Harrison v. Hardin Co. Community Unit School Dist. No. 1, No. 5-99-0225

5th District, 9 May 2000

JUSTICE MAAG delivered the opinion of the court:

Connie Harrison (plaintiff) filed a civil action against defendants Joshua Davis, his grandfather Jimmy Davis, and HardinCounty Community School District No. 1 for injuries she sustained in a motor vehicle accident. Claims against JoshuaDavis, who was driving his grandfather's car when he lost control and struck plaintiff's vehicle, and his grandfather weresettled. Plaintiff also sued Hardin County Community School District No. 1 (School District), alleging that school districtpersonnel were willful and wanton in refusing Joshua Davis's request to leave school early due to inclement weather anddeteriorating road conditions. The School District filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that it was entitled toimmunity under section 2-201 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (the Act) (745ILCS 10/2-201 (West 1994)). The trial court granted summary judgment and plaintiff now appeals.

The facts pertinent to this appeal follow. On December 8, 1995, Joshua Davis drove his grandfather's car to school. Joshua,who had recently celebrated his 16th birthday, was a student at Hardin County High School. Hardin County High School isowned and operated by the School District. On December 8, 1995, a mixture of freezing rain, sleet, and snow began fallingin Hardin County.

Joshua Davis testified as follows: During his lunch period, about 11:40 a.m., Joshua approached his principal, RonBrumley, and asked if he could leave school early. Joshua told Brumley that he wanted to leave before it started snowingheavily because "he didn't want to have a wreck." Brumley told Joshua that all of the students who drove would bedismissed early, at a certain time after lunch.

After the lunch period ended, Joshua went to his next class and asked his teacher if he could use the phone to call hisparents to get permission to leave early. The teacher told Joshua to sit down and that school would be dismissed early.Joshua testified that school was dismissed at 1 p.m. that day. Accompanied by three other students, Joshua proceeded todrive his grandfather's car from school. Joshua passed his home and drove toward his girlfriend's house. En route, Joshualost control of the vehicle, crossed the center line, and struck the front of plaintiff's vehicle.

At the time of this incident, Ron Brumley was the principal of Hardin County High School. Brumley testified that decisionsregarding early dismissal are made by the superintendent of the School District. The principal does not make thosedecisions. Brumley testified that typically, once the superintendent notified him that school should be dismissed early, hewould advise the principal of the elementary school, which shared the same building. Those students who drove to schoolwould then be dismissed by Brumley at least 15 minutes earlier than those students who rode the bus. These early dismissalprocedures had been approved by the superintendent.

Brumley testified that during the time he was principal, there was a procedure by which parents could call the school andrequest that their children be dismissed early. Brumley said that if an individual student requested to leave early due toinclement weather, the school usually required permission from the parent. The school allowed students to call home to asktheir parents if they could leave school early. This practice was in place before Brumley became principal. Brumley testifiedthat he might deny a student's request to call home if school was going to be dismissed shortly.

Brumley testified that he could not recall whether or not he spoke with Joshua about leaving early on December 8, 1995. Hestated that the decision to dismiss an individual student was not a "policy decision," but an "individual call." He said thatJosh was a student who "would ask to go home at 8 o'clock in the morning if he could." He also commented, "Anybodywho has ever seen Josh drive in Hardin County would be critical of his parents for letting him drive, but I didn't give him acar and send him to school."

In plaintiff's complaint, she alleged that the accident and her injuries were "directly and proximately caused by thefollowing willful and wanton acts on behalf of school district personnel:

a. Refused to allow Joshua Davis to leave school when it was safe to do so given the deteriorating weather conditions onlocal roads;

b. Permitted Joshua Davis to leave school property in a motor vehicle after having been advised by the student that he haddifficulty driving in inclement weather conditions;

c. Failed to call Joshua Davis' grandparents, parents, and/or adult guardian to have him picked up from school."

In its motion for summary judgment, the School District claimed that it is absolutely immune from liability under section 2-201 of the Act. Plaintiff argued that this section provides immunity only if the act or omission by the employee is both thedetermination of policy and the exercise of discretion. Plaintiff claims that this decision did not involve the determination ofpolicy.

In determining whether the circuit court properly granted a motion for summary judgment, we exercise de novo review. SeeWhite v. Village of Homewood, 285 Ill. App. 3d 496, 673 N.E.2d 1092 (1996). All evidence is construed favorably towardthe nonmoving party and strictly against the moving party. White, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 501, 673 N.E.2d at 1095. A reversal iswarranted if a material issue of fact or an inaccurate interpretation of the law exists. See White, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 501, 673N.E.2d at 1095.

In this case, we must determine whether the trial court erred in finding that section 2-201 of the Act provided immunity foractions of the school district personnel. The doctrine of sovereign immunity was abolished by the Illinois Supreme Court in1959. See Molitor v. Kaneland Commuity Unit District No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959). The 1970 IllinoisConstitution also abolished the doctrine of sovereign immunity, except as the General Assembly may provide by law. Ill.Const. 1970, art. XIII,