No. 5-00-0465WC

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DIVISION

The claimant, Vernon Anderson, filed an application foradjustment of claim under the Workers' Occupational Diseases Act(Act) (820 ILCS 310/1 et seq. (West 1992)), seeking benefits for adepressive disorder which he alleged arose out of and in the courseof his employment with the East St. Louis Police Department (theDepartment). Following a hearing, an arbitrator awarded theclaimant temporary total disability (TTD) benefits for 79 weeks andordered the Department to pay $2,170 in medical expenses incurredby the claimant. The Industrial Commission (Commission) reversedthe arbitrator's decision and denied the claimant benefits underthe Act. The claimant sought judicial review of the Commission'sdecision in the circuit court of St. Clair County, which confirmedthe Commission's decision. The claimant then filed this timelyappeal. For the reasons which follow, we affirm.

The following factual recitation is taken from the evidencepresented at the arbitration hearing. The claimant joined theDepartment in 1977, advanced through the ranks, and was appointedan inspector in 1988. During this period of time, Alonzo Perronwas one of the claimant's supervisors. In 1980, Perron wasappointed assistant chief of the Department, and in May of 1991, hewas appointed chief of police. According to the claimant'stestimony, he had a number of "run-ins" with Perron, beginning asearly as 1980. The claimant testified, though, that the incidentsprior to 1989 "never amounted to anything."

On June 5, 1991, Perron issued an order reassigning theclaimant from his position as an inspector to the position ofsergeant in the Department's patrol division, a move which resultedin a $600.00 reduction in the claimant's annual salary. Theclaimant testified that Perron informed him of the reassignmentduring a closed-door meeting on June 9, 1991. According to theclaimant, after Perron informed him that he and his fellowinspectors would be reassigned to patrol duties, Perron then statedthat he was going to "destroy" the claimant and told the claimantthat he "better take out some more insurance." The claimant statedthat he interpreted Perron's statements to be a threat on his life.

The claimant testified that he went home after hisconversation with Perron but that, later that evening, he drove toPerron's home. According to the claimant, he "sat in [his] car fora while with a weapon." After a period of time, the claimant leftand went to a vacant house, where he sat until his father andbrother found him approximately four hours later.

On the following day, the claimant saw his personal physician,Dr. William Juergens. In his note of that visit, Dr. Juergensindicated that the claimant suffered from "job stress" and was toremain off work until he could be seen by Dr. Robert Hicks.

Dr. Hicks, a psychiatrist, evaluated the claimant on June 11,1991. According to Dr. Hicks's record of that evaluation, theclaimant reported that he had recently been demoted to the rank ofsergeant by the chief of police. The claimant reported a rivalrybetween himself and the chief and stated his belief that thechief's actions toward him were a political reprisal designed toharass him into quitting the police force. In his record, Dr.Hicks went on to state that the claimant "has recently beenobsessed by the idea of shooting the police chief, though he thinksthis would be an irrational move and would result in his death orincarceration." As a result of that evaluation, Dr. Hicks was ofthe impression that the claimant suffered from "probable majordepression with secondary obsessional thinking." On that same day,Dr. Hicks signed a note stating that the claimant was medicallyunable to work.

The claimant continued to treat with Dr. Hicks after hisinitial evaluation. His treatment consisted of anti-obsessionaland anti-depressant drugs and psychotherapy. Dr. Hicks did notauthorize the claimant to return to work until December 15, 1992. In a letter dated September 11, 1998, and addressed to theclaimant's attorney, Dr. Hicks opined that, although the claimant'swork environment was not totally responsible for his condition, itwas a "major factor in the intensity, severity, and duration of hisillness."

Perron testified that one of his job duties was to disciplinemembers of the Department, including the claimant, and that therewas nothing unique about his relationship with the claimant. Perron denied ever having harassed the claimant and specificallydenied threatening the claimant or telling the claimant that heneeded to obtain insurance.

The medical records of Drs. Juergens and Hicks were receivedinto evidence. These records contain absolutely no reference toany confrontation between the claimant and Perron on June 9, 1991,nor do they reflect that the claimant told either physician thatPerron had threatened him. Additionally, Dr. Juergens's medicalrecords indicate that he had been periodically prescribing Valiumfor the claimant's "anxiety" since 1976.

After the hearing, the arbitrator issued a written decisionfinding that the claimant established that he sustained anoccupational disease arising out of and in the course of hisemployment with the Department and that his condition was causallyrelated to that occupational disease. The arbitrator found theclaimant to be credible and held that Perron's threat to theclaimant's well-being was "beyond the common and necessary stressesof employment." The arbitrator relied on Dr. Hicks's letter insupport of her finding that a causal relationship existed betweenthe depression from which the claimant suffered and his employment. Based upon those findings, the arbitrator awarded the claimant 79weeks of TTD benefits for the period from June 11, 1991, throughDecember 15, 1992, and ordered the Department to pay $2,170 inmedical expenses incurred by the claimant.

The Department sought a review of the arbitrator's decision. The Commission issued a decision in which it reversed the arbitrator's decision and denied the claimant benefits under the Act. The Commission determined that the claimant failed to prove that hesustained an occupational disease arising out of and in the courseof his employment. Unlike the arbitrator, the Commission foundthat the claimant's testimony that he had been threatened by Perronwas not credible. It noted that the claimant's version of theevents of June 9, 1991, is wholly uncorroborated and finds nosupport in the records of his treating physicians. Additionally,the Commission found that the conditions under which the claimantworked were "not so outside the norm in terms of everydayemployment stresses occasioned by employees in general so as towarrant compensability." On review, the circuit court of St. ClairCounty confirmed the Commission's decision.

On appeal, the claimant attacks the Commission's finding thathe did not prove that he sustained an occupational disease arisingout of and in the course of his employment. He first contends thatthe Commission erroneously based this finding on the fact that histestimony regarding Perron's alleged threat was uncorroborated. Hefurther argues that the Commission's decision is against themanifest weight of the evidence. We disagree on both counts.

The claimant in an occupational disease case has the burden ofproving both that he suffers from an occupational disease and thata causal connection exists between the disease and his employment. The question of whether such a causal relationship exists is one offact for the Commission to decide. Payne v. Industrial Comm'n, 61Ill. 2d 66, 69, 329 N.E.2d 206 (1975).

In deciding questions of fact, it is the function of theCommission to judge the credibility of witnesses, resolve conflicting evidence, and draw whatever reasonable conclusions andinferences might be warranted by the evidence. General SteelIndustries v. Industrial Comm'n, 49 Ill. 2d 552, 555, 276 N.E.2d290 (1971). We will not substitute our judgment for that of theCommission on a factual issue unless the Commission's finding isagainst the manifest weight of the evidence. Orsini v. IndustrialComm'n, 117 Ill. 2d 38, 44, 509 N.E.2d 1005 (1987).

The Commission exercises original, rather than appellate,jurisdiction and is in no way bound by the arbitrator's findings. Paganelis v. Industrial Comm'n, 132 Ill. 2d 468, 483, 548 N.E.2d1033 (1989). We reject, as we have in the past, the argument thatan extra degree of scrutiny must be applied to a decision of theCommission which reverses the decision of an arbitrator. WagnerCastings Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 241 Ill. App. 3d 584, 594, 609N.E.2d 397 (1993).

In this case, the claimant testified that Perron threatenedhim on June 9, 1991. The arbitrator found the claimant to becredible and held that the incident was "beyond the common andnecessary stresses of employment." The arbitrator also found thatthe "[t]emporal relationship" between the confrontation which theclaimant claimed had occurred and the diagnosis of major depressivedisorder was a "substantial factor" in her decision. In contrast,the Commission did not find the claimant to be credible and,instead, believed Perron's testimony denying that he everthreatened the claimant. The Commission also noted that none ofthe claimant's medical records make reference to Perron's allegedthreats on June 9, 1991.

At the outset, we reject the claimant's argument that theCommission erred as a matter of law by basing its determinationthat he did not sustain a compensable injury on the fact that histestimony was uncorroborated. It is true, as the claimant asserts,that a recovery under the Act can be based upon an injuredemployee's uncorroborated testimony. Old Ben Coal Co. v.Industrial Comm'n, 198 Ill. App. 3d 485, 492, 555 N.E.2d 1201(1990). That does not, however, mean that uncorroborated testimonywill always support a benefit award. Rather, the Commission andreviewing courts can, and frequently do, take into considerationthe fact that a claimant's testimony is uncorroborated in resolvingissues of fact and making credibility determinations. SeeCaterpillar Tractor Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 83 Ill. 2d 213, 414N.E.2d 740 (1980); Walden v. Industrial Comm'n, 76 Ill. 2d 193, 390N.E.2d 911 (1979); Gallentine v. Industrial Comm'n, 201 Ill. App.3d 880, 559 N.E.2d 526 (1990).

The Commission based its determination that Perron did notthreaten the claimant on June 9, 1991, in part, on the fact thatthe claimant's testimony of those events was uncorroborated. TheCommission also relied on the contrary testimony of Perron and onthe fact that the records of the claimant's treating physicianscontain no reference to the alleged threats (see Jensen v. Elgin,Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co., 24 Ill. 2d 383, 388, 182 N.E.2d 211(1962) (statements as to cause of injury or condition made bypatient to physician from whom he seeks treatment fall withinguarantee of truthfulness)). Additionally, as the Commissionnoted, the claimant's original application for adjustment of claimalleged a date of accident "approximately on and after October1989." It was not until the arbitration hearing in September 1998that the claimant amended the date of accident to June 9, 1991, thedate of Perron's alleged threats. Based upon the record before us,we are unable to find that the Commission's determination that theclaimant's testimony regarding a threat by Perron was not credibleis against the manifest weight of the evidence.

The Commission also found that the claimant "offered noevidence of any unique aspect of his employment that one couldreasonably and objectively describe as anything people in thegeneral workforce are not commonly exposed to." As this courtstated in Runion v. Industrial Comm'n, 245 Ill. App. 3d 470, 473,615 N.E.2d 8 (1993):

"Recovery for nontraumatically induced mental disease islimited to those who can establish that: (1) the mentaldisorder arose in a situation of greater dimensions thanthe day-to-day emotional strain and tension which allemployees must experience; (2) the conditions exist inreality, from an objective standpoint; and (3) theemployment conditions, when compared with thenonemployment conditions, were the 'major contributorycause' of the mental disorder."

Accepting, as we must, the Commission's determination thatPerron did not threaten the claimant, there is nothing in therecord before us to support the proposition that the claimant'semployment exposed him to any greater stress or tension than onecould reasonably and objectively expect to encounter as a member ofthe general workforce. The claimant himself stated that, otherthan the alleged incident of June 9, 1991, the "run-ins" he claimedto have had with Perron "never amounted to anything."

For these reasons, we hold that the Commission's finding thatthe claimant failed to prove that he sustained an occupationaldisease arising out of and in the course of his employment with theDepartment and its denial of his claim for benefits under the Actare not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Consequently,we affirm the decision of the circuit court of St. Clair Countyconfirming the Commission's decision in this matter.

Affirmed.

McCULLOUGH, P.J., and O'MALLEY, HOLDRIDGE, and RARICK, JJ.,concur.