PRESIDING JUSTICE CHAPMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

The plaintiffs filed complaints in the circuit court of Franklin County for theadministrative review of a decision by the Department of Revenue of the State of Illinois(Department). The Department had granted real estate exemptions for three parcels of landowned by the Rend Lake Conservancy District (Rend Lake), one of the defendants herein. The circuit court affirmed the Department, and two of the plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

Rend Lake applied for property tax exemptions for assessment year 1999 for threeparcels of real estate on which a restaurant, a hotel, and a condominium complex are located. Rend Lake sought tax exemptions for this real estate under section 15-75 of the Property TaxCode (35 ILCS 200/15-75 (West 1998)), which provides, in part, that public grounds ownedby a municipal corporation and used exclusively for public purposes are tax exempt. TheDepartment found that the properties were not in exempt use, and it denied Rend Lake'sapplications.

Rend Lake requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ) pursuant tosection 8-35 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/8-35 (West 2000)). The ALJ framedthe issues for the hearing in a pretrial order entered on July 10, 2000: (1) whether Rend Lakeis a municipal corporation, (2) whether Rend Lake owns the real estate for which theexemptions were sought, and (3) whether Rend Lake used the real estate for public purposesduring the 1999 assessment year. Ewing Northern Community Consolidated School DistrictNo. 115 (Ewing) and Benton Community High School District No. 103 (Benton) intervenedas plaintiffs in the proceeding. They filed a response with the ALJ and admitted that RendLake was a municipal corporation and that Rend Lake was eligible for a property taxexemption pursuant to section 15-75 of the Property Tax Code, if the real estate was usedexclusively for public purposes. They denied that the real estate was used exclusively forpublic purposes.

Plaintiff Franklin County Board of Review (Board) did not participate in theadministrative hearing. Rend Lake's general manager and consulting engineer testified, asdid the school superintendents for Ewing and Benton. The following evidence was presentedto the ALJ. The creation of Rend Lake, a special-purpose unit of government, wasauthorized by the River Conservancy Districts Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, ch. 42, par. 383 etseq. (now see 70 ILCS 2105/1 et seq. (West 2002)). It came into existence in 1955 inresponse to local water-supply problems. It is one of three river conservancy districts inSouthern Illinois and is located about 18 miles south of Mt. Vernon on Interstate 57. RendLake was given broad powers to accomplish a number of objectives for Southern Illinois,including water supply and distribution, sewage treatment, conservation, and recreation. Rend Lake supplies water to 55 cities, villages, and water districts and an additional 700households, via 300 miles of distribution pipes. Rend Lake also has a sewage plant in theVillage of Ewing.

Rend Lake's promotional material in the record refers to a recreation complex andboasts of millions of visitors annually. It consists of 18,900 acres of water and 20,000 acresof land. The lake, including dams and a reservoir, was constructed by the United StatesArmy Corps of Engineers (Army Corps) from 1965 to 1972 for the purposes of flood control,water supply and quality control, conservation, recreation, and the redevelopment of the area. It cost $60 million. The management of the lake and surrounding forest areas is shared bythe Army Corps, the State of Illinois, and Rend Lake.

Rend Lake's recreation complex is large and diverse. The shooting complex housesa 10-station trap field, a skeet range, a sporting clay range, a 3-D archery range, and a five-stand range. A state-licensed public hunting preserve is located within the 300 acressurrounding the shooting complex, and visitors may go on guided hunts with dogs providedby Rend Lake. The golf facility includes a 27-hole course, a driving range, practice greens,a clubhouse, and a pro shop. There are more than 20 boat ramps on the lake, but Rend Lakeoperates only one. The recreation complex also houses the Southern Illinois artisan shop,where local artists display their work for sale. The artisan shop is owned by the State ofIllinois. Rend Lake, in conjunction with other state and federal agencies, hosts numerousfestivals and events. Swimming, camping, boating, cycling, horseback riding, and otheractivities are also available at Rend Lake.

In addition to the foregoing, Rend Lake owns and operates a restaurant, known as theSeasons Restaurant, which includes a dining room, a lounge, a kitchen area, and a banquetroom. It offers general restaurant and banquet services. Rend Lake owns and operates a 40-unit hotel, referred to as the Seasons Hotel, and 22 condominiums in a complex called theFairway Condominiums. (The status of these three properties for the 1999 assessment yearis the subject of this appeal. Prior to 1999 they were owned or leased to and operated byprivate, for-profit entities.) All of Rend Lake's recreational facilities are open and availableto the public for a charge, except the boat ramp, which is free. All of Rend Lake'srecreational facilities are used by the local citizenry and out-of-town tourists. Visitors atRend Lake often participate in multiple activities during one visit.

Rend Lake, as a governmental unit, is exempt from sales tax and is not taxed on otheroperations, including its farm, oil, water, and sewer activities. Rend Lake's income is derivedfrom fees charged for activities noted above and tax revenue. All the revenue generated byRend Lake's facilities and operations, except water revenue, is deposited into the generalbank accounts for Rend Lake, from which expenses are paid. In any given year, if there isa surplus, no profits are distributed, because Rend Lake is not a for-profit enterprise. Thereare no shareholders, partners, or owners.

The ALJ received lists (consisting of several hundred pages) containing the names ofindividuals and organizations that used the banquet facilities at the restaurant and stayed atthe hotel and condominiums in 1999. These records reflect that in 1999, the banquetfacilities were reserved by more than 400 individuals and private and public entities. Thehotel logged a total of 7,665 room nights in 1999. The lists provide the names of theindividuals who stayed at the hotel and the dates of their arrival and departure. The purposeof those individuals' visits and their places of residence are not noted. The vast majority ofthe individuals who stayed at the hotel in 1999 stayed one to two days. The 22condominiums logged 607 room nights from July through December of 1999. These lists aredifficult to decipher, but according to the Board's brief, one of the condominiums was leasedto an individual for four months and three others were leased to individuals for three monthsor less. The remaining 18 condominiums appear to have been leased in 1999 to differentpeople for one to three days at a time.

The parties briefed their arguments after the hearing. Ewing and Benton, in their jointmemorandum of law, set forth one argument, i.e., that Rend Lake failed to show that the realestate had been used exclusively for public purposes in assessment year 1999. NeitherEwing nor Benton challenged Rend Lake's status as a municipal corporation or the ownershipof the subject real estate.

The ALJ recommended that the restaurant and hotel parcels be exempt from taxationfor the 1999 assessment year and that the condominiums be exempt for 49% of the 1999assessment year, pursuant to section 15-75 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/15-75(West 1998)). (The condominiums were owned by Rend Lake for only 49% of the year.) The ALJ's "Recommendation for Disposition" included lengthy and detailed factual findingsand conclusions of law. He concluded that the enabling legislation for river conservancydistricts delineated a number of purposes, public in nature, and that the subject real estatewas primarily used to fulfill those purposes. The Director of Revenue accepted the ALJ'srecommended decision, and the plaintiffs sought administrative review pursuant to theAdministrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 2000)), in the Franklin Countycircuit court.

Two complaints for administrative review were filed, one by the Board and the otherby Ewing and Benton. The administrative review actions were consolidated. The plaintiffsraised a number of issues before the circuit court that they had not presented to the ALJ forhis consideration during the administrative proceedings. They argued that the subject realestate should not be tax exempt because (1) the legislature did not enact a specific orownership-based tax exemption for river conservancy districts, (2) the legislature treatedriver conservancy districts uniquely compared with other special districts covered by chapter70 of the Illinois Compiled Statutes, by not providing a specific tax exemption and by addingcost-recovery language in the River Conservancy Districts Act, which, as they argue, revealsthe legislature's intent that a district pay property tax, (3) the cost-recovery language in theRiver Conservancy Districts Act nullifies the general tax exemption for municipalcorporations, (4) the Department erred in interpreting section 15-75 of the Property TaxCode in contradiction of legislative intent and failed to address whether the real estaterepresented public grounds used exclusively for public purposes, and (5) the evidence in theadministrative record does not support an exemption because insufficient facts exist to showthat the real estate consisted of public grounds that were used exclusively for publicpurposes.

The circuit court considered the merits of all the arguments presented and affirmedthe Department's decision granting property tax exemptions to Rend Lake. Only the Boardand Ewing appeal. Ewing has adopted the Board's briefs and argument. The Departmentand Rend Lake filed separate briefs, and the Illinois Association of Park Districts submittedan amicus curiae brief in support of Rend Lake.

We first address the Department's contention that the Board and Ewing waived anumber of issues because they raised them for the first time in the circuit court. The Boardand Ewing contend that their arguments are not waived because Rend Lake failed to assertthe waiver doctrine before the circuit court.

The general rule is that issues or defenses not raised by the parties before theadministrative agency will not be considered for the first time on administrative review. Thewaiver rule is necessary to avoid piecemeal litigation and to permit opposing parties anopportunity to refute the arguments presented to the agency. This is especially true becauseadministrative review is limited to the proof offered before the ALJ. Carpetland U.S.A., Inc.v. Illinois Department of Employment Security, 201 Ill. 2d 351, 396-97, 776 N.E.2d 166, 192(2002). Raising an issue for the first time before the circuit court is not sufficient to preservethe matter for review. S.W. v. Department of Children & Family Services, 276 Ill. App. 3d672, 679, 658 N.E.2d 1301, 1307 (1995).

Waiver is a limitation on the parties and not on a court's jurisdiction. CarpetlandU.S.A., Inc., 201 Ill. 2d at 397, 776 N.E.2d at 192. Although we may relax the waiverdoctrine in certain circumstances, we choose not to in this case. See Salt Creek Rural ParkDistrict v. Department of Revenue, 334 Ill. App. 3d 67, 71, 777 N.E.2d 515, 520 (2002);Freedom Oil Co. v. Illinois Pollution Control Board, 275 Ill. App. 3d 508, 655 N.E.2d 1184(1995). To do otherwise would result in insurmountable prejudice to Rend Lake and adeprivation to the Department of the opportunity to initially construe the law that it has aduty to apply. See Ranquist v. Stackler, 55 Ill. App. 3d 545, 549-50, 370 N.E.2d 1198, 1202(1977). Thus, we find that the Board and Ewing have waived all of their argumentsadvanced on appeal except the issue of whether the Department erred in finding that the realestate was used exclusively for public purposes.

For this issue, the parties disagree on the proper standard of review. In reviewing afinal decision under the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 2002)),we review the administrative decision and not the circuit court's judgment. MetropolitanWater Reclamation District of Greater Chicago v. Department of Revenue, 313 Ill. App. 3d469, 474, 729 N.E.2d 924, 928-29 (2000). It is the circuit court's task to judge whether theagency's decisions on questions of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence. McLean v. Department of Revenue, 326 Ill. App. 3d 667, 673, 761 N.E.2d 226, 232 (2001). On review, we are to consider the administrative agency's findings of fact to be prima faciecorrect. 735 ILCS 5/3-110 (West 2002).

The matter before us does not present a question of pure fact or pure law. In orderto decide whether the ALJ erred in applying the municipal corporation tax exemption toRend Lake, we must determine whether the real estate was used exclusively for publicpurposes in 1999. To do so, we must interpret statutory language and examine the legaleffect of certain facts. Thus, this appeal presents a mixed question of fact and law. Theapplicable standard of review should be between a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standardand a de novo standard, in order to provide some deference to the ALJ's experience andexpertise. We therefore find that the "clearly erroneous" standard of review is the properstandard in this case. See City of Belvidere v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 181 Ill.2d 191, 205, 692 N.E.2d 295, 302 (1998); Metropolitan Water Reclamation District ofGreater Chicago, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 474, 729 N.E.2d at 929; Lutheran Church of the GoodShepherd of Bourbonnais v. Department of Revenue, 316 Ill. App. 3d 828, 831, 737 N.E.2d1075, 1078 (2000).

We now turn to the merits of the Board's argument. The Board argues that theDepartment improperly concluded that the restaurant, hotel, and condominiums were usedprimarily for public purposes in 1999. Specifically, the Board contends that this real estatedoes not qualify for an exemption for 1999 under section 15-75 of the Property Tax Code(35 ILCS 200/15-75 (West 1998)) because it was used for commercial and long-termresidential purposes. The Department and Rend Lake argue that the ALJ's recommendationcomports with Illinois decisional law.

The ALJ made detailed factual findings and conclusions of law. It is evident from theALJ's written recommendation that he considered all the testimony, the evidence, the expresslanguage of the statutes, and the relevant case law. In sum, the ALJ concluded that therestaurant, hotel, and condominiums were tax exempt because they were facilities of publicaccommodation made available to the general public for use in 1999 in connection with theuse of the greater recreation complex at Rend Lake. We find no clear error in theDepartment's factual findings, legal conclusions, and final recommendation.

Rend Lake's creation was authorized by section 1 of Illinois's River ConservancyDistricts Act (the Act), which stated in part:

"Whenever the unified control of a river system or a portion thereof shall bedeemed conducive to the prevention of stream pollution development, conservationand protection of water supply, control or prevention of floods, reclamation of wetand overflowed lands, development of irrigation, conservation of soil, provision ofdomestic, industrial[,] or public water supplies, collection and disposal of sewage andother public liquid wastes, provision of forests, wildlife areas, parks[,] andrecreational facilities, and to the promotion of the public health, comfort[,] andconvenience the same may be organized as a conservancy district under this Act ***.

*** Such territory need not be contiguous, provided that it be so situated thatthe public health, safety, convenience[,] or welfare will be promoted by theorganization as a single district of the territory described." (Emphasis added.) Ill.Rev. Stat. 1953, ch. 42, par. 385 (now see 70 ILCS 2105/1 (West 2002)).

Thus, the statute expressly states that some of the primary purposes of a conservancy districtare to provide forests, wildlife areas, parks, and recreational facilities and to promote thepublic health, comfort, and convenience.

Section 9b of the Act confers broad powers onto the board of a conservancy districtto fulfill these statutory purposes, including the power to acquire land to establishrecreational grounds and to construct buildings for recreational purposes. 70 ILCS2105/9b(d) (West 2002). The Act further authorizes conservancy district boards to develop,purchase, and operate:

"[l]odges, cottages, trailer courts, and camping grounds, marinas and relatedfacilities for the accommodation and servicing of boats, tennis courts, swimmingpools, golf courses, skating rinks, skeet ranges, playgrounds, stables, bridle paths, andathletic fields, picnic grounds and parking areas, convention and entertainmentcenters, and other related buildings and facilities for the accommodation andrecreation of persons visiting the reservoirs owned by the district or from which it isdrawing a supply of water." 70 ILCS 2105/11(1)(c) (West 2002).

On its face, the statute permits Rend Lake to own and operate the restaurant, hotel, andcondominiums involved in this case to enhance visitors' recreational experiences.

Rend Lake seeks the benefit of the municipal corporation tax exemption, whichprovides in part that public grounds owned by a municipal corporation and used exclusivelyfor public purposes are tax exempt. 35 ILCS 200/15-75 (West 1998). On review, we mustconstrue the exemption strictly in favor of taxation. The burden of proving that theexemption applies rests upon Rend Lake. See City of Chicago v. Illinois Department ofRevenue, 147 Ill. 2d 484, 491, 590 N.E.2d 478, 481 (1992). The mere fact that Rend Lakeis a municipal corporation and owns the real estate does not automatically exempt it fromtaxation. See Sanitary District of Chicago v. Hanberg, 226 Ill. 480, 483, 80 N.E. 1012, 1013(1907). To prevail, Rend Lake must demonstrate that the restaurant, hotel, andcondominiums were used in 1999 exclusively for public purposes. Thus, we must determinewhether the statutory purposes noted above are public and whether the real estate was usedin furtherance of those purposes in 1999.

We hold that the purposes set forth by the legislature in the Act are public purposes. The concept of public purpose is not static, but it must be flexible and capable of expansionto meet the modern complexities or our world. In re Marriage of Lappe, 176 Ill. 2d 414,430, 680 N.E.2d 380, 388 (1997). In today's society, legislatures and the judiciary alike tendto broaden the scope of activities classified as involving public purposes. In re Marriage ofLappe, 176 Ill. 2d at 431, 680 N.E.2d at 388. In the case of the Act, very little, if any,expansion or broadening is required to find that the purposes therein are public in nature.

Water, sewage, and drainage operations had been declared public purposes longbefore the Act was enacted. See Sanitary District of Chicago v. Hanberg, 226 Ill. 480, 483,80 N.E. 1012, 1013 (1907); Metropolitan Sanitary District of Greater Chicago v. Rosewell,133 Ill. App. 3d 153, 156, 478 N.E.2d 1100, 1102 (1985); Long Island Water-Supply Co. v.City of Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685, 689, 41 L. Ed. 1165, 17 S. Ct. 718, 720 (1897). Yet noexpress statement of public purpose is found in the Act for these specific operations. Theabsence of an explicit legislative declaration that the water and sewage operations of RendLake constitute a public purpose does not negate the public nature of the legislation or RendLake's operations. Likewise, we find that a conservancy district's charges to provide parksand recreational facilities and to promote the public comfort, convenience, health, safety, andwelfare are inherently public in nature.

We must now examine whether the restaurant, hotel, and condominiums were usedexclusively for those purposes in 1999. It is undisputed that these facilities provided dining,banquet, and overnight accommodations to Rend Lake visitors in 1999. The provision ofmeals, meeting facilities, and lodging serves to enhance the overall recreational experiencefor visitors and promote the comfort and convenience for the visiting public; therefore, wehave no difficulty in holding that these uses fulfill public purposes. However, the Boardargues that these properties were not used for public purposes because they were used byprivate individuals and businesses for a fee to further their personal agendas and because thehotel and condominiums were put to residential use. We disagree.

The evidence demonstrates that all of Rend Lake's facilities, including the restaurant,hotel, and condominiums, were open and available to the public in 1999. They were usedin 1999 by members of the public, which included individual persons, groups, businesses,and government organizations, among others. The fact that Rend Lake charges a fee doesnot destroy the public purpose the facilities fulfill. Indeed, the Act requires Rend Lake tocharge fees for the use of its facilities. Furthermore, the fact that some of the individuals orgroups who used these facilities did not do so in conjunction with other activities at RendLake is irrelevant. It is well-settled in this state that where the "primary and substantial useof the property is for a public purpose, an incidental or occasional use for private purposesdoes not deprive the property of its tax-exempt character." Metropolitan Sanitary Districtof Greater Chicago v. Rosewell, 133 Ill. App. 3d 153, 156, 478 N.E.2d 1100, 1102 (1985).

The Board's argument that the hotel and the condominiums cannot be tax exemptbecause they are put to residential uses is equally without merit. The Board principally relieson Harrisburg-Raleigh Airport Authority v. Department of Revenue, 126 Ill. 2d 326, 533N.E.2d 1072 (1989), in support of this argument. The Harrisburg-Raleigh Airport Authoritycourt interpreted the meaning of "airport authority purposes" and construed a tax exemptionspecific to airport authorities; thus, the case is not directly applicable to the instant appeal. However, the Illinois Supreme Court's reasoning, applied to the facts before us, supportsRend Lake's position. The supreme court held that property leased to private parties (in somecases for a year at a time) which is used in a manner which bears a real and substantialrelationship to airport-authority purposes is tax exempt. Harrisburg-Raleigh AirportAuthority, 126 Ill. 2d at 330, 335-36, 533 N.E.2d at 1073, 1075-76. Employing similar logicand reasoning, we hold that the provision of overnight lodging, by way of daily rentals andshort-term leases, bears a real and substantial relation to Rend Lake's public purposes ofproviding recreational facilities and promoting public safety, comfort, and convenience.

Applying the foregoing principles and case law to the case at bar, we find that theDepartment's decision to grant Rend Lake tax exemptions on its real estate was not clearlyerroneous because Rend Lake demonstrated that the real estate was primarily used for tax-exempt purposes during the 1999 assessment year. Therefore, we affirm the Department'sdecision that the Seasons Hotel and the Seasons Restaurant, and the parcels on which theyare located, be exempt from real estate taxation for the 1999 assessment year. We alsoaffirm the Department's decision that 22 units of the Fairway Condominiums, and the parcelon which they are located, be exempt from real estate taxation for 49% of the 1999assessment year.

Taken with the case were (1) Rend Lake's motion to bar the State's AttorneysAppellate Prosecutor from appearing as counsel on appeal for the Board, (2) the Board'sresponse thereto, and (3) Rend Lake's motion for leave to reply to the response. In light ofour disposition in this case in favor of Rend Lake, we decline to pass on the foregoing.

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the Department's decision.

Affirmed.

WELCH and MAAG, JJ., concur.