The plaintiffs, Amanda and Brittany Adams, by their father and next friend, TommyAdams, and Tommy Adams, individually, filed this cause of action against the defendant,Harrah's Casino of Maryland Heights, Missouri, to recover damages for alleged personalinjuries to the minor plaintiffs, Amanda and Brittany, arising out of an incident on thedefendant's premises. The defendant filed a special and limited entry of appearance claimingthat the circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction over it. On February 4, 2002, the circuitcourt denied the defendant's motion and the defendant's motion for reconsideration, and thecourt certified the following questions for interlocutory review pursuant to Supreme CourtRule 308(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 308(a)): Can the circuit court properly exercise personaljurisdiction in a tort action over the defendant under the Illinois long-arm statute (735 ILCS5/2-209 (West 1998)), and if so, can such exercise of personal jurisdiction satisfy therequirements for due process? We answer yes to the certified questions and remand this casefor further proceedings.

Subsequent to the February 4, 2002, order, the circuit court entered an ex parteamended order on February 15, 2002, that was never agreed to by the plaintiffs' counsel andincluded more facts than the original certified questions. For these reasons, we will onlyconsider the original certified questions and the facts contained within the record on appeal. We note parenthetically that the additional facts in the amended certified questions wouldhave made no difference because those facts are contained within the record on appeal.

Generally, an appeal under Rule 308 is limited to the question that is identified by thecircuit court. Johnson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 323 Ill. App. 3d376, 379, 752 N.E.2d 449, 452 (2001). When the circuit court has not heard testimony, thestandard of review for a permissive interlocutory appeal of a certified question is de novo(El-Amin v. Dempsey, 329 Ill. App. 3d 800, 802, 768 N.E.2d 344, 346 (2002)). See Gaidarv. Tippecanoe Distribution Service, Inc., 299 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 1039-40, 702 N.E.2d 316,319 (1998).

Initially, the plaintiff carries the burden of establishing a prima facie basis uponwhich jurisdiction over nonresidents can be exercised. International Business MachinesCorp. v. Martin Property & Casualty Insurance Agency, Inc., 281 Ill. App. 3d 854, 857-58,666 N.E.2d 866, 868 (1996). Once the plaintiff demonstrates the requisite minimumcontacts to establish personal jurisdiction, the defendant bears the burden of showing whythe assertion of jurisdiction over the defendant would be unreasonable. WorldtronicsInternational, Inc. v. Ever Splendor Enterprise Co., Inc., 969 F. Supp. 1136, 1142 (N.D. Ill.1997).

The Illinois long-arm statute allows Illinois courts to exercise personal jurisdictionover nonresident defendants. 735 ILCS 5/2-209(a), (b), (c) (West 1998). Although, at onetime, subsection (a) of the long-arm statute listed the only acts that could form the basis forpersonal jurisdiction, subsection (c) was added in a 1989 amendment and is a catchallprovision. Subsection (c) states as follows: "(c) A court may also exercise jurisdiction onany other basis now or hereafter permitted by the Illinois Constitution and the Constitutionof the United States." 735 ILCS 5/2-209(c) (West 1998). Illinois courts have treated section2-209(c) as an independent basis for asserting in personam jurisdiction over a defendant. Flint v. Court Appointed Special Advocates of Du Page County, Inc., 285 Ill. App. 3d 152,165, 674 N.E.2d 831, 841 (1996); Allerion, Inc. v. Nueva Icacos, S.A. de C.V., 283 Ill. App.3d 40, 47, 669 N.E.2d 1158, 1163 (1996). Thus, an Illinois court may exercise personaljurisdiction over a nonresident defendant as long as the exercise of such jurisdiction offendsneither federal nor state guarantees of due process. 735 ILCS 5/2-209(c) (West 1998).

Federal due process requires that, in order for a court to exercise in personamjurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, it is necessary that the defendant have certainminimum contacts with the forum state such that the maintenance of the suit there does notoffend " 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' " International Shoe Co. v.Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 90 L. Ed. 95, 102, 66 S. Ct. 154, 158 (1945) (quotingMilliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 85 L. Ed. 278, 283, 61 S. Ct. 339, 343 (1940)). Thoseminimum contacts must have a basis in " 'some act by which the defendant purposefullyavails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invokingthe benefits and protections of its laws.' " Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court ofCalifornia, 480 U.S. 102, 109, 94 L. Ed. 2d 92, 102, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1030 (1987) (quotingBurger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528, 542, 105 S. Ct. 2174,2183 (1985)). This requirement ensures that an alien defendant will not be forced to litigatein a distant or inconvenient forum solely as a result of random, fortuitous, or attenuatedcontacts or the unilateral act of a consumer or some other third person. Burger King Corp.,471 U.S. at 475, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 542, 105 S. Ct. at 2183. A court conducting a federal dueprocess analysis must consider whether (1) the nonresident defendant had minimum contactswith the forum state such that there was fair warning that the nonresident defendant may behailed into a forum court, (2) the action arose out of or related to the defendant's contactswith the forum state, and (3) it is reasonable to require the defendant to litigate in the forumstate. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 471-77, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 540-44, 105 S. Ct. at 2181-84.

The minimum-contacts and fair-warning requirements are satisfied if the defendanthas purposefully directed its activities at Illinois residents, reached out beyond one state tocreate continuing relationships with citizens of another state, or purposefully derivedbenefits from its activities within the forum state. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 471-74,85 L. Ed. 2d at 540-41, 105 S. Ct. at 2181-83.

In the instant case, the plaintiffs showed that the defendant maintains a significantcustomer base from Illinois. In fact, 63,596 of the defendant's gold card holders are fromIllinois. This is approximately one-third of all of the defendant's gold card holders. Additionally, the defendant has directed advertisements, flyers, brochures, and coupons toIllinois residents. The record also shows that the defendant actively advertises in magazines,newspapers, television, radio, and the yellow pages where Illinois residents will be lured bythose advertisements. Finally, the defendant advertises a free shuttle service from the Alton,Illinois, area. The free shuttle service requires no reservations, but seating is limited. Hence, there is no question that the defendant purposefully directed its activities towardIllinois residents and has reached out to create continuing relationships with those residents. Because the defendant has directed its activities toward the Illinois marketplace and hasderived an economic benefit as a result of those activities, the minimum-contacts and fair-warning requirements are satisfied.

The meaning of the minimum-contacts standard depends upon whether the forumasserts specific jurisdiction or general jurisdiction. Specific jurisdiction refers to jurisdictionover a defendant in a suit "arising out of or related to the defendant's contacts with theforum." Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414, 80 L. Ed.2d 404, 411, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 1872 (1984). General jurisdiction refers to suits neitherarising out of nor related to the defendant's contacts, and it is permitted only where thedefendant has "continuous and systematic general business contacts" with the forum. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A., 466 U.S. at 416, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 412, 104 S. Ct.at 1873.

The case at bar does not arise directly out of the defendant's contacts with Illinois. We conclude, however, that the defendant has maintained continuous and systematicbusiness contacts with Illinois that support the assertion of general jurisdiction over it. Therefore, the defendant's contacts with Illinois cannot be characterized as random,fortuitous, or attenuated. See Quaker Oats Co. v. Chelsea Industries, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 85,88 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (the assertion of jurisdiction was allowed where alien corporationsengaged in out-of-state activities that were sufficiently continuous and systematic to satisfydue process concerns; over a period of several years, the corporations sold substantialamounts of their products to customers located in Illinois and sent representatives to Illinoison several occasions to meet with customers).

In light of the defendant's substantial activities directed at the Illinois marketplace,the volume of Illinois customers, and the shuttle service from Illinois to Missouri, it isreasonable for Illinois courts to exercise in personam jurisdiction over the defendant. Asserting jurisdiction over the defendant does not violate federal due process requirements.

We also find that asserting in personam jurisdiction over the defendant is permissibleunder the Illinois Constitution. Due process in Illinois requires as follows: "Jurisdiction isto be asserted only when it is fair, just, and reasonable to require a nonresident defendant todefend an action in Illinois, considering the quality and nature of the defendant's acts whichoccur in Illinois or which affect interests located in Illinois." Rollins v. Ellwood, 141 Ill. 2d244, 275, 565 N.E.2d 1302, 1316 (1990).

As we have already demonstrated, the defendant in the case at bar has engaged ineconomic activities that have a substantial effect upon the people of the State of Illinois. The record demonstrates that the defendant shuttles Illinois residents who are planning togamble from Alton, Illinois, to its Missouri business. The defendant directs advertisements,flyers, brochures, and coupons to Illinois residents. The defendant advertises in magazines,newspapers, television, radio, and the yellow pages where Illinois residents will be urged to gamble. The record shows that the defendant's efforts have been successful, becauseone-third of all gold card members are Illinois residents. In light of the defendant'ssubstantial connections with Illinois, it is "fair, just, and reasonable" for an Illinois court toassert in personam jurisdiction over it. See Alderson v. Southern Co., 321 Ill. App. 3d 832,856-58, 747 N.E.2d 926, 946-48 (2001).

In summary, the certified questions were as follows: Can the circuit court properlyexercise personal jurisdiction in a tort action over the defendant under the Illinois long-armstatute (735 ILCS 5/2-209 (West 1998)), and if so, can such exercise of personal jurisdictionsatisfy the requirements for due process? We answer these questions in the affirmative.

Certified questions answered.

CHAPMAN and GOLDENHERSH, JJ., concur.

Opinion Filed: May 1, 2003

Justices: Honorable Gordon E. Maag, J.

Honorable Melissa A. Chapman, J.

Honorable Richard P. Goldenhersh, J.

Concur

Attorneys Williams Venker & Sanders LLC, Thomas L. Orris, C. Wayne Davis,

for Lucy T. Herbers, 10 S. Broadway, Suite 1600, St. Louis, MO 63102

Appellant

Attorney The Law Office of Michael J. Brunton, Michael J. Brunton, 100 East

for Clay Street, Suite 201, Home Federal Building, Collinsville, IL 62234

Appellees