PRESIDING JUSTICE CHAPMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway (respondent) appeals from an October 14,1999, order entered in Madison County circuit court granting a Supreme Court Rule 224(134 Ill. 2d R. 224) petition for presuit discovery. The issues presented for review arewhether the petitioner's verified petition for discovery exceeded the scope of IllinoisSupreme Court Rule 224, whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting the Rule224 petition, and whether a cause of action exists under the Right of Publicity Act (765ILCS 1075/1 et seq. (West 1998)) against IPSA International. We reverse.

Before addressing the merits of the instant appeal, we must first address this court'sjurisdiction to hear it. Jurisdiction can be neither stipulated to nor waived by the parties(Provident Life & Accident Insurance Co. v. Smith, 266 Ill. App. 3d 705, 639 N.E.2d 627(1994)), and this court must determine sua sponte whether jurisdiction exists (Salemi v.Klein Construction Co., 266 Ill. App. 3d 110, 639 N.E.2d 629 (1994)). It is necessary tofirst determine whether the trial court order granting a Rule 224 petition for discovery is afinal and appealable order pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 301 (155 Ill. 2d R. 301). Because the filing of a Rule 224 petition creates an independent action for discovery (134Ill. 2d R. 224) and an order entered on a Rule 224 petition finally adjudicates the rights ofthe parties and terminates the litigation, appellate jurisdiction exists. See F.H. Prince & Co.v. Towers Financial Corp., 266 Ill. App. 3d 977, 640 N.E.2d 1313 (1994); Anest v. Bailey,265 Ill. App. 3d 58, 637 N.E.2d 1209 (1994).

As noted above, the instant appeal raises issues concerning the scope of allowablediscovery under Supreme Court Rule 224. On August 31, 1999, several employees ofrespondent allegedly reported to the company that they were ill and, therefore, would not bereporting to work that day. As a result of what respondent considered an unusual numberof employees calling in sick, the company hired an investigative service to performsurveillance and videotape a particular golf outing that it suspected the allegedly sickemployees might attend.

On September 23, 1999, John Gaynor (petitioner) filed a verified petition fordiscovery under Supreme Court Rule 224. In his petition, petitioner stated that respondenthired an entity known as IPSA International to provide certain investigative services onAugust 31, 1999, and that IPSA International recorded several hours of videotape. Petitioner gained access to a videotape with an IPSA International label. Since petitionerviewed only three minutes of the videotape, he does not know the frequency at which or theduration for which his image was recorded or the identity and affiliation of those whoperformed such surveillance.

On September 23, 1999, petitioner filed a separate suit against IPSA International fordamages allegedly arising from this incident. That suit, which was filed the same day as thepetition under Supreme Court Rule 224 was filed, was pending in the circuit court ofMadison County, Illinois, at the time this appeal was commenced.

In his Rule 224 petition, petitioner sought (1) the name and address of every firmretained by respondent to perform surveillance at or near the Arlington Golf Club on August31, 1999, (2) the name, address, and employment affiliation of every individual whoperformed surveillance at or near the Arlington Golf Club on August 31, 1999, (3) allcontracts or other documents referencing a relationship between respondent and IPSAInternational and any other firm or individuals connected with surveillance performed at therequest of respondent at or near the Arlington Golf Club on August 31, 1999, and (4) allphotographs, motion pictures, or video and audio recordings resulting from surveillanceperformed at the request of respondent at or near the Arlington Golf Club on August 31,1999. Petitioner alleged that the information requested in the petition was necessary todetermine who might be liable to him for damages under the Right of Publicity Act.

The trial court, after a hearing on the petition, granted petitioner's verified petitionfor discovery and ordered respondent to produce the materials requested in the petition. Respondent appealed. Respondent then filed, and the trial court granted, a motion to staythe trial court's order to produce the discovery, pending this appeal.

Supreme Court Rule 224(a)(1) (134 Ill. 2d R. 224(a)) provides as follows:

"(i) A person or entity who wishes to engage in discovery for the sole purposeof ascertaining the identity of one who may be responsible in damages may file anindependent action for discovery.

(ii) *** The petition shall be brought in the name of the petitioner and shallname as respondents the persons or entities from whom discovery is sought and shallset forth: (A) the reason the proposed discovery is necessary and (B) the nature ofthe discovery sought and shall ask for an order authorizing the petitioner to obtainsuch discovery. The order allowing the petition will limit discovery to theidentification of responsible persons ***." 134 Ill. 2d R. 224(a)(1).

The scope of Rule 224 has been addressed by the Illinois Appellate Court severaltimes. In Guertin v. Guertin, the appellate court limited the rule's application to situationswhere the identity of the defendant was unknown. Guertin v. Guertin, 204 Ill. App. 3d 527,561 N.E.2d 1339 (1990). In that case, the petitioner sought to depose the sister-in-law ofa testator who purchased certificates of deposit that constituted the bulk of the testator's networth. The sister-in-law was also a joint tenant in the certificates of deposit. The petitionerspeculated that the sister-in-law had exercised undue influence over the testator. Theappellate court reversed the trial court and vacated a civil contempt citation issued when thesister-in-law refused to appear for the deposition. The court found that the trial court hadno authority under common law, the Code of Civil Procedure, or the supreme court rules toorder the deposition. Rule 224 was found inapplicable because the identity of the defendantwas already known.

In Shutes v. Fowler, 223 Ill. App. 3d 342, 584 N.E.2d 920 (1991), the appellate courtupheld the constitutionality of Rule 224 and, in responding to challenges of the rule'sconstitutionality on vagueness grounds, noted that discovery under the rule was limited todiscovering the identities of potential defendants. The court affirmed the trial court orderrequiring the petitioner's employer to disclose the identities of other companies that wereknown to be involved at the construction site where the petitioner was injured.

The next cases to address the scope of Rule 224 were Roth v. St. Elizabeth's Hospital,241 Ill. App. 3d 407, 607 N.E.2d 1356 (1993), and Malmberg v. Smith, 241 Ill. App. 3d 428,607 N.E.2d 1370 (1993). In Roth, the petitioner sought the production of medical recordsand the depositions of the respondent doctor who rendered care to the petitioner's decedent. The petitioner argued that broad discovery should be allowed to determine who might beresponsible in damages. In reversing the contempt citation, Roth concluded that Rule 224allowed a search for identity, not responsibility. The language of Rule 224 limits discoveryunder it to the identity of those who may be responsible in damages. 134 Ill. 2d R. 224(a)(i). Relying on the language of Rule 224 and the committee comments that follow, Roth heldthat it was abundantly clear that "one who may be responsible" (134 Ill. 2d R. 224) meansa "potential defendant" and that the order should limit discovery to the identification ofdefendants. Roth, 241 Ill. App. 3d at 414-15, 607 N.E.2d at 1361. In addition, Roth statedthat the rule is not intended to replace the general discovery provisions contained in SupremeCourt Rule 201 (134 Ill. 2d R. 201).

Roth also agreed with the observation in Shutes that Rule 224 is intended tosupplement section 2-402 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-402 (West 1998)),the respondent-in-discovery statute, which allows for the full discovery of namedrespondents once a lawsuit is filed against at least one known defendant. Roth, 241 Ill. App.3d at 416, 607 N.E.2d at 1362. Once the identity of such a person or entity has beenascertained, the purpose of Rule 224 has been achieved and the action should be dismissed.

In Malmberg, an employee of the Illinois Department of Transportation filed apetition to compel the department to disclose the identity of an informant and the contentsof the informant's statement, which accused the employee of using illegal substances. Thepetitioner knew the identity of the potential libel defendant, a coemployee, and knew thatthe coemployee had accused the petitioner of illegal drug use while on duty. Relying on thedecisions in Guertin, Shutes, and Roth, Malmberg held that Rule 224 was inapplicablebecause the identity of the potential defendant was already known.

The latest appellate court case to examine the scope of Rule 224 was Beale v.EdgeMark Financial Corp., 279 Ill. App. 3d 242, 664 N.E.2d 302 (1996). In Beale, thepetitioner pledged EdgeMark Financial Corp. (EdgeMark) stock as collateral for loans fromtwo different lending institutions. The petitioner alleged that the pledged stock was sold bythe lending institutions at a time the directors of the lending institution had reason to believethat the sale of EdgeMark was imminent. The petitioner further alleged that the NationalAssociation of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD), wrote to EdgeMark's president and askedEdgeMark to identify whether certain persons listed in an attached letter had any type ofaffiliation with EdgeMark or its officers, which could make them privy to nonpublicinformation concerning the business activities of EdgeMark. This letter, with the attachedlist of names and addresses of 36 individuals or married couples, was included as an exhibitto the Rule 224 petition. The petition, among other things, sought the discovery of allinformation provided by EdgeMark in response to the NASD letter. After the trial courtgranted this discovery, EdgeMark moved to modify the court's order, seeking to limit thatdiscovery to only the names of the persons identified by EdgeMark in its response to theNASD letter. The trial court later denied EdgeMark's motion, after an in camera review ofEdgeMark's response to the NASD letter. EdgeMark appealed and the First Districtaffirmed the trial court's order allowing the discovery of all information provided to NASDin EdgeMark's response to the same.

In examining Roth, Malmberg, and Guertin, Beale noted that none of those casesprecluded discovery solely on the basis of the petitioner's knowledge of a name only, butin those cases the connection of each individual to the injury involved was known, andtherefore, each was already identified as someone who might be responsible. The courtheld, "[W]here the known connection to the injury is remote and does little or nothing tolimit or define the universe of potential defendants, the petitioner should not be precludedfrom ascertaining additional connecting facts to further refine the universe of defendantshaving potential liability so long as the attempted discovery does not seek to delve into anyactual details of wrongdoing." Beale, 279 Ill. App. 3d at 252-53, 664 N.E.2d at 308. Thecourt remarked that it is the trial judge who is to determine the extent of the above inquiryon a case-by-case basis, and the court instructed that a petition which sought to establishactual liability rather than the potential for liability should be denied. Beale, 279 Ill. App.3d at 253, 664 N.E.2d at 308. After an in camera review by the appellate court ofEdgeMark's response to the NASD letter, the court found that the document did not disclosespecific facts of insider trading or any actual acts of wrongdoing. Beale, 279 Ill. App. 3dat 253, 664 N.E.2d at 309.

In the instant appeal, respondent argues that petitioner's verified petition fordiscovery exceeded the scope of Rule 224 and that, therefore, the trial court abused itsdiscretion in granting the petition and ordering respondent to provide the materialsrequested. Respondent contends that the identity of two potential defendants-respondentand IPSA International-were known to petitioner, as he has alleged in his petition thatrespondent hired IPSA International to provide investigative services. In addition,respondent indicates that petitioner has already filed suit against IPSA International fordamages allegedly arising out of this incident and remains in a position to file a suit againstrespondent. Relying on Roth v. St. Elizabeth's Hospital, 241 Ill. App. 3d 407, 607 N.E.2d1356 (1993), respondent argues that because the identities of potential defendants areknown, petitioner can use the general rules of discovery to determine responsibility. Respondent contends that although in Beale the court ordered the respondent to disclose adocument though the document contained information and facts beyond the identity ofpotential defendants, the court did so only to assist the petitioner's search for potentialdefendants and emphasized that a search for actual liability is not to be allowed. Respondentalso argues that no Illinois court has so interpreted Rule 224 as to allow for a search for theidentity of additional plaintiffs.

Petitioner argues that his discovery request in this action does not exceed theauthority of Supreme Court Rule 224. Relying on Beale and its discussion of Roth,petitioner argues that even though a petitioner seeking Rule 224 discovery knows the nameof one or more potential defendants and even when a suit has been filed against one or moredefendants, a petitioner is not precluded from Rule 224 discovery. Petitioner contends thatseeking the disclosure of both the name or names of the firms and individuals whichrespondent hired to perform surveillance and the production of documents regarding anysuch relationship is not an attempt to establish actual liability.

Rule 224's use is appropriate in situations where a plaintiff has suffered injury butdoes not know the identity of one from whom recovery may be sought. In such cases, thereis a genuine need and, if the expiration of the statute of limitations is near, an urgent needto identify potential defendants so that a plaintiff is not without redress for the injurysuffered. This scenario is a stark contrast to the case presented here, in which petitioner fileda verified petition seeking presuit discovery under Rule 224 and contemporaneously filedsuit alleging injury arising out of the same incident. Petitioner's reliance on Roth and Bealeis misplaced. Roth held that once the identity of those who may be responsible in damageshas been ascertained, the purpose of the rule has been accomplished and the action shouldbe dismissed. The petitioner in Roth argued that he should be allowed to engage in broaddiscovery in order to determine "the identity of one who may be responsible in damages"(emphasis added) (134 Ill. 2d R. 224), though it was clear, as it is here, that counsel alreadyknew the identities of some who might be responsible in damages. Ascertaining identity isthe only use for a Rule 224 action. Though Beale may have expanded the discoveryavailable under Rule 224 somewhat, that expansion is not unlimited.

Beale held that, on occasion, the identification of a defendant may require more thansimply a name and that, on those occasions, discovery under Rule 224 is not limited to thepetitioner's ascertainment of a name only. However, even under Beale, knowledge of theconnection of an individual to the injury involved will preclude further discovery under therule. In Malmberg, it was the petitioner's knowledge that the respondent had made allegedlyfalse statements about his drug use. In Roth, it was the petitioner's knowledge of theidentities of many of those who might be responsible for the decedent's treatment. InGuertin, it was the petitioner's knowledge of facts that the respondent had allegedlyexercised undue influence over a testator. In the instant appeal it is petitioner's knowledgethat respondent hired IPSA International to perform surveillance, that his image wasrecorded without his consent by IPSA International while it performed such surveillance,and that the recordings were conveyed to respondent. Petitioner has knowledge of theconnection of his alleged injury under the Right of Publicity Act to the potential defendants(respondent and IPSA International). The connection between petitioner's alleged injuryand the identity of potential defendants already known is not remote. Therefore, petitionerhas no need for additional connecting facts to further refine the universe of defendantshaving potential liability. To obtain additional discovery, petitioner may now utilize eitherthe respondents-in-discovery statute of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-402 (West 1998)) or the general discovery provisions of the Illinois Supreme Court rules(134 Ill. 2d R. 201 et seq.).

In this case, petitioner went far beyond anything authorized by Beale and sought notonly the identities of additional defendants but also the identities of other potential plaintiffs. At a hearing on the petition, petitioner argued that Rule 224 and its reference to thoseresponsible should also be read as allowing him to obtain the identity of additional plaintiffs. Petitioner argued before the trial court that he believed it imperative, due to the transientnature of videotape, that he should be entitled to see who else is on the videotape and towhat extent their presence on the tape may be a basis for other causes of action. On appeal,petitioner suggests that where a petitioner suspects that the rights of others, as well as hisown, have been violated by another, it is a legitimate and prudent exercise for the court'sdiscretion to order steps which identify other claimants arising out of the same act. Onrebuttal at the hearing, petitioner argued that he did not think it would be a radical departurefrom the case law in existence to allow for the identification of potential plaintiffs when theinformation sought is so ethereal and transient in nature.

We agree with respondent's observation that no Illinois court has held Rule 224 toauthorize a search for the identity of additional plaintiffs. To determine the identity of thosewho may have a cause of action requires an inquiry into facts that may give an individualor entity a right to seek redress for a wrongful act by a potential defendant. Torcasso v.Standard Outdoor Sales, Inc., 157 Ill. 2d 484, 626 N.E.2d 225 (1993). Such a search is notwithin the purview of Rule 224. Though Beale holds that Rule 224 may allow the discoveryof additional connecting facts to further refine the universe of defendants having potentialliability, it does so as a means of discovering the identity of those who may be liable andonly so long as the attempted discovery does not seek to delve into any actual details ofwrongdoing.

The transient or elusive nature of a medium that is the subject of discovery may beof genuine concern to a party in litigation; however, that circumstance is not particularlyrelevant in this case. Even if it were, there are other methods available to protect thevideotape. Supreme Court Rule 201(b)(1) allows a party to obtain full disclosure regardingany relevant matter, even where the discovery relates to the claim or defense of the partyseeking disclosure. 134 Ill. 2d R. 201(b)(1). In addition, discovery may be initiated afterall defendants have appeared or are required to appear, or it may be initiated earlier withleave of court. 134 Ill. 2d R. 201(d); Yuretich v. Sole, 259 Ill. App. 3d 311, 317, 631 N.E.2d767, 772 (1994). Because petitioner has already filed suit against IPSA International, he hasthe opportunity, with leave of the court, to discover and protect the videotape under Rule201, which eliminates any necessity for using Rule 224 because of the transient or etherealnature of the medium sought.

The trial court's order granting the discovery provided as follows: "Rule 224 says[']the identity of those persons who may be responsible in damages.['] The question is[,][D]amages for what[?] The only way the petitioner can find that out is to see the tape." Thetrial judge asked the wrong question. "Damages for what?" is not what the rule seeks todetermine through presuit discovery; it is the identity of those persons who may beresponsible in damages. The comments that follow the rule state, "The order allowing thepetition will limit discovery to the identification of responsible persons and entities." 134Ill. 2d R. 224, Committee Comments, at 189. The rule does not provide for the discoveryof the identification of the injury or wrong that may have caused the damages or the identityof others who may have been injured by the conduct.

In the instant case, the identity of potential defendants and the close connection ofsuch defendants to the injury alleged were known to petitioner at the time the Rule 224petition was filed. On the same day that this Rule 224 petition was filed, petitioner filed anaction against a known defendant. For further discovery, petitioner has had the ability toutilize the Code of Civil Procedure, namely, section 2-402 (735 ILCS 5/2-402) (West 1998))and the general discovery provisions of the supreme court rules (134 Ill. 2d R. 201 et seq.). It is clear that the discovery sought in this action greatly exceeds the scope of Rule 224. Thetrial court order did not limit the discovery to the identification of responsible persons andentities; rather, it endorsed a search for actual liability. The trial court abused its discretionwhen it ordered the discovery sought in the petition.

For the foregoing reasons, the order entered by the circuit court of Madison Countyis reversed, and the petition is dismissed.

Due to our finding that the petition exceeds the scope of Rule 224, we need notdecide whether a cause of action exists under the Right of Publicity Act.

Order reversed.

WELCH and HOPKINS, JJ., concur.