JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court:

In September 1999, plaintiff, WestPoint Marine, Inc.,was leasing 500 feet of riverfront property from defendant MaryA. Prange, pursuant to a lease agreement that contained a provision granting WestPoint Marine an option to buy the propertyshould Prange decide to sell it. The leased riverfront propertywas part of Prange's farm. On September 25, 1999, Prange enteredinto a contract to sell the Prange farm (including the riverfrontproperty leased by WestPoint Marine) to defendant Pool 24 TugService, Inc.

In November 1999, WestPoint Marine filed a complaintseeking specific performance of the option-to-buy provision ofits lease agreement with Prange. Following an October 2002 benchtrial, the trial court denied WestPoint Marine's complaint forspecific performance.

WestPoint Marine appeals, arguing that the trialcourt's decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree and affirm.

In December 1993, Prange and her husband, WilliamPrange (who is now deceased), entered into a lease with Grantz'sMarine Service, Inc. The lease provided that (1) Grantz's Marinewould "lease with an option to buy approximately five hundred(500) feet of river frontage" for 25 years, for the purpose offleeting barges; and (2) the river frontage "is located inCalhoun County, on the right descending bank of the IllinoisRiver, just below Hardin, IL. (approximately mile 20)." InFebruary 1996, Grantz's Marine assigned the lease to WestPointMarine.

The lease also provided, in pertinent part, as follows:

"In the event [the Pranges] desire tosell or otherwise dispose of all or any portion of the river frontage below Hardin[,]IL., and have received a bona fide offer forthe same, [s]ellers shall notify Steven F.Grantz in writing, and thereafter Steven F.Grantz shall have fifteen (15) days withinwhich to purchase the river frontage at theprice, terms, and conditions as is offered bythe proposed purchaser."

In a September 27, 1999, letter, Prange's realtor, JeanHagen, notified WestPoint Marine's president, Kevin Jennings,that the entire Prange farm was going to be sold to Pool 24 TugService, pursuant to the terms of a sales contract, a copy ofwhich was attached. On October 12, 1999, Jennings replied toHagen via facsimile. The cover page of the facsimile transmission stated, in pertinent part, "Please accept this as my meetingmy comittment [sic] to express my intent to purchase before yourdeadline. I am looking forward to reaching final terms andconditions as soon as possible in order to assist Ms. Prange inreaching her goals and time requirements." The two pages thatfollowed were in the form of a letter from Jennings to Prange andHagen, and set forth various conditions of Jennings' proposedpurchase. The section entitled "Description of Property,"stated, in pertinent part, as follows: "The property to be soldis located at Hardin, Illinois[,] and is described as the Mary JoPrange property, just south of Hardin, Illinois." In the sectionentitled "Price" the letter stated, "[t]he proposed purchaseprice shall be negotiated in good faith based upon appraisal byan independent third party."

At the October 2002 bench trial, the trial courtadmitted in evidence Prange's deposition. Prange stated that sheowned approximately 1,000 feet of riverfront property. Whenasked if she knew the distance or the size of the area leased toWestPoint Marine, she replied as follows:

"It covered the 500 feet. Our property atthat time was marked in lots on the riverfrontage, each was 50 foot and it began inthe middle of lot 16 and 17. And they werefurther south from that by probably fourlots. Then from that point, you could markthe 500 and they were just about at the samelocation each time."

She acknowledged that at times, WestPoint Marine used more than500 feet of riverfront property, and no one took umbrage at it.

Jennings testified at trial that when he sent Hagen thefacsimile expressing his intent to exercise the option to buy, hewas not certain whether he would be buying just the riverfrontproperty or the whole Prange farm. When asked whether he "wantedto exercise [his] option to purchase the property that [h]e hadleased," Jennings responded, "yes." Jennings estimated thatbetween 30 and 45 days during any given year, WestPoint Marineused more than 500 feet of Prange's riverfront property. Jennings also explained that WestPoint Marine's floating buoyswere tied off to trees on the riverfront property. Jenningsestimated that it used up to 200 feet inland, depending on waterlevels.

Jennings identified WestPoint Marine's exhibit No. 5 asa map showing the location of the 500 feet of riverfront propertythat WestPoint Marine was leasing. The trial court admitted theexhibit for demonstrative purposes only, after sustainingPrange's objection to the exhibit on the ground of insufficientfoundation.

At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court grantedthe parties additional time to file written arguments.

In July 2003, the trial court entered an order denyingWestPoint Marine's complaint for specific performance. The orderstated that the court found "[t]hat the lease agreement which[WestPoint Marine] alleges also creates a[n] 'option to buy' doesnot contain a description of the property specific enough forwhich specific performance should be granted."

This appeal followed.

II. WESTPOINT MARINE'S CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION

WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE

WestPoint Marine argues that the trial court's decisionwas against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree.

Parties to a contract are not entitled to specificperformance as a matter of right. Instead, the remedy of specific performance is granted in the exercise of the trial court'ssound discretion. Butler v. Kent, 275 Ill. App. 3d 217, 226, 655N.E.2d 1120, 1126 (1995). "[C]lear, explicit[,] and convincingevidence is required to support a grant of specific performance,"and where testimony is conflicting in a bench trial, the trialcourt's factual findings will not be disturbed unless they areagainst the manifest weight of the evidence. Butler, 275 Ill.App. 3d at 227, 655 N.E.2d at 1126.

A contract for sale of real estate cannot be enforcedby a court unless it contains the essential contract terms,including (1) the names of the buyer and seller; (2) a description of the property; (3) the sales price or the means of determining the price, and the terms and conditions of the sale; and(4) the signature of the party to be charged. Kane v. McDermott,191 Ill. App. 3d 212, 217, 547 N.E.2d 708, 712 (1989). Inaddition,

"[t]he contract's terms must be so certainand unambiguous that the court can requirethe specific thing contracted for be done. Where the terms of a contract are ambiguousor where the writing is capable of more thanone construction, parol evidence is admissible to explain or ascertain what the partiesintended. However, parol evidence may not beused to supply missing terms. [Citation.] The court should not make a new contract forthe parties." Kane, 191 Ill. App. 3d at 217,547 N.E.2d at 712.

"A description of property is sufficiently definite if it willenable a surveyor, by aid of extrinsic evidence, to locate theproperty." Kane, 191 Ill. App. 3d at 217, 547 N.E.2d at 712.

WestPoint Marine contends that the trial court'sfinding that the property was not defined with enough specificityto grant specific performance was against the manifest weight ofthe evidence because there was "no evidence presented that thelocation of the property was disputed by any party." However,the issue is not whether the location of the property was disputed; rather, the issue is whether the contract, pursuant towhich the trial court was asked to grant specific performance,identified the property with sufficient specificity.

In this case, the following evidence supports the trialcourt's finding that the property was not sufficiently defined inthe lease: (1) the lease described the property only as "approximately" 500 feet of riverfront property at "approximately mile20" "just below Hardin"; (2) the 500 feet of riverfront propertyused by WestPoint Marine fluctuated to some extent; (3) whenJennings attempted to exercise the option to buy, he was notcertain what he would be buying; and (4) no agreement existed asto how far inland WestPoint Marine's lease extended. Reviewingthe evidence under the appropriate standard of review, we conclude that the court's finding was not against the manifestweight of the evidence.

In so concluding, we note that this case is distinguishable from Kane. In that case, the crop lease that containedan option-to-buy provision contained a legal description of theproperty at issue. Kane, 191 Ill. App. 3d at 217, 547 N.E.2d at712. Here, the lease does not contain anything resembling alegal description of the property subject to the option-to-buyprovision. It does not indicate the precise location or thedimensions of either the Prange farm or the 500 feet of river-front property leased by WestPoint Marine.

For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court'sjudgment.

Affirmed.

APPLETON, J., concurs.

COOK, J., dissents.

JUSTICE COOK, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent and would reverse the judgmentof the trial court, remanding with instructions that the optionto purchase be honored.

Prange owns a 49-acre tract of land on the west bank ofthe Illinois River, south of Hardin, Illinois. It appears thetract is primarily used for barge fleeting operations. In 1993,the Pranges entered into a 25-year lease with Grantz's MarineService, Inc., covering "approximately five hundred (500) feet ofriver frontage," and giving Grantz's Marine a first option topurchase the leased premises. That lease was assigned to WestPoint Marine in 1996. On September 24, 1999, Pool 24 Tug Service, Inc., submitted an offer to purchase the 49-acre tract,"subject to cancellation of present lease on the riverfront ofsaid property." (The lease provides that "In the event the riverfrontage is sold to another party, the purchaser will be obligated to honor the terms and conditions of this lease.") OnSeptember 27, Prange's agent notified WestPoint Marine of thepending contract, advising that "you, under the articles of theagreement, have fifteen (15) days within which to purchase theproperty as stated in the enclosed contract or forfeit yourinterests."

The lease agreement clearly provides WestPoint Marinewith an option to purchase. WestPoint Marine and its predecessorhave performed their obligations under the lease for more than 10years. The majority now makes a new contract for the parties,deleting the option to purchase, a substantial right that theoptionee had bargained for and paid for. If the option topurchase is invalid because the legal description in the lease isinsufficient, is the lease also invalid? The majority shoulddisclaim any intention to make its holding res judicata in anyfuture action filed by Pool 24 Tug Service, Inc., seeking toinvalidate the lease.

Where the facts are not in dispute, the existence andinterpretation of a contract are questions of law that the trialcourt may decide on a motion for summary judgment and that we mayreview independently. Pokora v. Warehouse Direct, Inc., 322 Ill.App. 3d 870, 875, 751 N.E.2d 1204, 1209 (2001). The case citedby the majority for the proposition that parties to a contractare not entitled to specific performance as a matter of right andthat deference should be given the trial court's factual findingsis distinguishable, involving a complicated calculation of theamount due plaintiff for the "net fair market value" of hisinterest in the Village Green Investment Corporation. Butler,275 Ill. App. 3d at 225, 655 N.E.2d at 1125-26.

The trial court found that the lease agreement "doesnot contain a description of the property specific enough forwhich specific performance should be granted." How can that be? This lease agreement was executed in 1993, and the leased premises have been used continuously since that time. Perhaps in1993 there could have been a dispute as to what property had beenleased, but that is no longer possible. The law is clear that alease need not contain a specific description of the property. "[A] defective description of land may be aided by the conduct ofthe parties, such as, that the vendor put the purchaser inpossession of the premises intended to be conveyed." Hayes v.O'Brien, 149 Ill. 403, 413, 37 N.E. 73, 75 (1894). There is nodispute that a surveyor could stake out WestPoint Marine'sexisting operation. That is all that is required.

The majority ignores the holding of Kane, upon which itpurportedly relies. Kane involved a farm lease of property insections 8, 21, and 29, but the plaintiff sought to enforce theoption only as to a part of the property in section 29. Theexercise of the option in Kane said simply that the plaintiff wasexercising the option granted in section 7 of the lease. Section7 of the lease said simply that the plaintiff had "'first optionto purchase any part or all of the land farmed by the tenant.'" Kane, 191 Ill. App. 3d at 214-15, 547 N.E.2d at 710. This courtrejected the argument that the property was insufficientlydescribed in the option. "A description of property is sufficiently definite if it will enable a surveyor, by aid of extrinsic evidence, to locate the property. Any reference to ownershipor other matters which would make the description definite willbe considered to locate the property." Kane, 191 Ill. App. 3d at217, 547 N.E.2d at 712.

The majority decision is consistent with JusticeSteigmann's dissent in Crawley v. Hathaway, 309 Ill. App. 3d 486,721 N.E.2d 1208 (1999), but we should follow the Crawley majorityopinion. In that case, an agreement to buy a portion of a farm, "100 Acres More or less, 83 acres of pasture & timber and 19acres of tillable ground" was held to be a sufficient description. Crawley, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 487, 721 N.E.2d at 1209. Theland is sufficiently described in the writings when that description will enable a surveyor, with the aid of extrinsic evidence,to locate the property. Crawley, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 490, 721N.E.2d at 1211, citing Thomas v. Moore, 55 Ill. App. 3d 907, 911,370 N.E.2d 809, 811-12 (1977). Crawley cited other cases. Adescription of the property only as "my farm" was deemed sufficient because the description could be made certain by the aid ofextrinsic evidence and the property located. Werling v. Grosse,76 Ill. App. 3d 834, 841, 395 N.E.2d 629, 634 (1979). A letterthat did not specify the subject property was sufficient wherethe surrounding facts and circumstances served to identify thesubject matter of the letter as the premises in question. Moorev. Pickett, 62 Ill. 158, 161 (1871). "Moreover, parol evidenceis admissible to identify the subject matter of the contract ormemorandum. It is not necessary in contracts for the sale ofreal estate that it should be so described as to admit of nodoubt as to what it is." Callaghan v. Miller, 17 Ill. 2d 595,599, 162 N.E.2d 422, 424 (1959).

There is a strong tendency for the courts to sustain alegal description if at all possible, since it is apparent thatthe parties intended for something to be conveyed or they neverwould have been involved in the transaction. J. Cribbet, Principles of the Law of Property 157 (1962). The majority heretrashes the intent of the parties by its insistence that thelease "indicate the precise location or the dimensions of eitherthe Prange farm or the 500 feet of riverfront property" (slip op.at 7), a specificity requirement that is disavowed by the cases. Just as an offer to sell "my farm," is sufficient, an offer topurchase "the property I lease" is sufficient.

Questions are presented when the owner of a tractleases out a portion of that tract with an option to purchase. Certainly the lessee should not be allowed to frustrate thelessor's later attempt to sell the entire tract by insisting thatthe leased portion be split off. On the other hand, the lessorshould not be allowed to render the option nugatory merely byattaching additional land to the part under option. The Retreatv. Bell, 296 Ill. App. 3d 450, 456, 695 N.E.2d 892, 896 (1998). WestPoint Marine acted appropriately here by offering to take theentire tract, or the portion it leased, as Prange chose. Prangewill not be prejudiced whether WestPoint Marine or Pool 24 TugService, Inc., purchases the property.