PRESIDING JUSTICE COOK delivered the opinion of the court:

The circuit court entered an order finding the settlement between plaintiff, Anna Skaggs, and defendant Help at Home,Inc. (Help at Home), to be in good faith within the meaning ofthe Illinois Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act (Contribution Act) (740 ILCS 100/0.01 through 5 (West 2002)). Defendant SeniorServices of Central Illinois, Inc. (Senior Services), appeals. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Skaggs hired defendant Help at Home to takeher to vote at a building occupied by defendant Senior Services. Help at Home's employee, Gwen Alexander, drove Skaggs to thebuilding and parked the van near a depression in the parking lot. The parking lot abutted the lot of defendant Ushman Communications Company (Ushman). When Skaggs finished voting and attempted to get back into the van, she fell near the point whereSenior Services' lot met the adjoining Ushman property. Skaggsbroke both of her ankles. While undergoing rehabilitation forthe injured ankles, she fell and fractured her hip.

Skaggs filed a complaint. Counts I and II allegedSenior Services negligently allowed the drop-off to be created,failed to warn of the dangerous condition, failed to provide forramping, and maintained a condition of unreasonable risk on thepremises. Count III claimed Ushman was negligent in failing tomaintain its premises and in allowing an unreasonably dangerouscondition to develop. Count IV asserted Help at Home's agentnegligently parked near the hole, failed to ensure the vehiclewas parked at a safe location for exit and entry, and failed toprovide a safe exit and entry. Upon Skaggs' motion for voluntarydismissal, count III against Ushman was dismissed with prejudice. In its answer, Senior Services asserted affirmative defenses ofcomparative fault on the part of Skaggs, Ushman, and otherparties not presently before the court. Senior Services alsofiled a counterclaim against Ushman.

Before Skaggs filed her complaint, Help at Home filed apetition in bankruptcy. Upon a petition by Senior Services, thebankruptcy court granted it relief from the automatic stay. Senior Services then asserted its claim for contribution againstHelp at Home as a claim in the bankruptcy proceedings. In thecircuit court, Senior Services filed a counterclaim against Helpat Home and its employee, Gwen Alexander, seeking contributionand a reduction in fault should any finding of liability be madeagainst Senior Services.

In the bankruptcy proceeding, Skaggs filed a $400,000claim against Help at Home. Skaggs and Help at Home negotiated aresolution to Skaggs' claim in the bankruptcy proceeding, and thebankruptcy court entered a stipulation and order allowing Skaggs'claim as an unsecured claim in the amount of $100,000 with thestipulation that the order shall not prejudice Skaggs' ability torecover from any insurance coverage available to Help at Home tosatisfy the alleged personal injury damages. The settlementfurther provided that any money actually received by Skaggs willbe allowed as a credit against any liability that might beimposed upon Senior Services. As part of the settlement, Skaggsand Help at Home agreed to file a motion for a good-faith findingin state court. Skaggs' claim against Help at Home was released.

Skaggs and Help at Home filed a motion requesting thecircuit court find their proposed settlement to be in good faithin accordance with the provisions of the Contribution Act (740ILCS 100/0.01 through 5 (West 2002)) and bar any claim forcontribution or any other claim by any tortfeasor against Help atHome. In the motion, Help at Home claimed it did not haveliability insurance that would cover the incident by virtue ofthe fact that it was insured by Reliance Insurance Company, whichwas insolvent and not covered by the Illinois Guaranty Fund. Themotion further stated that under the bankruptcy proceedings, theamount of money available for distribution to unsecured creditorswas $50,000 to be distributed on a proportionate basis to theunsecured creditors based upon the value of their claims. Theactual amount Skaggs would receive could not be determined untilthe bankruptcy court allocated the specific amounts to thevarious unsecured creditors.

Senior Services opposed the motion for good-faithfinding. Following a hearing, the circuit court entered an orderfinding the settlement to be in good faith within the meaning ofthe Contribution Act. The order authorized Skaggs to execute arelease of any and all of Help at Home's liability for Skaggs'injuries; and it discharged any and all liability of Help at Hometo any other joint tortfeasor, including Senior Services. The order further established that the amount Skaggs receives pursuant to the settlement shall operate as a credit against any judgment that may be entered against Senior Services.

II. ANALYSIS

A. "Good-Faith" Requirement

The Contribution Act establishes a right of contribution where "[two] or more persons are subject to liability intort arising out of the same injury" to another person and limitsthat right to "a tortfeasor who has paid more than his pro ratashare of the common liability." 740 ILCS 100/2(a), (b) (West2002). The Act further provides that a plaintiff may release oneor more persons liable in tort without discharging other tortfeasors, but such release will reduce "the recovery on any claimagainst the others to the extent of any amount stated in therelease *** or in the amount of the consideration actually paidfor it, whichever is greater." 740 ILCS 100/2(c) (West 2002). Asettling tortfeasor is discharged from all liability for anycontribution to another tortfeasor and is not entitled to recovercontribution from any nonsettling tortfeasors. 740 ILCS100/2(d), (e) (West 2002). The only limitation on the settlementprovided in the Act is that the release be given "in good faith." 740 ILCS 100/2(c) (West 2002).

Initially, the settling parties have the burden ofestablishing that the settlement is in good faith by showing, ata minimum, that the agreement is legally valid and that thesettlement is "fair and reasonable in light of the policiesunderlying the Contribution Act." Johnson v. United Airlines,203 Ill. 2d 121, 132, 784 N.E.2d 812, 820 (2003). TheContribution Act promotes two policies: (1) encouragingequitable apportionment of damages according to relative faultand (2) encouraging tortfeasors to settle with injuredplaintiffs. In re Guardianship of Babb, 162 Ill. 2d 153, 171,642 N.E.2d 1195, 1203 (1994). Upon an initial showing of goodfaith, the nonsettling party must prove bad faith by apreponderance of the evidence. Johnson, 203 Ill. 2d at 132, 642N.E.2d at 820.

The test for determining a good-faith settlement is atotality-of-the-circumstances test. Dubina v. Mesirow RealtyDevelopment, Inc., 197 Ill. 2d 185, 191, 756 N.E.2d 836, 840(2001). No single factor will be determinative. Babb, 162 Ill.2d at 162, 642 N.E.2d at 1199. The trial court's determinationof good faith will be upheld absent a showing of abuse ofdiscretion. Dubina, 197 Ill. 2d at 191-92, 756 N.E.2d at 840.

Senior Services asserts that the Contribution Actrequires that nonsettling parties be treated equitably. Also,because the exact amount Skaggs will receive is unknown, SeniorServices claims the settlement cannot be found to be in goodfaith. Under the settlement, Senior Services claims it will paya disproportionate amount in relation to its probable liabilitybecause Help at Home is principally at fault. Further, SeniorServices argues that the trial court's finding did not adequatelyaddress the issue of liability insurance. Finally, if thesettlement is approved and Help at Home dismissed as a defendant,Senior Services asserts it may not request the trier of fact toapportion liability by including Help at Home. This couldjeopardize Senior Services' right under section 2-1117 of theCode of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1117 (West 2002)) to beonly severally liable for damages other than medical expenses ifit was less than 25% at fault.

As we discuss below, we do not agree that theContribution Act requires that trial courts determine that thesettlement amount is equitable. Also, the indefiniteness of thesettlement amount does not constitute bad faith under thesecircumstances. Finally, we do not find that the liability-insurance issue affects this settlement's good-faithdetermination. It is the question of whether, after thesettlement, Help at Home's fault may be considered inapportioning liability under section 2-1117 that creates anissue.

First, Senior Services cites many cases thatpurportedly establish that the settlement must treat nonsettlingparties equitably. In each case, though, the court reviews morefactors than just the allegedly disproportionate settlement. Thetest is a totality-of-the-circumstances test, and one factor isnot determinative.

The Supreme Court of Illinois in Babb and Dubinadetermined the settlements were not in good faith under atotality-of-the-circumstances test. In Babb, the court looked atfactors including the deceptive manner in which the settlingparties obtained approval from the court, the misrepresentationof the terms of the settlement to the court, the absence ofnotification to the nonsettling parties, the inequitable terms,and, most significantly, the loan-receipt provision, whichviolated the terms of the Contribution Act. See Babb, 162 Ill.2d 153, 642 N.E.2d 1195. A typical loan-receipt agreementinvolves the following arrangement:

"[T]he plaintiff received an interest-free loan (settlement monies) from the settling tortfeasor, who was then dismissed from the plaintiff's tort action. Under the terms of the loan-receipt agreement, however, the plaintiff was obligated to repay the settlement monies received pursuant to the loan-receipt agreement to the settling tortfeasor out of any judgment or settlement that the plaintiff obtained from the other nonsettling tortfeasors.

*** The settling tortfeasor obtained contribution indirectly, because any money that the nonsettling tortfeasors paid to the plaintiff was immediately used to repay the settling tortfeasor for the amount it loaned to the plaintiff pursuant to the loan-receipt agreement." Babb, 162 Ill. 2d at 168, 642 N.E.2d at 1202.

Loan agreements violate the terms of the Contribution Act becausethey allow a settling tortfeasor to indirectly recovercontribution from a nonsettling tortfeasor and attempt to deprivethe nonsettling tortfeasor of their statutory right to a setoff. Babb, 162 Ill. 2d at 172, 642 N.E.2d at 1204.

In Dubina, the crucial factor was that the portion ofthe settlement that allocated $4.5 million as payment forplaintiffs assigning their claims against the nonsettlingdefendants to the settling defendants effectively deprived thenonsettling defendants of their statutory right to a setoff. Dubina, 197 Ill. 2d at 195, 756 N.E.2d at 842. The court inDubina regarded this settlement as collusive because theassignments allowed the settling defendants, "in the guise ofplaintiffs, to indirectly recover contribution from [thenonsettling defendant]." Dubina, 197 Ill. 2d at 196, 756 N.E.2dat 842.

The small amount of the settlement alone will notestablish bad faith. Warsing v. Material Handling Services,Inc., 271 Ill. App. 3d 556, 561, 648 N.E.2d 1126, 1130 (1995). The court must consider all of the surrounding circumstances, notjust the amount of the settlement. Dubina, 197 Ill. 2d at 191,756 N.E.2d at 840.

Second, Senior Services' concern that the exact amountto be paid by Help at Home is unknown does not amount to badfaith. Because Help at Home filed for bankruptcy, any settlementhad to be negotiated under bankruptcy procedures. Skaggs andHelp at Home negotiated a concrete unsecured creditor's claimthat entitles Skaggs to a right of cash distribution withouthaving to litigate. While the exact amount Skaggs will actuallyreceive is unknown, the bankruptcy court follows a procedure fordetermining the amount. Further, under Senior Services'reasoning, plaintiffs negotiating with defendants in the midst ofbankruptcy proceedings would be precluded from settling if thiscourt deemed settlements that included unsecured-creditor claimsto be per se bad faith. In this case, the settling parties wererestricted in arranging their settlement and should not be foundto have acted in bad faith simply for negotiating within theconstrictions imposed by the bankruptcy proceeding.

Finally, as to the issue of liability insurance, SeniorServices complains there may be coverage from a Traveler'sInsurance policy covering Help at Home. Senior Services appearedto have been aware of the existence of Travelers' automobilepolicy before the hearing on the motion for a good-faith finding. Further, it is uncertain that Travelers would cover any of Helpat Home's liability. The bankruptcy court's order andstipulation do not prevent Skaggs from recovering from anyinsurance coverage that Help at Home may have to cover theaccident. Help at Home requested that Travelers participate inits defense in connection with the appeal, but Travelers movedfor an order declaring it had no duty to defend or indemnify Helpat Home. The chance that there may be some insurance coveragewould not by itself establish that the trial court abused itsdiscretion in determining that the settlement was in good faith.

The real issue in this case is the possibility that bytheir settlement, Help at Home and Skaggs destroyed SeniorServices' right to have the trier of fact consider Help at Home'spercentage of fault when determining Senior Services' liabilityunder section 2-1117 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS5/2-1117 (West Supp. 2003)). Section 2-1117 provides that incases such as these:

"all defendants found liable are jointly and severally liable for the plaintiff's past and future medical and medically related expenses. Any defendant whose fault, as determined by the trier of fact, is less than 25% of the total fault attributable to the plaintiff, the defendants sued by the plaintiff, and any third[-]party defendant except the plaintiff's employer, shall be severally liable for all other damages." 735 ILCS 5/2-1117 (West Supp. 2003).

Prior to June 2003, this statute included the phrase "who couldhave been sued by the plaintiff" following "third[-]partydefendant" instead of the phrase "except the plaintiff'semployer." 735 ILCS 5/2-1117 (West 1994), amended by Pub. Act 93-10,