the Codeand his right to procedural due process. Thus, Scotti alleged factsthat established a right to the relief requested and the existence ofa statutory and constitutional duty on Taylor's part to provide thatrelief.

A mandamus petition is an appropriate vehicle forobtaining the relief Scotti seeks--namely, an official's compliancewith a statutorily prescribed nondiscretionary duty. Noyola v. Boardof Education of the City of Chicago, 179 Ill. 2d 121, 132, 688 N.E.2d81, 86 (1997). On this record, we fail to see how Scotti's petitionfails to state a cause of action for mandamus relief or is otherwisefrivolous. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgmentdismissing the petition.

In so doing, we are not suggesting that Scotti's petitionmay not be the proper subject of dismissal or denial in furtherproceedings. In addition, we reiterate our suggestion in Mason thatwhen a trial court sua sponte dismisses a DOC inmate's mandamuspetition, the court also set forth in the record the basis upon whichthat determination was made.

For the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court'sjudgment and remand for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.

COOK and McCULLOUGH, JJ., concur.