4 October 2000

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JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court:

In March 1998, plaintiff, Vivian Opal True, sueddefendant, Greenwood Manor West, Inc. (Greenwood), seekingdamages for injuries she suffered when she tripped over a fanlocated inside her sister's room at a nursing home operated byGreenwood. Following a December 1999 jury verdict in True'sfavor, Greenwood filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding theverdict (judgment n.o.v.), alleging that Greenwood did not owe aduty to True. In February 2000, the trial court conducted ahearing on Greenwood's motion and denied it. Greenwood appeals,and we reverse.

In her complaint, True alleged that on April 15, 1997,she was a visitor at Greenwood's nursing home. She furtheralleged that she sustained severe injuries to her head and bodyas a result of a "negligent condition of the premises."

At trial, True testified that on April 15, 1997, shewent to visit her sister, who was a resident of Greenwood. Whenshe arrived at her sister's room, her sister was not there. AsTrue stepped into the room, she noticed a fan situated on thefloor near the foot of her sister's bed. She walked past the fanand placed her purse on her sister's bed. After pausing momentarily at her sister's bed, True turned around to walk out of theroom, tripped over the fan, and fell to the floor. She slidacross the floor, hitting her head on the door.

On cross-examination, True acknowledged that nothingobstructed her view of the fan at the time she tripped over it,and she did not look down as she turned to leave the room.

Mary Black, a nurse at Greenwood, testified that on theday in question she responded to True's accident and found herlying on the floor, with a large hematoma on her head. Blackalso saw a fan lying in the middle of the room. She did not knowwhy the fan had been placed in the room, and she acknowledgedthat the fan could have been stored in some other location atGreenwood when it was not in use.

Janet Young, a nurse at Greenwood, testified that thefan, which she estimated was about two or three feet wide, wasturned off at the time of the accident. She stated that the fancould have been moved from the foot of the patient's bed when notin use.

Linda Franklin, director of nursing at Greenwood,testified that, about 10 days prior to the accident, a nightnurse had placed the fan in the room to cool off True's sister'sroommate, who was suffering from congestive heart failure, acondition that frequently makes patients feel uncomfortably warm.Franklin did not know when the fan had last been used. Franklinstated that there would be no reason to remove the fan, which sheestimated was 20 inches square, from a patient's room when shetemporarily leaves.

Lela Thompson, True's niece, testified that she hadfrequently visited True's sister at Greenwood during the two- orthree-week period prior to the accident. During those visits,she had noticed the fan in the room, where it was positioned upagainst True's sister's dresser. Thompson never had any problemseeing or walking past it.

Other evidence described True's course of treatmentfollowing the accident and her medical problems since the accident.

In December 1999, the jury returned a verdict in True'sfavor and assessed her damages at $57,600. The jury also foundTrue 50% negligent and accordingly fixed her recoverable damagesat $28,800.

Greenwood subsequently filed a motion for judgmentn.o.v., alleging that because the fan was an "open and obvious"condition, it did not owe a duty to True. In February 2000, thetrial court conducted a hearing on the motion and denied it. This appeal followed.

Greenwood argues that the trial court erred by denyingits motion for judgment n.o.v. on the question of whether Greenwood owed a duty to True. Specifically, Greenwood contends that(1) True encountered an "open and obvious" condition on Greenwood's property in the form of the fan; and (2) Greenwood owed noduty of care to protect True from injuries arising from an openand obvious condition. We agree.

A trial court should not grant a motion for judgmentn.o.v. unless "all of the evidence, when viewed in its aspectmost favorable to the opponent, so overwhelmingly favors movantthat no contrary verdict based on that evidence could everstand." Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co., 37 Ill. 2d 494,510, 229 N.E.2d 504, 513-14 (1967).

The existence of a duty is essential to a claim sounding in negligence, and whether a duty exists is a question oflaw. LaFever v. Kemlite Co., 185 Ill. 2d 380, 388, 706 N.E.2d441, 446 (1998). In determining whether a duty exists, a courtshould consider the following factors: (1) the reasonableforeseeability of injury, (2) the reasonable likelihood ofinjury, (3) the magnitude of the burden that guarding againstinjury places on the defendant, and (4) the consequences ofplacing that burden on the defendant. LaFever, 185 Ill. 2d at389, 706 N.E.2d at 446.

When a plaintiff alleges--as in this case--that aninjury was caused by a condition on the defendant's property, andthe plaintiff was an invitee on the property, the foreseeabilityprong set forth above is decided pursuant to section 343 of theRestatement (Second) of Torts (hereafter Restatement) (Restatement (Second) of Torts