This is a consolidated appeal from the entry of aplenary order of protection against respondent, Leslie Schluter. Respondent argues that the trial court erred when it (1) precluded him from calling his child's counselor, Dr. Andrea Klein,to testify on his behalf; and (2) ordered him to reimburse PiattCounty for fees paid to the domestic violence attorney representing petitioner, Koni Steward. We affirm.

On November 1, 2002, Steward, on behalf of the minorchild, Kelsi Schluter, filed a petition for an emergency order ofprotection against respondent. Koni is respondent's ex-wife andthe mother of Kelsi. The petition alleged that respondent hadphysically abused Kelsi on several occasions by throwing anotebook at her, shoving his face into hers and yelling at her,shoving her up the stairs, and calling her names. At the timeKoni filed the petition, Kelsi was living with respondent and hadbeen in his custodial care since November 1998. After an exparte hearing, the trial court issued an emergency order ofprotection and set a hearing for plenary order of protection forNovember 21, 2002.

On November 4, 2002, respondent filed a motion to re-open the cause and rehear the petition for an order of protection, and also filed a response to the petition for an order ofprotection. Prior to the hearing on respondent's motion, Konirequested the appointment of a domestic violence attorney pursuant to Piatt County Administrative Order 97-1. The trial courtappointed John Foltz as the domestic violence attorney and alsoappointed Suzanne Wells as guardian ad litem for Kelsi.

On November 5, 2002, respondent subpoenaed Kelsi'smental health counselor, Klein, to testify in this case and tobring all notes of counseling with Kelsi. On November 19, 2002,Koni filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Klein, and theguardian ad litem filed a motion to quash the subpoena of Klein. Both the motion to exclude and the motion to quash were basedupon a prior court order and stipulation agreement in the case ofIn re Marriage of Schluter, Nos. 97-D-78, 99-OP-26 (Cir. Ct.Piatt Co.). In that stipulation agreement, the parties agreed,in relevant part:

"Until further order of this court Kelsi Shluter shall be furnished with mental health counseling not less frequently than once per month by a counselor selected from among those providers authorized by the health care plan covering the child. The counselor shall report the progress and any concerns to the [g]uardian ad litem not less frequently than quarterly. The counselor selected may not be called as a witness by either parent to testify in any further proceeding or hearing in this or any other proceeding. Nothing in this paragraph shall be interpreted to prevent the [g]uardian ad litem from calling such counselor to testify in any proceeding that may be instituted by the [g]uardian ad litem or as otherwise mandated by law."

Also attached to the motion to exclude was a letter from theguardian ad litem to Klein, which stated in part that the purposeof this provision in the stipulation agreement was "so that Kelsicould have a safe confidential place to discuss her concernsabout either parent and neither parent could use this counselingin any further proceeding." After hearing arguments from allparties, the trial court granted the motions, excluding Klein'stestimony and quashing the subpoena.

After the trial court barred Klein's testimony, respondent provided an offer of proof with regard to her testimony. Inthat offer of proof, respondent stated that Klein would havetestified that Kelsi's demeanor was inconsistent with her statements about the abuse. He stated that Klein would have testifiedthat her opinion as a psychotherapist and child counselor wasthat Kelsi had not been abused or treated in the manner sheclaimed.

The trial court heard testimony on November 22, 2002;January 27, 2003; February 5, 2003; February 6, 2003; February27, 2003; and February 28, 2003. The court entered extensions ofthe emergency order of protection on November 22, 2002; February6, 2003; February 28, 2003; and March 5, 2003.

On April 28, 2003, the trial court approved, overobjection, the fees filed by the domestic violence attorney inthe total sum of $12,435.68 and by the guardian ad litem in thesum of $6,071.83. The court directed the county treasurer to paythe fees. On July 29, 2003, the court signed the plenary orderof protection. On August 28, 2003, respondent filed his noticeof appeal from the plenary order of protection.

On September 10, 2003, the trial court approved another$945 in fees for the domestic violence attorney and appointed himto continue to represent Koni on appeal. The court then held ahearing on the apportionment of the fees of both the guardian adlitem and the domestic violence attorney. The court ordered bothparties to reimburse the county for the fees of the guardian adlitem, with each paying half. The court also ordered thatrespondent reimburse the county for two-thirds of the domesticviolence attorney's fees and Koni reimburse the county for one-third of the fees. On October 8, 2003, respondent filed a noticeof appeal regarding this issue.

On November 7, 2003, the trial court entered a judgmentin favor of Piatt County and against respondent and ordered himto reimburse the county the sum of $11,955 for domestic violenceattorney fees and guardian ad litem fees. The court entered theorder nunc pro tunc September 10, 2003. Respondent appealed, andon respondent's motion, this court consolidated all of respondent's appeals in this case.

On appeal, respondent argues that the trial court erredby (1) excluding the testimony of Kelsi's counselor, Klein, and(2) ordering respondent to reimburse Piatt County for the domestic violence attorney fees. We affirm.

Respondent first contends that the trial court erred byprecluding him from calling Kelsi's counselor, Klein, to testifyat the hearings for the plenary order of protection. The admissibility of evidence falls within the sound discretion of thetrial court, and its ruling will not be disturbed absent an abuseof discretion. Mowen v. Holland, 336 Ill. App. 3d 368, 372, 783N.E.2d 180, 183 (2003). Here, the court noted a 1999 court-approved stipulation agreement between the parties that requiredKelsi to attend counseling sessions and provided as follows:

"The counselor selected may not be called as a witness by either parent to testify in any further proceeding or hearing in this or any other proceeding."

The effect of the stipulation, if enforced, would bar eitherparent from calling Kelsi's counselor as a witness in any proceeding.

Parties are generally bound by their stipulationsunless such stipulations are shown to be unreasonable, the resultof fraud, or violative of public policy. In re Marriage ofSanborn, 78 Ill. App. 3d 146, 149, 396 N.E.2d 1192, 1195 (1979). However, we note that the trial court is not bound by spousalagreements made in marital dissolution proceedings providing forthe support, custody, and visitation of the children. In reMarriage of Smith, 347 Ill. App. 3d 395, 400, 806 N.E.2d 727, 731(2004); see also 750 ILCS 5/502(b) (West 2002). Instead, thecourt is obligated in such cases "to protect the best interestsof the children and is not bound by agreements between theparties which would circumvent judicial protection of the children's interests." In re Marriage of Ealy, 269 Ill. App. 3d 971,975, 647 N.E.2d 307, 310 (1995); In re Marriage of Duffy, 307Ill. App. 3d 257, 260, 718 N.E.2d 286, 289 (1999) ("Parents maynot bargain away their interest of the children and the court isnot bound by an agreement that does not protect the best interestof the children").

We conclude that the same consideration of a child'sbest interests should apply in this case. Where the best interests of the child were the primary consideration for the trialcourt, it was not bound by the stipulation agreement made by theparents in a separate dissolution proceeding. The testimony ofDr. Klein might well have been helpful to the trial court andserved the best interests of the child. The record shows Kelsitestified at length concerning her involvement with each parent.The record suggests that she was influenced in her testimony. However, that determination is for the trial court.

Further, while the trial court noted the existence ofthe stipulation between the parents in the dissolution proceedings, it focused more on the reasons behind the stipulationrather than any binding authority on the parties. It noted thatthe agreement was based upon "an extensive report" and recommendation by Dr. Klein that "Kelsi needs to have a save [sic] place,a place of trust and confidence that she can go to and discussthings about either parent." The perceived intent of the partieswas "to provide an absolute place of confidence that she could goand discuss matters without fear that they would be disclosed toeither parent." The court recognized that at the time theagreement was made, both parents were "looking more towardKelsi's benefit than their own." In addition, the guardian adlitem opposed having Klein testify, and there were no legalfactors that would compel Klein's testimony. The court did notabuse its discretion in barring the testimony of Klein.

This case raises concerns because of the placement ofKelsi as the center of argument between selfish parents who wesubmit have forgotten the best interests of the child in aneffort to win a "show-me" contest. The record suggests, and asthe trial court stated, "these two people, two parents, have beenat each other's throat about Kelsi for a number of years." Theloser is Kelsi, and it appears that the parental battle hasinfluenced her. Mom and Dad have forgotten that when a couple ishappily married, there is need for cooperation and involvement asto children. When Mom and Dad go their separate ways, there isthen an even greater need for cooperation and involvement.

Respondent also contends that the trial court erredwhen it ordered him to reimburse Piatt County for fees paid tothe domestic violence attorney. In Piatt County AdministrativeOrder 97-1, the circuit court created the position of domesticviolence attorney. The domestic violence attorney was created torepresent pro se petitioners in domestic violence proceedings. The order provided that upon completion of the representation,the domestic violence attorney shall provide an itemization offees with the court and shall be paid by the county. The orderalso provided:

"Upon the allowance of a petition for fees by the Domestic Violence Attorney, the court may order reimbursement by the parties to the County for the expense of the Domestic Violence Attorney. If the Domestic Violence Attorney represented the petitioner, and a plenary order of protection was entered during such representation, then the court, considering the financial resources of the parties, may order the respondent to reimburse the County for the expense of the Domestic Violence Attorney." Piatt County Adm. Order 97-1 (Eff. June 17, 2002).

Respondent does not challenge the trial court's authority toappoint an attorney to represent petitioner, only the court'sauthority to order the parties to reimburse the county for feespaid to the appointed attorney.

This court upheld the trial court's authority toappoint an attorney to serve as a domestic violence attorney inScroggins v. Scroggins, 327 Ill. App. 3d 333, 337, 762 N.E.2d1195, 1199 (2002). Respondent mistakenly asserts that theholding in Scroggins is based upon the Domestic Relations LegalFunding Act (Legal Funding Act) (705 ILCS 130/1 through 30 (West2002)). Although we cited the Legal Funding Act in support ofour finding, Scroggins did not rely upon it for the holding thatcourts have the authority to appoint counsel to represent anindigent person in domestic relations matters. Scroggins, 327Ill. App. 3d at 337, 762 N.E.2d at 1199. Courts have the authority to appoint counsel pursuant to the inherent power of thejudiciary to regulate the practice of law and to conduct theorderly administration of justice. People ex rel. Conn v.Randolph, 35 Ill. 2d 24, 28, 219 N.E.2d 337, 340 (1966).

The applicable statute in this matter is the IllinoisDomestic Violence Act of 1986 (Domestic Violence Act) (750 ILCS60/101 through 401 (West 2002)), under which the order of protection was issued. Section 214 of the Domestic Violence Actprovides that, as a remedy, the trial court may:

"Order respondent to pay petitioner for losses suffered as a direct result of the abuse, neglect, or exploitation. Such losses shall include, but not be limited to *** reasonable attorney's fees ***." 750 ILCS 60/214(b)(13) (West 2002)

Respondent argues that petitioner did not suffer any directlosses or incur any attorney fees in this case because the countypaid the domestic violence attorney fees. We are unpersuaded.

The trial court determined that respondent's abusejustified the entry of an order of protection against him. Thefact that the domestic violence attorney was appointed by thecourt and paid for by the county does not change the fact thatrespondent's actions directly caused the petition to be filed inthe first place. The Domestic Violence Act authorizes the courtto order respondent to pay for losses suffered as a direct resultof his abuse, and is meant to be construed liberally. 750 ILCS60/102 (West 2002). Had petitioner hired an attorney on her own,the court could clearly have ordered that the attorney fees bepaid by the respondent. 750 ILCS 60/214(b)(13) (West 2002). Wesee no reason why the court should be prevented from orderingrespondent to pay for petitioner's attorney in this case wherethe attorney was provided to petitioner by the court.

For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court'sjudgment.

Affirmed.

TURNER, J., concurs.

COOK, J., specially concurs.

I agree a court is not bound by agreements between theparties that would circumvent judicial protection of the children's interests. I disagree, however, with the majority'ssuggestion that it might have decided this issue differently ifit had been the trier of fact.  "The testimony of Dr. Klein mightwell have been helpful to the trial court and served the bestinterests of the child." Slip op. at 6. The trial court got itexactly right when it noted that the child needed to have a safeplace where she could discuss matters without fear that theywould be disclosed. The court's statement, joined in by Dr.Klein and the guardian ad litem, goes to a fundamental tenet ofmental health counseling. "Effective psychotherapy *** dependsupon an atmosphere of confidence and trust in which the patientis willing to make a frank and complete disclosure of facts,emotions, memories, and fears." Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1,10, 135 L. Ed. 2d 337, 345, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1928 (1996).

In most cases, the best interests of the child is notserved by having the child's treating mental health counselortestify. The trial court did not appoint a mental health counselor so that the parties would have a witness the next time theyreturned to court. The court appointed the counselor to help thechild, to provide the child with someone to confide in, someonewith whom she could freely discuss her feelings and concerns. The parties are to be complimented for their agreement that thecounselor would not be called as a witness. It would be exceptional for such an agreement to be disregarded. "[A]nyoneseeking the nonconsensual release of mental health informationfaces a formidable challenge ***." Norskog v. Pfiel, 197 Ill. 2d60, 72, 755 N.E.2d 1, 10 (2001).