Plaintiff, Lawrence Elam, who suffers from a central nervous system injury diagnosedas Parkinson's disease, filed a negligence and products liability action against defendants,Lincoln Electric Company (Lincoln Electric), Hobart Brothers Company, and Airco/TheBOC Group, Inc. (Airco), manufacturers of welding rods. Plaintiff alleged defendants failedto investigate the harms they were aware of relating to manganese in welding rods and failedto warn of those harms. Plaintiff claimed the failure to investigate and the failure to warncaused his Parkinson's disease.

Plaintiff began working for his employer, Union Electric Company, which laterbecame Ameren Corp. (Ameren), in 1967. He held several jobs, including machinistapprentice, pipefitter, and ultimately, welder. Over the course of his career, he was exposedto intense welding fumes, oftentimes working with a number of welders in enclosed, poorlyventilated spaces. Welding fumes contain manganese, a known neurotoxin that penetratesthe blood-brain barrier and harms the basal ganglia. While plaintiff was provided withprotective gear, he never wore it due, in part, to the confined spaces in which he worked. Plaintiff could not recall any welders who used the protective gear. In 1995, plaintiff wasdiagnosed with Parkinson's disease by Dr. Joseph Black, a neurologist, after experiencingclassical symptoms of the disease, including fatigue, tremors, stiffness, and a mask-like face. In 1996, plaintiff retired from Ameren.

Within the welding industry, manufacturers, including defendants, control anddominate safety and health activities. They do so by creating, within trade organizations inwhich they are members, committees, subcommittees, and task forces assigned to investigatehealth hazards in the welding industry and to write and publish precautionary productinformation. In 1967, a warning label was placed on welding rod containers, stating,"Welding may produce a concentration of fumes and gases hazardous to health." Thewarning cautioned users to avoid breathing the fumes and gases and use proper ventilation. The welding industry was specifically advised by the American Welding Society (Society),of which all defendants are members, to study the problem of chronic manganese poisoning,but it failed to follow the recommendation.

In 1979, the warning was updated but again failed to include any mention ofmanganese, even though substantial evidence existed showing that manganese is toxic ifinhaled. In 1986, welding rod manufacturers added a product sticker which noted thatcertain chemicals, including manganese, may be hazardous. In 1991, the product sticker wasupdated as follows: "Warning, the following chemicals may be hazardous during welding:Iron, manganese, silicon, titanium dioxide. Lung and nervous system damage may resultfrom overexposure." These warnings were placed on the cartons that contained the weldingrods. The evidence showed that the welders seldom saw the cartons because the rods hadbeen already removed from the cartons by the time they were used by the welders.

On July 27, 2001, plaintiff filed his complaint, in which he alleged defendants (1)were negligent in failing to investigate the health hazards associated with welding and infailing to provide adequate warnings with their mild steel welding rods and (2) should beheld strictly liable because of the alleged lack of investigation and adequate warnings. Aftera four-week trial in the circuit court of Madison County, the jury returned a $1 milliongeneral verdict in favor of plaintiff. The trial court entered a judgment in favor of plaintiffin the amount of $925,000, reflecting a setoff for a prior settlement. On appeal, defendantsargue the trial court erred as a matter of law in refusing to enter a judgment in favor ofdefendants because (1) defendants in fact gave warnings, which plaintiff admitted he did notread, and thus the alleged failure to warn did not cause plaintiff's injuries and (2) plaintiffwas diagnosed with Parkinson's disease, a disease for which medical science has yet toidentify a cause, and there is no credible scientific literature or expert testimony linkingmanganese in welding fumes to plaintiff's Parkinson's disease. In the alternative, defendantscontend they are entitled to a new trial due to numerous alleged errors and/or abuses ofdiscretion on the part of the trial court. We affirm.

In this appeal, defendants filed a motion to strike plaintiff's brief or, in the alternative,to strike certain portions of plaintiff's brief for a failure to comply with Supreme Court Rule341 (188 Ill. 2d R. 341) and for relying on materials not presented at the trial. This courtdenies defendants' motion. Because the record is voluminous and defendants raise numerouscomplex issues and subissues, this court will address the necessary facts regarding each issueand subissue as they arise.
 

The first major issue raised in this appeal is whether the trial court erred in failing todirect a verdict or enter a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (judgment n.o.v.) in favor ofdefendants. We point out that the standard of review in deciding whether a trial court erredin refusing to direct a verdict or enter a judgment n.o.v. is rigorous. A directed verdict orjudgment n.o.v. is only proper in a case in which all the evidence when viewed in the lightmost favorable to the nonmoving party so overwhelmingly favors the movant that no contraryverdict based upon the evidence could ever stand. Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co., 37Ill. 2d 494, 510, 229 N.E.2d 504, 513-14 (1967). Pedrick emphasizes that parties have aright to have substantial factual disputes resolved by the jury.

Defendants argue the trial court erred in denying their motions for a directed verdictor a judgment n.o.v. on plaintiff's claim that defendants failed to adequately warn of a causalnexus between fumes from mild steel welding rods and Parkinson's disease because plaintiffdid not and could not show that any inadequacy in the warnings provided by defendantsproximately caused his Parkinson's disease. Defendants insist that because plaintiff knewwarning labels were present on defendants' products but chose not to read them, plaintiff'sfailure-to-warn claim fails as a matter of law. Plaintiff responds that defendants' obscurewarnings and acknowledged failure to supply warnings to welders show the trial court wascorrect in denying defendants' motions.

Defendants rely on Kane v. R.D. Werner Co., 275 Ill. App. 3d 1035, 657 N.E.2d 37(1995), in which our colleagues in the First District held that a plaintiff cannot maintain aproducts liability action premised on a failure-to-adequately-warn theory where a plaintiffadmits he never read the given warnings. We find Kane distinguishable from the instantcase. In Kane, the worker's argument was not that the inadequacies of the warning labelsprevented him from reading them but, rather, that the content of the labels was inadequate. The Kane court determined that because the plaintiff failed to read the warnings, anyinadequacy in the content of the warnings could not have proximately caused the plaintiff'sinjuries and the trial court properly granted a summary judgment. Kane, 275 Ill. App. 3d at1037, 657 N.E.2d at 39. The Kane court specifically agreed, however, that " 'a plaintiff whodoes not read an allegedly inadequate warning cannot maintain a negligent-failure-to-warnaction unless the nature of the alleged inadequacy is such that it prevents him from readingit.' " (Emphasis added.) Kane, 275 Ill. App. 3d at 1037, 657 N.E.2d at 39 (quoting E.R.Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Cox, 477 So. 2d 963, 971 (Ala. 1985)). Here, the evidence indicatesdefendants packaged the relevant warnings in a way that virtually guaranteed plaintiff andothers within the welding trade would not read them.

The evidence at the trial showed that the warnings were placed on the cartons inwhich the welding rods were distributed. Testimony was presented that welders tended notto see the cartons. For example, a letter dated June 7, 1967, was introduced into evidence. In that letter, the chief engineer for the electrode division of defendant Lincoln Electricexplained that many welders who used the electric welding rod would never see the containeron which the warning label appeared. Dr. Zimmerman, an expert in industrial hygiene,reviewed the warning labels and testified that the first warning label issued in 1967 was noteffectively communicated because it was only placed on the welding rod can, not on the rod. Dr. Zimmerman explained that because the label was only on the can, the welders wouldoften not even see the warning because they tended to get the rods from a location other thanthe can.

Dr. Zimmerman also explained that the warning label was not effectivelycommunicated because it was directed only toward welders, and not toward welders'assistants or other bystanders who are within the plume of the welding fumes. Dr.Zimmerman analogized the situation to secondhand smoke in the cigarette industry. Heexplained a smoker knows what he is putting into his lungs and has the benefit of thewarning on the cigarette package, but a nonsmoker standing nearby may not even be awarehe is inhaling secondhand smoke and does not have the benefit of seeing the warning on thecigarette package. Under these circumstances, where the evidence indicates defendantsintentionally placed the warnings in a place where plaintiff would be unlikely to read them,we are unconvinced by defendants' argument that plaintiff's failure-to-warn claim fails as amatter of law. Sufficient testimony was presented to submit the issue to the jury.

We also point out that a general verdict was entered in the instant case. Under section2-1201(d) of the Civil Practice Law (735 ILCS 5/2-1201(d) (West 2002)), a general verdictcan be sustained on any of several bases of liability and will not be reversed due to theimpairment of one of the theories. Witherell v. Weimer, 118 Ill. 2d 321, 329, 515 N.E.2d 68,72 (1987). Therefore, even if the inadequacy of the warnings was not the proximate causeof plaintiff's injuries and the failure-to-warn claim should have been dismissed as a matterof law, plaintiff could still recover under the separate theory of defendants' breach of a dutyto investigate the health hazards associated with welding.

Contrary to defendants' assertions, there is significant evidence in the record showinga link between Parkinson's disease and manganese in welding fumes, and there is significantevidence supporting plaintiff's claim that defendants breached their duty to investigate thehealth hazards associated with welding. Plaintiff introduced numerous scientific articlesregarding industrial manganese poisoning. For example, plaintiff's exhibit No. 7, an articleentitled "Industrial Manganese Poisoning," was published by the United States Public HealthService in 1943. The article points out that industrial manganese poisoning has beenrecognized since 1837, when there was a report of five workers being affected, and explains,"Industrial manganese poisoning occurs through the absorption of vapor, fumes[,] or dustthrough the respiratory system following the inhalation of dust of manganese ore or thefumes from the fusing of the manganese in steel manufacture." Fed. Security Agency, U.S.Pub. Health Serv., Nat'l Inst. of Health Bull. No. 182, Industrial Manganese Poisoning 6(1943). Considering the number of workers exposed, the article concludes that manganesepoisoning is rare but does occur. The article specifically states, "The most importantpathological changes in man are those which occur in the central nervous system, with theresultant development of the [P]arkinsonian syndrome." Industrial Manganese Poisoning at6.

Plaintiff's exhibit No. 4, a 1932 German article that discusses manganese poisoningin welders during the 1920s, concludes, "Electric arc welding can be a health risk for thewelder, because of the manganese fumes generated from the electrode." E. Beintker,Manganeinwirkung bei dem elektrischen Lichtbogenschweißen, Zentralblatt fürGewerbehygiene 207, 211 (1932) (plaintiff's translation at p. 8). It also discusses how a formof manganese poisoning can occur in welders. Plaintiff's exhibit No. 3, a June 1977publication by the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare onoccupational diseases and a guide to their recognition, discusses chronic manganesepoisoning at length. U.S. Dep't of Health, Education, & Welfare, Pub. Health Serv., Ctr. forDisease Control, Nat'l Inst. for Occupational Safety & Health, Occupational Diseases: AGuide to Their Recognition (rev. ed. 1977) (Occupational Diseases Guide). It concludes thatas the disease progresses its symptoms are "indistinguishable from classical Parkinson'sdisease." Occupational Diseases Guide at 369. The record is replete with articles, scientificpapers, and testimony showing a correlation between welding and Parkinsonism.

Dr. Alexander Lesnewich, who holds a Ph.D. in metallurgical engineering, testifiedfor plaintiff regarding a proposed epidemiological study. Dr. Lesnewich worked fordefendant Airco from 1952 until his retirement in 1985. Since 1974, he had been a memberof the Society and organized the research subcommittee of the safety and health committeeof the Society. He was also a member of the Society's technical activities committee. Heagreed that a 1958 technical document lists manganese as a potentially toxic material. In1979, during his tenure with the Society, the Franklin report was issued. The Franklin reportwas a technical summary of medical literature published by the Society. The purpose of theFranklin report was to help determine the health hazards of welding fumes. Dr. Lesnewichread the report's conclusions regarding manganese intoxication as follows:

" [']Epidemiology. Although a number of cases[']-they have a bunch of referenceshere-[']have been reported, there are no recent studies reported in the literature thatexplore the magnitude of the problem of chronic manganese poisoning in welders. In the future epidemiology-in future epidemiology studies of various weldingpopulations, the prevalence of this disease should be investigated.['] "

Despite this conclusion, no epidemiology study was conducted by the Society.

Dr. Lesnewich was specifically asked about a 1976 lawsuit involving a person namedAcie Nobels and a document he wrote in connection with that case. Dr. Lesnewich readfrom the notation as follows:

" [']Welder since 1960 at age 50. In 1960 working different jobs, mostly outdoors. He is very ill. Perfectly clear lungs. Has neurological[']-I can't read that. [']Onlymanganese could cause that. Had been making tetraethyl lead years ago. Lead coulddo the same.['] "

Minutes from one of the Society's meetings from which Dr. Lesnewich was absent wereintroduced and state as follows:

"Mr. Kinser observed that in mild steel welding a significant amount of manganeseappears in the fume. In view of the several court cases alleging manganese poisoning,it would seem appropriate to include some kind of neurological examination toindicate the possible connection with manganese exposure to the epidemiologicalstudy."

The Society's safety and health committee went so far as to hire a doctor, Dr. Mastrometteo,to develop a study.

Minutes from a December 4, 1981, meeting show that neurological testing was to beincluded, yet no study was ever done. A review of the record here shows that defendantswere well aware of a possible causal link between manganese in welding fumes and thedevelopment of Parkinson's disease or a central nervous system disorder with Parkinson's-like symptoms. Despite this knowledge, defendants failed to investigate the health hazardsof manganese in the welding fumes.

As previously set forth, defendants did not appeal the jury's verdict on the failure-to-investigate count. Defendants' appeal is based on the claim that there is no link betweenwelding and Parkinson's disease and, thus, no duty to warn. Accordingly, even if we areincorrect on the failure-to-warn claim, the verdict can be sustained on the failure-to-investigate count, which defendants did not appeal. Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 46 Ill. 2d 288,294, 263 N.E.2d 103, 106 (1970).

In their reply brief, defendants argue that no cause of action exists in Illinois for afailure to investigate the alleged dangers of a product. Defendants rely on an unpublishedorder, which has no precedential value pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23(e) (166 Ill. 2d R.23(e)), and Baylie v. Swift & Co., 283 Ill. App. 3d 421, 434, 670 N.E.2d 772, 782 (1996),which does not support defendants' assertion. With regard to a "duty to test," Baylie stated:

"The evidence at trial in fact disclosed that Swift had the capability to test thematerial for flammability and explosibility[] but that it failed to do so. Evidence ofthe so-called 'duty to test' was thus intertwined with Swift's duty to warn and wasproperly before the jury." Baylie, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 434, 670 N.E.2d at 782.

Likewise, in the instant case, the issue of a failure to investigate was properly before the jury. Plaintiff provided evidence that defendants were aware of the hazards associated withmanganese in welding fumes but ignored the dangers and ignored advice to perform anepidemiological study. We find that plaintiff alleged a legal theory under which liabilitycould attach.

Defendants next complain plaintiff failed to establish a causal link between weldingfumes and Parkinson's disease. Defendants insist plaintiff's diagnosis of idiopathicParkinson's disease precludes a finding of liability because, by definition, idiopathic meansthat the cause of the disease is unknown. We disagree with defendants' logic.

As plaintiff points out, the jury was not instructed that in order to find defendantsliable, there must be a finding that plaintiff suffers from Parkinson's disease. Rather, the jurywas instructed that in order to find defendants liable, plaintiff must prove "defendants knewor should have known that welding fumes increased the risk of central nervous systeminjury." (Emphasis added.) Defendants objected to the use of the term "central nervoussystem injury" on the basis that it did not conform with Illinois's pattern jury instruction inthat it was a modification of the instruction. Plaintiff's counsel defended instructing the juryin this manner, arguing as follows:

"In terms of the central nervous system injury, your Honor, while it is the defendant'sposition that this-[plaintiff's] condition is exclusively and only called Parkinson'sdisease, that is not what Dr. Nausieda said. That is not what Dr. Racette said. Thatis not what Dr. Margolis said. Their testimony is that there is a continuum or aspectrum of this disease and it is a central nervous system disorder and we're justtalking about semantics. But[] we do not have to be tied or characterized orcategorized into one specific injury only. And[,] of course, they want that to beidiopathic Parkinson's disease. What we're dealing with is a spectrum or continuumof central nervous system disorders, which is in essence what the defendant hasconceded. So, we submit the instruction is appropriate and conforms to the proof andevidence in this case."

The trial court offered defendants the opportunity to respond, but defendants declined. Thejury was then instructed using the term "central nervous system injury" rather than"Parkinson's disease." Defendants have not appealed giving the central-nervous-system-injury instruction.

The record in this case supports use of the term "central nervous system injury." Theevidence is overwhelming that manganese can cause a central nervous system injury. Evendefendants' expert, Dr. Olanow, conceded that manganese damages the brain. In discussingidiopathic Parkinson's disease, plaintiff's expert, Dr. Margolis, explained that idiopathicmeans that there is no known cause for a disease; he stated, however, "But I think that'sbetter phrased [']we don't know the cause yet.['] " Dr. Margolis diagnosed plaintiff assuffering from "Parkinson's as a welder." He explained the basis of his diagnosis as follows:

"Based on the fact that [plaintiff] was a welder. Based on the fact that [plaintiff] hasParkinson's disease or looks like Parkinson's disease. Looks like idiopathicParkinson's disease and his manganese exposure plus my knowledge at that point ofthe literature in regard to manganese and [P]arkinsonism."

Dr. Margolis was then asked what he knows from literature about the manganese effect onthe central nervous system. He replied:

"Basically manganism or manganese toxicity is a disorder that occurs when you areexposed to excessive amounts of manganese. And it effects [sic] the basal ganglial,the putamen (ph), the pallidum[,] which is part of the basal ganglium[,] and patientsfor the most part develop a syndrome that was manifested initially as a psychosis,what we call manganese madness[,] and then they developed a movement disorderthat had a lot of postural tremor, a lot of rigidity, a lot of dystonia, and in the extremeform this abnormal walk referred to as this cock-walk[,] [w]here one would walk withtheir arms out on the balls of their feet. There were some other nuances ofmanganism that were different than idiopathic Parkinson's disease[-][p]rimarily moreproximal tremor, the type we see in other disorders such as Wilson's disease. Andthen there's also some literature showing-you asked me about the literature or myknowledge of [m]anganese?"

Dr. Margolis went on to discuss literature he has read on the topic and studies that have beendone which show an increased incidence of what looks like idiopathic Parkinson's diseasein the welding population. According to Dr. Margolis, the literature indicates that weldersdo have an increased incidence of what looks like idiopathic Parkinson's and that their PETscans look just like patients with Parkinson's, and not like the patients with manganism.

Likewise, Dr. Martinez testified he looked at all the possibilities for plaintiff'sParkinsonism, such as genetics, drug abuse, viral encephalopathy, antipsychotic drugs,stroke, and more. He concluded, "The only thing that stands out like a mountain on a plainby itself is [plaintiff's] long, continuous workplace exposure to manganese, that is[,] whichis a known cause of [P]arkinsonism and has been known for a very long time." This is buta fraction of the expert testimony and compelling scientific material before the jury thatdescribed the common symptoms in welders exposed to manganese.

Moreover, the record indicates an overlap in the terms "Parkinson's disease,""Parkinsonism," and "central nervous system injury." Even defendants' expert, Dr. Black,who first diagnosed plaintiff, agreed that "welding is considered a cause of [P]arkinsonism." The defendants' arguments regarding idiopathic Parkinson's disease distort the evidence inthe record.

Defendants also contend that plaintiff's causal-link theory was based upon speculativeexpert opinions and preliminary data that was inadmissible under Illinois law. Defendantsobject to Dr. Margolis in general and complain that his causation opinions were based onspeculation. They challenge Dr. Martinez on the basis he is unqualified and his methodologyfailed to conform to the requirements for expert testimony. Defendants also object totestimony concerning what was commonly referred to as the Gulf Coast study on the basisthat (1) the data proffered by plaintiff that of 20,000 workers studied, 2,000 to 2,500 havebecome ill is untrue and (2) even putting aside the falsity of the results, the Gulf Coast studyis so methodologically flawed that it does not constitute admissible evidence. Plaintiffresponds that the opinions and methodology offered by his experts are admissible underIllinois law. We agree with plaintiff.

In Illinois, the admissibility of expert scientific testimony is governed by the "generalacceptance test" set forth in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Donaldsonv. Central Illinois Public Service Co., 199 Ill. 2d 63, 76-77, 767 N.E.2d 314, 323-24 (2002). Under the general acceptance test, scientific evidence is only admissible at a trial if themethodology upon which the opinion is based is "sufficiently established to have gainedgeneral acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." Frye, 293 F. at 1014.

" '[G]eneral acceptance' does not concern the ultimate conclusion. Rather, the proper focusof the general acceptance test is on the underlying methodology used to generate theconclusion." (Emphasis added.) Donaldson, 199 Ill. 2d at 77, 767 N.E.2d at 324.

A dual standard of review now applies to the trial court's admission of expertscientific testimony. The questions of whether an expert scientific witness is qualified totestify and whether the proffered testimony is relevant are left to the trial court's discretion. However, the trial court's analysis of the admissibility of scientific evidence is subject to denovo review. In re Commitment of Simons, 213 Ill. 2d 523, 530-33, 821 N.E.2d 1184, 1189-90 (2004). In conducting a de novo review, the reviewing court may consider sourcesoutside the record, including legal and scientific articles, as well as court opinions from otherjurisdictions. In re Commitment of Simons, 213 Ill. 2d at 531, 821 N.E.2d at 1189.

In the instant case, there is no dispute that plaintiff suffers from Parkinson's disease,a central nervous system injury. The dispute centers on whether plaintiff's central nervoussystem injury can be linked to manganese in welding fumes. After careful consideration, wefind that the jury was properly allowed to hear the evidence and the experts' opinions anddraw its own conclusions.

We disagree with defendants' contentions regarding Dr. Margolis's and Dr. Martinez'squalifications and causation opinions. Dr. Margolis is a neurologist experienced in treatingpatients with central nervous system injuries such as Parkinson's disease. He was able toconnect plaintiff's symptoms to manganese exposure in welding fumes based upon thenumerous articles and scientific literature that link manganese exposure in welders toParkinson's and Parkinson's-like symptoms. Dr. Martinez is a toxicologist with doctoraldegrees in both toxicology and chemistry. His background qualified him to give an opinionabout the toxicity of manganese and its effects. The trial court was aware that Dr. Martinezhad been qualified as an expert in another toxic tort case, Bonner v. ISP Technologies, Inc.,259 F.3d 924, 930-31 (8th Cir. 2001). Dr. Martinez personally interviewed plaintiff andapplied his knowledge and expertise and concluded that plaintiff's central nervous systeminjury was caused by manganese in welding fumes. Dr. Martinez's background andmethodology are reliable. It was not an abuse of the trial court's considerable discretion topermit him to render an opinion on causal connection.

As for the Gulf Coast study, defendants have misrepresented the nature of Dr.Nausieda's testimony. Dr. Nausieda is a board-certified neurologist who practices inMilwaukee, Wisconsin. His clinic is one of approximately 35 clinics designated as centersof excellence by the National Parkinson's Foundation. The clinic has approximately 4,500active patients. Dr. Nausieda testified that Parkinson's disease is a relatively new disease inthat there is no reference to symptoms in medical literature until the early 1800s, when Dr.James Parkinson describes a series of patients with symptoms that have now become knownas Parkinson's disease. According to Dr. Nausieda, the most common theory is thatParkinson's disease is a by-product of the Industrial Revolution, because the first reportedcases of the disease occurred outside London, which was highly industrialized at the time. Dr. Nausieda reported that the next description of similar cases occurred some 20 years laterin manganese-ore-crushing workers.

Dr. Nausieda went on to outline the history of the disease and his own attempts todiscover its cause. Dr. Nausieda first discovered a link between welders and Parkinson'ssymptoms in the early 1990s when one of his patients, a retired welder, showed him anadvertisement from the Chicago Tribune in which plaintiff's attorney's law firm was seekingParkinson's patients who were welders. After discussions with the law firm, Dr. Nausiedabegan questioning his own patients about a potential link between welding and Parkinson'sdisease symptoms. Since that time, Dr. Nausieda has uncovered at least 67 of his ownpatients, who were originally diagnosed as suffering from Parkinson's, who actually sufferfrom what is, in his opinion, manganese exposure. Of these 67 patients, he does not believeany neurologist would have diagnosed them with anything other than Parkinson's disease. Dr. Nausieda's testimony was based upon his own experience and impressions from treatingParkinson's patients.

Dr. Nausieda specifically stated the Gulf Coast study is not an epidemiologic study. He admitted there is a known bias in that the group being screened was chosen by plaintiffs'lawyers attempting to find clients. Dr. Nausieda agreed the consortium behind the studyhopes to uncover a group of plaintiffs and file suit on behalf of these shipyard workers whohave contracted Parkinson's disease symptoms through manganese exposure. Dr. Nausiedaacknowledged that there are no written findings from the study and that his data is rather"loose." The Gulf Coast study is an ongoing project. Dr. Nausieda made it clear the ultimateresults may be different from the early results. The Gulf Coast study was never presentedas a completed epidemiologic study that must pass the Frye test. Accordingly, Dr.Nausieda's testimony was not "false," as defendants argue.

In addition, we agree with plaintiff that to the extent there is a disagreement amongexperts about the precise symptoms associated with manganese exposure, it was the jury'sfunction to resolve any disagreement. The jury's resolution of any disagreement in favor ofplaintiff is supported by the record before us. It was within the jury's province to decide thecentral issue in this case: whether plaintiff's central nervous system injury was, in fact,idiopathic or whether it was caused by manganese in welding fumes. The evidence heresupports the jury's finding that plaintiff suffers from a central nervous system injury causedby the manganese in welding fumes. Therefore, we will not overturn the jury's verdict onthe basis that no causal link between welding fumes and Parkinson's disease exists.

Having found that defendants were not entitled to a directed verdict or a judgmentn.o.v., we now address defendants' alternative contention that they are entitled to a new trialbecause of numerous alleged prejudicial errors and/or abuses of discretion.

Defendants argue that exposing the jury to testimony concerning the ongoing,unpublished Gulf Coast "study," especially without providing defendants with thedocumentation underlying the study, constitutes reversible error. We disagree for thefollowing reasons.

First, as previously discussed, Dr. Nausieda's testimony about the Gulf Coast studywas not "untrue," as defendants contend. Dr. Nausieda did testify that out of the 20,000people screened, approximately 2,000, or roughly 10%, showed signs of Parkinson's;however, it is clear from his testimony that this was a preliminary estimate. Second, contraryto defendants' assertions, Dr. Nausieda's subsequent deposition testimony does not totallyrefute his testimony here. Dr. Nausieda's testimony in the instant case centered on his ownobservations through his career as a neurologist and his findings regarding a high incidenceof Parkinson's-like symptoms in welders. Dr. Nausieda was candid that the screening wasin its initial phases and did not place undue emphasis on the study as defendants suggest. Third, while defendants insist they were given inadequate documentary evidence so that theywere unable to effectively cross-examine Dr. Nausieda, the record suggests otherwise. Oncross-examination, defense counsel capably pointed out the weaknesses of the study,including the fact that the "study" was not an epidemiological study and the fact that aninherent bias exists.

Defendants further contend the error of admitting the Gulf Coast study wascompounded by the trial court's refusal to allow defendants to present a study of 20,000Caterpillar workers exposed to welding fumes. According to defendants, the Caterpillarstudy indicates no increase in neurological symptoms. What defendants fail to consider isthat the Gulf Coast study was introduced through the testimony of Dr. Nausieda and that thestudy helped him to form his opinion that manganese is harmful and can cause Parkinson'ssymptoms. The trial court instructed the jury that the testimony was for a limited purpose:

"It is allowed so that the witness may tell you what he relied on in forming hisopinions. The materials being referred to is [sic] not evidence in this case and maynot be considered by you as evidence. You may consider the material for the purposeof deciding what weight, if any, you will give the opinion testified to by this witness."

Defendants, on the other hand, sought to introduce the Caterpillar study as evidence thatplaintiff was not harmed.

The Caterpillar study was not directly responsive to the Gulf Coast study. The GulfCoast study is limited to welders, whereas the Caterpillar study screened 20,000 people whoworked at a Caterpillar plant, many of whom were not welders. The testimony of theCaterpillar witnesses was, for the most part, anecdotal and in no way qualified as anepidemiological study. In light of the trial court's considerable discretion in the admissionof evidence, defendants have failed to convince us they are entitled to a new trial on the basisthat the trial court allowed testimony regarding the Gulf Coast study but refused to allowtestimony regarding the Caterpillar study.

Defendants also argue they are entitled to a new trial on the basis that the trial courterroneously denied their right to present an alternative sole-proximate-cause defense againstplaintiff's employer. Defendants insist the trial court erred by precluding them frompresenting evidence that another factor, the condition of plaintiff's work site, was the solecause of plaintiff's injuries. We disagree.

A manufacturer is under a nondelegable duty to produce a reasonably safe product. Hammond v. North American Asbestos Corp., 97 Ill. 2d 195, 208, 454 N.E.2d 210, 217(1983). Here, the strict liability counts sent to the jury involved a failure to warn aboutmanganese fumes' dangers when defendants knew or should have known their product couldcause central nervous system injury and a failure to provide adequate instructions aboutventilation, safety equipment, or precautionary measures. The evidence established thatdefendants knew or should have known about the dangerous propensities of manganese intheir steel welding rods but failed to adequately warn of the hazards. Accordingly,defendants failed to adequately inform not only plaintiff but also his employer, Ameren,about the dangers of manganese in their steel welding rods. Under these circumstances, thetrial court properly granted plaintiff's motion in limine, which barred defendants frompresenting evidence or argument that Ameren's conduct was the sole proximate cause ofplaintiff's injuries.

Defendants argue plaintiff's counsel repeatedly made improper comments andaccusations during the trial that warrant a new trial. Defendants first complain that plaintiff'scounsel repeatedly suggested to the jury, without presenting any substantive evidence, thatother workers became ill as the result of welding. The allegedly improper comments referto a worker in Hobart, Pennsylvania, and another worker at the Ameren plant. Afterreviewing these comments, we find that any error resulting from these or any other commentswas, at worst, harmless error and does not entitle defendants to a new trial.

Defendants also complain about allegedly improper closing and rebuttal argumentsby plaintiff's attorney. Defendants argue plaintiff's attorney violated an in limine ruling whenhe analogized welding fumes to asbestos, silica, and cigarettes and told the jury thatmanufacturers of those products had, in the past, told the public that diseases now shown tobe caused by those products were "idiopathic" but that an "intelligent, enlightened,empowered jury changed all that idiopathic nonsense." Defendants further maintain thatplaintiff's counsel violated another in limine ruling when he sarcastically referred to defensecounsel as "Chicago lawyers" and suggested they would use "slick" tactics and "trick[s]."

It is well-settled that attorneys are allowed broad latitude in closing argument. Lewisv. Cotton Belt Route-St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co., 217 Ill. App. 3d 94, 119, 576 N.E.2d918, 937 (1991). A judgment will only be reversed if the challenged remarks prevented adefendant from receiving a fair trial. Decker v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 268 Ill. App. 3d 521,531, 644 N.E.2d 515, 522 (1994). Here, defendants failed to object during closing to thesearguments, and after considering the comments, we do not find they rise to the level ofprejudicial error. Finally, while the comments about defense counsel were inappropriate,they do not rise to the level of prejudice necessary to warrant a new trial.

The final argument raised by defendants is that the verdict was against the manifestweight of the evidence. A verdict is only against the manifest weight of the evidence wherethe opposite conclusion is clearly evident or where the findings of the jury are unreasonable,arbitrary, and not based upon the evidence. Maple v. Gustafson, 151 Ill. 2d 445, 454, 603N.E.2d 508, 512-13 (1992). Our review of the evidence at the trial establishes that the jury'sverdict is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

We previously set forth the evidence in support of the jury's verdict in issue I and neednot repeat that evidence here. The record establishes plaintiff suffers from a central nervoussystem injury. Plaintiff's experts testified there was a causal link between the manganese indefendants' welding rods and plaintiff's condition. Defendants' experts testified that plaintiffsuffers from idiopathic Parkinson's disease and that the cause of his disease is unknown. Numerous scientific articles were introduced by the parties. It was the jury's function toresolve conflicts in the evidence. After careful consideration, we cannot say that the jury'sverdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

The record does not indicate that the jury's verdict was inconsistent with the evidenceor the result of undue prejudice. We find the trial court properly denied defendants' motionsfor a directed verdict and for a judgment n.o.v. Likewise, defendants have failed to convinceus they are entitled to a new trial due to any single error or the cumulation of errors.

For the foregoing reasons, the motion to strike is denied, and the judgment of thecircuit court of Madison County is hereby affirmed.

Affirmed.

DONOVAN and WELCH, JJ., concur.