Beggs v. Griffith

SUPREME COURT CASES

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Beggs v. Griffith

State: Illinois

Court: 5th District Appellate

Docket No: 5-08-0083 Rel

Case Date: 08/25/2009

Preview:NO. 5-08-0083
NOTICE Decision filed 08/25/09. The text of this decision may be changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Peti tion for Rehearing or th e

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT ________________________________________________________________________ MELODY BEGGS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Marion County. ) v. ) No. 06-L-13 ) JAMES GRIFFITH, ) Honorable ) Patrick J. Hitpas, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ________________________________________________________________________ JUSTICE CHAPMAN delivered the opinion of the court: Defendant James Griffith appeals from the trial court's entry of a judgment on a jury's verdict finding in favor of plaintiff Melody Beggs for injuries and damages she sustained in an accident involving horses pastured on Griffith's property. He also appeals from the trial court's January 18, 2008, denial of his posttrial motion and the January 22, 2008, denial of his motion for a setoff. We affirm. FACTS Griffith had his house and acreage listed for sale. Until 2000, Griffith raised horses on his property. Due to declining health, he sold his horses. In the fall of 2005, as a favor to a friend and neighbor, Gailen Rankin, Griffith allowed Rankin to temporarily pasture on his property eight or nine horses that Rankin owned. This was not a contractual relationship and apparently no money exchanged hands. Before the horses were brought to Griffith's property, Rankin installed a battery-operated electric fence to contain them. Rankin paid for and maintained the fence. Rankin provided his horses with all the grain, exercise, grooming, training, and medical attention. Griffith had no active involvement with the horses. The

disposition of the same.

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horses also had open access to Griffith's barn for shelter. Plaintiff Melody Beggs and her husband were in the market for property that would accommodate their animals, which included horses, donkeys, and goats. Melody contacted a realtor, who scheduled an October 11, 2005, showing of Griffith's home and property. At the showing were Melody, her husband, Dennis Beggs, Melody's brother and sister-in-law, Scott and Judy Beckmann, and the real estate agent, Lori Baldridge. Both Griffith and Rankin were present but did not take part in the tour of the property. After viewing the house, Melody and the others began looking over the grounds. The horses were in a pasture separated from the house area by way of a fence. When Lori Baldridge went to ask Griffith a question, they saw the horses in the pasture next to the barn and witnessed one horse walking up towards the barn. Griffith indicated to Lori that the horse must be coming up for a treat. Melody opened up the gate and entered the pasture. Upon entering the pasture, Melody also noticed the presence of the horses. She and the others continued walking through the pasture towards the barn in order to "see what condition the barn was in." Three horses followed them into the barn through an open door on the east side of the barn. The horses then walked up behind Melody and the others and passed them by. Immediately after passing Melody and her companions, the horses turned and suddenly ran side-by-side straight back towards the barn door opening. Melody testified that she was in the middle of the group and tried to turn and get out of the horses' way when she realized what the horses were doing. She was struck on her left side by one of the horses and fell on her right hand. She claimed that the sequence of events had happened too quickly to have avoided contact with the horse. Her husband testified that Melody was struck by the side of the horse, knocking her to the ground and actually pushing her across the barn floor. She sustained a fairly substantial wrist fracture. Melody's theory in this case is that at the time of the injury, she was on Griffith's

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property at his invitation as a potential purchaser and that the barn inspection was a part of the real estate showing. Additionally, Melody contends that Griffith knew that the horses had open access to the barn for shelter. Melody argues that, knowing all this, Griffith did nothing to prevent the horses from coming into contact with the plaintiff when he clearly had the ability to do so. Under these circumstances, Melody contended that Griffith maintained some control over the horses akin to an owner within the purview of the Animal Control Act (the Act) (510 ILCS 5/1 et seq. (West 2004)). Initially, Melody only sued Griffith, but upon learning that the horses were owned by Rankin, not Griffith, she amended her complaint to name him as a second defendant. Before the trial, she dismissed her claim against Rankin and further dismissed her negligence claim against Griffith. The case proceeded to a trial in November 2007 against Griffith solely on an Animal Control Act claim. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Melody in the amount of $27,276.73. Griffith filed a posttrial motion seeking a new trial and also seeking a setoff. The trial court denied the motion for a new trial on January 18, 2008, and denied the request for a setoff on January 22, 2008. Griffith appeals. ISSUES AND ANALYSIS Animal Control Act On appeal, Griffith contends that Melody did not present a prima facie case pursuant to the Animal Control Act because the plaintiff did not prove that Griffith was an "owner" of the horses and the plaintiff did not prove that the horses acted "without provocation" within the meaning of the Act. Griffith also contends that Melody is not within the class of people protected under the Act or, alternatively, that she assumed the risk of injury. We turn to the applicable sections of the Animal Control Act. At the time of the incident, section 16 stated as follows: "If a dog or other animal, without provocation, attacks or injures any person

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who is peaceably conducting himself in any place where he may lawfully be, the owner of such dog or other animal is liable in damages to such person for the full amount of the injury sustained." 510 ILCS 5/16 (West 2004). Owner In order for Griffith to be liable pursuant to the Animal Control Act, he must necessarily be deemed an "owner" of the horses. The term "owner" is further defined in the Act as "any person having a right of property in an animal, or who keeps or harbors an animal, or who has it in his care, or acts as its custodian." 510 ILCS 5/2.16 (West 2004). The definition is broader than actual ownership of the animal but requires a position of some control like that an owner would maintain. Frost v. Robave, Inc., 296 Ill. App. 3d 528, 533, 694 N.E.2d 581, 584 (1998). In determining the "control" required for the liability of a keeper or harborer of an animal, the focal point is the precise moment of the accident at issue

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