JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the opinion of the court:

Third-party plaintiff, Bradley R. Curtis, appeals theentry of summary judgment by the circuit court of McLean Countyon his claims against third-party defendant, Anthem CasualtyInsurance Company (Anthem). We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On December 6, 1996, Affirmative Insurance Company(Affirmative), a subsidiary of Anthem, issued Curtis an automobile policy for one year. Premiums were due each month, andCurtis often paid premiums in cash at the office of Terry Woithand Associates, his independent agent. During the policy period,Curtis received three cancellation notices that were followed byreinstatement notices. For example, on February 14, 1997, acancellation notice was sent to Curtis, while on February 20, areinstatement of coverage was issued.

In addition, on June 2, 1997, Anthem sent Curtisanother cancellation notice, stating Anthem would cancel thepolicy if payment was not received by June 20, 1997. In mid-July, Anthem received a check for $155 from Curtis. Curtis'scredit union dishonored the check for insufficient funds. Later,Curtis sent a payment of $63.82 to Anthem by check dated August3, 1997. Anthem cashed the check in mid-August. The policy wasreinstated by notice dated August 15, 1997, effective August 27,1997.

On August 18, 1997, Anthem sent a cancellation noticenot followed by a reinstatement notice. This notice indicated ifthe premium due on or before August 31, 1997, was not timelyreceived, the policy would be canceled:

"As you know, you have a premium due08/31/97. ***

***

If this payment is not received by usbefore 08/31/97, then this notice will serveas a notice of cancellation for non[]paymentof premium effective 08/31/97, at 12:01 a.m.standard time."

Also sent to Curtis on that date was a statementindicating a payment of $229.09 was due on or before August 31,1997. Anthem did not receive this payment or any payment afterthe August 3, 1997, check for $63.82 sent by Curtis.

Anthem established by affidavit that it sent Curtis onSeptember 19, 1997, a collection notice for $106.81, the premiumdue for the period of early August 1997 through August 31, 1997. The September 19, 1997, notice states as follows: "Recently,your policy with our company was canceled. Prior to that cancellation, there was a balance due for insurance protection you havealready received. The premium due is $106.81." In his deposition, Curtis admitted receiving this notice.

On October 17, 1997, Curtis was in an automobileaccident that allegedly resulted in damages to Ronald J. Yacko. When Curtis inquired about coverage under the policy, Anthemresponded the policy was canceled and Curtis was not covered onOctober 17, 1997.

On June 22, 1999, Yacko filed suit, alleging a claim ofnegligence against Curtis. Later, on December 1, 2000, Curtisfiled an amended third-party complaint against Anthem. Curtisclaimed Anthem improperly denied his claim and failed to providecoverage and representation.

By motion dated July 23, 2001, Anthem moved for summaryjudgment on Curtis's claim. Anthem maintained the policy byCurtis had been canceled due to nonpayment of premium and thusCurtis was not covered on the date of the collision with Yacko.Curtis claimed he was covered by the policy. Curtis presentedtestimony from Terry Woith, the insurance agent who worked withCurtis. Woith, who worked in the insurance industry since 1988,testified she believed the policy was in effect on October 17,1997, and the August 18, 1997, cancellation notice could bediscarded because the August 15, 1997, reinstatement stated thereinstatement was effective August 27, 1997. Woith testified shereceived no other notices regarding Curtis's policy after August27, 1997.

The circuit court agreed with Anthem and grantedAnthem's motion after finding "Anthem has established the requisite cancellation notices were mailed according to law."

Curtis appeals.

II. ANALYSIS

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. Crum& Forster Managers Corp. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 156 Ill. 2d384, 390, 620 N.E.2d 1073, 1077 (1993). On summary judgment, weview all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Boldini v. Owens Corning, 318 Ill. App. 3d 1167, 1170, 744 N.E.2d370, 372 (2001). Summary judgment is inappropriate if a materialquestion of fact exists. It is proper, however, "when thepleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits demonstrate nogenuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitledto judgment as a matter of law." Boldini, 318 Ill. App. 3d at1169-70, 744 N.E.2d at 372, citing 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West1998).

Curtis does not dispute the facts or contend a materialissue of fact exists. Instead, Curtis argues two theories onappeal. First, Curtis contends the policy was in effect and infull force when the collision with Yacko occurred. Curtiscontends "[b]ased on the history between the parties it would bevery reasonable to interpret the actions of [Anthem] betweenAugust 15 and August 18, 1997[,] as having reinstated the policyand thereby voiding the effect of the August 18, 1997[,] noticeof cancellation." Curtis maintains the reinstatement as ofAugust 27, 1997, "superceded the cancellation date of August 18,1997," and it was reasonable to believe the cancellation noticeand his check crossed in the mail. Curtis then contends whileviewing all evidence in the light most favorable to him, thepolicy was in effect on October 17, 1997.

In response, Anthem maintains the policy was properlycanceled for nonpayment of premium. Anthem maintains despiteboth the August 18, 1997, and September 19, 1997, cancellationnotices, Curtis made no payment after the $68.82 check in August3, 1997. Anthem states Curtis's contention the reinstatementfollowing receipt of the $68.82 check rendered the August 18cancellation notice irrelevant is incredible given the August 18,1997, notice states an amount three times greater than the $68.32paid.

While we must view evidence in the light most favorableto a nonmovant, we cannot simply ignore evidence unfavorable tothe nonmovant. The August 18 cancellation notice and statementindicated Curtis must pay $229.09 before August 31, 1997. Curtispaid $68.82. Even if Curtis believed the $68.82 went toward theAugust 31, 1997, payment, it is still far short of the amountrequired by the cancellation notice. Curtis was clearly told "if[$229.09] is not received by us before 08/31/97, then this noticewill serve as a notice of cancellation for nonpayment of premiumeffective 08/31/97, at 12:01 a.m. standard time."

Kujbida v. Horizon Insurance Agency, Inc., 260 Ill.App. 3d 1001, 1008-09, 632 N.E.2d 151, 156 (1994), relied upon byCurtis, does not hold otherwise. Kujbida states before a cancellation under Illinois law is valid, notice must provide unambiguously sufficient information to determine whether the reason isvalid, so the insured may either contest the cancellation orcorrect the defect. See Kujbida, 260 Ill. App. 3d at 1008-09,632 N.E.2d at 156. Here, because the notice was clear andunambiguous, Kujbida does not help Curtis.

Curtis next argues Anthem's conduct in providing threenotices of cancellation and then reinstatement "constitute[s] atthe very minimum a waiver of strict compliance with the policy." Curtis cites two cases in support: Western Casualty & Surety Co.v. Brochu, 105 Ill. 2d 486, 475 N.E.2d 872 (1985), and InsuranceCo. of Illinois v. Brown, 315 Ill. App. 3d 1168, 734 N.E.2d 964(2000).

Anthem, on the other hand, contends it acted within thelaw. Anthem points to section 143.15 of the Illinois InsuranceCode, which permits an insurer to cancel a policy for nonpayment,so long as notice of cancellation is mailed 10 days beforecancellation is effective. 215 ILCS 5/143.15 (West 1996). Anthem also contends both Brochu and Brown are factuallyinapposite.

We agree with Anthem; neither Brochu nor Brown supports Curtis's contentions. In Brochu, the Supreme Court ofIllinois found no waiver, when the insurer expressly reserved itsright to deny coverage if necessary at a later date. Brochu, 105Ill. 2d at 499, 475 N.E.2d at 878-79. In Brown, the FirstDistrict found the insurer waived its right to enforce a cancellation provision when the insurer accepted a premium but did notrefund the amount applicable to the relevant date. Brown, 315Ill. App. 3d at 1175, 734 N.E.2d at 969. At best, these casescan be said to show waiver may arise if an insurer intentionallyrelinquishes a known right. Here, the facts, taken in the lightmost favorable to Curtis, reveal Anthem did not intentionallyrelinquish its rights, but instead intentionally invoked itsstatutory right to cancel the policy when the premium was notpaid. Curtis has provided no authority to prove otherwise.

The dissent raises points not argued by either party. The dissent contends the cancellation notice was insufficientbecause it (1) was sent before the insured failed to pay hispremium and (2) was conciliatory in tone.

Neither of these points may be resolved simply bylooking at the face of section 143.15, the rest of the statute,or earlier holdings. Arguments based on these points raise legaland policy questions best not decided without the benefit ofparty debate. The first issue, whether prospective notice isbarred, has been addressed by a handful of non-Illinois courts. The decisions, however, were not unanimous. Compare Mackey v.Bristol West Insurance Services of California, Inc., 105 Cal.App. 4th 1247, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 536 (2003), and PennsylvaniaNational Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. v. Person, 164 Ga. App.488, 297 S.E.2d 80 (1982), with Munoz v. New Jersey AutomobileFull Insurance Underwriting Ass'n, 145 N.J. 377, 678 A.2d 1051(1996). (We note Mackey states two Illinois courts have foundprospective notice barred. See Mackey, 105 Cal. App. 4th at 1259n.8, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 544 n.8. These cases, however, did notaddress this specific issue. See Fisher for use of Kiniry v.Associated Underwriters, Inc., 294 Ill. App. 315, 13 N.E.2d 809(1938); Mitchell v. Burnett, 1 Ill. App. 3d 24, 272 N.E.2d 393(1971). Instead, Fisher and Mitchell addressed the second issueraised by the dissent.)

In addition to the points argued in the above decisions, we note others may exist, including how prospective noticemay benefit an insured by giving him or her more time to pay forrequisite insurance. In addition, there is no discussion of theconsequences of a notice of cancellation that follows a missedpremium. By not allowing prospective notice, we might be placingthe insured at a disadvantage by giving the insurer sole discretion to reinstate coverage at the end of the 10-day noticeperiod.

We doubt an interpretation of section 143.15 thatallows prospective notice would permit insurers to give a cancellation notice in the policy itself. The dissent's approachignores the case law requirement that a cancellation notice mustprovide sufficient information for the insured to determinewhether the reason is valid and to allow him or her to contestthe cancellation or correct the defect. See Kujbida, 260 Ill.App. 3d at 1008-09, 632 N.E.2d at 156. A general cancellationnotice in the policy would likely fail the requirements inKujbida.

The second issue raises questions not debated in sometime. A few appellate court decisions have resolved the issue asthe dissent suggests, finding similar notices conciliatory andequivocal. See, e.g., Mitchell, 1 Ill. App. 3d at 27-28, 272N.E.2d at 396; Burnett v. Illinois Agricultural Mutual InsuranceCo., 318 Ill. App. 629, 631-34, 48 N.E.2d 559, 560-61 (1943). These cases can be traced or linked to Fisher, 294 Ill. App. 3d315, 13 N.E.2d 809, and the conclusion Fisher found a similarnotice conciliatory and thus insufficient. See Mitchell, 1 Ill.App. 3d at 27, 272 N.E.2d at 396; Burnett, 318 Ill. App. at 632-33, 48 N.E.2d at 560.

In Roon v. Van Schouwen, 406 Ill. 617, 621-22, 94N.E.2d 880, 882 (1950) (Roon I), however, the Supreme Court ofIllinois refused to apply Fisher in the same way. The Roon Icourt adopted the appellate court dissent's interpretation ofFisher (see Roon I, 406 Ill. at 622, 94 N.E.2d at 882; see alsoRoon v. Van Schouwen, 339 Ill. App. 173, 176-79, 89 N.E.2d 427,429-30 (1949) (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (Roon II)) and found thefollowing notice sufficient:

"'We acknowledge receipt of the estimatedadvance premium due to renew the above policy. You did not file a labor record asrequired in the policy and this policy cannotbe continued unless you do furnish us withthe information on the amount of labor youemployed during the past six months.

***

This policy will be canceled on Mar. 16,

1945[,] unless you furnish us a report ofthe amount of labor employed by you duringthe past six months period.'" Roon I, 406Ill. at 623, 94 N.E.2d at 883 (Thompson, J.,dissenting).

Roon I thus appears to permit cancellation notices thatturn on action or inaction of the insured. Roon I may, however,be distinguishable. Roon I predates the current version ofsection 143.15. Roon I also does not involve cancellation fornonpayment of premium.

Other questions arise, including the effect of theSeptember 19 letter that gave Curtis actual notice of the cancellation almost one month before the accident. That letter mayitself be a cancellation notice. That letter may be viewed aschanging the allegedly conciliatory tone of the cancellationnotice. Perhaps the letter cures the issue of prospectivenotice. These interesting assertions were not raised by anyone.

This court would have benefitted from a full, or evenpartial, debate of these issues. We decline the dissent'sinvitation to resolve issues not raised.

For the forgoing reasons, we affirm.

Affirmed.

MYERSCOUGH, P.J., concurs.

COOK, J., dissents.

JUSTICE COOK, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent and would reverse the decisionof the trial court.

On August 18, 1997, Anthem sent Curtis the following"Notice of Cancellation":

"Dear Insured,

As you know, you have a premium due 08/31/97. If you have already sent thispayment to us, we thank you for your prompt attention. If, however, you have not yet sent it to us. [sic] Please remember that this payment is due in our office on 08/31/97.

Having it here before that date will avoid cancellation of this policy.

If this payment is not received by us before 08/31/97, then this notice will serve as a notice of cancellation for non[]payment of premium effective 08/31/97, at 12:01 a.m. standard time."

This August 18 notice purports to cancel the policy fora breach that may occur on August 31. Anthem argues that thenotice complies with section 143.15 because it was "mailed atleast 10 days before the effective date of the cancellation." 215 ILCS 5/143.15 (West 1996). The notice was also mailed beforethere was any breach, any nonpayment of premium. The noticecould have been sent the day the policy was issued.

Perhaps Curtis was already in breach on August 18, whenthe notice was sent. Perhaps Anthem could have declared thepolicy canceled for that breach, such cancellation to be effective sometime after August 28. Anthem, however, chose not to dothat. Anthem's specific reason for the "notice of cancellation"was the premium due August 31. Under the "notice of cancellation" there could be no breach until August 31. Anthem then sent Curtis, on September 19, 1997, acollection notice for the premium due for the period throughAugust 31, 1997. The notice stated, "Recently your policy withour company was canceled. Prior to that cancellation, there wasa balance due for insurance protection you have already received. The premium due is $106.81." On October 17, 1997, Curtis was inan automobile accident, which resulted in damages to Ronald J.Yacko.

This case presents two related issues: (1) Can aninsurer send a notice of cancellation before the reason forcancellation has occurred? and (2) Was the language in the August18 "notice of cancellation" positive and unequivocal? The issuesare related because it is questionable whether a "notice ofcancellation," sent before a breach has occurred, can be positiveand unequivocal.

An insurer is permitted to cancel an automobile insurance policy only by compliance with the applicable provisions ofthe Insurance Code. Bates v. Merrimack Mutual Fire InsuranceCo., 238 Ill. App. 3d 1050, 1051, 605 N.E.2d 626, 627 (1992)(must also comply with policy terms). An insurance company isheld to a strict standard when it attempts to terminate a policyin midstream, to cancel a policy for the nonpayment of a premium. Textile Maintenance v. Industrial Comm'n, 263 Ill. App. 3d 866,871, 636 N.E.2d 748, 751-52 (1994); Conley v. Ratayzcak, 92 Ill.App. 3d 29, 34-35, 414 N.E.2d 500, 504 (1980).

After an automobile insurance policy has been in effectfor 60 days, it may be cancelled only for the reasons specifiedin section 143.19 of the Insurance Code. 215 ILCS 5/143.19 (West2000). Most notices of cancellation must be mailed at least 30days prior to the effective date of cancellation. 215 ILCS5/143.15 (West 2000). The insurer, however, may take advantageof a special rule where the cancellation is for nonpayment ofpremium. "[W]here cancellation is for nonpayment of premium, thenotice of cancellation must be mailed at least 10 days before theeffective date of the cancellation." 215 ILCS 5/143.15 (West2000). Cancellation for nonpayment of premium, unlike otherreasons for cancellation, cannot be appealed to the Director ofInsurance. 215 ILCS 5/143.23 (West 2000). "Nonpayment ofpremium" means "failure of the named insured to discharge, whendue, any of his obligations in connection with the payment ofpremiums." (Emphasis added.) 215 ILCS 5/143.13(e) (West 2000). The is no suggestion in the statute that a nonpayment of premiumcan occur before the premium is due.

Under the majority's analysis, insurers may ignore thestatutory requirement that a notice of cancellation be sent. Because there is no limit how early the notice can be sent, thepolicy can be its own notice. The policy may simply contain aparagraph stating that if any premium payment is not timelyreceived, the policy is terminated, effective 10 days thereafter.

Where a notice of cancellation is sent after a reasonfor cancellation has occurred, the insured is given some important information, not that something is possible but that it hashappened. In the present case, for example, assume that theinsured sent in a premium payment on August 25. Would theinsured know on August 31 whether that payment had been receivedby the insurer? Would he know whether his policy was in force? The answer to both questions is "no." In contrast, if theinsured had received a notice of cancellation after the premiumwas due on August 31, he would have been given some definiteinformation: (1) his August 31 premium payment had not beenreceived by the insurer; (2) his policy had been canceled; and(3) he had 10 days from the date of mailing to do something aboutit.

"All notices of cancellation shall include a specificexplanation of the reason or reasons for cancellation." 215 ILCS5/143.15 (West 1996). The specificity provision requires that anotice of cancellation unambiguously provide sufficient infor-mation to enable the insured to determine whether the reason isvalid, so that, if not valid, the insured can contest the cancellation and, if valid, the insured can correct the defect in orderto obtain substitute insurance coverage. Kujbida, 260 Ill. App.3d at 1008-09, 632 N.E.2d at 156. The requirement that a specific reason be given for cancellation supports the argument thata policy cannot be cancelled for nonpayment of premium untilthere has been a nonpayment of premium. What was the specificreason for cancellation in this case? No reason for cancellationexisted at the time the "notice of cancellation" was sent. It isdifficult to be specific about the reason for cancellation whenspeculating about what might happen in the future.

A notice of cancellation is sufficient so long as itpositively and affirmatively indicates to the insured that it isthe intention of the company that the policy shall cease to bebinding upon the expiration of the stipulated number of days fromthe time when the intention is made known to the insured. Burnett, 318 Ill. App. at 632, 48 N.E.2d at 560. A cancellationnotice that is equivocal, that is conciliatory in tone, thatcontains some contemplation of future action, is ineffective tocancel the policy. Mitchell, 1 Ill. App. 3d at 28, 272 N.E.2d at396; First National Bank of Pittsfield v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 175 Ill. App. 3d 860, 867, 530 N.E.2d 521, 525 (1988)(the strict rules that apply to cancellation do not apply tononrenewal). The notice of cancellation in the present case didnot positively and unequivocally inform the insured that thepolicy would terminate after August 31. Quite to the contrary,the insurer was encouraging the insured to send the payment dueon that date, and was hoping to continue the coverage. Thenotice of cancellation was conditional: "if this payment is notreceived by us before 08/31/97, then ***."

The majority suggests that the history of nonpayment ofpremiums, notices of cancellation, and continuation of the policyin force in this case warrants a hard-line position against theinsured. Actually, the law takes the opposite approach. Wherethe insurer has continued coverage despite repeated nonpaymentsof premium and notices of cancellation, the insurer may therebywaive the right to argue that a supposed "notice of cancellation"terminated the policy. See Cormican v. Anchor Casualty Co., 249Minn. 196, 204, 81 N.W.2d 782, 788 (1957) ("generous credit"extended in the payment of premium for the prior year). A waivermay be express or implied, arising from acts, words, conduct, orknowledge of the insurer. It is unilateral, as no act of theinsured is necessary to complete it. Prejudicial reliance by theinsured is not required. Brochu, 105 Ill. 2d at 499, 475 N.E.2dat 878.

The attitudes of insurance companies change after aloss has occurred. Prior to that time, the insurer is interestedin the premium, and the goal of the "notice of cancellation" maybe simply to persuade the insured to pay the premium. After aloss has occurred, the insurer is no longer interested in thepremium. After a loss has occurred, past equivocal statements,which did nothing more than demand payment and raise the possibility of cancellation, may be argued to have been definiteexpressions of termination. See Conley, 92 Ill. App. 3d at 34,414 N.E.2d at 503 (purpose of notice requirement is to forestalla retroactive notice). In the present case, did the insured,after August 31, believe that what he had to do was (1) pay hisinsurance premium or (2) find replacement coverage? Given thestrict rules for notices of cancellation, the insured here wouldhave been justified in concluding that he had insurance, but heneeded to get his premium paid.

The remaining question is the effect of the September19 collection notice. The September 19 collection notice wasclearly not a notice of cancellation. Can it be argued that thetwo notices should be added together to equal one good notice? Under that logic, the policy was in force until 10 days after themailing of the September 19 collection notice, even though nosuch notification was given. If those two notices were insufficient, could a third or perhaps a fourth piece of correspondencebe taken into account? Given the strict rules that apply tonotices of cancellation, the answer should be "no." The insuredshould be given a definite statement whether his policy is inforce or not. The existence of several pieces of correspondencethat may be construed together to indicate the policy has beenterminated do not equate with a positive unequivocal notice. Requiring a positive unequivocal notice does not impose any greatburden on the insurer.

The question is not whether Curtis owed money for hispremiums. Smith v. Richard, 134 Ill. App. 3d 378, 383, 480N.E.2d 859, 862 (1985) (mere failure to pay premiums does notterminate policy). Anthem agreed to furnish coverage for aperiod of one year, expiring December 6, 1997. Anthem wasobligated to provide that coverage unless it gave notice ofcancellation in strict compliance with the statute. In theabsence of such a notice, Anthem's remedy was to collect past-duepremiums from its insured, not to deny coverage.

The majority asserts that these issues were not raisedby the parties. The sufficiency of the August 18 notice wasclearly an issue presented to us. Curtis argued that the notice"must unambiguously provide sufficient information to enable theinsured to determine whether the reason is valid," citingKujbida, which he misspelled. Curtis specifically argued thatAnthem's actions in continuing coverage despite repeated noticesof cancellation constituted a waiver of any right to strictlyinterpret the August 18 notice. This court is required to decidethis case and establish the precedent of our court. We should dothe best job we can. I reject the majority's suggestion that aninadequate presentation by the parties requires an inadequatedecision by this court.