PRESIDING JUSTICE MAAG delivered the opinion of the court:

In separate actions, Robie P. Poston and Opal M. Gibbs filed suit against the MadisonCounty sheriff's department (defendant). Each plaintiff sought a judgment declaring that adeputy sheriff assigned to work as a jail-correction officer was an "eligible employee" underthe Public Employee Disability Act (Act) (5 ILCS 345/1 (West 1998)). The MadisonCounty circuit court determined that sheriff's deputies assigned as jail-correction officerswere law enforcement officers and were eligible employees under the Act. Defendantappealed.

The pertinent facts are not in dispute. In September 1996, the Madison Countysheriff appointed Poston as a deputy sheriff and assigned him to work in the jail division. Gibbs had also been appointed as a deputy sheriff and was also assigned to the jail division. Both Poston and Gibbs took the official oath for the office of "Jail-CorrectionOfficer-Deputy Sheriff". From the date of their respective appointments, Poston and Gibbswere assigned to work in the position of jail-correction officer (jail officer). Prior to theirrespective dates of injury, neither had been assigned to work in the patrol division of thesheriff's department. On June 10, 1996, Gibbs sustained a line-of-duty injury whileperforming the duties of a jail officer. She applied for disability benefits pursuant to section1(b) of the Act (5 ILCS 345/1(b) (West 1994)). On July 14, 1999, Poston sustained a line-of-duty injury to his hand while performing the duties of a jail officer. He also applied forbenefits under section 1(b). Madison County denied both applications on the basis that localcorrections officers were not eligible employees according to section 1(a) of the Act (5 ILCS345/1(a) (West 1998)).

On August 16, 1999, Gibbs filed the declaratory judgment action in the circuit court. She sought a determination that she was a law enforcement officer and an "eligibleemployee" under section 1(a) of the Act. Poston filed a similar action on September 2, 1999. The circuit court determined that the term "law enforcement officer", as used in the Act,includes an individual performing the job functions of a correctional officer, and the courtconcluded that Poston and Gibbs were "eligible employees" under section 1(a). Defendantappealed the judgments. We granted defendant's motion to consolidate the cases forpurposes of appeal.

On appeal, defendant claims that the circuit court erred in deciding that jail officerswere "law enforcement officers" and eligible for benefits under the Act. In support of itsposition, defendant notes that the pre-1992 version of section 1(a) specifically included localcorrections officers as eligible employees (5 ILCS 345/1(a) (West 1992)) but that localcorrections officers were excluded from that section when it was amended by the legislaturein 1992 and 1993 (5 ILCS 345/1(a) (West Supp. 1993) (as amended by Pub. Act 87-1161,eff. September 18, 1992 (1992 Ill. Laws 3175-76) and Pub. Act 88-45, eff. July 6, 1993(1993 Ill. Laws 366))). Defendant argues that these amendments demonstrate a legislativeintent to exclude local jail officers from coverage under the Act. Pointing to the definitionsof "law enforcement officer" contained in the Illinois Police Training Act (50 ILCS 705/2(West 2000)) and the Illinois Human Rights Act (775 ILCS 5/2-104 (West 2000)), defendantasserts that a law enforcement officer is primarily responsible for the prevention or detectionof crime and the enforcement of state and local criminal and traffic laws and that the dutiesof a jail officer do not fall within that definition. Defendant concludes that because Gibbsand Poston had worked exclusively as jail officers and had never performed patrol duties,they were not law enforcement officers and therefore were not eligible for benefits under theAct.

In this case, we must decide whether a sheriff's deputy assigned as a jail officer is a"law enforcement officer" as that term is used in section 1 of the Act. An issue involvingstatutory interpretation is a question of law and is subject to de novo review. Lucas v. Lakin,175 Ill. 2d 166, 171, 676 N.E.2d 637, 640 (1997). In interpreting a statute, the primary goalis to ascertain and give effect to the true intent of the legislature. 5 ILCS 70/1.01 (West1994); Kraft, Inc. v. Edgar, 138 Ill. 2d 178, 189, 561 N.E.2d 656, 661 (1990). The bestevidence of legislative intent is the language used in the statute itself. Kraft, Inc., 138 Ill.2d at 189, 561 N.E.2d at 661. If the legislative intent can be ascertained from the plainlanguage of the statute, we must give it effect without resorting to interpretive aids. Barnettv. Zion Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 378, 389, 665 N.E.2d 808, 813 (1996). When the languageof a statute is clear and unambiguous, a court should not depart from the plain language ofthe statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that the legislature did notexpress. Kraft, Inc., 138 Ill. 2d at 189, 561 N.E.2d at 661. However, when the language ofa statute lends itself to two possible interpretations, it should be given the interpretation thatis reasonable and that will not produce an absurd, unjust, or unreasonable result. Collins v.Board of Trustees of Firemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund, 155 Ill. 2d 103, 110, 610 N.E.2d1250, 1253 (1993).

The question in this case is whether sheriff's deputies who work in the jail divisionare law enforcement officers and are thereby eligible employees under section 1(a) of theAct. This issue of statutory interpretation arises from the legislative revisions to that sectionwhich became effective in 1992 and 1993. The pre-1992 version of section 1 stated inpertinent part as follows:

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