JUSTICE WELCH delivered the opinion of the court:

The plaintiff, Coleen R. Glasco, filed her complaint against the defendants, GeorgeMarony and Joseph Goodge, and alleged that the defendants had violated the AIDSConfidentiality Act (the Act) (410 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 2000)). The defendants servedtheir request for admissions on the plaintiff, and the plaintiff did not deny or object to therequests within the rule's time limit (134 Ill. 2d R. 216). The circuit court denied theplaintiff's motion to file late answers to the defendants' request for admissions and granted thedefendants' motion for a summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the rulingof the trial court.

On September 13, 2001, the plaintiff filed her complaint against the defendants andalleged that they had wrongfully disclosed her confidential HIV report in violation of the Act. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant Goodge, a lab employee of Memorial Hospital ofCarbondale, had accessed the plaintiff's confidential HIV report and provided a copy of thereport to the defendant Marony and that the defendant Marony had released the plaintiff's HIVtest results to five additional persons. The plaintiff sought damages of $5,000 for eachintentional or reckless disclosure, in addition to attorney fees. See 410 ILCS 305/13 (West2000).

On February 1, 2002, the defendants filed their request for admissions, along with theircertificate of service, indicating that they had mailed the request to the plaintiff's attorney onJanuary 28, 2002. The defendants requested that the plaintiff admit the following facts:

1. The plaintiff requested that Marti Burrows perform an HIV test on the plaintiffwithout the knowledge or without an order of any physician at Memorial Hospital ofCarbondale, Illinois.

2. The plaintiff did not request that the test be performed by any physician.

3. No physician ordered the HIV test performed on the plaintiff.

4. The plaintiff obtained a negative HIV test result from the hospital laboratory.

5. The plaintiff changed the negative test result of her HIV test to reflect apositive test result.

6. The plaintiff or the plaintiff's husband mailed the altered HIV test result to Dr.Guillen.

7. The plaintiff had not requested that the HIV test be performed anonymouslyby using a coded system that does not link individual identity with the request or theresult.

8. George Marony was an employee of Memorial Hospital of Carbondale onOctober 28, 1999.

9. Joseph Goodge was an employee of Memorial Hospital of Carbondale onOctober 28, 1999.

10. The plaintiff, while employed at Memorial Hospital of Carbondale, onOctober 28, 1999, was involved in direct patient care.

11. The plaintiff ordered the HIV test for herself.

On August 22, 2002, the defendants filed their motion for a summary judgment. In theirmotion, the defendants asserted that the plaintiff had failed to respond to the defendants'request for admissions and that, as a result, the facts in the defendants' request for admissionswere deemed admitted. The defendants concluded that because the plaintiff had not obtainedthe HIV test results by the procedures outlined in the Act and because the plaintiff hadvoluntarily disclosed her results, the plaintiff could not claim protection under the Act and,therefore, the defendants were entitled to a summary judgment.

On September 5, 2002, the plaintiff filed a motion to allow her to answer thedefendants' request for admissions. She asserted that the plaintiff's attorney had been unawareof and unable to locate the request for admissions that had been sent to him.

On October 1, 2002, the circuit court denied the plaintiff's motion to allow the plaintiffto answer the defendants' request for admissions. On the same day, noting that the plaintifffailed to offer evidence to counter her constructive admissions, the circuit court entered asummary judgment for the defendants.

On October 31, 2002, the plaintiff filed her motion to reconsider, to which theplaintiff's attorney attached his affidavit stating that he had not received the defendants' requestfor admissions and that he had been out of town and did not have a secretary between January28 and February 4, 2002. On December 6, 2002, the circuit court denied the plaintiff's motionto reconsider, and on January 3, 2003, the plaintiff filed her timely notice of appeal.

The plaintiff's first contention on appeal is that the circuit court erred in denying herrequest to serve late responses to the defendants' request for admissions. The circuit court hasdiscretion regarding the conduct of discovery. Ragan v. Columbia Mutual Insurance Co.,183 Ill. 2d 342, 352 (1998). We will not reverse the circuit court's decision to deny a motionfor an extension of time, absent an abuse of discretion. Ragan, 183 Ill. 2d at 352; WaterfordExecutive Group, Ltd. v. Clark/Bardes, Inc., 261 Ill. App. 3d 338 (1994).

"A party may serve on any other party a written request for the admission by the latterof the truth of any specified relevant fact set forth in the request." 134 Ill. 2d R. 216(a). A factis deemed admitted unless the party to whom the request for admissions was directed respondswithin 28 days with a sworn statement or written objection. 134 Ill. 2d R. 216(c).

Supreme Court Rule 183 gives judges discretion to allow responses to be servedbeyond the 28-day time limit, but the respondent must first show good cause for the extension. 134 Ill. 2d R. 183; Bright v. Dicke, 166 Ill. 2d 204, 209 (1995). The fact that the opposingparty did not suffer prejudice is irrelevant. Bright, 166 Ill. 2d at 209. The respondent mustassert some independent ground why his untimely response should be allowed. Bright, 166Ill. 2d at 209.

On February 1, 2002, the defendants filed their request for admissions, along with theircertificate of service, indicating that they had mailed the request to the plaintiff's attorney onJanuary 28, 2002. The plaintiff did not deny or object to the requests within 28 days. Whenthe plaintiff requested leave to file her late answers to the defendants' request for admissions,she asserted that her attorney was unable to locate the request for admissions and had beenunaware of the document until the defendants filed their motion for a summary judgment onAugust 22, 2002. In the plaintiff's motion to reconsider, the plaintiff's attorney asserted thathe had been out of town and without a secretary at the time of service.

We find that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying the plaintiff'srequest for an extension of time to respond to the defendants' request for admissions. Mistake, inadvertence, or simple attorney neglect cannot constitute the sole basis for a goodcause determination. See Greene v. City of Chicago, 48 Ill. App. 3d 502, 513 (1976), aff'd,73 Ill. 2d 100, 382 N.E.2d 1205 (1978); Floyd v. United States, 900 F.2d 1045, 1048 (7thCir. 1990). We affirm the circuit court's judgment on this issue.

The plaintiff's second contention on appeal is that even if the circuit court did not abuseits discretion in denying the plaintiff's request for an extension, the facts deemed admitted donot support the circuit court's award of a summary judgment for the defendants. We do notagree. A summary judgment is proper where, when viewed in the light most favorable to thenonmoving party, the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with theaffidavits, if any, reveal that there is no genuine issue on any material fact and that the movingparty is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2002); Purtillv. Hess, 111 Ill. 2d 229, 240 (1986). The failure to respond to a request for admissions maybe considered in a motion for a summary judgment and provide a basis for a court to grant themotion for a summary judgment. P.R.S. International, Inc. v. Shred Pax Corp., 184 Ill. 2d224, 244 (1998). Although a summary judgment is an expeditious method of disposing of alawsuit, it should only be allowed when the right of the moving party is clear and free fromdoubt. Purtill, 111 Ill. 2d at 240. We review a summary judgment de novo. Busch v. GraphicColor Corp., 169 Ill. 2d 325, 333 (1996).

The burden of proof and the initial burden of production for a motion for a summaryjudgment lie with the movant. Pecora v. County of Cook, 323 Ill. App. 3d 917, 933 (2001). A defendant who moves for a summary judgment may meet the initial burden of productioneither (1) by affirmatively showing that some element of the cause of action must be resolvedin the defendant's favor or (2) by demonstrating that the plaintiff cannot produce evidencenecessary to support the cause of action. Pecora, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 934. Only if thedefendant satisfies the initial burden of production does the burden shift to the plaintiff topresent some factual basis that would arguably entitle the plaintiff to a favorable judgment. Rice v. AAA Aerostar, Inc., 294 Ill. App. 3d 801, 805 (1998).

Section 9 of the Act provides, "No person may disclose or be compelled to disclose theidentity of any person upon whom a test is performed, or the results of such a test[,] in amanner which permits identification of the subject of the test, except to [certain specifiedpersons]." 410 ILCS 305/9 (West 2000). Section 10 of the Act states, "No person to whomthe results of a test have been disclosed may disclose the test results to another person exceptas authorized by Section 9." 410 ILCS 305/10 (West 2000).

The plaintiff constructively admitted that she changed the negative test results of hertest to reflect positive test results and that she or her husband mailed the altered HIV testresults to Dr. Guillen. The fraudulent act of altering her test results notwithstanding, theplaintiff now seeks the protection of the above-quoted provisions of the Act. We begin bynoting that when the plaintiff released the results which she had altered from HIV negative toHIV positive, she was not releasing the actual results of her test. More importantly, we believethat when the plaintiff fraudulently altered her test results with the intention of releasing thosealtered results to a third party, she waived the confidentiality protections afforded her underthe Act, at least with regard to these defendants and the allegations made in the plaintiff'scomplaint. We conclude that this is true regardless of whether it was the plaintiff or herhusband who released the altered test results to Dr. Guillen, for it is obvious that the plaintiffmade the alterations with the intention of releasing them to some third party, be it her husbandor Dr. Guillen; it simply defies logic to suppose she made the alterations only for her ownperusal.

We note that the purpose of the Act is "to control the spread of the HIV virus byencouraging the public to submit to voluntary testing through an assurance of confidentiality"(In re Application of Multimedia KSDK, Inc., 221 Ill. App. 3d 199, 202, 581 N.E.2d 911, 913(1991)), and we note as well that we do not believe that this purpose is in any way hindered byour ruling in this case that when the plaintiff fraudulently altered the results of her own HIVtest with the intention of releasing those fraudulently altered results to a third party, she lostthe confidentiality protections of the Act regarding these defendants and regarding theallegations made in the plaintiff's complaint. To the contrary, it is the abuse of theconfidentiality provisions of the Act that will hinder the effectiveness of the Act. Indeed, toreach the result the plaintiff urges would be to make a mockery of the Act, allowing theplaintiff to abuse the privileges of the Act and then to potentially profit personally from sodoing by bringing suit against the defendants in this action. The conversion of the Act'sconfidentiality shield into a sword to be brandished against those attempting to undo thedamage done by the plaintiff's fraudulent actions cannot be the result our General Assemblyintended when it passed the Act.

The dissent states, "Although the plaintiff released her altered HIV information to Dr.Guillen, she did not lose her privilege of confidentiality to prevent third persons, such as thedefendants in this case, from independently acquiring her HIV test information and disclosingher results." Slip op. at 8. The dissent cites Doe v. Chand, 335 Ill. App. 3d 809, 812 (2002),to support this proposition. Doe, however, involved the egregious conduct of a defendantphysician who intentionally leaked both the actual positive HIV test results of the plaintiff andthe false and defamatory information that the plaintiff suffered from AIDS. 335 Ill. App. 3dat 824. In that case, there was no wrongdoing on the part of the plaintiff. In the case at bar, itis the behavior of the plaintiff that is egregious and fraudulent. Accordingly, we find Doeinapposite to the case at bar.

Having waived the protections afforded by the Act, the plaintiff may not now bring anaction against these defendants under the Act. Accordingly, the circuit court did not err ingranting a summary judgment in favor of the defendants. For the foregoing reasons, thejudgment of the circuit court of Jackson County is affirmed.

Affirmed.

CHAPMAN, P.J., concurs.

The majority holds that because the plaintiff fraudulently altered her test results andbecause she or her husband released those altered results to a third party, who is not adefendant in this case, she waived the confidentiality protections afforded her under the Act. I disagree.

Courts should be particularly reluctant to find that a party waived the Act's statutoryprivilege. See In re Marriage of Bonneau, 294 Ill. App. 3d 720, 729 (1998). The privilegeof confidentiality is far too important to be brushed aside when, as the legislature has found,public health is served by facilitating the confidential use of tests designed to reveal HIVinfection. 410 ILCS 305/2(3) (West 2000); see also Thiele v. Ortiz, 165 Ill. App. 3d 983, 993(1988).

Although the plaintiff released her altered HIV information to Dr. Guillen, she did notlose her privilege of confidentiality to prevent third persons, such as the defendants in thiscase, from independently acquiring her HIV test information and disclosing her results. SeeDoe v. Chand, 335 Ill. App. 3d 809, 812 (2002) (the plaintiff disclosed to an acquaintance thatthe plaintiff's husband had given the plaintiff AIDS, but the health professional defendant wasnevertheless liable for his numerous disclosures of the plaintiff's condition). Following themajority's logic, an individual who has tested positive for HIV but releases to her friends or toher family that she is not infected with the deadly virus has now lost her protections under theAct with respect to third persons who acquire and then release her actual test results. Such aresult directly contravenes the purpose and language of the Act.

Allowing the release of the plaintiff's HIV information in this case erodes the expressstatutory exceptions contained in the Act (see Weast Construction Co. v. Industrial Comm'n,102 Ill. 2d 337, 340 (1984) (the expression of certain exceptions in a statute will be construedas an exclusion of all others)) and results in opening a Pandora's box of inquiry into whetherone tested for HIV released the results, what he released, and to whom. Howeverunsympathetic we are to this plaintiff, who allegedly doctored her own HIV test results toincite fear among hospital personnel, we must honor the purpose and language of the Act. Thelegislature has created the confidentiality protections as a matter of public policy, and theplaintiff's purported misuse of the privilege should not be deemed of greater importance to thiscourt than the public policy.

The majority is attempting to legislate an application of the Act that the legislatureneither wrote nor intended. I choose not to join the majority in this endeavor and respectfullydissent.