The Bond County Board of Review (Board of Review) petitioned the circuit court foradministrative review, contesting the determination of the Illinois Property Tax AppealBoard (PTAB) that two parcels of land owned by Clarence H. Potthast, Jr., should beclassified as farmland. The PTAB appeals the circuit court's decision classifying the parcelsas residential. We reverse the decision of the circuit court and affirm the decision of the PTAB.

In 1974, Norbert and Margaret Zahner subdivided a nine-acre tract of land into threeparcels, and the Bond County officials recorded the subdivision. The Zahners neverimproved the property for residential use and subsequently sold two of the parcels, totaling6.31 acres, to Clarence Potthast, Sr., who sold them to his son, Clarence H. Potthast, Jr., in1994. From 1994 to 1999, Potthast prepared, planted, and harvested hay and stored hay andlogs on the two parcels, using neither of the parcels for residential purposes.

For the 1999 assessment year, the Board of Review assigned to Potthast's property anassessed value of $4,619 for the four-acre parcel and an assessed value of $1,937 for the two-acre parcel, based on the parcels' highest and best use as rural residential lots. Potthastcomplained to the Board of Review that the parcels should be valued as farmland and not asresidential property. The Board of Review affirmed the assessments, and Potthast appealedto the PTAB.

Before the PTAB, the Board of Review did not dispute Potthast's contention that heused the parcels as farmland and had done so for the previous five years. Instead, the Boardof Review argued that, because the parcels were parts of a recorded subdivision, they wereproperly assessed as residential lots.

On August 23, 2000, the PTAB disagreed with the Board of Review and reclassifiedthe property from residential to agricultural. On January 10, 2001, after receiving certifiedvalues from the Board of Review, the PTAB issued a final administrative decision indicatingthat Potthast's four-acre parcel should be valued at $180 and his two-acre parcel should bevalued at $53.

On February 9, 2001, the Board of Review filed its complaint for administrativereview in the Bond County circuit court. On December 19, 2001, the circuit court reversedthe PTAB's decision, holding that sections 9-65 and 10-30 of the Property Tax Code (theCode) (35 ILCS 200/9-65, 10-30 (West 2002)), when construed together, mandate that theparcels be taxed as rural residential.

On January 18, 2002, the PTAB filed its notice of appeal.

The PTAB asserts that because Potthast used the land for farming in 1999 and formany years prior to 1999, the property should be classified as agricultural. The Board ofReview counters that because the property was subdivided, the property must be classifiedas rural residential.

This court gives substantial weight and deference to the statutory interpretations ofan administrative agency charged with the statute's administration and enforcement. IllinoisPower Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 111 Ill. 2d 505, 510-11 (1986). The agency'sinterpretations, while not binding on courts, are considered an informed source forascertaining the legislative intent because of the agency's expertise and experience inenforcing the statute, and courts will rely on the agency's interpretation of the statute'smeaning. Illinois Power Co., 111 Ill. 2d at 511; Grundy County National Bank v. PropertyTax Appeal Board, 297 Ill. App. 3d 774, 776 (1998).

"The primary rule of statutory interpretation and construction is to ascertain andeffectuate the true intent and meaning of the legislature." Lake County Board of Review v.Property Tax Appeal Board, 192 Ill. App. 3d 605, 616 (1989). When a statute has not beenjudicially interpreted, the reviewing court is guided by the plain meaning of the statute'slanguage and the legislative intent. Lake County Board of Review, 192 Ill. App. 3d at 616-17.

Taxing laws are strictly construed and are not to be extended beyond the clear importof the language used. Getto v. City of Chicago, 77 Ill. 2d 346, 359 (1979). Any doubt oftheir application will be construed most strongly against the government and in favor of thetaxpayer. Getto, 77 Ill. 2d at 359.

Section 10-110 of the Code provides, "The equalized assessed value of a farm, asdefined in Section 1-60 [(35 ILCS 200/1-60 (West 2002))] and if used as a farm for the 2preceding years ***, shall be determined as described in Sections 10-115 through 10-140[(35 ILCS 200/10-115 through 10-140 (West 2002))]." 35 ILCS 200/10-110 (West 2002).Sections 10-115 through 10-140 set forth methods for valuing farm property. A farm isdefined in section 1-60: "any property used solely for the growing and harvesting of crops[,]*** including, but not limited to, hay ***." 35 ILCS 200/1-60 (West 2002). The present useof land determines whether it is entitled to a farmland classification for assessment purposes. Sante Fe Land Improvement Co. v. Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board of Department ofLocal Government Affairs, 113 Ill. App. 3d 872, 875 (1983).

In 1999, and in the two preceding years, Potthast used the property for agriculturalpurposes, to harvest hay; and generally, the parcels must be classified and valued accordingto their use as farmland. The Board of Review, however, contends that when section 9-65of the Code is read in conjunction with section 10-30 of the Code, the assessor is mandatedto increase Potthast's assessment from agricultural to rural residential use, even though theparcels were used for agricultural purposes. We disagree.

Section 9-65 of the Code states:

"Except as otherwise provided by Section 10-30 ***, whenever acreageproperty has been subdivided into lots and the subdivision has been recorded[,] thelots shall be reassessed and placed upon the assessor's books, replacing the acreageproperty, as of the first day of January immediately following the date of therecording or filing of the subdivision." 35 ILCS 200/9-65 (West 2002).

Section 10-30(a) of the Code states:

"(a) *** the platting and subdivision of property into separate lots and thedevelopment of the subdivided property with streets, sidewalks, curbs, gutters, sewer,water[,] and utility lines shall not increase the assessed valuation of all or any part ofthe property, if:

(1) The property is platted and subdivided in accordance with the PlatAct [(765 ILCS 205/0.01 et seq. (West 2002))];

(2) The platting occurs after January 1, 1978;

(3) At the time of platting the property is in excess of 10 acres; and

(4) At the time of platting the property is vacant or used as a farm asdefined in Section 1-60." 35 ILCS 200/10-30(a) (West 2002).

Section 9-65 requires that once acreage property has been subdivided into lots and thesubdivision has been recorded, the assessor must reassess the lots, replacing the acreageproperty, by the first day of January following the date of the recording or filing of thesubdivision. 35 ILCS 200/9-65 (West 2002); see Kennedy Brothers, Inc. v. Property TaxAppeal Board, 158 Ill. App. 3d 154, 164 (1987) (this section provides for the reassessmentof acreage property that has been subdivided).

Nothing in the language of section 9-65 requires the assessor to ignore the present useof the property and automatically reassess subdivided agricultural property as residential. If the subdivided farmland continues to be used as a farm, as defined in section 1-60 of the Code, then it shall be assessed as a farm pursuant to section 10-110 of the Code. 35 ILCS200/1-60, 10-110 (West 2002). If the subdivided farmland's use changes to residential, asis evidenced by the development of roads, sewers, etc., then the assessor shall reassess theland as residential, unless the taxpayer falls within the criteria enumerated in section 10-30(35 ILCS 200/10-30 (West 2002)).

Section 10-30 of the Code was enacted to protect real estate developers, who changethe use of property from farmland to residential or commercial or industrial use, from risingassessments that result from the initial platting and dividing of the farmland. KennedyBrothers, Inc., 158 Ill. App. 3d at 160; see 83d Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, June24, 1983, at 184 (statements of Representative Slape) (if a person buys more than 10 acresand puts in water lines, streets, or curb and guttering improvements, the assessment does notrise until he sells the lot).

Section 10-30(a), which involves "the platting and subdivision of property" in additionto "the development of the subdivided property" (35 ILCS 200/10-30(a) (West 2002)),presumes a change of use from farmland to residential once a subdivision is combined withdevelopment. Section 10-30 protects the taxpayer, i.e., the real estate developer, from anincreased assessment, notwithstanding the change to residential use, if the taxpayerestablishes the preferential property tax assessment criteria in section 10-30(a). See 35 ILCS200/10-30(a) (West 2002). Section 10-30, in conjunction with section 9-65, allows ataxpayer to avoid an increased assessment even though the property has been developed withstreets, sidewalks, water, etc. and its use has changed to residential. However, sections 9-65and 10-30, when construed together, do not mandate an increased assessment for residentialuse if the property has not changed to residential use, has not been developed with streets,sidewalks, water, etc., and remains used for agricultural purposes.

Thus, section 9-65 leads to an increased assessment, based on a change of use fromfarmland to residential, whenever a subdivision of farmland coincides with the property'schange to residential use, such as when the property is developed with roads, sidewalks,utility lines, water, curbs, gutters, and sewers, as provided in section 10-30. 35 ILCS 200/9-65, 10-30 (West 2002); see Paciga v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 322 Ill. App. 3d 157(2001) (the developer subdivided the property and cut a road into the acres, thereby changingits use, but section 10-30(a) applied to prohibit an increased valuation); Grundy CountyNational Bank, 297 Ill. App. 3d 774 (the property had been used for agricultural purposesat the time of subdivision, but the trustee purchased the property to develop into a residentialsubdivision, and a reclassification from farmland to residential was appropriate because thepreferential property tax assessment under a previous version of section 10-30 did not apply). In the present case, although the parcels had been platted and subdivided in 1974,prior to Potthast's purchase, the parcels had not been improved for residential use, i.e., noone had developed the property with streets, sidewalks, curbs, gutters, sewer, water, or utilitylines. See 35 ILCS 200/10-30 (West 2002). Since 1994, Potthast has continued to use theland for agricultural purposes. Accordingly, the assessor's office, in reassessing the propertyfrom acreage to lots, pursuant to section 9-65, was not required to ignore its agricultural useand reassess the property from agricultural to residential. See 35 ILCS 200/9-65 (West2002).

We agree with the PTAB's decision and find that the parcels in question must beassessed as agricultural. We therefore reverse the circuit court's decision.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Bond County isreversed.

Reversed.

GOLDENHERSH and MAAG, JJ., concur.