PRESIDING JUSTICE CHAPMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

The defendants, Illinois Department of Human Services Secretary Linda Renee Bakerand former Governor George Ryan, appealed an order of the Madison County circuit court thatenjoined the Department of Human Services (DHS) from closing the Alton Mental HealthCenter (Alton) and ordered it to follow the procedures contained in the Illinois HealthFacilities Planning Act (Planning Act) (20 ILCS 3960/1 et seq. (West 2002)), which requirea permit from the Health Facilities Planning Board (Planning Board) before any health facilitycan be modified (20 ILCS 3960/5 (West 2002)). They contend that (1) the plaintiffs lackstanding to bring the instant action, (2) some plaintiffs are barred by principles of collateralestoppel from raising the issues involved, (3) the action is barred by sovereign immunity, and(4) the Planning Act does not require a permit to close Alton's civil unit. We agree that theprivate plaintiffs lack standing, but we find that the State's Attorney may maintain this action,and we affirm the trial court's order.

Alton, which is run by DHS, provides residential mental health care services in twodistinct and separate units: the forensic unit treats patients who are committed through thecriminal justice system, while the civil unit provides care to patients who are civillycommitted. In June 2002, due to a reduction in the funding allocated for Alton, DHSannounced plans to close the civil unit at Alton. A plan entitled "Preliminary Plan for theRestructuring of the Metro East Network Community Mental Health Service System" calledfor several patients in Alton's civil unit to be transferred to the Choate Mental Health Facility(Choate) in Anna, Illinois. Choate is 142 miles from Alton. Some of these patients weretransferred to Choate during the summer of 2002. The plan called for other patients to betransferred to private hospitals in the Metro East area, which would provide services to themthrough contracts with DHS. The remaining patients were to be discharged and referred tononresidential mental health services in the community.

The plaintiffs in the instant suit are the American Federation of State, County andMunicipal Employees, Council 31 (AFSCME), a union representing Alton employees; GinaRives, a pharmacy technician employed at Alton who serves on the executive board ofAFSCME Local 124; and William Mudge, the State's Attorney of Madison County, the countyin which Alton is situated. Mudge was substituted as a party for his predecessor as State'sAttorney, William Haine, who had sued in his official capacity on behalf of the people ofMadison County. On August 14, 2002, the plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking to enjoin thedefendants from closing the civil unit at Alton until they had complied with the permitrequirement of the Planning Act (20 ILCS 3960/5 (West 2002)). On the same day, theplaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order. On August 22, the parties enteredinto a "standstill agreement," pursuant to which the defendants agreed not to close the civil unituntil the court held a final hearing on the merits. The agreement further provided that theparties would stipulate to the relevant facts in the case, in order to expedite the final hearing. Because the standstill agreement rendered it moot, the plaintiffs voluntarily withdrew theirmotion for a temporary restraining order.

On September 18, 2002, the parties entered into a stipulation of facts. The same day,the trial court heard oral arguments in the matter and granted the plaintiffs' request for apermanent injunction. On October 8, the defendants filed a motion to reconsider, which thecourt denied on October 18. This appeal followed.

The defendants contend that the plaintiffs lack standing to bring the instant action. Inso contending, they argue that the Planning Act does not allow for suits either by privatecitizens or by State's Attorneys to enforce its permitting provisions. They further argue thatAFSCME's and Rives' interests in the litigation are insufficient to confer standing and that bothAFSCME and Rives are barred by collateral estoppel because the issues presented herein weredecided adversely to them in American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees,Council 31 v. Ryan, 332 Ill. App. 3d 866, 773 N.E.2d 739 (2002). There, with one judgedissenting, the Fourth District of the Illinois Appellate Court held that private plaintiffs,including AFSCME, did not have a right to bring an action to enforce the permit requirementof the Planning Act. Ryan, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 872, 773 N.E.2d at 743. For the reasons thatfollow, we find that the Planning Act does not preclude an enforcement action by the MadisonCounty State's Attorney. We agree, however, that the Planning Act does not contemplateprivate enforcement actions by plaintiffs in the position of AFSCME and Rives. Thus, we neednot reach the parties' arguments relating to collateral estoppel or AFSCME's and Rives'standing.

In Ryan the Fourth District faced facts nearly identical to those before us. There, muchthe same as here, the plaintiffs included AFSCME and one of its officers who was an employeeof the Lincoln Development Center. Additional plaintiffs included the state representative inwhose district the center was located and the parents of a long-term resident and patient of thecenter. Ryan, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 869, 773 N.E.2d at 741. Early in 2002, DHS begandeveloping alternate plans to either downsize or close the Lincoln Development Center. Ryan,332 Ill. App. 3d at 869, 773 N.E.2d at 741. The plaintiffs filed an action seeking to enjoinDHS from closing the center without first obtaining a permit. Ryan, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 869,773 N.E.2d at 741. The trial court entered a preliminary injunction ordering the defendantsto obtain a permit prior to implementing their plans to downsize the center, and the defendantsappealed. Ryan, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 870, 773 N.E.2d at 741. While the initial appeal waspending, however, DHS decided that it would close Lincoln Development Center, and SecretaryBaker applied for a permit. Ryan, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 869, 773 N.E.2d at 741. As a result, thepending appeal was dismissed as moot. Ryan, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 870, 773 N.E.2d at 741.

The plaintiffs next filed a motion for a temporary restraining order to enjoin DHS fromtransferring patients from the center until the Planning Board ruled on its permit application. The trial court granted the motion and the defendants appealed. Ryan, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 870,773 N.E.2d at 741.

Although the parties raised other issues, the appellate court considered only whetherthe plaintiffs before it were authorized to bring the underlying action. Writing for themajority, Justice Steigmann examined sections 15 and 17 of the Planning Act (20 ILCS3960/15, 17 (West 2000)). Section 15 provides, in relevant part as follows:

"Notwithstanding the existence or pursuit of any other remedy, the [State PlanningBoard] or the [Illinois Department of Public Health] may, *** upon the advice of theAttorney General[,] who shall represent the [State Planning Board] or the [Departmentof Public Health] in the proceedings, maintain an action in the name of the State ***to restrain or prevent *** construction or modification of a health care facility withoutthe proper permit ***." 20 ILCS 3960/15 (West 2002).

Section 17 provides, "It is hereby specifically declared that the powers and functions exercisedand performed by the State pursuant to this Act are exclusive to the State of Illinois and thatthese powers and functions shall not be exercised *** by any home rule unit." 20 ILCS3960/17 (West 2002). The court concluded that these two sections confer exclusive authorityto enforce the Planning Act's permit requirement on the Planning Board and the Departmentof Public Health. Ryan, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 872, 773 N.E.2d at 743. In so concluding, thecourt reasoned that to hold otherwise would "render superfluous the requirement in section 15that the Planning Board or the Illinois Department of Public Health proceed on the advice ofthe Attorney General, who shall represent them in the proceedings." Ryan, 332 Ill. App. 3d at872, 773 N.E.2d at 743. Justice Appleton wrote a special concurrence in which he concludedthat each plaintiff lacked standing, and Justice Myerscough dissented.

The defendants contend that Ryan, as the only Illinois appellate decision to address theissue we face, is binding precedent that required the trial court (and, by implication, requiresthis court) to find that no one but the Attorney General is authorized to bring an enforcementaction under the Planning Act. The plaintiffs, by contrast, argue that Ryan does not constitutea final binding opinion to which principles of stare decisis may be applied. They contend thatJustice Appleton, in his special concurrence, rejected Justice Steigmann's conclusion that thePlanning Act prohibited private actions and that, therefore, there was no majority consensus. We agree with the defendants that Justice Appleton did, in fact, agree with Justice Steigmann'sopinion and wrote separately only to emphasize the alternative basis for the court's ruling thathe concluded existed. See Ryan, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 873, 773 N.E.2d at 744 (Appleton, J.,specially concurring). Nevertheless, principles of stare decisis do not require us to followthe decisions of other districts of the Illinois Appellate Court. Loftis v. Vesta Cos., 292 Ill.App. 3d 772, 775, 686 N.E.2d 383, 385 (1997). We should not discount a decision lightlywhen we face issues and facts similar to those that confronted the court rendering the decision. If, however, we find its reasoning unpersuasive, we may decline to follow its holding. Loftis,292 Ill. App. 3d at 775, 686 N.E.2d at 385. This is so even where, as here, the opinion wedecline to follow is the only Illinois appellate case to address the issue before us. Loftis, 292Ill. App. 3d at 774, 686 N.E.2d at 385.

We choose not to adopt the reasoning of the Fourth District in Ryan because we do notfind it persuasive. Unlike the majority opinion there, we think the plain and unambiguouslanguage of the Planning Act is silent on the right of parties other than the Illinois AttorneyGeneral to enforce its provisions. As Justice Myerscough observed in her dissent:

"[N]owhere does the [Planning] Act prevent anyone, even a home-rule unit, frommaintaining an action for [an] injunction to require compliance with the Planning Act.[Section 17 (20 ILCS 3960/17 (West 2000))] merely limits the use of the PlanningAct's regulatory powers to the State, not home-rule units." Ryan, 332 Ill. App. 3d at875, 773 N.E.2d at 745 (Myerscough, J., dissenting).

She went on to explain that the "powers and duties" that are exclusive to the State pursuant tosection 17 are those regulatory powers listed in the sections delineating the powers and dutiesof the Planning Board (20 ILCS 3960/12 (West 2002)) and the Department of Public Health(20 ILCS 3960/12.2 (West 2002)). In other words, section 17 merely provides that only theState agencies charged with regulating health care facilities may do so. Ryan, 332 Ill. App. 3dat 875, 773 N.E.2d at 745 (Myerscough, J., dissenting). While section 17 prohibits MadisonCounty from issuing a permit to Alton, it does not prohibit the county from bringing an actionto compel DHS to comply with the Planning Act.

We also disagree with the Ryan majority's conclusion that a holding like ours wouldrender superfluous the language in section 15 providing that the Attorney General shallrepresent the Planning Board or the Department of Public Health should either of them bringan action to enforce the permit requirement. Rather, we think it means just what it says-thatif either of these State agencies brings an enforcement action, the Attorney General willrepresent the agency.

Moreover, the statute expressly states that its provisions apply "[n]otwithstanding theexistence or pursuit of any other remedy." 20 ILCS 3960/15 (West 2002). The Ryan majoritydismisses this language, stating that it means only that the agencies named in the statute mighthave other remedies. Ryan, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 872, 773 N.E.2d at 743. This court, however,has interpreted similar statutory language to demonstrate a legislative intent to supplementexisting remedies rather than to restrict them. Giles v. General Motors Corp., 344 Ill. App.3d 1191, 1198, 802 N.E.2d 858, 864 (2003). Thus, we do not believe that the Planning Actprecludes actions for injunctive relief, a remedy that is ordinarily available to enjoin publicofficials from performing acts that are illegal or beyond the scope of their official duties. SeeRyan, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 872, 773 N.E.2d at 743 (acknowledging that such a remedy would beavailable absent express statutory language to the contrary); see also Village of Westmont v.Lenihan, 301 Ill. App. 3d 1050, 1060, 704 N.E.2d 891, 898 (1998) (citing Lindsey v. Boardof Education of City of Chicago, 127 Ill. App. 3d 413, 422, 468 N.E.2d 1019, 1026 (1984)).

Although we find that the Planning Act does not preclude enforcement actions byparties other than the Attorney General, we agree with the Ryan court that it does not permitAFSCME and Rives to sue to enforce its permit requirement. The rationale by which we reachthis conclusion, however, is quite different from that of the Ryan court. This difference iscrucial to our determination that the State's Attorney, unlike the private plaintiffs, does havethe authority to bring this suit.

Although the Planning Act does not expressly limit enforcement actions to the AttorneyGeneral, it does not expressly provide a private right of action either. Where a piece oflegislation contains no express language providing for a private right to file an enforcementaction, we will find such a right implicit in the legislation only if all the following fourrequirements are met: (1) the plaintiffs are members of a class of people for whose benefitthe statute was enacted, (2) the plaintiffs' injuries are the type of injury the statute wasdesigned to protect, (3) permitting a private right of action is consistent with the underlyingpurpose of the statute, and (4) allowing a private right of action is necessary to effectuate thepurposes of the statute involved. Moore v. Lumpkin, 258 Ill. App. 3d 980, 989, 630 N.E.2d982, 989 (1994).

AFSCME and Rives do not satisfy the first two requirements. Where a statute isintended to benefit the public at large, rather than a particular segment of the population, courtsdo not recognize an implicit legislative intent to create a private right of action. Moore, 258Ill. App. 3d at 991, 630 N.E.2d at 990. The Planning Act applies not only to State-run mentalhealth care facilities but also to all public and private ambulatory surgical centers, hospitals,nursing homes, and kidney disease treatment centers. 20 ILCS 3960/3 (West 2002). Thus,it covers such a wide range of health care services that most Illinoisans will benefit from itsprotections at some point. Moreover, one express purpose of the Planning Act is to ensure"the availability of quality health care to the general public." (Emphasis added.) 20 ILCS3960/2 (West 2002). Thus, we must conclude that AFSCME and Rives do not belong to aclass for whose particular benefit the Planning Act was enacted. Further, the injuries theyallege are not the type of harm the Planning Act was meant to prevent. They allege thatAFSCME members will be laid off from their jobs if the civil unit is closed and that theirprofessional interest in seeing that mental health care is accessible and available will beharmed. The plaintiffs argue that the loss of employment income is a tangible loss and thatprotecting against it is sufficient to confer standing. See Greer v. Illinois HousingDevelopment Authority, 122 Ill. 2d 462, 493, 524 N.E.2d 561, 575 (1988) (noting thateconomic injuries are generally sufficient to confer standing). We need not determinewhether either of these interests is direct enough to give Rives or AFSCME standing, however,because an application of this principle presupposes the existence of a cause of action. Indetermining the existence of an implicit private right to file an enforcement action, we mustconsider not whether the plaintiffs have any legally cognizable interest but whether theirinterest is of the type meant to be protected by the legislation at issue. The Planning Act wasintended to contain the rising costs of health care and to ensure the availability of quality healthcare services to the public. 20 ILCS 3960/2 (West 2002). It was not meant to protect the jobsor professional interests of health care workers, even if these interests might benefit as anincidental result. We thus conclude that neither the first requirement nor the secondrequirement for finding an implied private right to bring an enforcement action has been met.

Having concluded that AFSCME and Rives do not have the right to bring an enforcementaction under the Planning Act, our disposition turns on whether the Planning Act permitsState's Attorney Mudge to bring the action. We conclude that it does.

The State's Attorney is a constitutional officer whose duties and powers largely parallelthose of the Attorney General. People ex rel. Kunstman v. Nagano, 389 Ill. 231, 249, 59N.E.2d 96, 104 (1945). Where the powers of the two offices coincide, they may be exercisedeither concurrently by both or independently by either. People v. Dasaky, 303 Ill. App. 3d986, 991-92, 709 N.E.2d 635, 640 (1999). One important duty of the State's Attorney is to"commence and prosecute all actions, suits, indictments[,] and prosecutions, civil andcriminal, in the circuit court for his county, in which the people of the State or county may beconcerned." (Emphasis added.) 55 ILCS 5/3-9005(a)(1) (West 2002). Access to quality localmental health care services and the opportunity to participate in the permit process throughpublic hearings (see 20 ILCS 3960/10 (West 2002)) are matters of public interest in whichthe people of Madison County have an interest. Thus, we find that the instant case fallssquarely within the State's Attorney's statutorily prescribed duties, absent an express provisionto the contrary.

Further, we find that the Planning Act grants implicit authority to the State's Attorneysto enforce its provisions because that authority is necessary to effectuate the purposes of thePlanning Act. This is especially true where, as here, the health care provider seeking to modifya facility is a State agency. The Attorney General is charged with the duty of defending allactions and proceedings against State officers and agencies. 15 ILCS 205/4 (West 2002). Thus, were State's Attorneys not authorized to bring enforcement actions under the PlanningAct, the Attorney General would be charged both with defending DHS and prosecuting anaction to compel DHS to comply with the permit requirement. The difficulties inherent insuch a dual role are readily apparent. Moreover, the Planning Act expressly provides for thedelegation of some of its regulatory authority to local and regional health care planningorganizations. 20 ILCS 3960/8 (West 2002) (requiring the Department of Public Health tohelp communities and regions establish area-wide health care planning organizations andprescribing their duties); 20 ILCS 3960/2 (West 2002) (defining area-wide and local healthcare planning organizations). The Planning Act also provides that the Planning Board mayrequest assistance from county health departments and municipal health boards in determiningwhether to grant a permit. 20 ILCS 3960/7 (West 2002). These provisions recognize the needfor local involvement if the goal of providing access to quality health care throughout the Stateis to be met. Given this recognition of the importance of local input to achieving the expressgoals of the Planning Act, the impracticality of limiting enforcement to the Attorney Generalwhere the provider seeking a modification is a State agency, and the lack of any expressprovision prohibiting enforcement actions by State's Attorneys, we conclude that this actionby State's Attorney Mudge is warranted.

The defendants contend that they are not required to obtain a permit prior to closing thecivil unit at Alton. They base their contention on several definitions found in the Planning Actand the regulations promulgated thereunder. We find that their overly technical interpretationis at odds with the express purposes of the Planning Act.

The defendants argue that the closing of Alton's civil unit is not a "modification" underthe Planning Act. The Planning Act defines the "construction or modification" of a health carefacility as the "establishment, erection, building, alteration, reconstruction, modernization,improvement, extension, discontinuation, [or] change of ownership" of the facility. 20 ILCS3960/3 (West 2002). The closing of the entire civil unit at Alton is clearly a "modification"or "alteration" if we give these words their plain and ordinary meanings, as we are required todo when construing a statute (Land v. Board of Education of City of Chicago, 202 Ill. 2d 414,421, 781 N.E.2d 249, 254 (2002)). However, the regulations define an "alteration" as "anyrevision or change to a project *** that occurs after [Planning Board] issuance of the permit." 77 Ill. Adm. Code