The Department of Corrections and the Department of Central Management Services(collectively the Employer) appeal from the Jefferson County circuit court's order denyingits petition to vacate an arbitration award and granting a motion filed by AFSCME, Council31, AFL-CIO (the Union), to confirm the award. On appeal, the Employer claims that thearbitration award must be vacated because the award which reinstates the employee violatespublic policy and because the arbitrator did not expressly determine that the employee wasamenable to discipline.

The pertinent facts follow. On August 13, 1998, the Department of Correctionsterminated Ronald Henderson from his employment as a correctional officer at the BigMuddy River Correctional Center. Mr. Henderson had been hired as a correctional officeron September 14, 1981. He was assigned to Big Muddy River Correctional Center in 1993. In March 1998, Mr. Henderson had an altercation with an inmate. Another inmate, who hadwitnessed the skirmish, reported the incident to prison officials, and an investigation waslaunched. Following the investigation, an employee review hearing was conducted. Thehearing officer determined that charges that Mr. Henderson violated rules regarding the useof force and documentation of such incidents were substantiated, and the hearing officerrecommended that Mr. Henderson be placed on suspension pending discharge. The wardenconcurred in the recommendation and Mr. Henderson was discharged.

Mr. Henderson filed a grievance. A hearing was held on March 4, 1999. On March26, 1999, the arbitrator issued his written decision. The arbitrator determined that a fight,involving Mr. Henderson and an inmate, had occurred on March 18, 1998. The arbitratorfound that Mr. Henderson had engaged in misconduct by initiating the use of force againstan inmate and by failing to report the incident. The arbitrator made this determination afterweighing the testimony of the employee and the witnesses and concluding that the inmates'accounts were more credible than the employee's account.

In the decision, the arbitrator outlined his findings regarding the events that led to thefight. On March 18, 1998, an inmate, who was walking to the dining room, turned to Mr.Henderson, the correctional officer on duty at that time, and called him a "crack head". Thisinmate had taunted Mr. Henderson in a similar manner in the past. After dinner, Mr.Henderson confronted the inmate while he was playing dominos with two other inmates. Mr. Henderson asked the inmate not to call him a crack head again. A heated discussionfollowed. The inmate repeated his taunt. When Mr. Henderson directed him to refrain, theinmate yelled, "fuck you crack head", and stated, "I have freedom of speech". Mr.Henderson then punched the inmate in the face. The inmate returned a punch and the fightensued. Another inmate joined in, striking Mr. Henderson twice. Mr. Henderson fell to thefloor. At that point, the fighting stopped. Eventually, a third inmate reported the incident.

After determining that Mr. Henderson had violated rules of employment, thearbitrator turned to the issue of discipline. In reaching his decision, the arbitrator balancedaggravating and mitigating factors to determine whether a discharge was the appropriatepenalty. The mitigating factors noted in the award were: (1) the employee had 16 years ofseniority at the time of his discharge, (2) all of his evaluations indicated that he metexpectations in all areas except attendance and, thus, was considered a good employee, (3)there was no evidence of prior personnel problems with the employee, and (4) there was nopremeditation on the part of the employee. After weighing these factors, the arbitrator foundthat the discharge was not for just cause. He reinstated Mr. Henderson to his former positionwithout loss of seniority but with no back pay.

The Employer filed an application to vacate the arbitration award in the circuit courtof Jefferson County. The Union filed a motion to confirm the arbitration award. After ahearing, the circuit court denied the Employer's petition to vacate the award and confirmedthe arbitration award.

Judicial review of an arbitration award is extremely limited. American Federationof State, County & Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO v. State, 124 Ill. 2d 246, 261, 529N.E.2d 534, 540-41 (1988) (AFSCME); American Federation of State, County & MunicipalEmployees, AFL-CIO v. Department of Central Management Services, 173 Ill. 2d 299, 304,671 N.E.2d 668, 672 (1996) (Central Management). A court will enforce an arbitrationaward if the arbitrator acts within the scope of his authority and the award draws its essencefrom the parties' collective bargaining agreement. Board of Education of City of Chicagov. Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1, 86 Ill. 2d 469, 474, 427 N.E.2d 1199, 1200-01(1981). This is because the parties to the agreement bargained for the arbitrator'sconstruction of the contract, and a court has no business overruling him because itsinterpretation of a contract provision is different from his. Central Management, 173 Ill. 2dat 305, 671 N.E.2d at 672.

Courts have carved out a public policy exception to vacate arbitration awards thatotherwise are based in a collective bargaining agreement. Central Management, 173 Ill. 2dat 306, 671 N.E.2d at 673; United Paperworkers International Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco,Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 98 L. Ed. 2d 286, 108 S. Ct. 364 (1987). This exception is a narrow oneand is invoked only when a contravention of public policy is clearly shown. AFSCME, 124Ill. 2d at 261, 529 N.E.2d at 540-41. In order to vacate an arbitrator's award on public policygrounds, some provision of the contract, as interpreted by the arbitrator, must violate someexplicit and dominant public policy. Central Management, 173 Ill. 2d at 307-08, 671N.E.2d at 673.

The public policy exception requires a two-step analysis. The initial question iswhether a well-defined public policy can be identified. If there is a definitive public policy,then the next question is whether the arbitrator's award, as reflected in his interpretation ofthe agreement, violated public policy. Central Management, 173 Ill. 2d at 307-08, 671N.E.2d at 674; Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. at 43-44, 98 L. Ed. 2d at 302-03, 108 S. Ct. at 373-74. Ultimately, the exception's applicability to a case is necessarily fact dependent. CentralManagement, 173 Ill. 2d at 311, 671 N.E.2d at 675.

In this case the arbitrator found that Mr. Henderson was guilty of misconduct byinappropriately initiating the use of force against an inmate and by not reporting the incidentbut that because of mitigating factors, discharge was not for just cause. The arbitratorreinstated the employee to his former position without a loss of seniority but with no backpay.

The Employer contends that the award reinstating Mr. Henderson violates publicpolicy. That there is a public policy against battering prisoners (730 ILCS 5/1-1-2(c) (West1992)) is not disputed. The question is whether the arbitrator's award of reinstatementactually violated that public policy. Central Management, 173 Ill. 2d at 307-08, 671 N.E.2dat 674; Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. at 44, 98 L. Ed. 2d at 303, 108 S. Ct. at 373-74.

When an agreement contemplates that the arbitrator will determine remedies forcontractual violations, such as in the case here, it is the function of the arbitrator, not thecourt, to decide what disciplinary action is required and a court has no authority to disagreeor to substitute its judgment. Central Management, 173 Ill. 2d at 306, 671 N.E.2d at 673. If the arbitrator makes a rational finding that the employee can be trusted to refrain from theoffending conduct, the arbitrator may reinstate the employee to his or her former job and thecourts would be obligated to affirm the award. Central Management, 173 Ill. 2d at 322, 671N.E.2d at 680. However, if the arbitrator's construction of an agreement, including theremedy he fashions, violates public policy, an award based upon that construction may bevacated. Central Management, 173 Ill. 2d at 318, 671 N.E.2d at 678.

In this case, the parties had contractually agreed to a system of progressive andcorrective discipline, and a suspension and a discharge were penalties available to thearbitrator. The Employer has not pointed to any contractual provision which requires thatan employee be automatically terminated for hitting a prisoner. Nor did the Employer reciteany statute or regulation that prohibits reinstatement for such conduct. Therefore, there isno evidence that an automatic termination was required for the proven misconduct under thecollective bargaining agreement or any statute or regulation.

The arbitrator carefully balanced the aggravating and mitigating factors to determinewhether the penalty was proportionate to the misconduct. In explaining the balancingprocess, the arbitrator specifically referenced and quoted from an opinion written byArbitrator Malin (the Department of Management Services and the Department ofCorrections, Arbitration No. 3029 (Malin, 1997)), who stated that a balance must be struckbetween the employee's investment in his job and expectation of job security and the risk tothe employer posed by continuing to employ the employee.

After reviewing his decision, we conclude that the arbitrator made a rationaldetermination that Mr. Henderson was amenable to discipline. It is clear to us that inreaching this decision, the arbitrator considered the potential of the employee to repeat hisoffense and the risk posed to the Employer and to the inmates of the facility. The arbitratorspecifically noted that throughout 16 years of service, this employee had received goodevaluations, had no history of prior personnel problems, and did not plan or provoke thefight. The arbitrator indicated that if the employee did not have a proven track record, hewould have sustained the discharge. Implicit in the decision is the arbitrator's considerationof the public policy against battering prisoners and thoughtful determination that Mr.Henderson was amenable to rehabilitation and that the risk that he would engage in similarincidents in the future was low. There is no requirement that the arbitrator expressly statethat an employee is amenable to discipline. See Central Management, 173 Ill. 2d at 332,671 N.E.2d at 685 (citing Stead Motors of Walnut Creek v. Automotive Machinists LodgeNo. 1173, International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 886 F.2d 1200, 1213(9th Cir. 1989)). If it is clear from the award that the arbitrator made a rational finding thatan employee could capably return to and perform his duties without impinging orundermining the public policy and without posing a risk to public safety and welfare and thatthe employee will refrain from the misconduct, the court is obligated to affirm the award.

In this case, the arbitrator imposed a measured but meaningful penalty afterdetermining that the employee was guilty of misconduct, that he was a capable employee,that the risk of a repeat of the proven misconduct was low, that reinstatement posed little riskto the welfare of the inmates and the Employer, and that reinstatement was appropriate. Based upon this record, we cannot say that public policy mandated that Mr. Henderson bedischarged.

Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court denying the petition to vacate andconfirming the arbitration award is affirmed.