This case presents the question whether a company thatcreates a list of health-care providers that it makes availablefor a charge to members of health plans may enter into an agreement under which the health-care providers themselves would payto be included on the list. We conclude the agreement improperlyrequires physicians to pay a fee for the referral of patients. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

Plaintiff Vine Street Clinic is a partnership consisting of physicians who render psychiatric services. PlaintiffUrsala Thatch, M.D., is an Illinois physician who specializes inobstetrics and gynecology. Defendant HealthLink, Inc., is anIllinois corporation that enters into participating physicianagreements with physicians, and other agreements with otherhealth-care providers, thereby creating a network of health-careproviders. HealthLink makes these provider networks available tomembers of health plans that are offered by insurance carriers,self-funded employer groups, governmental entities, and uniontrusts ("payors"). HealthLink contracts with payors and grantsthem access to its networks. Health-care providers agree toprovide medical services to payor members at a discounted rateand send their claims for reimbursement to HealthLink. HealthLink processes the claims and sends them to the payor forbenefit determination and payment.

Vine Street was a provider in HealthLink's network from1989 until 2001. During that time, Vine Street paid HealthLink a5% administrative fee that totaled at least $21,720.48. Thatchis a provider in HealthLink's network. From 1993 until June 30,2002, she paid HealthLink a percentage-based fee, totaling$25,079.06. On May 30, 2002, HealthLink calculated her new fixedflat fee at $600 per month. Thatch refused to pay the flat fee.

The Attorney General is charged with enforcing statelaw, including the Medical Practice Act of 1987 (Act) (225 ILCS60/1 through 63 (West 2002)). On March 5, 2002, the AttorneyGeneral issued an opinion that section 3.7 of the HealthLinkagreement, requiring each participating physician to payHealthLink an administrative fee equal to 5% of the amountsallowed in HealthLink's rate schedule for services provided tomembers by the physician, violated subsection 22(A)(14) of theAct and is void under Illinois law. 2002 Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. No.02-005, slip op. at 7. On May 30, 2002, HealthLink notified itsproviders that to comply with the Attorney General's opinion, itwould charge a fixed flat fee instead of the percentage-basedfee. HealthLink calculated the flat fee based on two factors: physician speciality and volume of HealthLink claims submittedduring the preceding calendar year.

Plaintiffs' complaint sought a declaration that boththe percentage-based fee and the flat fee violated the Act (Ill.Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 111, pars. 4400-1 through 4400-63 (now 225ILCS 60/1 through 63 (West 2002))) and sought recovery of allfees previously paid. Other counts alleged a violation of theIllinois Insurance Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 73, pars. 613through 1065.906 (now 215 ILCS 5/1 through 1416 (West 2002))) anda theory of unjust enrichment. The trial court dismissed therequest for recovery of fees previously paid, reasoning that evenif the agreements for fees were illegal, a party to an illegalcontract cannot recover monies paid pursuant to it. The trialcourt later entered judgment on the pleadings (735 ILCS 5/2-615(e) (West 2002)), declaring that the percentage-based feeviolated the Act but the fixed flat fee did not. The trial courtdid not address plaintiffs' request for class certification. Thecourt made a finding that no just reason existed for delayingappeal under Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)). Plaintiffs appeal, and HealthLink cross-appeals.

Statutory interpretation, construction of contracts,and determinations of public policy are all questions of lawwhere our review is de novo. Shields v. Judges' RetirementSystem, 204 Ill. 2d 488, 492, 791 N.E.2d 516, 518 (2003);Liccardi v. Stolt Terminals (Chicago), Inc., 283 Ill. App. 3d141, 147, 669 N.E.2d 1192, 1199 (1996). Judgment on thepleadings is proper only where no genuine issue of material factexists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matterof law. In ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings,only those facts apparent from the face of the pleadings, matterssubject to judicial notice, and judicial admissions in the recordmay be considered. All well-pleaded facts and all reasonableinferences from those facts are taken as true. Our review is denovo. M.A.K. v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center, 198Ill. 2d 249, 255, 764 N.E.2d 1, 4 (2001).

Subsection 22(A)(14) of the Act provides that theDepartment of Professional Regulation may revoke or take otheraction regarding the license of any person to practice medicineon a number of grounds, including:

"(14) Dividing with anyone other than physicians with whom the licensee practices *** any fee, commission, rebate[,] or other form of compensation for any professional services not actually and personally rendered."  225 ILCS 60/22(A)(14) (West 2002).

Three exceptions exist: (1) where physicians divide fees in anapproved partnership, corporation, or association; (2) whereapproved medical corporations form a partnership or jointventure; or (3) where physicians concurrently render professionalservices to a patient and divide a fee, "provided[] the patienthas full knowledge of the division, and, provided, that thedivision is made in proportion to the services performed andresponsibility assumed by each." 225 ILCS 60/22(A)(14) (West2002).

It is interesting that subsection 22(A)(14) does notmention the terms "fee splitting" or "referral." CompareAmerican Medical Association, Code of Medical Ethics: CurrentOpinions with Annotations, 2002-2003, No. 6.02 (2003): "Paymentby or to a physician solely for the referral of a patient is fee[-]splitting and is unethical." Fee splitting occurs when aphysician refers a patient to another physician and then collectsa portion of that patient's fee. Lieberman & Kraff v. Desnick,244 Ill. App. 3d 341, 345, 614 N.E.2d 379, 381 (1993). Althoughnot specifically referred to in subsection 22(A)(14), feesplitting is clearly an evil prohibited by the broad language ofthe Act and by public policy. Lieberman, 244 Ill. App. 3d at345, 614 N.E.2d at 382 (statute, however, not restricted solelyto fee splitting).

Lawyers, in contrast, can receive a fee for referring aclient to a lawyer not in the same firm, even if no services areperformed by the referring lawyer, so long as "the referringlawyer agrees to assume the same legal responsibility for theperformance of the services in question as would a partner of thereceiving lawyer." 134 Ill. 2d R. 1.5(g)(2). The rule in effectmakes the referring lawyer a partner of the lawyer performing thework, for that particular case. Under Illinois law, agreementsto split fees between a lawyer and a nonlawyer are usuallyagainst public policy. In re Marriage of Steinberg, 302 Ill.App. 3d 845, 857, 706 N.E.2d 895, 903 (1998); see also 134 Ill.2d R. 5.4(a) ("A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal feeswith a nonlawyer"). The policy against fee splitting stems fromthe concerns that an attorney who has agreed to split fees may betempted to devote less time and attention to the cases of theclients whose fees they must share and that a layperson may havean incentive to recommend an attorney, not based on the lawyer'scredentials, but on her own financial interest. Steinberg, 302Ill. App. 3d at 857, 706 N.E.2d at 903; O'Hara v. Ahlgren,Blumenfeld & Kempster, 127 Ill. 2d 333, 343, 537 N.E.2d 730, 734(1989).

Rule of Professional Conduct 7.2(b), effective August1, 1990, now allows a lawyer to "pay the usual charges of a not-for-profit lawyer referral service or other legal serviceorganization." 134 Ill. 2d R. 7.2(b). Under Rule 7.2(b), alawyer has been required to pay a referral fee of 25%, $31,250,to the nonprofit lawyer referral service of the West Suburban BarAssociation. However, "[a] bar association is motivated toensure the integrity and competency of the lawyers it refers." Richards v. SSM Health Care, Inc., 311 Ill. App. 3d 560, 568, 724N.E.2d 975, 981 (2000). We do not see any similar independenceon the part of an organization such as HealthLink, and no statuteauthorizes such a referral fee. At any rate, lawyer feesplitting and physician fee splitting raise somewhat differentconcerns and do not necessarily warrant identical solutions. It is also interesting that subsection 22(A)(14)is directed at physicians; it is the physician who is madesubject to discipline by engaging in fee splitting. TLC TheLaser Center, Inc. v. Midwest Eye Institute II, Ltd., 306 Ill.App. 3d 411, 428-29, 714 N.E.2d 45, 57 (1999). Even though it isthe physician whose participation in the contract is prohibited,where the contract violates the statute it is void andunenforceable, either by the physician or by the othercontracting party. TLC, 306 Ill. App. 3d at 429, 714 N.E.2d at57.

A physician may not share his profits with anonprofessional, even if no referral of patients is involved. E&B Marketing Enterprises, Inc. v. Ryan, 209 Ill. App. 3d 626,568 N.E.2d 339 (1991). In E&B Marketing, a physician and amarketing firm entered into an agreement in 1983 whereby themarketing firm would promote the physician's name and practice,primarily to insurance companies, in exchange for 10% on allbillings collected. Despite the argument that no directsolicitation of patients was involved, the appellate court voidedthe agreement because of the percentage fee. The court rejectedthe argument that the contract was made only for the purpose ofadvertising and promoting the physician's business, because therewas "fee-splitting for services not rendered by E & B." E&BMarketing, 209 Ill. App. 3d at 630, 568 N.E.2d at 342. Serviceswere rendered, marketing services, but they were not professionalmedical services that qualified for payment under subsection22(A)(14) and its exceptions.

There is an additional consideration in the presentcase. In E&B Marketing, the marketing firm was only on one sideof the transaction, the side of the physician. The marketingfirm was similar to any other advertiser the physician employed,except for the 10% fee based on billings. In the present case,HealthLink is on both sides. It first charges the payors (andindirectly the patients) for furnishing a list of medicalproviders who will provide services at a reduced rate. It thencharges the providers it allows to be on the list. Providers whomight be very desirable to the patients and payors do not get onthe list unless they make the payment to HealthLink. Plaintiffsargue that HealthLink is the only administrator that attempts toassess such fees.

The First District's decision in Practice ManagementLtd. v. Schwartz, 256 Ill. App. 3d 949, 628 N.E.2d 656 (1993), isinformative. In that case, nonphysicians (optometrists) formed apartnership with physicians (opthalmologists) where the partiesand their separate companies would refer patients to each otherand split the partnership's profits. The partnership would alsorender management services to the opthalmologists and theircompany. The nonphysicians argued that they were seekingcompensation for performing legitimate services having nothing todo with referral of patients. The court rejected that argument,"since our careful review of the agreements at issue here leavesno doubt that patient referrals played a significant role in thearrangement between the parties." Practice Management, 256 Ill.App. 3d at 954, 628 N.E.2d at 659. The fee in PracticeManagement was a percentage fee, but any fee paid by a physicianfor referrals is improper.

"One danger of fee splitting arrangements isthat they may motivate nonprofessionals torecommend the services of a particularprofessional out of self-interest, and notbecause of the competence of theprofessional. Such arrangements are againstpublic policy because the public is bestserved by recommendations uninfluenced byfinancial considerations." PracticeManagement, 256 Ill. App. 3d at 953, 628N.E.2d at 658.

From this we conclude that physicians may not receive afee for referring a patient to another physician unless they arein practice with that physician or concurrently renderprofessional services to the patient. Nonphysicians may neverreceive a fee from a physician for referring a patient to thatphysician. By definition, it is impossible for a nonphysician torender "professional services" to a patient and thereby qualifyto receive a referral fee. Nonphysicians can receive a fee forservices rendered, apart from referral, but cannot receive apercentage of the physician's profit, or its equivalent.

HealthLink argues that it does not make patientreferrals, that it instead makes a network of thousands ofphysicians available to payors for use by members-patients. HealthLink argues the flat fee currently paid by physicians isfor administrative services, such as administrating andimplementing HealthLink's policies, procedures, and programs, andnot for patient referrals.

If all physicians in the State of Illinois belonged tothe HealthLink network, it could not be said that HealthLink wasrecommending any physician. That is not the situation, however;and it appears that in practice several physicians in aparticular community will be on the HealthLink list and severalwill not. The fact that HealthLink does not technically refer amember-patient to a specific provider does not negate the factthat HealthLink exercises substantial control over its member-patients. HealthLink members must generally choose from theHealthLink list of network providers or incur substantialadditional expense.

There are some differences between referring a patientto a certain physician and referring a patient to severalphysicians in a particular community as HealthLink does. We donot perceive any significant difference, however, betweenreferring a patient to a particular physician and charging thatphysician a fee and referring a patient to several physicians,any of whom will be required to pay a fee. Members-patients,through their payors, pay HealthLink a fee to provide them with alist of physicians. The members-patients are entitled to assumethat HealthLink is looking out for them, not for HealthLink's owninterests. Again, one of the dangers of allowing physicians toenter into agreements to pay fees to those who refer patients tothem "is that they may motivate nonprofessionals to recommend theservices of a particular professional out of self-interest, andnot because of the competence of the professional. Sucharrangements are against public policy because the public is bestserved by recommendations uninfluenced by financialconsiderations." Practice Management, 256 Ill. App. 3d at 953,628 N.E.2d at 658. It is difficult to accept thatHealthLink provides administrative services to physicians. Theservices HealthLink provides seem identical to the claim-processing functions of insurance companies. Physicians arestill required to maintain patient records, including billingrecords. HealthLink argues that it streamlines the processwhereby a physician in the network receives payment, that insteadof dealing with hundreds of payors, physicians, by contractingwith HealthLink, engage a single, knowledgeable organization thatdoes this for them. That seems an incidental benefit, however,like dealing with a merchant that has good records and billingprocedures as opposed to one that does not. The good merchantwill probably get more business but is unlikely to charge a feefor its businesslike operation.

HealthLink argues that the marketing and advertisingfor which it charges its physicians is no different from anphysician placing an advertisement in the Yellow Pages, the localnewspaper, or the local radio station. That argument wasrejected in Practice Management, where a management-servicesgroup charged a fee based on a percentage of the physicians'profits. Practice Management, 256 Ill. App. 3d at 954-55, 628N.E.2d at 659-60. Even absent charging a percentage, HealthLinkdoes more than market and advertise here. It actually refersmembers-patients to physicians.

HealthLink argues that the Attorney General's opinionindicates that a flat fee is permissible.

"With respect to the HealthLink agreement, ithas not been suggested that the object of theagreement is violative of public policy, orthat the services that HealthLink providesare improper in any way. The only aspect ofthe agreement found invalid in opinion No.02-005 was the basis upon which the fees forthe administrative services performed underthe agreement are calculated." 2002 Ill.Att'y Gen. Op. No. 02-005, Addendum, slip op.at 5.

The Attorney General's opinion focused on the percentage-feeaspect of the agreement and not the physicians' payments forreferrals. The Attorney General's opinion does not say thatHealthLink may charge physicians a fee for referrals. Certainlynothing is wrong with HealthLink creating a network of health-care providers. Nothing is wrong with HealthLink charging itspayors for making these provider networks available to them. There is a problem, however, when HealthLink charges a fee, evena flat fee, to physicians who desire to be listed on the networkof health-care providers.

Percentage fees certainly involve the division of fees,as that term is used in subsection 22(A)(14). 225 ILCS60/22(A)(14) (West 2002). A doctor cannot use a percentage feeto pay general expenses, such things as supplies, electricity, ornurses, even if no referral is involved. Practice Management,256 Ill. App. 3d at 954, 628 N.E.2d at 659. We find it difficultto see any difference between the percentage fee criticized bythe Attorney General and the "flat fee" in this case. The "flatfee" is determined as to each provider by the volume of claimsprocessed in the preceding year. That fee is simply a percentagecalculated by a more circuitous route. See TLC, 306 Ill. App. 3dat 428, 714 N.E.2d at 56 ("Although the contract did notstructure the annual fee in literal terms of a 'percentage' ofthe practice's revenue per se, the fee clearly increased as therevenues increased"). The fact that fees are to be shared withnonphysicians could well exert pressure on the physicians toperform the services even if not needed. TLC, 306 Ill. App. 3dat 428, 714 N.E.2d at 56.

We conclude that HealthLink refers patients tophysicians through its network of health-care providers and thatthe fee HealthLink charges those providers, both the percentagefee and the flat fee, is a fee for referral of patients. Thesection of the HealthLink agreement requiring that fee violatesthe Act and public policy and is accordingly void.

We agree with the trial court that plaintiffs are notentitled to recover fees previously paid, either the percentagefee or the flat fee. Where a contract is illegal or againstpublic policy, the contract should not be enforced, because toallow such relief would undermine the policy considerations inprohibiting fee splitting. In order to discourage professionalsand nonprofessionals from attempting illegal fee splitting, thecourt will leave the parties where they have placed themselves. Practice Management, 256 Ill. App. 3d at 955, 628 N.E.2d at 660. Plaintiffs argue they are not seeking to enforce the contract,only to be restored to the status quo, and they are not in paridelicto with HealthLink because they were coerced into signingthe agreement to have access to patients. This is not a case,however, where anyone "held a gun" to plaintiffs' heads. Plaintiffs could have sought relief from the courts, the AttorneyGeneral, or the Department of Professional Regulation at anytime. The physicians who have really been harmed are the oneswho never signed the agreement and never received the benefit ofthe provider network. As discussed above, the physiciansviolated the Act, not HealthLink. See TLC, 306 Ill. App. 3d at429, 714 N.E.2d at 57 ("the physician is the wrongdoer" under theAct). We see no reason to depart from the rule that the partieswill be left where they have placed themselves.

We affirm the trial court's decision that thepercentage-based fee violated the Act but that plaintiffs couldnot recover monies paid pursuant to the agreement. We reversethe trial court's decision that the fixed flat fee did notviolate the Act.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded.

APPLETON, J., specially concurs.

STEIGMANN, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.

JUSTICE APPLETON, specially concurring:

I write separately in response to Justice Steigmann'spartial dissent. It is the majority's use of the term "referral"that is the strawman to which the dissenting opinion responds.

I find the "flat fee" charged by HealthLink, Inc., tobe indistinct in substance from the "percentage fee" previouslyfound to be violative of the law by the Illinois AttorneyGeneral. That is the reason for my concurrence. The semanticalargument concerning what, if anything, a physician receives inexchange for payment of the fee is irrelevant.

JUSTICE STEIGMANN, specially concurring in part anddissenting in part:

In my opinion, the majority has misconstrued section22(A)(14) of the Act, leading to its erroneous conclusion thatHealthLink may impose neither a percentage-based fee nor a flatfee on the physicians who elect to participate in its network. Accordingly, I dissent.

Throughout these proceedings, HealthLink has assertedthat it charges providers an administrative fee to cover servicesit performs on their behalf. Those services include thefollowing: (1) administering and implementing HealthLink'spolicies, procedures, and programs; (2) customer services; (3)utilization review and case management; (4) claims receipt,processing, or repricing; (5) network development and management;(6) provider marketing; (7) credentialing; (8) electronic-claimssupport services; (9) monthly patient-activity reportingservices; and (10) claims-status research and advocacy services.

I disagree with the majority and the First District'soverly broad interpretation of section 22(A)(14) of the Act, asset forth in Lieberman, E&B Marketing, Practice Management, andTLC. The majority and the First District interpret section22(A)(14) of the Act as if it did not contain the language "forany professional services not actually and personally rendered" (225 ILCS 60/22(A)(14) (West 2002)). Indeed, the majority'sdecision would be precisely the same if the legislature amendedthe statute by deleting this language. When interpreting astatute, a court must give effect to the legislature's intent,which is best determined by the statute's plain language. American Federation of State, County, & Municipal Employees,Council 31 v. Ryan, 332 Ill. App. 3d 866, 871-72, 773 N.E.2d 739,743 (2002). If possible, a statute should be construed so thatno term is rendered superfluous or meaningless. AmericanFederation of State, County, & Municipal Employees, 332 Ill. App.3d at 872, 773 N.E.2d at 743.

The language of section 22(A)(14) of the Act permitsphysicians to divide fees with an entity for professionalservices actually and personally rendered. 225 ILCS 60/22(A)(14)(West 2002). As written, the statute contains (1) a generalprohibition against a physician's dividing fees and (2)exceptions to that general prohibition. The exceptions are (1)other physicians with whom the physician practices and (2) otherpersons who provide professional services that are (a) actuallyrendered and (b) personally rendered. Because the Act places nolimitation on the type of professional services that qualifyunder the section 22(A)(14) exception, this court should declineto (1) limit the term to professional medical services or (2)ignore the existence of the exception altogether.

The record shows that HealthLink charged thepercentage-based fee for administrative services provided forplaintiffs' benefit. Those services are outlined in the contractbetween HealthLink and Thatch. Although plaintiffs claim thatHealthLink does not perform the services for the providers'benefit, they do not deny that HealthLink actually performs them.

The majority disparages these services by saying, "Itis difficult to accept that HealthLink provides administrativeservices to physicians. The services HealthLink provides seemidentical to the claim-processing functions of insurancecompanies." Slip op. at 11. The majority also deems some ofthese services as "incidental" benefits. Slip op. at 11. However, the majority cites no evidence in the record supportingthe inference it has drawn--namely, that the contract settingforth the services HealthLink provides is essentially a sham andthat the fees physicians pay HealthLink are actually "kickbacks"for HealthLink's "referral" of patients to physicians in thenetwork. Absent some evidence that HealthLink does not actuallyprovide physicians with the services it purports to provide underthe contract, I would conclude that (1) HealthLink provides theseservices and (2) these services are professional services thatfall within the section 22(A)(14) exception.

Throughout the majority's analysis of the Act, themajority constantly uses the terms "referral" and "referring" todescribe the essence of the relationship between Healthlink andthe physicians in the network. For instance, in the majority'sconcluding paragraph in part II. B. of its opinion, it writes, inpertinent part, as follows: (1) "physicians may not receive a feefor referring a patient to another physician," unless certaincircumstances exist; (2) "[n]onphysicians may never receive a feefrom a physician for referring a patient to that physician"; and(3) "[b]y definition it is impossible for a nonphysician torender 'professional services' to a patient and thereby qualifyto receive a referral fee." Slip op. at 9. These are just a fewexamples of the majority's use of those terms. What issignificant about the use of these terms is that neither"referral" or "referring" (or any other form of the verb "refer,"for that matter) appears in section 22(A)(14) of the Act, whichthe majority purports to be construing. Thus, the majority hasreached its conclusion by extensively discussing terms that donot appear in the statute while ignoring those that do.

The kind of analysis the majority engages in amounts tojudicial legislating. That is, the majority has construedsection 22(A)(14) of the Act not as written, but as the majoritybelieves the legislature should have written it. Although Imight agree with the policy considerations expressed in themajority's opinion, my personal preferences regarding what thestatute should say and the policies it should further are asirrelevant as are the personal preferences of my colleagues. Instead, our duty is to construe the statute as written, badpolicy and all. See In re Application of the County Treasurer &exofficio Collector of Cook County, 323 Ill. App. 3d 1044, 1049,753 N.E.2d 363, 367 (2001) (a court must construe a statute aswritten and "may not, under the guise of construction, supplyomissions, remedy defects, annex new provisions, add exceptions,limitations, or conditions, or otherwise change the law so as todepart from the plain meaning of the language employed in thestatute").

A new convenience offered by many physicians to theirpatients is the opportunity to pay their medical bills with acredit card. Companies that permit physicians to offer thisconvenience typically assess the physician a small percentage ofthe physician's billed fee to pay for the service. In myjudgment, such "fee splitting" is entirely permissible undersection 22(A)(14) of the Act because these are professionalservices actually and personally rendered by the credit cardcompany to the physician. When I asked plaintiffs' counsel atoral argument whether such credit card fee splitting waspermissible, they said "yes" but explained that the differencebetween the credit card company and HealthLink is that the creditcard company did not refer patients to certain physicians,whereas HealthLink did. The majority seems to have accepted thisargument. Even though I disagree with the claim that HealthLinkin fact refers patients to certain physicians, I could concedethe point because, as earlier discussed, such a referral isirrelevant. Because the statute does not allude to referrals,the issue of referrals is simply a straw man that plaintiffs andthe majority have chosen to knock down.

Further, this contract does not offend Illinois publicpolicy. HealthLink does not refer any specific providers tomembers; its members are allowed to choose their own providerfrom within HealthLink's network or choose a physician not in thenetwork at a higher cost. The majority's tortured efforts toconstrue this record so as to find referrals being made byHealthLink constitutes its own best refutation. Although thefees were based on a percentage of each provider's processedclaims, HealthLink has no control over what medical procedures aprovider will administer and what procedures the payor willcover. This contract does not jeopardize the medical judgment ofproviders or threaten the safety of members who sign up withHealthLink. In addition, the goal of the Act is to regulate thelicenses of physicians, not to prevent them from entering intolegitimate contracts or relieve them of the corollary duty to payfor services actually and personally rendered pursuant to suchcontracts.

For the reasons stated, I conclude that the trial court erred by determining that the percentage-based fee violated either the Act or Illinois public policy.

III. FIXED FLAT FEE

I also disagree with the majority's conclusion that thetrial court erred by determining that HealthLink's fixed flat feedoes not violate the Act.

In May 2002, HealthLink modified its method forcalculating the administrative fee from the percentage-based feeto a fixed flat fee. The flat fee covered the sameadministrative services covered by the percentage fee. For thereasons set forth in my analysis of the percentage-based fee, Iconclude that HealthLink's flat fee is valid and does not violatethe Act or Illinois public policy.

I agree with the majority's decision rejecting therecovery of fees.