Plaintiffs, Sanford Welton, Jr., and Adair Ward, are theco-special-representatives for the estate of Sanford Welton, Sr. They appeal from the Sangamon County circuit court's order grantingsummary judgment in favor of defendants, Dr. James Ambrose andMemorial Medical Center. We affirm in part, reverse in part, andremand for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

In 1994, Sanford Welton, Sr. (Welton), went to MemorialMedical Center in Springfield (Memorial) because he noticed that hewas becoming excessively fatigued while walking. His doctors determined that surgery could address this problem but that he firstneeded to undergo a coronary bypass procedure. Dr. William Pyle ofMemorial successfully performed the coronary bypass surgery in August1994.

On the morning of December 7, 1994, Welton returned toMemorial for aorto-bifemoral bypass, left femoral popliteal bypass,and left renal artery bypass surgery to correct the problem with hislegs. Pyle conducted this operation as well, and defendant JamesAmbrose served as the anesthesiologist.

Elayne Whitlock, Welton's wife at the time, accompaniedhim to Memorial. When they arrived, they spoke first to a nurse,then to an anesthesiologist, whom Whitlock remembered as a dark-complected, apparently Indian man who spoke with an accent. Thisanesthesiologist suggested that Welton agree to an "epidural" duringand after the surgery to control the pain. After first declining,Welton agreed. Neither Whitlock nor Welton remembered seeing Ambrosebefore the surgery. That morning, Welton signed a form called"Consent to Operative Surgical Procedure." It contained a sectionthat read: "I consent to the administration of anesthesia to beapplied by or under the direction of the staff anesthesiologists andto the use of such anesthetics as they may deem advisable."

Before the surgery began, Ambrose placed an epiduralcatheter in Welton's lumbar region to manage pain during and afterthe operation. Welton received the drugs fentanyl and bupivacaine,among others, through the epidural. The surgery lasted from 8:40a.m. until 4:55 p.m., and a few minutes later Welton was taken to arecovery room. He did not see Ambrose again until two days later.

Ambrose is a shareholder of and employed by AssociatedAnesthesiologists of Springfield (Associated), a corporation thatmaintains an office at Memorial. Associated maintains a staff ofdoctors 24 hours a day to provide "pain service" at Memorial. Theparticular doctor on call ordinarily visits each patient on anesthesia once in the morning and once in the evening.

The morning after the surgery, December 8, Dr. PrasadKareti of Associated saw Welton and noted that he seemed comfortableand pain-free. At 11:20 a.m. that day, however, two nurses tried totake Welton to use the bathroom and found that he had trouble usinghis legs. A nurse reported this to Pyle, the surgeon, who determinedthat it was not abnormal for Welton's legs to be weak so soon aftersurgery. The same day, Dr. Ramaiah Samala of Associated visitedWelton during his evening rounds. Ramaiah found that Welton remainedcomfortable and free of pain. The epidural remained in placethroughout this time.

A nurse recorded on Welton's medical chart that at 7:45a.m. on December 9, he was having seizure-like activity in his face,arms, and hands, "could only utter words yes, yes, yes," and couldnot follow commands. Early on December 9, someone turned off thepump attached to the epidural. It is not clear who turned off thepump or exactly when this happened. From December 9 until his death,Welton was paralyzed from the chest down. He was discharged from thehospital in March 1995.

On November 22, 1996, Welton filed a complaint againstAmbrose only, alleging that he was negligent in failing to monitorWelton's blood pressure and neurological condition and in failing todiscontinue the epidural pump after it was reported that Welton hadneurological deficits. A report by Dr. Mervyn Jeffries attached tothe complaint offered the opinion that Welton's paraplegia was causedby complications when the epidural anesthesia established during theoperation was continued for too long afterward, that the epiduralshould have been removed after Welton's trouble using his legs onDecember 8 at 11:20 a.m.

Welton later learned that although Ambrose claimed that heconducted a preanesthetic evaluation on every patient heanesthetized, including Welton, neither he nor Memorial possessed apreanesthetic evaluation form for the December 7, 1994, surgery. Welton then filed a first-amended complaint on November 8, 1999. Inaddition to raising new allegations to support the negligence claimagainst Ambrose, Welton added three new claims. Count II allegedlack of informed consent, and count III alleged battery. Finally,count IV added Memorial as a defendant and claimed spoliation ofevidence for its loss of the preanesthetic evaluation form.

Welton died of atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease onApril 9, 2001. Plaintiffs, Sanford Welton, Jr., and Adair Ward, asrepresentatives of Welton's estate, filed an eight-count, second-amended complaint, in which they continued the previous claims andalso realleged them as wrongful-death claims. Ambrose moved forsummary judgment as to counts I, II, III, V, VI, and VII. Memorialthen moved for summary judgment as to counts IV and VIII. On June18, 2003, the circuit court granted summary judgment as to all eightcounts of the complaint. A docket entry records this event, but thecourt did not enter a written order.

On July 14, 2003, plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal. The same day, Memorial filed a "Motion for Clarification," seeking toamend certain errors in the docket entry of June 18, 2003. After ahearing on July 25, 2003, the circuit court granted the motion forclarification and issued a written order to that effect on July 31.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Preliminary Matters

1. Jurisdiction

We must first address whether we have jurisdiction to hearthis appeal. Defendants argue that the motion for clarification wasessentially a posttrial motion and that plaintiffs' notice of appealwas therefore premature. Under Supreme Court Rule 303(a), a partywishing to appeal must file a notice of appeal "within 30 days afterthe entry of the final judgment appealed from" or "within 30 daysafter the entry of the order disposing of the last pendingpost[]judgment motion" if one has been filed. 155 Ill. 2d R.303(a)(1). The filing of the post-judgment motion renders the priornotice of appeal of no effect. See 155 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)(2); John G.Phillips & Associates v. Brown, 197 Ill. 2d 337, 343, 757 N.E.2d 875,879 (2001) (post-judgment motion for sanctions under Rule 137 (155Ill. 2d R. 137)).

Only a motion specified in section 2-1203 of the Code ofCivil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1203 (West 2002)) qualifies as apostjudgment motion. Marsh v. Evangelical Covenant Church ofHinsdale, 138 Ill. 2d 458, 461, 563 N.E.2d 459, 461 (1990). Thatsection allows for a party to file a motion "for a rehearing, or aretrial, or modification of the judgment or to vacate the judgment orfor other relief." 735 ILCS 5/2-1203(a) (West 2002). A motion seeks"other relief" within the meaning of the statute only if it issimilar in nature to the enumerated motions. Marsh, 138 Ill. 2d at461, 563 N.E.2d at 462.

We conclude that Memorial's motion for clarification wasnot a motion for "other relief" within the meaning of section 2-1203. A motion for clarification of a trial court's previous action hasbeen held not to fall within section 2-1203. Giammanco v. Giammanco,253 Ill. App. 3d 750, 756-57, 625 N.E.2d 990, 996 (1993) (SecondDistrict). Although we have held before that a plaintiff's motionfor findings after the complaint was dismissed could constitute such"other relief" (Knapp v. City of Decatur, 160 Ill. App. 3d 498, 503,513 N.E.2d 534, 537 (1987)), we noted that the plaintiffs' motion didnot expressly accept the court's judgment (Knapp, 160 Ill. App. 3d at503, 513 N.E.2d at 536).

Here, Memorial's motion did accept the circuit court'sjudgment and sought only to correct a double negative in the docketentry, in a sentence that originally read: "There's no contraryevidence that [p]laintiff did not die as a result of the epidural." The context makes clear that the sentence should have said: "There isno evidence that [p]laintiff did die as a result of the epidural,"which is how the corrected version appears. The court's order alsocorrected two other minor errors. Memorial's motion made noobjection to the actual judgment (granting the summary judgmentmotion in its favor) and in fact stated that it sought to correct a"clerical" or "typographical" error. We reject defendants'contention that such a motion was so similar to the forms of reliefnamed in section 2-1203 that it rendered plaintiffs' notice of appealpremature. Such relief could have been sought in a motion for a nuncpro tunc order long after the judgment had become final. In reEstate of Young, 414 Ill. 525, 534, 112 N.E.2d 113, 117 (1953). Wethus consider the merits of the appeal.

2. Discovery

Plaintiffs argue that the circuit court erred in itsruling concerning their "First Request for Discovery." (Thisdocument was filed before Welton's death but to simplify ourdiscussion, we shall refer to both Welton and the current plaintiffsas plaintiffs.) We generally review a trial court's discoveryrulings for whether they constituted an abuse of discretion. Reda v.Advocate Health Care, 199 Ill. 2d 47, 54, 765 N.E.2d 1002, 1007(2002). Plaintiffs suggest that we should review the discoveryquestions here using a de novo standard, but the case cited for thatstandard involves claims of a statutory evidentiary privilege. Reda,199 Ill. 2d at 54, 765 N.E.2d at 1007. The general rule remains thatwe use the abuse-of-discretion standard.

The discovery request at issue contained 33 separateparagraphs seeking numerous types of documents from Ambrose. Ambrosefiled an "objection" specifically addressing many of the requests andobjecting "to the entire [r]equest to [p]roduce as unduly burdensome,overly broad[,] and costly to comply with." Plaintiffs responded byfiling a motion to compel Ambrose to comply with the discoveryrequest, at the same time withdrawing 5 of the 33 paragraphs. Aftera hearing, the circuit court ordered Ambrose to respond to 9 of thepending 28 paragraphs but denied plaintiffs' motion as to theremainder.

Plaintiffs stress that a party may discover not onlyinformation admissible at trial but also information that may lead toadmissible evidence. See Monier v. Chamberlain, 35 Ill. 2d 351, 357,221 N.E.2d 410, 415 (1966). Although the scope of permissiblediscovery is indeed broad, it is not unlimited, and the circuit courtin exercising its discretion must balance "the needs of truth andexcessive burden to the litigants." People ex rel. General MotorsCorp. v. Bua, 37 Ill. 2d 180, 193, 226 N.E.2d 6, 14 (1967). Further,a court ruling on a discovery motion may keep in mind Supreme CourtRule 201(a), which states that "[d]uplication of discovery methods toobtain the same information should be avoided." 166 Ill. 2d R.201(a).

Ambrose objected to the first four paragraphs of therequest as overly broad because they asked for billing recordsrelated to anesthesia care provided to Welton but were not limitedeither in time or in referring to care rendered by Ambrose. A partyto litigation may certainly object that a discovery request is overlybroad. Bua, 37 Ill. 2d at 194, 226 N.E.2d at 15 (upholding thedefendant's objection to a "catch-all demand for the production ofdocuments without the slightest degree of specificity"). On theother hand, despite these requests' somewhat broad wording, surelyAmbrose could have provided the records related to the surgery atissue in this case. These records might shed light on the servicesactually provided and thus are properly discoverable. The trialcourt may wish to revisit this particular issue on remand.

Several other paragraphs (8, 11, 12, 19, 31, and 32)sought Memorial's bylaws and various rules, regulations, policies,and procedures. Ambrose objected that plaintiffs had alreadyobtained many of these in deposing Penny Mueller, administrator ofquality monitoring at Memorial. We have reviewed these and theremainder of plaintiffs' request to produce and conclude that thetrial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling on the motion tocompel.

B. Summary Judgment

Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in grantingsummary judgment as to all eight counts of the complaint. Inreviewing a grant of summary judgment, we must consider theaffidavits, depositions, admissions, exhibits, and pleadings on filein the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Es-pinoza v.Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co., 165 Ill. 2d 107, 113, 649 N.E.2d1323, 1326 (1995). Summary judgment is a drastic means of disposingof a lawsuit, in that it denies the nonmoving party a trial, and itis properly granted only when there is no genuine issue of materialfact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Espinoza, 165 Ill. 2d at 113, 649 N.E.2d at 1326. The party movingfor summary judgment bears the initial burden of production, and adefendant may meet this burden either by (1) affirmativelydemonstrating that it must prevail on an element of the cause ofaction or (2) demonstrating that the plaintiff cannot produceevidence necessary to support the plaintiff's cause of action. Hallv. Flowers, 343 Ill. App. 3d 462, 469-70, 798 N.E.2d 757, 762 (2003). If the defendant meets this standard, then the burden shifts to theplaintiff to present a factual basis that would entitle the plaintiffto a favorable judgment. Hall, 343 Ill. App. 3d at 470, 798 N.E.2dat 762. We review a circuit court's grant of summary judgment denovo. Espinoza, 165 Ill. 2d at 113, 649 N.E.2d at 1326.

1. Negligence

Plaintiffs' second-amended complaint alleged that Ambrosewas negligent in 1 of 11 ways, set out in paragraph 23 assubparagraphs (a) through (k). In part, these allegations rest onthe proposition that the other members of Associated who took part inWelton's care were agents of Ambrose, but the complaint also allegesthat Ambrose himself was negligent in failing to monitor Welton'scondition following the surgery. The docket entry documenting thegrant of summary judgment stated that "no other physicians acted asagents of Dr. Ambrose" and "Dr. Ambrose was not negligent."

Plaintiffs argue that Ambrose has admitted that the otherdoctors of Associated were his agents and he is thus vicariouslyliable for their actions. They base this claim on a health-insuranceclaim form dated December 16, 1994, and submitted to CIGNA forservices provided to Welton. The form's signature block containsAmbrose's typewritten name. The form is difficult to read, butplaintiffs have also provided a legible copy from a different patientand doctor. The signature portion of this form states that "Icertify that the statements on the reverse apply to this bill and aremade a part thereof." On the reverse, under the heading "Signatureof Physician or Supplier (Medicare, CHAMPUS, FECA, and Black Lung),"the following appears:

"I certify that the services shown on this formwere medically indicated and necessary for thehealth of the patient and were personallyfurnished by me or were furnished incident tomy professional service by my employee under myimmediate personal supervision, except asotherwise expressly permitted by Medicare orCHAMPUS regulations."

Assuming that the barely legible form with Ambrose's name on itcontains this certification on the back, this alone does not seem tous sufficient evidence to suggest an agency relationship. Thecertification appears only to apply to claims involving the listedprograms (e.g., Medicare), and nothing suggests that Welton fell intothese categories.

Plaintiffs also argue, citing Steinberg v. Dunseth, 259Ill. App. 3d 533, 631 N.E.2d 809 (1994), that Ambrose is liable forthe acts of his "partners" in Associated because he is employedtogether with them and he left Welton in their care. In Steinberg,the coverage agreement required the doctors "to assume the care ofthe other's patients if one of them was required to be out of town." Steinberg, 259 Ill. App. 3d at 534, 631 N.E.2d at 810. The coveringphysician in Steinberg performed a surgical procedure, and theplaintiff signed a consent for that treatment by the coveringphysician. Steinberg, 259 Ill. App. 3d at 535, 631 N.E.2d at 811. We agreed with the New York cases that even absent emergencies"'surely no person expects that his or her regular physician willalways be there to respond.'" (Emphasis omitted.) Steinberg, 259Ill. App. 3d at 537, 631 N.E.2d at 812, quoting Kavanaugh v.Nussbaum, 71 N.Y.2d 535, 548, 528 N.Y.S.2d 8, 13, 523 N.E.2d 284, 289(1988). However, we commented that physicians should not be viewedas interchangeable and it is important that the various treatmentsgiven a patient be coordinated. Steinberg, 259 Ill. App. 3d at 538,631 N.E.2d at 813. In Steinberg, 259 Ill. App. 3d at 538, 631 N.E.2dat 813, we did not approve the routine substitution of otherphysicians for a physician who has had the major care of the patient,the situation in this case.

We need not make a definitive ruling on the application ofSteinberg or the agency issue, however, because we conclude for otherreasons that summary judgment was improperly granted as to thenegligence count. To prevail on a claim of negligence in a medicalmalpractice case, a plaintiff must be able to show (1) the properstandard of care that applied to the physician's actions, (2) thephysician's failure to comply with this standard, and (3) that thisfailure proximately caused the plaintiff's injury. Purtill v. Hess,111 Ill. 2d 229, 241-42, 489 N.E.2d 867, 872 (1986).

In support of their allegations, plaintiffs point to thedeposition of their expert, Dr. Mervyn Jeffries. He testified thatbecause Ambrose was the doctor who inserted the epidural, Ambrose hada personal responsibility to monitor Welton's progress after theoperation. He stated that Ambrose should have seen Welton at leasttwice the day after the surgery and monitored him to some extent fortwo days after such a major operation. He further stated thatWelton's paraplegia was avoidable and that had Ambrose properlymonitored his condition, it would probably have been averted.

Dr. Jeffries's deposition provided sufficient evidence onthe necessary elements to raise a genuine issue of material fact asto whether Ambrose was negligent when he did not personally monitorWelton on the two days after the surgery. The trial court thus erredin granting summary judgment on the negligence count.

2. Lack of Informed Consent

Plaintiffs' count II alleged that Ambrose failed to obtainWelton's informed consent prior to administering the epidural. Acause of action based on lack of informed consent requires aplaintiff to show that (1) the physician had a duty to disclosematerial risks; (2) he failed to disclose or inadequately disclosedthose risks; (3) as a result of this failure to disclose, theplaintiff consented to treatment to which he would not otherwise haveconsented; and (4) the treatment caused plaintiff injury. Coryell v.Smith, 274 Ill. App. 3d 543, 546, 653 N.E.2d 1317, 1319 (1995).

Ambrose's response to the informed-consent allegation istwofold: he contends that Welton gave a valid consent and thatplaintiffs cannot show that paralysis was a "material risk" of theepidural such that Ambrose had an obligation to disclose it. Weagree with the latter contention. Evidence that Welton was notspecifically told of the risk of paralysis is not enough. Informedconsent does not mean that a physician must reveal every risk of aprocedure, no matter how remote. Rather, a physician must discloseto the patient the risks that a reasonable medical practitioner wouldhave disclosed in similar circumstances. Magana v. Elie, 108 Ill.App. 3d 1028, 1032, 439 N.E.2d 1319, 1321 (1982). A plaintiff mustshow the physician's failure to conform to this standard by expertmedical evidence. Magana, 108 Ill. App. 3d at 1032, 439 N.E.2d at1322; Taber v. Riordan, 83 Ill. App. 3d 900, 905, 403 N.E.2d 1349,1353 (1980).

Plaintiffs point to evidence that paralysis was a knownrisk of an epidural at the time of the operation but none saying thatit was a risk that a reasonable medical practitioner would havedisclosed before using one. The closest thing they can find is theinterrogatory answer of Dr. Gary Draper, in which he states that therisks that would customarily have been discussed before administeringan epidural

"include backache (usually transient): possible headaches, nausea[,] and prucrites (itching). Others might be included depending on the individual doctor. This group would possibly include paralysis since it is a rare occurrence and may be secondary to events other than an epidural."

Draper's response that the possible disclosure of the risk ofparalysis would depend on the doctor is insufficient to raise agenuine issue as to whether a reasonable medical practitioner wouldhave discussed the possibility with the patient.

3. Battery

Plaintiffs next contend that Ambrose's use of an epiduralconstituted a medical battery. We disagree. A battery generally isdefined as an unauthorized touching of another's person. Curtis v.Jaskey, 326 Ill. App. 3d 90, 93, 759 N.E.2d 962, 964 (2001). In amedical context, a plaintiff may recover by showing (1) a total lackof consent to the procedure performed, (2) that the treatment wascontrary to the patient's will, or (3) that the treatment was atsubstantial variance with the consent granted. Curtis, 326 Ill. App.3d at 94, 759 N.E.2d at 965.

It is clear in this case that Welton gave somebody (theanonymous dark-complected anesthesiologist) his consent to the use ofthe epidural during and after surgery. In addition, he signed theform consenting to the surgery, including "the administration ofanesthesia *** by or under the direction of the staffanesthesiologists." Plaintiffs claim that the consent must beobtained by the particular physician who inserts the epidural, but noevidence suggests that Welton's consent was limited to particularphysicians. The surgical consent form, referring to the "staffanesthesiologists," states just the opposite. Because Weltonconsented to the insertion of the epidural and its continued use, aswell as to anesthesia administered by the staff, no battery occurred.

4. Spoliation of Evidence

Plaintiffs' count IV alleged spoliation of evidence byMemorial, claiming that they were hampered in pursuing their lawsuitby the loss of the preanesthetic evaluation form filled out byAmbrose. Spoliation of evidence is a form of negligence, and as suchrequires a showing that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty topreserve evidence, breached that duty, and thereby proximately causedthe plaintiff to be unable to prove the underlying cause of action. Boyd v. Travelers Insurance Co., 166 Ill. 2d 188, 194-95, 652 N.E.2d267, 270 (1995). We shall assume for the moment that the form atissue existed, Memorial had a duty to maintain it, and Memorial lostthe form. Plaintiffs must still be able to show that Memorial's lossor destruction of the evidence denied them a "reasonable probability"of succeeding on the underlying action. See Boyd, 166 Ill. 2d at 196n.2, 652 N.E.2d at 271 n.2. "In other words, if the plaintiff couldnot prevail in the underlying action even with the lost or destroyedevidence, then the defendant's conduct is not the cause of the lossof the lawsuit." Boyd, 166 Ill. 2d at 197 n.2, 652 N.E.2d at 271n.2.

Plaintiffs do not adequately explain how the lost formcould aid them in proving lack of informed consent or battery. Ambrose stated at his deposition that he routinely fills out such aform before administering anesthesia and that the physician but notthe patient signs the form. The record contains a blank copy of theform, which contains a signature line for the physician, not thepatient. As such, it would seem that the absence of such a formactually helps plaintiffs because it would have tended to show thatWelton consented to Ambrose personally before receiving the epidural.

Plaintiffs suggest Ambrose might have written "DO NOT USEEPIDURAL!" or something similar on the form, but this is merespeculation. Even if those words appeared on the form, there wouldbe no reasonable probability that plaintiffs could prevail on theirclaims. The informed-consent count fails because plaintiffs cannotshow that paralysis is a material risk of an epidural. There was nobattery, regardless of any conceivable hesitancy by Ambrose in usingan epidural, because the evidence is undisputed that Welton consentedto its use. Finally, the form has no bearing on whether Ambrose wasnegligent in failing to monitor the epidural once it was in use, nordo plaintiffs maintain that it was negligent to use one.

5. Wrongful Death

Counts V through VIII of the second-amended complaintessentially realleged the first four counts as wrongful-death claims. Plaintiffs do not appear to challenge the dismissal of the firstthree wrongful-death counts (V, VI, and VII), addressing only countVIII in their brief. As to that count, Memorial points to an autopsyconducted by Dr. Bryan Mitchell, in which he concluded that Welton'sdeath was caused by atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease.

The autopsy appears to be the only evidence in the recordof what caused Welton's death. Plaintiffs object that the autopsy ishearsay and otherwise inadmissible. This ignores the fact thatMemorial filed a request to admit the authenticity of the autopsy,which the circuit court eventually allowed.

In any event, a wrongful-death action requires theplaintiff to show that the wrongful act of another caused the deathof the decedent. 740 ILCS 180/1 (West 2002). Regardless of whethercardiovascular disease caused Welton's death, without any evidence atall that his death resulted in any way from the epidural, defendantswere entitled to summary judgment on the wrongful-death counts.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court'sorder dismissing counts II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, and VIII ofplaintiffs' second-amended complaint. We reverse summary judgment asto count I and remand for further proceedings.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded.

STEIGMANN and APPLETON, JJ., concur.