JUSTICE WELCH delivered the opinion of the court:

DaimlerChrysler Corp. (the defendant) appeals from an order entered by the circuitcourt of Madison County denying the defendant's motion to transfer venue and motion todismiss on forum non conveniens grounds. Because we believe that the circuit court erredin denying the defendant's motion to transfer venue, this is the only issue we need to address. The facts in this case are as follows.

On June 2, 2000, Thomas Boxdorfer and Joanna Lane, individually and on behalf ofall others similarly situated (the plaintiffs), filed a complaint in Madison County against thedefendant. The complaint alleged one count of common law fraud and one count ofconsumer fraud. The plaintiffs complained that the paint on vehicles made by the defendantwas defective in that it would delaminate and the defendant failed to disclose this to theconsuming public, that the defendant failed to disclose that the defect might not exhibit itselfuntil after the warranty expired, and that the defendant failed to disclose that if the defect didnot exhibit itself until after the warranty expired, the defendant would not repair it.

The defendant points out on appeal, and the record supports, that this is at least thetenth time that the defendant has been sued on similar or identical grounds, by eitheridentical or similar plaintiffs, including two suits previously filed in Illinois. The plaintiffsdo not dispute the defendant's assertion that all previous actions have been dismissed.⁽¹⁾

On July 24, 2000, the defendant filed a motion to transfer venue to SangamonCounty. The defendant pointed out that although it is incorporated under the laws ofDelaware and its principal place of business is in Michigan, the defendant has a registeredagent in Sangamon County and that, therefore, venue is proper in Sangamon County. Thedefendant claimed that nothing in the plaintiffs' complaint demonstrates that venue is properin Madison County and that, therefore, the case should be transferred to Sangamon County.

On September 25, 2000, the plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to file an amendedcomplaint. In the proposed amended complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that venue was properin Madison County because (1) all the plaintiffs are citizens of Madison County, where thepaint on the plaintiffs' vehicles experienced delamination, (2) the defendant's fraud byomission directly affected the citizens of Madison County, and (3) the defendant hastransacted substantial business in Madison County through its authorized dealerships inMadison County.

In response to the plaintiffs' motion, the defendant filed a "renewed motion fortransfer of venue." The motion claimed that the plaintiffs' amended complaint does notsupport venue in Madison County. The defendant specifically disputed the plaintiffs'assertion that dealerships in Madison County acted as the defendant's agents. The defendantattached an affidavit to its motion. The affidavit stated the following: that the defendantdoes not sell automobiles directly to consumers but sells automobiles to dealers, who resellthe vehicles to individual members of the public; that dealerships pay the defendant forvehicles upon shipment; that the defendant does not have an ownership interest in anydealership in Madison County; that the defendant has no offices, manufacturing plants,facilities, or operations in Madison County; that most of the informational materialsdistributed by the defendant relating to automobile paint were developed at the defendant'soffices in Michigan; and that the defendant conducts no business in Madison County. Again, the motion sought to have the case transferred for improper venue to SangamonCounty, where the defendant has a registered agent.

On March 15, 2001, the circuit court of Madison County conducted a hearing on theplaintiffs' and the defendant's motions. There was no objection to the plaintiffs' motion toamend, so after granting the motion to amend, the court heard the parties' arguments basedon the facts alleged in the plaintiffs' amended complaint.

On March 22, 2001, the circuit court issued an order denying the defendant's motionto transfer venue. In its order, the circuit court noted that the plaintiffs purchased andgaraged their vehicles in Madison County and that the plaintiffs suffered damages to theirvehicles in Madison County. The circuit court held that these facts were "sufficient to meetthe requirements of venue" because they constituted "some part" of the transaction occurringin Madison County out of which the cause of action arose. The circuit court also found thatvenue was proper because local dealerships perform work in Madison County pursuant towarranties provided by the defendant and that the dealerships receive payments from thedefendant for that work. The circuit court denied the defendant's motion to transfer venue. The defendant now appeals this decision.

The sole issue raised by the defendant on appeal is whether the circuit court erred inholding that venue was established in Madison County and thereby denying the defendant'smotion to transfer venue. In order to properly address this issue, we must first set out theappropriate standard of review.

We begin by pointing out that there is a conflict within the appellate court pertainingto the appropriate standard of review for a circuit court's denial of a motion to transfervenue. Some cases have held that where the facts are undisputed, the appropriate standardof review is de novo. Reichert v. Court of Claims, 327 Ill. App. 3d 390, 393 (2002), vacatedon other grounds, No. 93319 (Ill. Feb. 21, 2003); Lake County Riverboat L.P. v. IllinoisGaming Board, 313 Ill. App. 3d 943 (2000). Other cases have held that the appropriatestandard of review is whether the circuit court abused its discretion. Southern & CentralIllinois Laborers District Council v. Illinois Health Facilities Planning Board, 331 Ill. App.3d 1112 (2002); Johnson v. Compost Products, Inc., 314 Ill. App. 3d 231 (2000). Webelieve that the de novo standard of review is applicable.

In Reichert⁽²⁾, a panel of this appellate district's court noted that the issue of whethervenue is proper raises a mixed question of law and fact. We then held that where the factsare undisputed in a motion-to-transfer-venue case, the issue becomes one of law and istherefore subject to de novo review. Reichert, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 394. The reason wedeclined to review under an abuse-of-discretion standard is because we reasoned that thedetermination of proper venue is not a discretionary decision but is compulsory. We holdto this reasoning.

The venue statute is section 2-101 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 735 ILCS 5/2-101(West 2000). It provides:

"Except as otherwise provided in this Act, every action must be commenced(1) in the county of residence of any defendant who is joined in good faith and withprobable cause for the purpose of obtaining a judgment against him or her and notsolely for the purpose of fixing venue in that county[] or (2) in the county in whichthe transaction or some part thereof occurred out of which the cause of action arose." (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/2-101 (West 2000).

We focus on the language that the action must be commenced in a county where one of tworequirements are satisfied. Nothing in the statute indicates that an action may be commencedin a county where certain requirements may apply. The statute clearly makes therequirements compulsory, and we find no room for a circuit court's discretion on whethercertain facts meet these requirements. Although we do acknowledge that a defendant maywaive the issue of proper venue, once a proper motion to transfer based on improper venueis made and proved, the circuit court has no discretion whether to grant it; the statute doesnot allow an action to be commenced where venue is not proper. Accordingly, we believethat either the facts of a case will establish venue under the law or they will not, and thecircuit court's decision after establishing those facts is a legal decision reviewed as a matterof law.

The two cases cited above that apply an abuse-of-discretion standard to a circuitcourt's decision pertaining to improper venue rely on the Illinois Supreme Court's decisionin Stambaugh v. International Harvester Co., 102 Ill. 2d 250 (1984). In Stambaugh, theIllinois Supreme Court held that the determination of proper venue is discretionary. Stambaugh, 102 Ill. 2d at 263. Although we do not lightly disregard the holding of thesupreme court, we do note that the case upon which Stambaugh relied as authority for theproper standard of review, Morrison v. Community Unit School District No. 1, 44 Ill. App.3d 315 (1976), did not involve a motion to transfer for improper venue. Instead, that caseinvolved a motion to transfer venue to a different court for fear that the inhabitants of thecounty were prejudiced against the movant and that a fair trial could not be received,pursuant to section 4 of "An Act to revise the law in relation to change of venue" (Ill. Rev.Stat. 1971, ch. 146,