JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court:

In May 2003, plaintiff, Kenneth W. Stringer, filed astrict-liability complaint against defendant, Packaging Corporationof America (PCA), seeking to recover for injuries he sustained when abox containing 30 dozen eggs gave way. In July 2003, PCA filed amotion to bar evidence and to dismiss the complaint, which the trialcourt denied. PCA filed a motion to reconsider, which the courtdenied. However, in December 2003, the court certified the followingquestion for interlocutory review, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule308(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 308(a)):

"In a product[-]liability action[,] anallegedly defective box was destroyed by plaintiff's employer through no fault of the plaintiff. The defendant filed a motion to bar evidence and dismiss the case on the basis thatthe box was unavailable for examination andtesting. Did the trial court err in denyingthe defendant's motion?"

We answer the certified question in the negative.

According to Stringer's May 2003 complaint, on May 14,2001, he was working at the Carrollton IGA Foodliners. He liftedboxes from a refrigerated delivery truck onto a two-wheeled cart andthen moved the cart to a refrigeration room. While unloading theboxes inside the refrigeration room, the left access hole of one ofthe boxes ripped and broke. Stringer tried to catch the box beforeit hit the ground, but the right access hole also ripped. Duringthis process, Stringer wrenched and injured his back.

Stringer was taken to the hospital and treated for hisinjuries. (He ultimately underwent fusion of some of his vertebrae.) Before he returned to work at the IGA on May 29, 2001, LouisBaumgartner, another employee, disposed of the box, which wasallegedly manufactured by PCA, in a compactor machine, destroying it.

In July 2003, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 219(c) (166Ill. 2d R. 219(c)), PCA moved the trial court to impose sanctionsupon Stringer by either (1) barring both direct and circumstantialevidence as to the condition of the allegedly defective box or (2)dismissing the strict-products-liability count of his complaint. PCAalso filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619(a)(9) of theCode of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2002)),arguing that because the box that allegedly caused Stringer's injurywas unavailable, PCA could not inspect the box and would thus suffersignificant prejudice.

In response to PCA's motion, Stringer filed an affidavit,in which he averred that (1) the box was destroyed without hisknowledge or consent; (2) because he was in the hospital, he wasphysically unable to prevent it from being destroyed; and (3) the boxwas not unique and, instead, was identical to other boxesmanufactured by PCA for use by IGA stores in transporting "30 dozeneggs." Stringer also filed Baumgartner's affidavit, in which heaverred that (1) he witnessed Stringer's injury, inspected the box,and noticed the access holes were ripped; (2) the box was destroyedlong before Stringer was able to return to work; and (3) the box wasidentical to other boxes used to transport "30 dozen eggs."

On August 12, 2003, the trial court conducted a hearing onPCA's motion for sanctions and denied it. In September 2003, PCAfiled a motion to reconsider and, alternatively, a motion for aSupreme Court Rule 308 finding. In support of those motions, PCAfiled an August 29, 2003, affidavit of Daniel Hofer, general managerof supply services for PCA, in which Hofer averred that without theactual box, it would be impossible to (1) determine if PCA actuallymanufactured the box, (2) find a box from the same manufacturing lot,(3) determine whether the packer improperly set up the box or damagedit during set up, filling, or sealing processes, or (4) determine thecause of the alleged failure.

Following a September 2003 hearing, the trial court deniedPCA's motion to reconsider. In December 2003, the court certifiedthe question at issue here.

The certified question asks us to determine whether (1) aplaintiff in a product-liability action is subject to discoverysanctions or (2) a product-liability claim is subject to dismissalwhen the allegedly defective product is destroyed through no fault ofthe plaintiff and without the plaintiff's knowledge or consent.

A. Discovery Sanctions

Under Supreme Court Rule 219(c), a trial court may imposesanctions upon any party who unreasonably fails to comply withsupreme court rules governing discovery or any court order enteredpursuant to those rules. 166 Ill. 2d R. 219(c); Shimanovsky v.General Motors Corp., 181 Ill. 2d 112, 120, 692 N.E.2d 286, 289(1998). The decision to impose sanctions under Rule 219(c) lieswithin the trial court's discretion, and we will not reverse thatcourt's decision absent an abuse of discretion. Shimanovsky, 181Ill. 2d at 120, 692 N.E.2d at 289.

Potential litigants have a duty to take reasonablemeasures to preserve the integrity of relevant and material evidence. Shimanovsky, 181 Ill. 2d at 121-22, 692 N.E.2d at 290. In a strict-products-liability case, the preservation of the allegedly defectiveproduct is important to both the proof and the defense of the case. Shelbyville Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sunbeam Leisure Products Co., 262Ill. App. 3d 636, 641, 634 N.E.2d 1319, 1323 (1994); see AmericanFamily Insurance Co. v. Village Pontiac-GMC, Inc., 223 Ill. App. 3d624, 627, 585 N.E.2d 1115, 1118 (1992) (the physical object in thesame condition as it was immediately following an accident may be farmore instructive and persuasive to a jury than oral descriptions orphotographs). However, if evidence is destroyed, altered, or lost, adefendant is not automatically entitled to a specific sanction. Shimanovsky, 181 Ill. 2d at 127, 692 N.E.2d at 292. Instead, thetrial court should consider the particular factual circumstances ofthe case to determine what, if any, sanction is appropriate. Shimanovsky, 181 Ill. 2d at 127, 692 N.E.2d at 292-93. An order todismiss with prejudice or the imposition of a sanction that resultsin a default judgment should be used only in those cases where aparty's actions show a deliberate, contumacious, or unwarranteddisregard of the court's authority. Shimanovsky, 181 Ill. 2d at 123,692 N.E.2d at 291.

The facts in this case are distinguishable from the factsin the cases PCA cites in support of its claim that Stringer shouldbe subject to sanctions. Here, almost immediately followingStringer's injury and while he was still hospitalized, the box wasdestroyed by a third party over whom Stringer had no control. In thecases PCA cites, the plaintiffs had control over either (1) theproduct's destruction or (2) the product itself. See Kambylis v.Ford Motor Co., 338 Ill. App. 3d 788, 791, 788 N.E.2d 1, 3 (2003)(the plaintiff received notice that his vehicle would be destroyed ifaccommodations were not made with the impound lot); Farely Metals,Inc. v. Barber Coleman Co., 269 Ill. App. 3d 104, 111, 645 N.E.2d964, 968 (1994) (appellate court concluded that the plaintiff hadnotice of impending destruction of artifacts stored in a warehouseand was in arrears for the storage costs); Shelbyville MutualInsurance Co., 262 Ill. App. 3d at 642, 634 N.E.2d at 1324 (anallegedly defective grill was in the plaintiff's sole possession);American Family Insurance Co., 223 Ill. App. 3d at 626, 585 N.E.2d at1117 (vehicle was destroyed with the plaintiff's permission after theplaintiff's expert removed an allegedly defective wire); Graves v.Daley, 172 Ill. App. 3d 35, 37, 526 N.E.2d 679, 681-82 (1988) (theplaintiffs destroyed an allegedly defective furnace after receivingpermission from their insurance-company subrogee).

We also decline PCA's invitation to read Miller v. Gupta,174 Ill. 2d 120, 672 N.E.2d 1229 (1996), as supporting the impositionof sanctions even when a party is not at fault in the destruction ofevidence. Miller was neither a products-liability case nor a caseinvolving discovery sanctions under Supreme Court Rule 219(c) (166Ill. 2d R. 219(c)). Instead, it involved the plaintiff's failure toattach a section 2-622 certificate of merit (735 ILCS 5/2-622 (West1994)) to a medical malpractice complaint. Miller, 174 Ill. 2d at127-28, 672 N.E.2d at 1232-33. Rule 219(c) permitssanctions only where a party unreasonably fails to comply with adiscovery order. A party who had nothing to do with the destructionof evidence cannot be said to have unreasonably failed to comply witha discovery order. Before noncompliance can be unreasonable, a partymust have been in a position to comply. Here, the destruction of thebox cannot be imputed to Stringer. As discussed above, nothing inthe record suggests Stringer ever had control over the box or theability to comply with PCA's discovery request. While we acknowledgePCA may experience difficulty in preparing a defense without the box,the trial court's decision to deny PCA's motion for discoverysanctions was not an abuse of discretion. Simply put, no discoveryviolation occurred here.

B. Motion To Dismiss

Although not set out as a separate argument in its brief,PCA also argues that this case should be dismissed because, withoutthe box, it would essentially be denied due process and fundamentalfairness. Relying upon Hofer's affidavit, which was filed along withPCA's motion to reconsider, PCA contends that the destruction of thebox effectively denied it the ability to defend this lawsuit becauseit (1) prevented PCA from asserting several affirmative defenses,including altered condition; (2) prevented PCA from inspecting andtesting the allegedly defective box; and (3) effectively denied PCAthe ability to dispute or refute plaintiff's claims regarding thebox's condition or manufacturing.

The fatal weakness in PCA's argument is that Hofer'saffidavit, which is crucial to PCA's position, was not properlybefore the trial court on the motion to reconsider. The purpose of amotion to reconsider is to bring to the trial court's attention (1)newly discovered evidence not available at the time of the hearing,(2) changes in the law, or (3) errors in the court's previousapplication of existing law. The decision to grant or deny a motionto reconsider lies within the trial court's discretion, and we willnot disturb the court's ruling absent an abuse of discretion. Broadnax v. Morrow, 326 Ill. App. 3d 1074, 1082, 762 N.E.2d 1152,1158 (2002).

PCA filed Hofer's August 29, 2003, affidavit in support ofits motion to reconsider after the trial court's August 12, 2003,denial of PCA's motions for discovery sanctions and dismissal. PCAdid not contend that the affidavit was newly discovered evidence orthat, with due diligence, it could not have presented the court withthis information earlier. PCA merely stated in its motion toreconsider that the affidavit "further demonstrates the unfairness ofthis case going forward since [Stringer] cannot prove his case and[PCA]'s due process is deprived by having to defend the instantlawsuit."

Motions to reconsider are retrospective in nature. When aparty seeks to have a motion to reconsider granted on grounds ofnewly discovered evidence, the movant must provide a reasonableexplanation for why the evidence was not available at the time of theoriginal hearing. Woolums v. Huss, 323 Ill. App. 3d 628, 640, 752N.E.2d 1219, 1229 (2001); see also In re Ashley F., 265 Ill. App. 3d419, 426, 638 N.E.2d 368, 373 (1994) ("To justify a rehearing on thebasis of newly discovered evidence, there must be a showing of duediligence and a demonstration that justice has not been done"). InGardner v. Navistar International Transportation Corp., 213 Ill. App.3d 242, 248-49, 571 N.E.2d 1107, 1111 (1991), this court explainedthe policy underlying this requirement, as follows:

"Trial courts should not permit litigants tostand mute, lose a motion, and then franticallygather evidentiary material to show that thecourt erred in its ruling. Civil proceedingsalready suffer from far too many delays, andthe interests of finality and efficiencyrequire that the trial courts not consider suchlate-tendered evidentiary material, no matterwhat the contents thereof may be." (Emphasisin original).

To present newly discovered evidence, a party must showthat the newly discovered evidence existed before the initial hearingbut had not yet been discovered or was otherwise unobtainable. Inthe present case, PCA has made no showing why Hofer's affidavit couldnot have been discovered and provided to the trial court in supportof PCA's original motions for discovery sanctions and dismissal. Wenote that Stringer filed his affidavits before the court decided theoriginal motion, and those affidavits contained evidence properlybefore the court. Hofer's affidavit did not.

Alternatively, after the trial court's decision denyingPCA's motions for sanctions or dismissal, PCA could have filed amotion to reopen proofs if it wanted to get Hofer's affidavit beforethe court. The decision whether to grant a motion to reopen proofslies within the trial court's discretion and will not be disturbed onappeal absent an abuse of discretion. Chicago Transparent Products,Inc. v. American National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 337 Ill. App.3d 931, 942, 788 N.E.2d 23, 32 (2002). The factors to be consideredin determining whether a party should be permitted to reopen proofsinclude (1) whether the failure to introduce the evidence occurredbecause of inadvertence or calculated risk, (2) whether the adverseparty will be surprised or unfairly prejudiced by the new evidence,(3) whether the new evidence is of the utmost importance to themovant's case, and (4) whether any cogent reason exists to justifydenying the request. Polk v. Cao, 279 Ill. App. 3d 101, 104, 664N.E.2d 276, 279 (1996). Further, if evidence offered for the firsttime in a posttrial motion could have been produced at an earliertime, the court may deny its introduction into evidence on thatbasis. Chicago Transportation Products, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 942, 788N.E.2d at 32.

In this case, PCA did not move to reopen proofs so thatHofer's affidavit could properly be considered by the trial court. We note that the trial court's September 22, 2003, docket entry,containing the denial of PCA's motion to reconsider, makes noreference to Hofer's affidavit. For all we know, the trial courtnever considered it. On this record, that action (or inaction, to bemore precise) would have been entirely justified. We thus concludethat the court did not err by denying PCA's motion to dismiss.

For the reasons stated, we answer the trial court'scertified question in the negative.

Certified question answered.

APPLETON, J., concurs.

COOK, J., specially concurs.

I disagree with the statement that "'[c]ivil proceedingsalready suffer from far too many delays, and the interests offinality and efficiency require that the trial courts not considersuch late-tendered evidentiary material, no matter what the contentsmay be.'" (Emphasis in original.) Slip op. at 9, quoting Gardner,213 Ill. App. 3d at 248-49, 571 N.E.2d at 1111. I would not placeany such arbitrary restriction on the broad discretion possessed bythe trial courts. I also disagree with the suggestion that it isimportant whether the motion is labeled a "motion to reopen proofs." We should look to the substance of the motion, not its title.

Certainly trial courts may choose not to consideradditional evidentiary material, reasoning that the litigant has hada full opportunity to present his evidence and going through anotherhearing would be a waste of time. In some cases, however, the courtmay appropriately conclude that the best way, the most certain way,to resolve the matter is to consider the evidence and reaffirm theprevious ruling. Alternatively, a court may conclude that it is moreimportant to be right than it is to be efficient. Standing byerroneous interlocutory rulings usually has consequences.

Not every motion to reconsider is an abuse of the legalprocess. For example, sometimes the opponent at the motion hearingraises issues that no one thought were disputed, issues easilyrefuted by an additional affidavit. The practice of law is not amatter of precision; even the best lawyers know more about their caseas it progresses than they did when it began.

The automatic denial of motions to reconsider may not leadto the speedy resolution of a case. In this case, for example, therewas a motion to dismiss. If that motion should have been granted, itwill be a waste of time and effort to go ahead with a trial and waitfor the case to be decided on a directed verdict or judgment n.o.v.

In any event, trial judges are free to ignore the quotedlanguage from Gardner. I cannot imagine that we would ever reverse afinal order, otherwise properly rendered, because the trial court hasconsidered "such late-tendered evidentiary material." The quotedlanguage is accordingly only advice to trial courts, but it is notgood advice.