No. 4-00-0562WC
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DIVISION
CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, ILLINOIS | ) | Appeal from the Court |
POLICE DEPARTMENT, | ) | of the 7th Judicial Circuit |
) | Sangamon County, Illinois | |
Appellant, | ) | |
) | No. 00 MR 40 | |
) | ||
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION and | ) | |
GLEN WESSEL, | ) | Honorable |
) | Thomas R. Appleton, | |
Appellees. | ) | Judge Presiding. |
) |
JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the Opinion of the Court:
Claimant, Glen Wessel, sought benefits pursuant to the Workers' CompensationAct (Act) (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 1996)) for injuries arising out of and in the course of hisemployment as a police officer/juvenile detective with the City of Springfield (employer). Ahearing was held before an arbitrator of the Illinois Industrial Commission (Commission). Thearbitrator denied the claim, finding that claimant had failed to prove that he sustained accidentalinjuries arising out of and in the course of his employment. On appeal, the Commission reversedthe decision of the arbitrator and found that claimant had proven that he sustained accidentalinjuries arising out of and in the course of his employment and that a causal connection existedbetween claimant's employment and his current condition of ill-being (acute hypertension). TheCommission awarded temporary total disability (TTD) benefits for a period of 22 5/7 weeks. The Commission also found that the claimant's condition had stabilized and he was entitled to nofurther TTD benefits. The Commission also noted that while the claimant had proven that hecould no longer work in law enforcement, he had failed to show that he was not employableelsewhere, had presented no evidence of a job search and made no request for vocationalrehabilitation. The Commission remanded the cause to the arbitrator for a finding as topermanency. The employer sought review from the circuit court of Sangamon County, whichconfirmed the order of the Commission. The employer then sought review in this court, takingissue with the Commission's finding that the claimant sustained injuries arising out of and in thecourse of his employment. We affirm.
The claimant, a 45-year-old juvenile detective began working as a police officerfor the employer in June 1982. He was generally assigned to a high crime area where his dutiesincluded handling murders and suicides. In October 1993, he was transferred to the JuvenileDivision. His duties as a juvenile detective included investigating criminal activities by juvenileoffenders, interviewing suspects and victims of crime and making arrests, including drug arrestsat crack houses. He investigated gang activity and his life had been threatened many times.
The claimant was diagnosed with hypertension in the early 1990s. In late 1995and early 1996, the claimant began having symptoms of headaches, severe pressure in his eyes,and his forearms throbbed and were in pain. He was placed on a series of medications in anattempt to control his hypertension, but his condition worsened. During the last months of 1997,the headaches intensified and he lost sleep. The claimant missed 80 days of work during 1997 asa result of the headaches. When the claimant was not working, the headaches and eye pressuretended to subside. When he was off work for an extended period, the symptoms virtuallyvanished. The claimant testified that since his last day of work on February 3, 1998, he no longersuffers headaches and eye pressure, and his medication is controlling his hypertension.
The claimant began treating with Dr. Thomas Wiss in March 1992. Dr. Wissinitially diagnosed acute hypertension. Dr. Wiss' records note that on November 5, 1996, theclaimant complained of an intense headache and stated that he felt as if "his eyes were going toexplode." Dr. Wiss noted increased blood pressure. The claimant continued to follow uptreatment for hypertension. In a report issued July 14, 1998, Dr. Wiss wrote that he had beentreating the claimant for acute hypertension since April 1996. Since that time, the claimant'shypertension had become increasingly more difficult to control. Dr. Wiss observed that "[o]verthese last two years it was noted that during times of stress at work or eventually indeed any timeat work his blood pressure would be essentially uncontrollable with high doses of two or threemedicines at a time. Also it was then noted that during vacations or times away from work hisblood pressure was easily controllable indeed became occasionally too low on the samemedicines." Dr. Wiss also noted that as a result of these prolonged episodes of hypertension, theclaimant began to show some signs of organ damage, including retinopathy, a thickening of thearteries in the back of the eye, and early left ventricular hypertrophy, a thickening of the heartmuscle wall. Dr. Wiss opined that the claimant's hypertension had been exacerbated by hisstressful job duties and that his hypertension was uncontrollable in his workplace. He furtheropined that the claimant was disabled from his job and that continued work in law enforcementwould be detrimental to the claimant's health.
In August 1998, Dr. Merry Downer examined the claimant and reviewed Dr.Wiss' records at the request of the employer. Dr. Downer noted that the claimant had a history ofpoorly controlled hypertension for the previous two to three years. He also noted that theclaimant's blood pressure had been difficult to control during his employment as a police officerdespite trying several different medications. He further noted that the claimant's blood pressurewas controllable during vacations and leaves of absences from work. Dr. Downer opined thathypertension is a very complex disease with many physiological and psychological contributors. Dr. Downer agreed that the claimant exhibited end organ damage and that stringent control of hisblood pressure was necessary. Dr. Downer also agreed that it would be beneficial for theclaimant to be employed in a less stressful environment.
Additional evidence established that juvenile officer work is one of the moststressful jobs in police work due to volume, recidivism, frustration and an overriding sense offutility. The record also established that the claimant was conscientious and did his job well.
Based upon the record as a whole, particularly the medical evidence of both Dr.Wiss and Dr. Downer, the Commission found that the claimant had sustained his burden ofshowing that he sustained accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of his employmentand awarded TTD benefits through July 14, 1998, the date of Dr. Downer's examination. TheCommission characterized the claimant's condition as a "mental-physical" case where theclaimant's pre-existing condition (hypertension) was aggravated by work-related stress. TheCommission found that Dr. Downer's diagnosis established that claimant had reached maximummedical improvement, and thus, no further TTD benefits were appropriate. The Commissionthen remanded the matter to the arbitrator for a determination as to permanency. The circuitcourt confirmed the decision of the Commission and the employer appealed to this court.
On appeal, the employer maintains that the claimant is attempting to recover forpsychological injuries and must therefore establish eligibility for compensation under either the"mental-mental" theory or the "physical-mental" theory. According to the employer, the claimantmay recover if he can show that his psychological injuries were caused by "a sudden, severeemotional shock traceable to a definite time, place and cause which causes psychological injuryor harm * * * though no physical trauma or injury was sustained." See, Pathfinder Co. v.Industrial Comm'n, 62 Ill. 2d 556, 563 (1976)). In the alternative, the employer suggests that theclaimant also failed to establish eligibility for compensation under a "physical-mental" theory,i.e., a mental injury caused by a physical trauma. See, City of Springfield v. Industrial Comm'n,291 Ill. App. 3d 734 (1997). Since the claimant cannot trace his injuries to a definite time, placeand cause or to a specific instance of physical trauma, the employer maintains it was error for theCommission to award compensation.
While the employer is correct in stating how an employee may prove eligibilityfor compensation for psychological injuries, it has misconstrued the nature of the claimant'sinjuries. Claimant is not seeking compensation for psychological injuries. Hypertension is aphysical condition. As Dr. Downer noted, hypertension may have some psychological causes,but it is nonetheless a physical condition which manifests physical symptoms such as headachesand organ damage. Thus, the analytical framework of the "mental-mental" or "physical-mental"are of no import in the instant matter.
In the instant matter, the Commission likened the claimant's condition to that ofthe claimant in City of Waukegan, which it characterized as a "mental-physical" trauma case. Asin City of Waukegan, the Commission here found that mental trauma in the form of work-relatedstress caused a physical manifestation of injury (the aggravation of the claimant's pre-existingphysical condition of hypertension). We agree with the Commission's characterization.
Whether an injury arises out of and in the course of employment is a question offact. Wheelan Funeral Home v. Industrial Comm'n, 208 Ill. App. 3d 832, 836 (1991). It is thefunction of the Commission to determine the facts, judge the credibility of the witnesses, anddraw reasonable inferences from competent evidence. Ingersoll Milling Machine Co. v.Industrial Comm'n, 253 Ill. App. 3d 462, 467 (1993); Wheelan, 208 Ill. App. 3d at 836;Marathon Oil Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 203 Ill. App. 3d 809, 816 (1990). It is also theCommission's province to weigh and resolve conflicts in medical evidence. Ingersoll, 253 Ill.App. 3d at 467. We, as a reviewing court, will not disturb the findings of the Commission unlesssuch findings are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Ingersoll, 253 Ill. App. 3d at467; Wheelan, 208 Ill. App. 3d at 836. Here, we cannot say in this instance the findings of theCommission are against the manifest weight of the evidence.
It is well established that an employer takes its employees as it finds them (County of Cook v. Industrial Comm'n, 69 Ill. 2d 10, 17 (1977)) and that, even if an employeesuffers from a pre-existing condition, such as heart disease or hypertension, if the conditionwhich brings on disability is work-related, the employee may recover workers' compensation. Wheelan, 208 Ill. App. 3d at 836; Associates Corp. of North America v. Industrial Comm'n, 167Ill. App. 3d 988, 996 (1988). Likewise, if there is work-related stress, either physical oremotional, that aggravates the disease so as to cause physical disability, then there is anaccidental injury arising out of and in the course of the employment. City of Waukegan v.Industrial Comm'n, 298 Ill. App. 3d 1086, 1089 (198); Wheelan, 208 Ill. App. 3d at 836;Associates, 167 Ill. App. 3d at 996. While the claimant must prove that some act of employmentwas a causative factor, the act need not be the sole, or even the principal, causative factor. City ofWaukegan, 298 Ill. App. 3d at 1089: Ingersoll, 253 Ill. App. 3d at 469; Wheelan, 208 Ill. App. 3dat 836.
Here, the medical evidence is uncontroverted that the claimant suffered from apre-existing physical condition of hypertension. It is also uncontroverted that the claimant's job-related stress aggravated that pre-existing condition to the point where the claimant could nolonger engage in police work without endangering his health. Given the overwhelming medicalevidence, we cannot say that the Commission erred in finding a direct connection between theclaimant's work-related stress and his uncontrollable hypertension.
We also agree with the Commission's observation that the claimant's conditionhas stabilized and he is no longer entitled to TTD benefits. His eligibility for an award ofpermanency is a matter yet to be determined.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Sangamon Countyconfirming the decision of the Commission is affirmed.
Affirmed.
McCULLOUGH, P.J., and HOFFMAN, O'MALLEY, and RARICK, JJ., concur.