JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court:

In February 1998, plaintiff, John D. Terry, was terminated from his employment at defendant, Watts Copy Systems, Inc.(Watts). Terry later filed a complaint with the Illinois HumanRights Commission (Commission), alleging that he was firedbecause of a handicap, in violation of section 2-102 of the HumanRights Act (Act) (775 ILCS 5/2-102 (West 2000)). In June 2000, ahearing was held before an administrative law judge (ALJ) of theCommission. In December 2000, the ALJ entered a recommendedorder and decision in Watts' favor, which the Commission lateradopted. Terry appealed that decision (No. 4-01-0321), which isa separate appeal.

In February 2001, Terry filed the underlying complaintof retaliatory discharge, alleging that Watts fired him inretaliation for exercising his rights under the Workers' Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/1 through 30 (West 2000)). Watts fileda motion to dismiss Terry's complaint, pursuant to section 2-619of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(4)(West 2000)). Following an April 2001 hearing, the trial courtgranted Watts' motion to dismiss Terry's complaint, upon concluding that it was barred by res judicata.

In May 2001, Terry filed a postjudgment motion and amotion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability. In July 2001, the trial court denied both motions.

Terry appeals, arguing that (1) his retaliatory discharge claim is not barred by the doctrines of res judicata orcollateral estoppel; and (2) the trial court erred by denying hissummary judgment motion. We reverse the court's dismissal ofTerry's complaint and decline to address its denial of Terry'ssummary judgment motion.

Following a June 2000 evidentiary hearing, the ALJ madethe following findings of fact. Terry began working for Watts asa field service technician in 1992. In March 1996, Terry'ssupervisors talked to him about his excessive absenteeism, notingthat within a three-month period he had been absent 13 days. InDecember 1996, Lisa Haley, Watts' personnel manager, documented14 absences between June 11, 1996, and December 17, 1996. In May1997, Terry's supervisor suspended Terry for one day due to hishaving been absent on 13 days between January 1997 and May 1997. Terry attributed his absences to his son's illness.

On November 4, 1997, Terry injured his back whilerepairing a photocopier machine. Terry did not return to workuntil November 10, 1997, pursuant to a note from his physician(identified in the record only as Dr. Jones). On that date,Terry returned to work but was restricted to light duty requiringno lifting or bending. Jones' note indicated that Terry couldreturn to normal duties on November 17, 1997. While on lightduty, Terry was given a chair and photocopiers were brought tohim to be repaired and cleaned.

On November 17, 1997, Terry resumed normal dutiesrepairing copiers, but at some point that day, he suffered backpain and told his supervisor he could not complete his work. Thenext day, Terry saw Jones, who again placed him on light duty andrestricted him from bending or lifting. Terry returned to hislight-duty assignment in Watts' reconditioning division.

On November 24, 1997, Terry told Haley that he couldnot handle light duty and would not return to work. Terry wentback to Jones, who, after considering results of a magneticresonance imaging (MRI) test, wrote a note indicating that Terrywould not be able to work until further notice and would beundergoing physical therapy. Jones referred Terry to a doctoridentified in the record only as Dr. Riesenberger.

Riesenberger diagnosed Terry with a degenerative discdisease, which caused the outer fibers of his lumbar discs todegrade and break. While tears could heal properly and allowTerry to return to work, the disease rendered Terry susceptibleto recurrent flare-ups of pain. Terry received physical therapythroughout December 1997 and January 1998. On December 16, 1997,he saw Jones, who issued another note indicating that Terry wouldnot be able to return to work until further notice.

During his treatments with Riesenberger, Terry informedRiesenberger that he was a musician in a band and sometimeshelped set up the stage for performances. Riesenberger encouraged Terry to continue playing in the band as long as he usedproper lifting mechanics.

Meanwhile, Haley had learned from other Watts' employees that Terry had been playing in a band. Terry had filed aworkers' compensation claim shortly after his November 1997injury and received temporary total disability benefits for theperiods he was not working due to his injury. Haley contactedFremont Insurance Agency (Fremont), Watts' workers' compensationcarrier. Fremont hired a detective who, on January 31, 1998,videotaped Terry playing in a band and carrying and loading soundequipment. On February 3, 1998, Fremont informed Haley what thedetective had observed and informed her that Terry's benefitswould be discontinued.

Terry played in the band on five occasions betweenNovember 21, 1997, and January 31, 1998. He played a guitar thatweighed 10 to 15 pounds and used an amplifier that weighed about40 pounds. Typically, he played in the band twice a month andperformed in the standing position with the guitar strapped tohis body for a total of three to four hours per performance (40-minute sets separated by 20-minute breaks). After November 4,1997, the band hired someone to move its equipment, and Terry wasonly responsible for carrying his guitar and amplifier to andfrom the band's performances.

On February 4, 1998, Terry completed his physicaltherapy program. Riesenberger found Terry's range of motion andstrength to be normal, but Terry still complained of pain andlimitation of activities. On February 10, 1998, Terry informedHaley that he would be receiving a return-to-work slip.

On February 13, 1998, Riesenberger discharged Terryfrom therapy with instructions that he refrain from lifting (1)objects weighing over 50 pounds on an occasional basis over afull range of motion, (2) objects weighing over 40 pounds on afrequent basis, or (3) objects weighing over 70 pounds from thefloor to his knuckle. Riesenberger stated that Terry couldreturn to work on February 16, 1998. On February 13, 1998, Terryinformed Haley that he had a doctor's note releasing him for workwith some restrictions. Haley informed Terry that he would bereceiving a letter from Watts' counsel.

Shortly thereafter, Terry received a letter from Watts'counsel informing him that he no longer had a position withWatts. The letter stated the following reasons for Watts'decision to terminate him: (1) "your past work record whichreflects work[-]related suspensions and excessive absences"; (2)"your present employment with other than [Watts] while receivingbenefits from [Watts]"; and (3) "your failure to complete required releases."

The ALJ found that Terry had failed to establish aprima facie case of handicap discrimination in that he had failedto show that an adverse action was taken against him that wasrelated to his handicap. The ALJ further determined that Terryfailed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Wattsviolated section 2-102 of the Act (775 ILCS 5/2-102 (West 2000))when it terminated Terry. In concluding his analysis of theissues, the ALJ also wrote as follows:

"I find that the inclusion of untrue reasonsfor [Terry]'s termination in the February 14,1998, letter constituted at most a clumsyattempt to cover the existence of the surveillance tape. In any event, [Terry] losesbecause the overwhelming weight of the evidence indicates that Watts terminated [Terry]because of [its] genuine belief that [Terry]had lied to management about the condition ofhis back."

In March 2001, the Commission adopted the ALJ's recommended orderand decision. Terry's appeal of that order is, as stated, No. 4-01-0321.

In February 2001, Terry filed his retaliatory dischargecomplaint, alleging that Watts terminated him in retaliation forexercising his rights under the Workers' Compensation Act (820ILCS 305/1 through 30 (West 2000)). In April 2001, the trialcourt granted Watts' section 2-619(a)(4) motion to dismissTerry's complaint (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(4) (West 2000)), concluding that the doctrine of res judicata barred it. Specifically,the court ruled that Terry "had the opportunity to litigate thereasons for his termination. The ultimate decision was thatthere was no causal relationship between [Terry]'s injury and histermination. The issue of why [Terry] was discharged has beenlitigated and any causal connections already denied."

In May 2001, Terry filed a postjudgment motion andmotion for summary judgment on the question of Watts' liability,both of which the trial court later denied. This appeal followed.

Terry first argues that the trial court erred byfinding that his retaliatory discharge claim is barred by thedoctrine of res judicata. Specifically, he contends that resjudicata does not apply because the Commission did not havejurisdiction to adjudicate his retaliatory discharge claim. Weagree.

"A section 2-619 motion to dismiss admits thelegal sufficiency of the complaint, but asserts an affirmative defense or other matterthat avoids or defeats the claim. [Citation.] The motion should be granted if,after construing the documents in support andin opposition to the motion in the light mostfavorable to the nonmoving party, there areno disputed issues of material fact." Whetstone v. Sooter, 325 Ill. App. 3d 225, 229,757 N.E.2d 965, 969 (2001).

We review de novo the granting of a section 2-619 motion todismiss. Nowak v. St. Rita High School, 197 Ill. 2d 381, 389,757 N.E.2d 471, 477 (2001).

A prior judgment may have preclusive effect in asubsequent action under both res judicata and collateralestoppel. Nowak, 197 Ill. 2d at 389, 757 N.E.2d at 477. "Thedoctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment renderedby a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits is conclusiveas to the rights of the parties and their privies, and, as tothem, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim, demand[,] or cause of action." Nowak, 197Ill. 2d at 389, 757 N.E.2d at 477. For the doctrine of resjudicata to apply, the following three requirements must besatisfied: (1) a final judgment on the merits rendered by acourt of competent jurisdiction, (2) an identity of causes ofaction, and (3) an identity of parties or their privies. Nowak,197 Ill. 2d at 390, 757 N.E.2d at 477. Different claims areconsidered part of the same cause of action if they arise from asingle group of operative facts. Altair Corp. v. Grand PremierTrust & Investment, Inc., 318 Ill. App. 3d 57, 61, 742 N.E.2d351, 355 (2000).

Exceptions to the application of res judicata exist(Cabrera v. First National Bank of Wheaton, 324 Ill. App. 3d 85,92, 753 N.E.2d 1138, 1145 (2001)), and the doctrine will not beapplied where it would be fundamentally unfair to do so (Nowak,197 Ill. 2d at 390, 757 N.E.2d at 477)). Although res judicataapplies to issues actually decided in the original action as wellas to matters that could have been decided, it does not applywhere a limit in the subject-matter jurisdiction of the courtrendering the earlier judgment prevented the plaintiff fromseeking relief. Cabrera, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 92, 753 N.E.2d at1145.

Citing La Porte v. Jostens, Inc., 213 Ill. App. 3d1089, 1092, 572 N.E.2d 1209, 1211 (1991) (holding that jurisdiction for a retaliatory discharge claim vests with the circuitcourt and not the Commission), Terry contends that res judicatadoes not bar his retaliatory discharge claim because the Commission does not have jurisdiction to hear such a claim. We agree.

The Commission's adjudicatory authority is limited tothe adjudication of complaints filed under the Act. See 775 ILCS5/8-102(G) (West 2000). Under the Act, it is a violation of anemployee's civil rights for an employer "to refuse to hire, tosegregate, or to act with respect to recruitment, hiring, promotion, renewal of employment, selection for training or apprenticeship, discharge, discipline, tenure or terms, privileges[,]or conditions of employment on the basis of unlawful discrimination." 775 ILCS 5/2-102(A) (West 2000). The Act defines "unlawful discrimination" as follows:

"'Unlawful discrimination' means discrimination against a person because of hisor her race, color, religion, national origin, ancestry, age, sex, marital status,handicap, military status, or unfavorabledischarge from military service as thoseterms are defined in this [s]ection." 775ILCS 5/1-103(Q) (West 2000).

Section 6-101 of the Act provides that it is also acivil rights violation to:

"[r]etaliate against a person because heor she has opposed that which he or she reasonably and in good faith believes to beunlawful discrimination, sexual harassment inemployment or sexual harassment in highereducation, discrimination based on citizenship status in employment, or because he orshe has made a charge, filed a complaint,testified, assisted, or participated in aninvestigation, proceeding, or hearing underthis [a]ct." 775 ILCS 5/6-101(A) (West2000).

Thus, retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim doesnot constitute a civil rights violation under the Act, and theCommission does not have jurisdiction over such a claim. Accordingly, we conclude that res judicata does not bar Terry's retaliatory discharge claim.

Terry also argues that his retaliatory discharge claimis not barred by collateral estoppel. We agree.

The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies when aparty participates in two consecutive cases arising on differentcauses of action and some controlling fact or question materialto the determination of both causes has been adjudicated againstthat party in the former suit by a court of competent jurisdiction. Nowak, 197 Ill. 2d at 389-90, 757 N.E.2d at 477.

Collateral estoppel bars a claim when (1) the issuedecided in the first proceeding is identical with the one presented in the current action; (2) there was a final judgment onthe merits in the prior adjudication; and (3) the party againstwhom estoppel is asserted was a party to, or in privity with aparty to, the prior adjudication. Nowak, 197 Ill. 2d at 390, 757N.E.2d at 478. A tribunal's finding collaterally estops alitigant in a subsequent proceeding only if the finding in theinitial proceeding was necessary or essential to the tribunal'sdecision. Ericksen v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's MedicalCenter, 289 Ill. App. 3d 159, 167, 682 N.E.2d 79, 85 (1997).

In Nowak, 197 Ill. 2d at 390-91, 757 N.E.2d at 478, theSupreme Court of Illinois discussed the principles underlying thedoctrine of collateral estoppel, in pertinent part, as follows:

"Application of the doctrine of collateralestoppel must be narrowly tailored to fit theprecise facts and issues that were clearlydetermined in the prior judgment. [Citation.]

Collateral estoppel is an equitabledoctrine. [Citation.] Even where thethreshold elements of the doctrine are satisfied, collateral estoppel must not be appliedto preclude parties from presenting theirclaims or defenses unless it is clear that nounfairness results to the party beingestopped. [Citations.] In deciding whetherthe doctrine of collateral estoppel is applicable in a particular situation, a court mustbalance the need to limit litigation againstthe right of a fair adversary proceeding inwhich a party may fully present his case. Indetermining whether a party has had a fulland fair opportunity to litigate an issue ina prior action, those elements which comprisethe practical realities of litigation must beexamined."

In this case, neither the first nor second requirementfor application of collateral estoppel has been satisfied. Wattscontends that Terry's claim is precluded because the Commissionalready determined the issue of "why Terry was terminated." However, as Terry points out, the precise issue considered andresolved in the hearing before the Commission was whether Wattsfired Terry for discriminatory reasons. Thus, the focus of thatproceeding was appropriately limited to determining what was inthe minds of Haley and Watts' other managers who decided toterminate Terry. See Johnson v. Human Rights Comm'n, 318 Ill.App. 3d 582, 587-88, 742 N.E.2d 793, 797 (2000) (in employmentdiscrimination litigation, when an employer articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, the sole questionis whether the plaintiff can show that the given reason is apretext for unlawful discrimination). Moreover, the Commission'sfinding--that Terry was terminated because Watts' managersbelieved he lied about his physical condition--does not defeatTerry's retaliatory discharge claim. See Clark v. Owens-BrockwayGlass Container, Inc., 297 Ill. App. 3d 694, 697-98, 697 N.E.2d743, 745-46 (1998) (in which the appellate court (1) rejected theproposition that an employer's reasonably held belief that anemployee lied about her injuries defeats the employee's retaliatory discharge claim and (2) explained that an act of "retaliation" occurs when the employer's action is causally related tothe employee's exercise of rights under the Workers' CompensationAct).

Although the Commission determined that Terry wasterminated because Watts' managers believed that Terry had liedto management about his injury, the Commission neither considerednor determined whether Terry actually lied about his injury. Even assuming, arguendo, that the Commission made such a finding,it would not estop Terry's retaliatory discharge complaintbecause it would not have been essential or necessary to thequestion before the Commission. See Ericksen, 289 Ill. App. 3dat 167, 682 N.E.2d at 85. While a finding on Terry's veracitywas irrelevant to the question before the Commission, it isessential for a determination on a retaliatory discharge claim.

To succeed on a claim of retaliatory discharge, theplaintiff must show that (1) he has been discharged; (2) inretaliation for his activities; and (3) the discharge violates aclear mandate of public policy. Stebbings v. University ofChicago, 312 Ill. App. 3d 360, 365, 726 N.E.2d 1136, 1140 (2000). In Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 181-82, 384 N.E.2d353, 357 (1978), our supreme court recognized the public policyfavoring the exercise of workers' compensation rights. A determination of whether Terry actually lied to Watts and Fremontregarding his injury is essential to the third prong of hisretaliatory discharge claim. Terry's termination would not be inviolation of the public policy favoring the exercise of workers'compensation rights if he was filing fraudulent claims.

Because the precise issues relevant to Terry's retaliatory discharge claim were not considered or decided by theCommission, Terry's claim is not barred by collateral estoppel.

Moreover, collateral estoppel cannot apply in this casebecause there has not been a final judgment in the first proceeding. For purposes of collateral estoppel, a judgment is notfinal until the potential for appellate review has been exhausted. Ballweg v. City of Springfield, 114 Ill. 2d 107, 113,499 N.E.2d 1373, 1375 (1986). Terry filed an appeal of theCommission's decision, and that appeal was still pending. Thus,collateral estoppel does not bar Terry's retaliatory dischargeclaim.

Because Terry's retaliatory discharge claim is notbarred by the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel,we hold that the trial court erred by dismissing Terry's complaint. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order dismissing the complaint.

Last, Terry argues that the trial court erred bydenying his motion for partial summary judgment on the issue ofliability. We decline to address this issue.

Because the denial of a summary judgment motion isinterlocutory, ordinarily, such a denial is not an appealablefinal judgment. Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 187 Ill. 2d 341, 357,718 N.E.2d 191, 200 (1999). However, when a circuit court grantsone party's summary judgment motion as to all issues and deniesthe other party's summary judgment motion as to the same issues,the resulting order is final and appealable. Arangold, 187 Ill.2d at 358, 718 N.E.2d at 201.

Here, however, Watts did not file a correspondingmotion for summary judgment, and no basis exists upon which thiscourt could consider Terry's appeal of the trial court's denialof his summary judgment motion. Accordingly, we decline toaddress the trial court's denial of Terry's summary judgmentmotion.

For the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court'sorder dismissing Terry's retaliatory discharge complaint andremand for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.

KNECHT, J., concurs.

COOK, J., specially concurs.

JUSTICE COOK, specially concurring:

I concur fully in the majority opinion. I respectfullysuggest, however, that the supreme court reconsider its statementthat "[f]or purposes of applying the doctrine of collateralestoppel, finality requires that the potential for appellatereview must have been exhausted." Ballweg, 114 Ill. 2d at 113,499 N.E.2d at 1375. The case which Ballweg cites for thatproposition appears to deal with law of the case, not with resjudicata. The rule in most jurisdictions appears to be to thecontrary. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments