JUSTICE KUEHN delivered the opinion of the court:

In this case, we are asked to determine where approximately 65 young students who livein Fairmont City, Illinois, will be publically schooled.

Collinsville Community Unit School District No. 10 (Collinsville Unit 10) and East St.Louis School District No. 189 (East St. Louis No. 189) both appeal from the trial court's September 12, 2002, order affirming the earlier order of the Regional Board of SchoolTrustees of St. Clair County, Illinois (Board). The Board had allowed a petition to detach asection of Fairmont City from East St. Louis No. 189 and to allow that section's annexationinto Collinsville Unit 10. The defendant parents of the annexed section of Fairmont Citycross-appeal, arguing that the trial court erred in refusing to grant their motion to dismiss theschool districts' complaints.

The case began with a petition circulated by residents of Fairmont City. Fairmont Cityis a divided city for purposes of school district ties. Prior to this case, 60% of Fairmont Citychildren were a part of and attended the schools of Collinsville Unit 10. The remaining 40%of the children were part of and attended the schools of East St. Louis No. 189. In August2000, residents of the East St. Louis No. 189 portion of Fairmont City began an organizedcampaign to obtain the signatures of at least two-thirds of the registered voters living withinthat area. Those signatures were notarized and attached to a document labeled "Petition forDetachment and Annexation."

The petition stated that the geographic area in question fell entirely within East St.Louis No. 189 and that the resident petitioners sought to have its geographic area detachedfrom East St. Louis No. 189 and annexed into Collinsville Unit 10. The petitioners noted thatthere were no school buildings within the geographic area in question. By inference, thepetitioners indicated that they had signatures of two-thirds of the area's registered votersseeking the detachment and annexation. They contended that the actions sought were in the"best interest and educational welfare of students" residing in the area and that the petitionersdesired an implementation of "Whole Child" and "Community of Interest" educationalconcepts. The petitioners further stated that they believed that the two districts had noobjections to the plan. Collinsville Unit 10 was alleged to be coterminous and contiguous. Finally, the petitioners stated as follows:

"Pupils residing in Petitioning Area would benefit greatly by participation inextracurricular and social activities in their local City, Community[,] and schools. Suchactivity is an essential part of their educational welfare[,] as is camaraderie with otherstudents residing in their local community."

Notice of a hearing on this petition was published in a local newspaper. The hearing wasinitially set for December 11, 2000, but was rescheduled for January 8, 2001, at thecontinuance request of Collinsville Unit 10.

The hearing was held on January 8, 2001. All the members of the Board were present. We will briefly summarize the testimony and evidence adduced at this hearing.

Shirley Kurry, the principal at Holy Rosary School, a parochial school located inFairmont City, testified. From talking to parents of students transferring from East St. LouisNo. 189 to Holy Rosary School, Ms. Kurry is aware of parental concerns regarding educationquality and safety. In her experience, Ms. Kurry found that the transferring students weretypically behind the Holy Rosary students of the same grade levels.

Several concerned parents testified in the petitioners' case: Donna Pacheco, JuliaMartinez, Jose Otero, and Louis Avila. The parents were concerned about the safety andwelfare of their children and about the quality of the education in East St. Louis No. 189. Those parents who had lived in the area for their entire lives all attended Holy Rosary School. One parent moved in with a friend across town in order to be able to attend Collinsville HighSchool. Only one parent had firsthand knowledge of safety problems in East St. Louis No.189, in that his daughter had been attacked. For her safety, she has now moved in with hergrandparents, who reside in a neighboring town in a different school system. Another concernexpressed by the parents was the lack of extracurricular activities at the elementary level inEast St. Louis No. 189.

Guillermo Macia was called on behalf of East St. Louis No. 189. He was the newIllinois certified bilingual teacher at Manners School beginning in November 2000. On aregular basis, he works with somewhere between 32 and 39 students at Manners School. Hisjob is to teach Hispanic children to speak English. Throughout each day, he meets with smallergroups of the Hispanic students for at least 40 minutes per session. Mr. Macia testified thathe had not observed any safety issues particularly affecting the Fairmont City children.

Lin Val Thomas next testified on behalf of East St. Louis No. 189. At the time of histestimony, he was the bilingual aide at Manners School, having been hired in September orOctober 2000. He works with the same students that Mr. Macia does. He testified about thewonderful working and nurturing relationship they have maintained with these children.

Francine Collins testified that she is an English-as-a-second-language teacher for EastSt. Louis No. 189 and that she had been so employed since the beginning of the 2000-2001school year. Previously, she had been the bilingual teacher at Manners School. She does notspeak Spanish. Her job is also to teach the Hispanic children to speak English and also to workwith the classroom teachers on how to teach these children.

Manners School principal Kelly Thrash, Jr., testified that the 2000-2001 school yearwas his third year in the position and his thirty-first year with East St. Louis No. 189. As ofthe date of his testimony, there were 61 Spanish-speaking students at Manners School, ofwhich 53 were from Fairmont City and 8 were from Washington Park. These Fairmont Citystudents are bussed to the school. Because of his belief that the number of Hispanic studentswill increase in the coming years, Mr. Thrash testified that East St. Louis No. 189 had planswithin the next two or three years for a new school building to accommodate the increasedpopulation. He testified that there is a high turnover in these students-while they may attendManners School, by the time they should graduate to junior or senior high, they havetransferred out of East St. Louis No. 189. In extracurricular activities, Manners School hasa basketball team and is working on getting a teacher to coach soccer but has no bandinstruction for its students. While he would not describe the St. Clair County Regional Officeof Education's 1998 request as being a "mandate," Mr. Thrash noted that the office did tell himthat Manners School needed an English-as-a-second-language teacher.

Dr. Nathaniel Anderson is the superintendent of East St. Louis No. 189. He testifiedthat his district had made great strides in getting several of the elementary schools off the Illinois academic watch list. Dr. Anderson indicated that there has been a great deal ofinstability with the Manners School administration with respect to turnover. Financially, EastSt. Louis No. 189 is very stable, but it operates under a State of Illinois financial oversightpanel. Dr. Anderson believes that it is important for the district not to lose the Hispanicstudents of Fairmont City because the cultural diversity they bring to the district improves thedistrict.

Superintendent Dennis Craft testified that it was his understanding that if the petitionwas allowed, Collinsville Unit 10 would have an increase of between 80 and 200 students. Anincrease of 80 students would mandate additional staffing.⁽¹⁾

Collinsville Unit 10 employs a neighborhood-schools approach to education, with nopresent bussing required. The nearest school to the involved Fairmont City students isKreitner Elementary School, which is 4.4 miles away. He compared the distance betweenFairmont City and Manners School as being only 2.6 miles away.

Kreitner Elementary School is currently overcrowded, in that the district has beenrequired to acquire and install two portable units to hold four additional classrooms andtransform an open area of the school known as "the pod" into seven additional classrooms,separated by temporary walls, which do not rise completely to the ceiling for heating purposes. The school was not then air-conditioned. The library of the school was then housed in a schoolhallway.

To house an additional 80 students, Mr. Craft proposed that Collinsville Unit 10 wouldneed to acquire four, or more likely five, additional portable classroom units, for an extra 8to 10 classrooms. Additionally, Collinsville Unit 10 anticipates the need to hire nine teachersfor these 80 students-four classroom teachers, one special education teacher, one physicaleducation teacher, one music teacher, one prekindergarten teacher, and one early childhoodeducation teacher. Additionally, the district anticipates having to hire another assistantprincipal, one secretary, one speech and language therapist, one Spanish-speaking socialworker, one special education teaching assistant, one custodian, two relief aides, and twocafeteria workers. The total projected cost for the first year of educating these 80 studentswas $1,256,182.

Collinsville Unit 10's only other witness was Jeff Endres, the director of businessaffairs. His figure of $161,020 in additional state aid was based upon current average dailyattendance figures (calculated out to $2,236.39 per student), which was multiplied by 92% ofthe potential 80 additional students. Collinsville Unit 10 will also receive an additional$762,758 in projected property taxes. Because of the filing date for the tax levy, he does notbelieve that Collinsville Unit 10 would see the increased property taxes by the fall of the firstschool year with the additional 80 students. Because he does not believe that the propertytaxes will be received in the first year, he projected a one-time deficit for the first year in theamount of $1,095,162. He did not do the calculations to determine the deficit, if any, insubsequent years when Collinsville Unit 10 receives all the relevant taxes and the one-timestartup costs are subtracted.

At the hearing's conclusion, the Board unanimously voted in favor of the detachment-and-annexation petition. Reasons given by the board members in support of this decisionincluded the test scores indicating that Collinsville Unit 10 was providing a better educationto its students, disbelief of Collinsville Unit 10's financial numbers, the seeming loss ofstudents in East St. Louis No. 189 after elementary school, the belief that as Collinsville Unit10 had dealt with partitions in its buildings for 25 years, the district could continue to do so,and the overriding belief that Collinsville Unit 10 could easily absorb the projected 65 to 80new students.

In response to this unanimous Board decision, Collinsville Unit 10 and East St. LouisNo. 189 filed petitions for a rehearing before the Board. In essence, Collinsville Unit 10sought an opportunity to re-present its evidence. Unanimously, the Board denied thesepetitions on March 5, 2001.

Following this denial, Collinsville Unit 10 and East St. Louis No. 189 filed theircomplaints for administrative review in St. Clair County circuit court. Initially, the complaintsdid not list individual original petitioners. On April 11, 2002, the trial court denied thepetitioners' motion to dismiss the complaints on that basis and allowed the request for leaveto file amended complaints including the petitioners. Thereafter, briefs were filed.

On September 12, 2002, the trial court issued its order affirming the order of theBoard. The court concluded that the order was supported by the manifest weight of theevidence. Specifically, the trial court noted that the disparities between the Illinois StandardsAchievement Test scores of the schools of Collinsville Unit 10 and East St. Louis No. 189were "substantial," and in every instance the scores were higher for Collinsville Unit 10. Additionally, there was a substantial gap in the parental involvement percentages based uponparental contact, with Collinsville Unit 10 reporting a 100% contact rate, while East St. LouisNo. 189 reported only a 43.6% contact rate. While Collinsville Unit 10 continued to arguethe alleged financial burdens attendant to the granting of the petition, Judge Rice noted that thefinancial evidence and testimony had been amply considered and largely discounted by theBoard. Although urged to adopt a strict scrutiny standard by East St. Louis No. 189, the trialcourt found no basis in the record to deviate from the manifest-weight-of-the-evidencestandard of review.

From this order, the two school districts appeal.

Because a determination of the motion to dismiss could be determinative, we mustinitially determine if the trial court's decision to deny the motion was erroneous. Typically,our supreme court rules do not allow a party to appeal from a denial of a motion to dismiss,which is an interlocutory order. See 166 Ill. 2d R. 306. Denials of motions to dismiss thatpertain to the jurisdiction of the courts can in certain situations be appealable. 166 Ill. 2d R.306(a)(3). But when, despite the denial of the motion to dismiss, the losing party iscompletely successful on the merits of the case in the trial court, that party is prohibited fromappealing the earlier denial of the motion to dismiss. See Davis v. International HarvesterCo., 167 Ill. App. 3d 814, 819, 521 N.E.2d 1282, 1285 (1988).

In this case, the petitioners did lose the motion to dismiss in the trial court. While thatmotion to dismiss addressed the jurisdiction of the court and therefore its denial should beappealable, the petitioners ultimately prevailed in the trial court. Consequently, the petitionerscannot specifically appeal from the trial court's denial of their motion to dismiss.

While the cross-appeal was not appropriate, the petitioners "maintained the right toadvance [their] position in support of the trial court's judgment, including a position previouslyadvanced and rejected in a motion to dismiss." Denis v. P&L Campbell, Inc., No. 5-03-0341,slip op. at 5 (May 6, 2004) (citing People ex rel. Barrett v. Bradford, 372 Ill. 63, 65-66, 22N.E.2d 691, 693 (1939); Pate v. City of Sesser, 75 Ill. App. 3d 233, 240, 393 N.E.2d 1146,1152 (1979)). Therefore, we will address this argument.

Section 3-103 of the Administrative Review Law requires the following: "Every actionto review a final administrative decision shall be commenced by the filing of a complaint andthe issuance of a summons within 35 days from the date that a copy of the decision sought tobe reviewed was served upon the party affected by the decision ***." 735 ILCS 5/3-103 (West2000). The Illinois Supreme Court has concluded that in this context, the filing of thecomplaint within the 35-day time frame specified is jurisdictional and that a failure to complywith these requirements prevents a court from reviewing the administrative decision. Lockettv. Chicago Police Board, 133 Ill. 2d 349, 354-55, 549 N.E.2d 1266, 1268 (1990). The 35-day time frame for the issuance of the summons is not jurisdictional but is mandatory, and solong as the litigant can demonstrate a good-faith effort (some circumstance beyond thelitigant's control) to secure the issuance of the summons within the 35 days, a dismissal is notmandatory. Lockett, 133 Ill. 2d at 355, 549 N.E.2d at 1268. In this case, the school districtsclearly filed their administrative review complaints and obtained the issuance of thesummonses within the 35-day time limit. At issue is the school districts' omission of theoriginal petitioners as named defendants in their complaints for administrative review. Theschool districts' complaints failed to include the 10 representatives who had been named in theoriginal detachment-and-annexation petition filed by the residents of Fairmont City.

Section 3-107(a) of the Administrative Review Law addresses who shall be named asdefendants. The rule clearly requires the inclusion as defendants "all persons *** who wereparties of record to the proceedings before the administrative agency." 735 ILCS 5/3-107(a)(West 2000). Section 3-102 of the Administrative Review Law provides that "[u]nless reviewis sought *** within the time and in the manner herein provided," the litigant will be barredfrom seeking administrative review. 735 ILCS 5/3-102 (West 2000). Because theAdministrative Review Law departs from common law, the procedures set forth in its sections"must be strictly adhered to in order to justify its application." Lockett, 133 Ill. 2d at 353, 549N.E.2d at 1267 (citing Winston v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Peoria County, 407 Ill. 588,595, 95 N.E.2d 864, 869 (1950)).

The petitioners argue that because they had not been named and no summonses had beenissued within the 35 days following the service of the order denying the school districts'requests for a rehearing, the complaints for administrative review should have been dismissed. The school districts counter that section 3-107(a) of the Administrative Review Law providesan applicable exception. The relevant language states as follows:

"If, during the course of a review action, the court determines that a party ofrecord to the administrative proceedings was not made a defendant as required by thepreceding paragraph, and only if that party was not named by the administrativeagency in its final order as a party of record, then the court shall grant the plaintiff21 days from the date of the determination in which to name and serve the unnamedparty as a defendant." (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/3-107(a) (West 2000).

The school districts point out that while the petitioners were mentioned in the final orders, theattorney or individual who drafted the order failed to include their names in the orders as"parties of record." The argument continues that because their names had not been includedin that manner, the amendment of the complaints was appropriate.

We find this argument to be specious. There would have been no request for a rehearingby the school districts if the petitioners had not filed the petition in the first place. Thepetition for detachment and annexation was not filed by the Board or by any of its individualmembers. Furthermore, neither school district dreamed up the petition. The petition beganwith the concerned citizens of that portion of Fairmont City who wanted a better educationalopportunity for their own children. The petitioners were clearly parties of record to thepetition and to the proceedings at issue. They fully participated in the hearing and in therequest for a rehearing-represented by counsel. The omission of their names, purposefullyor by clerical error, from the final order does not convert the petitioners into nonparties, asthe school districts contend.

In further support of this argument, the school districts cite several cases, which wenow address. The school districts contend that being named in the final order does not equateto being a party of record. Collinsville Unit 10 cites Fayhee v. State Board of Elections, 295Ill. App. 3d 392, 692 N.E.2d 440 (1998). That reading of the case is somewhat narrow. Whatthe case says is that a mention of the person's name in the final order is not dispositiveevidence that the individual is a party of record. Fayhee, 295 Ill. App. 3d at 400, 692 N.E.2dat 445. In a broader understanding of this case, if other evidence or law supports the claim thatan unnamed individual is a party, then that person's mention in the order is meaningful. Without more, the mere mention of the individual's name is not dispositive evidence of his orher status as a party.

Also cited is Villa Retirement Apartments, Inc. v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 302Ill. App. 3d 745, 706 N.E.2d 76 (1999). This case involves a disgruntled property owner,unhappy with an increased property tax assessment. Villa Retirement Apartments, Inc., 302Ill. App. 3d at 746-47, 706 N.E.2d at 78. From this case, it appears that there were twomethods of review available to such a property owner. Villa Retirement Apartments, Inc., 302Ill. App. 3d at 751, 706 N.E.2d at 81. One method involved taking the case before theSangamon County Board of Review. The second method involved bypassing the SangamonCounty Board of Review and seeking relief from the Property Tax Appeal Board (PTAB). Theproperty owner opted to bypass the Sangamon County Board of Review and filed its appeal ofthe assessment with the PTAB. Villa Retirement Apartments, Inc., 302 Ill. App. 3d at 747, 706N.E.2d at 78. The Sangamon County Board of Review did file a written response to theassessment appeal by providing the PTAB with notes regarding each of the properties at issue. After the PTAB made its final decision and upon the property owner's request foradministrative review, the property owner omitted the Sangamon County Board of Review asa party. Villa Retirement Apartments, Inc., 302 Ill. App. 3d at 749, 706 N.E.2d at 79. At issuewas whether the Sangamon County Board of Review had to be named as a "party of record" inthe administrative review of the PTAB's decision. Villa Retirement Apartments, Inc., 302 Ill.App. 3d at 751, 706 N.E.2d at 81. On appeal, the court held that if the property owner electedto bypass the Sangamon County Board of Review, then that entity would only need to be namedas a party of record on administrative review if the final order of the PTAB explicitly statedthat the Sangamon County Board of Review was a party of record. The final order at issuemade multiple references to the Sangamon County Board of Review, noting that the propertyowner had not filed a complaint with the board, that the board had provided notes regardingeach property at issue, and that the board had agreed to the removal of the equalization factor. The appellate court concluded that these references, which did not "expressly state that theBoard is a 'party of record,' " were insufficient to establish that the Sangamon County Boardof Review was a party of record and should have been named in the complaint foradministrative review. Villa Retirement Apartments, Inc., 302 Ill. App. 3d at 751, 706 N.E.2dat 81.

This court cited that final language with approval in United Methodist VillageRetirement Communities, Inc. v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 321 Ill. App. 3d 456, 748N.E.2d 1230 (2001). The facts of this case are somewhat similar to that of Villa RetirementApartments, Inc. The property owner, upset over a tax assessment increase, decided to fightthe increase. United Methodist Village Retirement Communities, Inc., 321 Ill. App. 3d at458, 748 N.E.2d at 1231. Different in this case is that the property owner started with theMadison County Board of Review, where it did not obtain relief, and thereafter filed an appealwith the PTAB, which entity also denied relief. United Methodist Village RetirementCommunities, Inc., 321 Ill. App. 3d at 458-59, 748 N.E.2d at 1232. From that final order, theproperty owner sought administrative review but failed to name the Madison County Board ofReview as a defendant to the complaint. United Methodist Village Retirement Communities,Inc., 321 Ill. App. 3d at 459, 748 N.E.2d at 1232. Based upon the holding in the VillaRetirement Apartments, Inc., case, we explained that the Madison County Board of Review wasa party of record, given the fact that the property owner actually appealed the assessmentincrease before that board and that the property owner could only amend its pleadings if theMadison County Board of Review was not listed as a party of record in the final order. UnitedMethodist Village Retirement Communities, Inc., 321 Ill. App. 3d at 460, 748 N.E.2d at 1233. Because the Madison County Board of Review was not listed as a party of record in the finalorder, we allowed the property owner's request to amend the appeal. United Methodist VillageRetirement Communities, Inc., 321 Ill. App. 3d at 460-61, 748 N.E.2d at 1233.

These cases are factually distinguishable from the situation with which we arepresented. Collinsville Unit 10 attempts to further twist the meaning of the requirement thatthe order must list the petitioners as parties of record without regard to the factual context ofthis case and the final order that was issued.

The context of Villa Retirement Apartments, Inc., and United Methodist VillageRetirement Communities, Inc., was that the county board of review was no longer a part of theongoing administrative appellate process, at which time it was not listed as a defendant in thecomplaint or on direct appeal. Since the board of review was no longer active in these cases,its mere mention in the final orders was simply a historical reference.

The final orders in this case do not spell out the names of the 10 people who hadactually filed the detachment-and-annexation petition. However, the initial order granting thepetition makes reference to the "petitioners" and to the "Committee of Ten." The petitionersare certainly "parties of record." We would be stretching logic to find that because the namesof the 10 petitioners were not spelled out in the order, their involvement in the case is any lessthan as parties of record. They appeared at these hearings. They were represented by counselat these hearings. They provided testimony at these hearings. They were involved at every stepof this process and were undeniably parties, because, without them, the subject of thisappeal-the petition for detachment and annexation-would not exist.⁽²⁾

A case dealing with detachment and annexation relative to school districts is relevantto this issue. In Board of Education of Bethany Community Unit School District No. 301 v.Regional Board of School Trustees of Clark, Coles, Cumberland, Edgar, Moultrie & ShelbyCounties, 255 Ill. App. 3d 763, 627 N.E.2d 1175 (1994), the petitioners were seeking todetach from one school district and annex onto an adjacent district. Board of Education ofBethany Community Unit School District No. 301, 255 Ill. App. 3d at 763, 627 N.E.2d at1175-76. The regional school board granted the petition, and administrative review was soughtin the circuit court. Board of Education of Bethany Community Unit School District No.301, 255 Ill. App. 3d at 763, 627 N.E.2d at 1176. The circuit court reversed the order of theregional school board, and both the adjacent school district and the petitioners appealed to theappellate court. Board of Education of Bethany Community Unit School District No. 301,255 Ill. App. 3d at 764, 627 N.E.2d at 1176. The adjacent school district, which had notparticipated in and was not represented at the hearing before the regional school board, was notnamed in the complaint in the circuit court or on appeal. Board of Education of BethanyCommunity Unit School District No. 301, 255 Ill. App. 3d at 766, 627 N.E.2d at 1177. Theappellate court concluded that the adjacent district was a party of record, despite its lack ofinvolvement in the case and that, therefore, the other school district's request foradministrative review in the circuit court should have been dismissed. Board of Education ofBethany Community Unit School District No. 301, 255 Ill. App. 3d at 767, 627 N.E.2d at1178. The case does not discuss the exception to the dismissal rule, which would authorizean amendment if the party had not been named a party of record in the final order.⁽³⁾ In reachingits decision, the appellate court noted that the situation would be clear if the adjacent schooldistrict had participated in the hearing before the regional school board. Board of Educationof Bethany Community Unit School District No. 301, 255 Ill. App. 3d at 766, 627 N.E.2d at1177 (citing Spicer, Inc. v. Regional Board of School Trustees of La Salle County, 212 Ill.App. 3d 16, 19, 570 N.E.2d 678, 681 (1991)). In this case, with no participation, the courtstated:

"Once it received notice of the initial Regional Board hearing, it was a party to theproceedings and had to be made a defendant in the review action. To hold otherwisewould suggest [that the adjacent school district] was not a party which would be boundby the judgment. Its status as a party is not affected by its failure to appear andparticipate. [The adjacent school district's] rights, as the annexing district, wouldnecessarily be affected by the decision to grant or deny the petition. Therefore, it mustbe considered a party of record, regardless of whether it participated in the hearing. Itthus had to be named as a defendant in the administrative review action. Becauseplaintiff failed to name and serve [the adjacent school district] within the 35-day timeframe, plaintiff's petition should have been dismissed." Board of Education of BethanyCommunity Unit School District No. 301, 255 Ill. App. 3d at 767, 627 N.E.2d at 1177-78.

The court found additional support for its position in section 7-7 of the School Code, whichprovides as follows:

"[A]ny resident who appears at the hearing or any petitioner or board ofeducation of any district affected may within 35 days after a copy of the decisionsought to be reviewed was served by registered mail upon the party affected thereby filea complaint for a judicial review of such decision in accordance with the AdministrativeReview Law and the rules adopted pursuant thereto." 105 ILCS 5/7-7 (West 2000).

The court explained that if the school district maintained the right to appeal the decision of theregional school board without having participated at the hearing, then "it should be considereda party of record for administrative review proceedings." Board of Education of BethanyCommunity Unit School District No. 301, 255 Ill. App. 3d at 767, 627 N.E.2d at 1178.

In our case, because the petitioners were parties of record, they should have been namedand served within the 35-day time limit. They were not. Neither the school districts involvednor the petitioners seeking detachment and annexation were explicitly labeled as "parties ofrecord" in the final orders at issue. We do not believe that the exception to the 35-day rulemeans that the order must have a special paragraph labeling who the parties of record to theproceeding were. We cannot conclude that this omission, if it can even be labeled as anomission, means that there were no parties of record in this case.

The petitioners were referenced in the order en masse, were present and testified, andwere represented by counsel at all the relevant hearings. We find that the petitioners wereclearly parties of record in the proceedings. Because they were not specifically named in thefinal orders but were referenced as merely the petitioners, the school districts failed to namethem as parties in their complaints for administrative review. The complaints failed to name,and the school districts failed to serve, parties of record in a timely fashion as required bystatute. Therefore, the trial judge lacked jurisdiction to allow the school districts' request toamend their complaints and to thereafter specifically name each of the parties of record. Thetrial judge should have granted the petitioners' motion to dismiss the complaints.

Because we conclude that the complaints should have been dismissed by the trial court,we do not reach any of the issues raised by the school districts. The orders of the Board stand.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of St. Clair County ishereby vacated, and in keeping with this court's powers pursuant to Supreme Court Rule366(a)(5) (155 Ill. 2d R. 366(a)(5)), we hereby dismiss the cause of action.

Vacated; cause of action dismissed.

HOPKINS, J., concurs.

JUSTICE WELCH, dissenting:

I agree that the order of the circuit court must be reversed. However, I do not agree thatthe court lacked jurisdiction to allow an amendment of the complaint. I believe that both theorder of the Board and the order of the circuit court are against the manifest weight of theevidence presented in this case, and I would reverse those orders.

Although the majority focuses on the issue of jurisdiction, I believe that in this case thequestion of jurisdiction is simple and straightforward: the plain language of section 3-107(a)mandates that "if [the omitted party] was not named by the administrative agency in its finalorder as a party of record, then the court shall grant the plaintiff 21 days from the date of thedetermination in which to name and serve the unnamed party as a defendant." (Emphasisadded.) 735 ILCS 5/3-107(a) (West 2000). It is undisputed that the petitioners were notnamed as parties of record in the Board's final order. Accordingly, the circuit court wasrequired by law to allow the plaintiffs to amend their complaint within 21 days in accordancewith section 3-107(a).

Established precedent should compel this court to reverse the order entered by theBoard and affirmed by the circuit court. In Carver v. Bond/Fayette/Effingham RegionalBoard of School Trustees, 146 Ill. 2d 347, 356, 358 (1992), the Illinois Supreme Courtreiterated the long-standing rule that petitions for detachment and annexation should be grantedonly where the petitioner has shown that the overall benefit to the annexing district and thedetachment area, considered together, clearly outweighs the resulting detriment to the losingdistrict and the surrounding community as a whole. In applying this benefit-detriment test, thefollowing factors must be considered: (1) the differences between facilities and curricula, (2)the distance from the petitioners' homes to the respective schools, (3) the effect detachmentwould have on the ability of either district to meet state standards of recognition, (4) theimpact of the proposed boundary change on the tax revenues of both districts, and (5) the"whole child" and "community of interest" factors, i.e., the identification of the petitioningterritory with the district to which annexation is sought and the corresponding likelihood ofparticipation in school and extracurricular activities. Carver, 146 Ill. 2d at 356. The courtstressed, as it had in previous cases, that although the personal desires of the petitioningparents may be taken into account, more than a personal preference is needed to support achange in school district boundaries. Carver, 146 Ill. 2d at 356.

Applying these factors to the case at bar, it is abundantly clear that the decision to allowthe detachment was against the manifest weight of the evidence. As to the first factor-differences between school facilities and curricula-the evidence presented shows that East St.Louis No. 189 is in a far better position to appropriately house, instruct, and accommodatestudents in the detachment area than is Collinsville Unit 10. At present, East St. Louis No. 189has adequate space and resources for all the detachment-area students, and in the very nearfuture, with an $80 million grant from the State of Illinois, the district plans to build newschools, including a brand-new, air-conditioned grade school in the heart of the FairmontCity/Washington Park area that will be able to operate year-round to serve the needs of thedetachment-area students. Collinsville Unit 10, on the other hand, already faces a seriousovercrowding problem, with the school that most of the detachment-area students wouldattend, Kreitner Elementary School, already strained to the point that seven classrooms nowoccupy the space designed for four and the school library is placed in the hallway of theschool. Two mobile classrooms, much like mobile homes, are presently in use, and as manyas four additional mobile classrooms would be needed if the detachment occurred. As todifferences in curricula, the petitioners, who bore the burden of clearly demonstrating that thebenefits of detachment outweighed the detriments, failed to provide any evidence that thereare courses of study available at Collinsville Unit 10 that are not available at East St. Louis No.189. To the contrary, the "evidence" provided by the petitioners consisted of anecdotal hearsayto the effect that they believed their children would receive a better education in CollinsvilleUnit 10. Disregarding this anecdotal hearsay and focusing on the facts, it is undisputed thatEast St. Louis No. 189 has hired a teacher certified in bilingual education and a teacher's aidecertified in bilingual language to assist the detachment-area students, many of whom have greatdifficulty communicating, either orally or in writing, in English. East St. Louis No. 189 alsoemploys an English-as-a-second-language teacher. The East St. Louis No. 189 administrationhas been very supportive of the bilingual education efforts in the district. Collinsville Unit 10has no such teachers, and the recruitment of trained, competent teachers would be costly interms of money, time, and effort expended. Accordingly, the first Carver factor weighsheavily against a detachment.

As to the second factor-distance from the petitioners' homes to the respectiveschools-it is undisputed that Collinsville Unit 10's Kreitner Elementary School is 4.4 milesfrom downtown Fairmont City, whereas East St. Louis No. 189's Manners School is only 2.6miles from Fairmont City, or roughly half as far. As noted above, East St. Louis No. 189 plansto build a new grade school in the heart of the Fairmont City/Washington Park area. "Build itand they will not come." This factor, too, weighs against a detachment.

As to the third factor-the effect a detachment would have on the ability of either districtto meet state standards of recognition-the petitioners provided absolutely no evidenceregarding the possible benefits of a detachment or regarding the detriments. Accordingly, theBoard, the circuit court, and this court are not in a position to assess the relevancy of thisfactor to the case at bar, although I stress again that it is the petitioners, not the schooldistricts, who must clearly make the case for a detachment.

As to the fourth factor-the impact of the proposed boundary change on the tax revenuesof both districts-the evidence shows that East St. Louis No. 189 would lose approximately$245,000, an admittedly small amount to East St. Louis No. 189. The cost to Collinsville Unit10, however, would be substantial. In undisputed testimony, the director of business affairsfor Collinsville Unit 10, Jeff Endres, stated that even after accounting for the increase inincome to the district from property taxes paid by the Fairmont City residents and additionalaid from the State of Illinois, the district would experience an annual deficit of $330,000 ifforced to take on the detachment-area students. Additionally, a one-time deficit of $1.1million would be incurred if the annexation took place before the district was permitted to levyand collect taxes from the annexed area. These financial burdens would come at a time whenthe district is already facing a deficit of $2.5 million. Testimony showed that East St. LouisNo. 189, on the other hand, is stable financially and recently received an upgrade in its creditrating. There was nothing inherently improbable in the evidence offered by the schooldistricts, and that evidence was uncontroverted and unimpeached. Nevertheless, at least oneboard member took issue with the evidence, and even the majority concedes that "disbelief ofCollinsville Unit 10's financial numbers" was a factor in the Board's decision. Slip op. at 7. Although this court would normally defer to an administrative body's findings of fact, thosefactual findings must still be based on the evidence. Crabtree v. Illinois Department ofAgriculture, 128 Ill. 2d 510, 518 (1989). Because the Board's findings of fact were not basedupon the evidence presented, the findings should be accorded no deference. Accordingly,disregarding the findings of the Board and looking at the actual evidence, described above, Ibelieve that it is clear that this factor, too, weighs against a detachment.

As to the fifth and final Carver factor-the identification of the petitioning territorywith the district to which annexation is sought and the corresponding likelihood ofparticipation in school and extracurricular activities-the petitioners again failed to provideevidence supporting the detachment. The petitioners offered no testimony demonstrating thatthe detachment-area students, in general, identify more closely with the community withinCollinsville Unit 10 than with the community within East St. Louis No. 189. To the contrary,the evidence clearly and unequivocally shows that East St. Louis No. 189 has already takenmany steps to accommodate language and other cultural issues of the detachment-areastudents, whereas Collinsville Unit 10 has not yet done so. The testimony of one parent thathis children would have better opportunities for extracurricular activities such as sports inCollinsville Unit 10 was effectively refuted when the parent was forced to concede that he didnot know whether the sporting activities he had "heard about" were offered by Collinsville Unit10 or by the Collinsville Area Recreation District. Finally, although no other evidence on thisfactor was offered by the petitioners, it should be noted that the area of Collinsville Unit 10that borders the detachment area is mainly rural, whereas the detachment area is predominatelyurban. Accordingly, the detachment area is more like the area it is attempting to detach fromthan the area in Collinsville Unit 10 to which it is adjacent. The fifth Carver factor weighsstrongly against a detachment. Indeed, all the evidence presented in this case weighsoverwhelmingly against a detachment. Not one Carver factor favors a detachment. Thedecision of the Board is clearly and unequivocally contrary to the manifest weight of theevidence and should be reversed.

1. Despite the figures provided by Manners School and East St. Louis No. 189 that only 65 students would be involved in the annexation, Collinsville Unit 10 chose to base its calculations on estimates of a minimum of 80 students subject to annexation.

2. Our colleague, Justice Welch, in his dissenting opinion, seems to read the statute as strictly requiring the individual names of the parties of record to have been listed in the ordersof the regional school board. The statute allows for the amendment of the complaints if theparty of record is completely omitted from the orders at issue. That is not what occurred inthis case.

3. The exception to the general rule was an amendment that took effect on January 1, 1992. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 110, par. 3-107(a). This particular case was initiated on May 26, 1992, and so the exception was available. Board of Education of BethanyCommunity Unit School District No. 301, 255 Ill. App. 3d at 763, 627 N.E.2d at 1175. Because there is no discussion in the opinion about whether the other school district was orwas not listed as a party of record in the final regional school board order, we assume that theparties chose, for whatever reason, not to raise the exception or that the exception was clearlyinapplicable.