In June 1998, plaintiff, Lee O. Griffin, filed suitagainst defendants, Marvin Goldenhersh (Marvin), Del Goldenhersh,and the professional corporation of Goldenhersh & Goldenhersh,for damages resulting from Marvin's legal representation ofplaintiff in a 1981 criminal matter. Defendants filed a motionto dismiss plaintiff's cause of action as time-barred, which thetrial court denied. Defendants brought this interlocutoryappeal, in which the trial court certified the following questions (155 Ill. 2d R. 308):

"[(1)] Whether the applicable statute oflimitations bars a cause of action for legalmalpractice brought in June 1998 by an attorney's former client who was found guilty ofmurder in 1981 and incarcerated, and whoseconviction was later overturned on the basisof ineffective assistance of counsel and hewas then released from prison in October1996[.]

[(2)] Whether the applicable statute ofrepose bars a cause of action for legal malpractice brought in June 1998 by an attorney's former client who was found guilty ofmurder in 1981 and incarcerated, and whoseconviction was later overturned on the basisof ineffective assistance of counsel and hewas then released from prison in October1996[.]

[(3)] Whether application of the statuteof repose to bar a claim for legal malpractice by an inmate who was estopped frombringing a cause of action for legal malpractice while he was incarcerated violatesplaintiff's rights under the equal protectionand due process clauses of both the Illinoisand [United States] Constitutions[.]"

We answer the second question in the affirmative andthe first and third questions in the negative.

On June 29, 1998, plaintiff filed a two-count complaintfor legal malpractice, consisting of negligence and breach ofcontract claims, against defendants for Marvin's representationof plaintiff in a 1981 criminal matter.

In February 1981, four people were repeatedly shot. One person survived and was later the State's key witness. Within hours of the shooting, plaintiff was arrested. People v.Griffin, 124 Ill. App. 3d 169, 170, 463 N.E.2d 1063, 1064 (1984)(Griffin II). Plaintiff originally retained Ralph Derango torepresent him. Griffin II, 124 Ill. App. 3d at 171, 463 N.E.2dat 1064. Several days later, Jimmie Lee Smith was arrested forthe same shootings and retained Marvin to represent him. Afterplaintiff's family discharged Derango, Marvin undertook the jointrepresentation of plaintiff and Smith. Griffin II, 124 Ill. App.3d at 171, 463 N.E.2d at 1065. (In a deposition relating to thehabeas corpus petition, Marvin claims he undertook representationof plaintiff prior to representing Smith. Griffin v. McVicar, 84F.3d 880, 881 n.1 (7th Cir. 1996).)

In a hearing on a motion to continue, the trial courtprobed for a possibility of a conflict in the joint representation, and Marvin stated no conflict existed. Prior to juryselection, the State's Attorney again questioned whether aconflict existed. Griffin II, 124 Ill. App. 3d at 171, 463N.E.2d at 1065. Neither Marvin nor the trial court responded tothe State's Attorney's question, and the case proceeded to trialwithout further inquiry. McVicar, 84 F.3d at 882.

In June 1981, a jury found plaintiff guilty of threecounts of murder and one count of armed violence. The trialcourt sentenced plaintiff to three concurrent 40-year prisonterms for the murder convictions and a concurrent 30-year prisonterm for the armed violence conviction. Griffin II, 124 Ill.App. 3d at 170, 463 N.E.2d at 1064.

On direct appeal of his criminal conviction, plaintiffargued ineffective assistance of counsel based on his trialcounsel's representation of both plaintiff and Smith as havingprecluded counsel from pursuing the theory most advantageous toplaintiff. People v. Griffin, 124 Ill. App. 3d 119, 127-28, 463N.E.2d 1055, 1061-62 (1984) (Griffin I). The Fifth Districtfound plaintiff failed to show ineffectiveness and affirmedplaintiff's conviction (Griffin I, 124 Ill. App. 3d at 128, 463N.E.2d at 1062), and the Supreme Court of Illinois denied leaveto appeal (People v. Griffin, 101 Ill. 2d 571 (1984) (No.60655)).

In August 1982, plaintiff filed a postconvictionpetition under paragraph 122-1 of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 122-1), again arguing ineffective assistance of counsel based on the conflict of interestarising out of the joint representation. Griffin II, 124 Ill.App. 3d at 176, 463 N.E.2d at 1068. The trial court deniedplaintiff's petition, and plaintiff appealed. Griffin II, 124Ill. App. 3d at 177, 463 N.E.2d at 1069. On appeal, the FifthDistrict found ineffective assistance of counsel based on trialcounsel's conflict of loyalties between plaintiff and Smith,reversed plaintiff's conviction, and remanded the case to thetrial court for a new trial. Griffin II, 124 Ill. App. 3d at181-83, 463 N.E.2d at 1072-73, rev'd, 109 Ill. 2d 293, 487 N.E.2d594 (1985). The supreme court reversed the Fifth District andaffirmed the trial court's judgment denying the postconvictionpetition, reasoning plaintiff's joint alibi testimony refuted theconflict. Griffin II, 109 Ill. 2d at 308-09, 487 N.E.2d at 605.

In March 1991, plaintiff filed a writ of habeas corpuspursuant to section 2254 of Title 28 of the United States Code(28 U.S.C.