Rule 23 Order filed
July 8, 2002;
Motion to publish granted
August 13, 2002.

Robert Diggs (plaintiff) appeals from the dismissal by the circuit court of RandolphCounty of his complaint filed under the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act (the Act)(775 ILCS 35/1 et seq. (West 2000)). He contends that the motion to dismiss filed byDonald N. Snyder, Jr., Roger D. Cowan, Leora Harry, Captain Lloyd Korando, Captain EvaMoore, Lieutenant Robert E. Gales, Tom Carter, Minh Scott, and Doug Sullins (defendants),all of whom are employees of the Department of Corrections (the Department), failed todemonstrate that his rights under the Act were not violated by the confiscation of a religiouspamphlet. He asserts that defendants impinged on his right to the free exercise of hisreligion because they did not use the least restrictive means by which to achieve acompelling governmental interest. Plaintiff seeks the reversal of the trial court's order andan order from this court granting the relief requested in his complaint.

Plaintiff is an inmate in the Department at Menard Correctional Center (Menard)serving a 30-year prison sentence for aggravated criminal sexual assault, a 20-year prisonsentence for another aggravated criminal sexual assault, a 30-year prison sentence for armedrobbery, one 15-year prison sentence for residential burglary, and two four-year prisonsentences for residential burglary. The date for his discharge from mandatory supervisedrelease is April 27, 2032.

On April 10, 2001, plaintiff, a follower of Islam, filed an action seeking injunctiveand declaratory relief from the circuit court. He complained that on June 19, 2000, he wasdisciplined for an unspecified infraction of Department rules, that he was punished with timein segregation, and that upon his release from segregation, where he was not allowed to havea television set, he was unable to persuade the authorities to give him a State-loan televisionon which to view Friday Jumu'ah services. He asked the court to direct defendant RogerCowan, warden of Menard, to provide a free State television to plaintiff so that he couldparticipate in the televised Jumu'ah services. He also asked the court to issue a declaratoryjudgment finding that Cowan had failed to provide him with an alternative means to physicalpresence at Jumu'ah services by denying him a free State-loan television, thereby violatinghis rights under the first amendment of the United States Constitution, the Constitution ofthe State of Illinois, and the Act. Exhibits attached to the pleading demonstrated thatplaintiff had pursued a grievance about his lack of a State-loan television to the point ofexhaustion. Because the disposition of this filing is not an issue on appeal, it need not bediscussed further.

On April 11, 2001, plaintiff filed a complaint under the Act. He asserted that on June14, 2000, he was improperly ticketed for gang or unauthorized organization activity whencorrectional officers shook down his cell and found an Islam-related pamphlet that"condemned" all correctional officers and any others who would interfere with the practiceof Islam. The pamphlet, which is not a part of the record on appeal, apparently included a"condemnation pledge"-a "pledge to condemn all correctional officer[s] and any people whodeny, deprive[,] or hinder the practice of worshiping Allah"-but plaintiff asserted that he hadnot signed the pledge. He contended that his Muslim religion was authorized by theDepartment, that he was not given notice that the pamphlet constituted contraband orunauthorized property, and that he was not informed that it was necessary for him todisavow Islam because it was a gang or an unauthorized organization. Nonetheless, plaintiffwas found guilty of gang or unauthorized organizational activity and possession ofcontraband or unauthorized property, confined to segregation for three months, and reducedto C grade for three months. No good-conduct credit was revoked as a result of thedisciplinary action, but plaintiff lost his prison job as a consequence of the ticket. Plaintiffsought a declaration by the court that defendants' actions violated the Act.

Exhibits to the complaint established that plaintiff grieved the discipline imposed, buthe did not assert that the practice of his Islamic religion was in any way burdened by theconfiscation of the pamphlet. His grievance was denied based on the grievance officer'sfinding that possession of the pamphlet was not authorized by the facility and that thecontents, while not specifically gang-related, constituted unauthorized organizationalmaterials. The officer also relied on Muslim chaplain Mu'min's statement, "[T]he pledge isnot literature condoned or disseminated by the Chaplaincy Department." Plaintiff appealedthe discipline imposed to the point of the exhaustion of his administrative remedies. Thefinding of guilt on the first charge (gang or unauthorized organizational activity) wasexpunged from his record by the administrative review board. The adjustment committee'sfinding of guilty of possession of contraband or unauthorized property was affirmed in ahearing report that stated, "It is the Board's opinion that the material should be considered[c]ontraband/[u]nauthorized [p]roperty based on the reference to 'condemning allcorrectional officers ...[.]' "

On June 6, 2001, defendants moved, pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of CivilProcedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2000)), to dismiss plaintiff's complaint forinjunctive relief and his complaint under the Act. In regard to the complaint, they noted thatplaintiff failed to assert that defendants' actions constituted a substantial burden on hisreligious practices. They contended that the confiscation of a single pamphlet due to itsthreatening content did not constitute a substantial burden on plaintiff's right to the freeexercise of his Islamic religion. They further claimed that even if it did, the Department mayinfringe on an inmate's constitutional rights by confiscating unauthorized, threateningprinted matter if that impingement is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests,in this case maintaining order and security in the prison. Defendants argued that because theadministrative review board deleted the disciplinary action related to gang or unauthorizedorganization activity from plaintiff's institutional record, his argument that the Departmentwas somehow requiring him to renounce his religion was baseless.

On July 6, 2001, plaintiff filed a response to the motion to dismiss, moved forinjunctive relief, and filed a "motion for economic and non[]economic loss" seeking $45 perday for each day he spent in segregation as a result of the disciplinary action. He assertedthat he was entitled to advance notice in the form of an institutional directive that thepamphlet constituted contraband and that, absent such notice, he should not have beendisciplined. Plaintiff claimed that he was still being punished on the basis of his religionbecause, despite the fact that the disciplinary action for gang or unauthorized organizationalactivity was expunged from his record, he lost his State-loan television as a result of thediscipline and he had no alternative means by which to participate in the televised FridayJumu'ah service. Plaintiff's injunction demand sought an order directing defendants toexpunge the second disciplinary report from his record, return him to his job assignment atthe rate of pay he previously had enjoyed, return the confiscated pamphlet to him, andsubmit all documents to the publications review committee in the future.

On July 9, 2001, the trial court granted defendants' motion to dismiss. In relevantpart, it found that no notice was required prior to the adoption of regulations that affectedreligious practices, that plaintiff's exercise of religion had not been substantially burdenedby the confiscation of the pamphlet, that defendants confiscated the pamphlet as the leastrestrictive means to achieve a compelling government interest, and that plaintiff was notpunished on the basis of his Muslim religion.

Plaintiff argues that defendants' motion to dismiss failed to demonstrate that his rightsunder the Act were not violated by the confiscation of his pamphlet. He asserts thatdefendants impinged on his right to the free exercise of his religion because they did not usethe least restrictive means to achieve a compelling governmental interest. He argues that,first, the confiscation was not done in the furtherance of a governmental interest, second, helacked notice that the possession of the pamphlet was against Department rules, and third,the Department did not submit the pamphlet to the publications review committee. Hecontends that the dismissal of his complaint should be reversed and his complaint should begranted, presumably by this court. He has abandoned his contentions in regard to the refusalof the Department to provide him with a State television on which to view Jumu'ah services, and thus no further discussion of that issue is necessary.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss under section 2-619 of the Code, which admitsthe legal sufficiency of the complaint but raises defects, defenses, or other affirmativematters appearing on the face of the complaint or established by external submissions thatdefeat the action (Lipinski v. Martin J. Kelly Oldsmobile, Inc., 325 Ill. App. 3d 1139, 1144,759 N.E.2d 66, 69 (2001)). It does not admit conclusions of law that are unsupported byspecific allegations. Lipinski, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 1144, 759 N.E.2d at 69. We review denovo the grant of a section 2-619 motion to dismiss. Parks v. Kownacki, 193 Ill. 2d 164,175, 737 N.E.2d 287, 293 (2000). Where, as here, a cause of action is dismissed pursuantto a section 2-619 motion, the questions on appeal are whether a genuine issue of materialfact exists and whether the defendant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Nowakv. St. Rita High School, 197 Ill. 2d 381, 389, 757 N.E.2d 471, 477 (2001). A reviewingcourt may affirm a dismissal for any reason appearing in the record. Lyons v. Ryan, 324 Ill.App. 3d 1094, 1100, 756 N.E.2d 396, 401 (2001), appeal allowed, 197 Ill. 2d 564, 763N.E.2d 771 (2001).

There is a paucity of cases involving the Illinois Act, given its relatively recentpassage. We may therefore turn to federal cases for guidance, despite the fact that thefederal statute, codified at 42 U.S.C.