JUSTICE KUEHN delivered the opinion of the court:

It took the law a long time to recognize domestic violence for what it is.⁽¹⁾ In 1986, ourlegislature awoke to the reality that "the legal system has ineffectively dealt with family violence inthe past, allowing abusers to escape effective prosecution or financial liability." 750 ILCS 60/102(3)(West 2000).

The Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986 (the Act) (750 ILCS 60/101 et seq. (West 2000))created the crime of domestic battery and provides serious penalties for those who committed it. While the Act provides a number of remedies in an effort to protect abused spouses and familymembers, it did not create a civil cause of action to remedy the damages done. This case addressesthe question of whether a victim of domestic violence can maintain a civil action to recover monetarydamages for a pattern of marital abuse, inflicted over a number of years and resulting in severeemotional distress.

The plaintiff wants to recover damages from her former husband for the way he treated herduring the course of their 11-year failed marriage. The complaint alleges a pattern of physical andmental abuse, along with the allegation that it inflicted severe and lasting emotional distress. Weare asked to decide whether a former wife can maintain such an action against her erstwhile husbandand, if so, whether an alleged pattern of domestic abuse constitutes one continuous tort, so that thestatute of limitations begins to run only after the final abusive act has occurred.

As a rule of thumb, we rarely review questions that arise during litigation's course. However,if an interlocutory appeal can resolve novel legal questions and thereby facilitate judicial economy,we sometimes accept the review of questions certified for our consideration prior to a finaladjudication in the trial court. 155 Ill. 2d R. 308(a). In this case, we have accepted three issuescertified for review by the trial judge. Their resolution leads us to conclude that this plaintiff canmaintain an action at law to recover monetary damages proximately caused by her ex-husband'spattern of abusive treatment during the course of their ill-fated marriage.

Lynn Feltmeier and Robert Feltmeier entered the bonds of matrimony on October 11, 1986. The ensuing marriage failed to measure up to the sacred vows under which it was entered. Lynn wasawarded a divorce from Robert on December 16, 1997. She prevailed on grounds of mental cruelty. The judgment incorporated the terms of a December 10, 1997, marital settlement agreement, whichcontained a provision that called for the mutual release of all future claims that either party mighthave against the other.

On August 25, 1999, Lynn sued Robert for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. According to the allegations contained in the complaint, Robert engaged in a pattern of domesticabuse-both physical and mental in nature-that began shortly after the exchange of the marital vows,continued throughout the marriage, and did not cease even after the marriage ended. Lynn'scomplaint was very specific about the details and time frames of the alleged physical and emotionalabuse. Lynn alleged that she was physically beaten at least 11 times. She claimed that many of thebeatings were administered while her children were at hand to witness them. Lynn further allegedthat she was physically restrained against her will on more than one occasion. In addition to thephysical abuse, Lynn repeatedly found herself on the receiving end of verbal attacks and flyingobjects hurled in her direction. She alleged that her husband systematically isolated her from familyand friends. Finally, she alleged that when she took action to rid herself of the abuse, Robert stalkedher. The complaint specifically alleged more than 45 episodes of abusive behavior.

On October 20, 1999, Robert filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit. Robert maintained thatthe complaint failed to allege facts that give rise to an action for the intentional infliction ofemotional distress. He argued that the conduct alleged was neither extreme nor outrageous in nature. He also argued that even if the conduct alleged was actionable, the claim was still not viable becausethe statute of limitations had run on most of the alleged misconduct.

On February 14, 2000, the trial judge denied Robert's motion. Immediately thereafter, Robertfiled an amended motion to dismiss that raised the marital settlement agreement as a release fromthe various claims presented by Lynn's lawsuit. The trial judge denied that motion on June 23, 2000.

On April 10, 2001, using the language of Supreme Court Rule 308(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 308(a))the trial judge found that the interlocutory orders denying Robert's motions to dismiss involvedquestions of law "as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion" and that animmediate appeal from the orders "may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation."

The issues certified for review are as follows:

1. Whether the plaintiff's complaint states a cause of action for the intentional inflictionof emotional distress.

2. Whether the plaintiff's claims for the intentional infliction of emotional distress basedon conduct prior to August 25, 1997, are barred by the applicable statute oflimitations.

3. Whether the plaintiff's claim against the defendant for the intentional infliction ofemotional distress has been released by the language of the marital settlementagreement.

We will address each issue in the order presented. Additionally, we address an immunityissue raised by Robert in this appeal.

When a trial judge is presented with a motion to dismiss a case for the failure to state a causeof action pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 1998)),he or she must determine whether the complaint sets forth sufficient facts that, if established, couldentitle the plaintiff to relief. Bryson v. News America Publications, Inc., 174 Ill. 2d 77, 86, 672N.E.2d 1207, 1214 (1996). The judge must accept all well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true anddraw reasonable inferences from those facts that are favorable to the plaintiff. Bryson, 174 Ill. 2dat 86, 672 N.E.2d at 1213. Because the judge is not being called upon to weigh any witness'scredibility or weigh facts, on appeal we review the matter de novo. Jackson v. Michael ReeseHospital & Medical Center, 294 Ill. App. 3d 1, 9, 689 N.E.2d 205, 211 (1997). The same standardof review applies when determining the propriety of an order denying a motion to dismiss pursuantto section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 1998)). Dunn v. Patton,307 Ill. App. 3d 375, 379, 718 N.E.2d 264, 268 (1999).

To state a valid cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiffmust plead certain facts. To maintain her action, Lynn had to initially allege that Robert engagedin conduct that was truly extreme and outrageous. She had to further allege that Robert intended toinflict severe emotional distress or knew that there was a high probability that his actions wouldcause severe emotional distress. Finally, Lynn had to allege that as a result of Robert's conduct, sheactually suffered severe emotional distress. McGrath v. Fahey, 126 Ill. 2d 78, 86, 533 N.E.2d 806,809 (1988). These elements are taken from section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. McGrath, 126 Ill. 2d at 86, 533 N.E.2d at 809; Restatement (Second) of Torts