| Notice |
IN THE
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| PATRICIA HEDRICK, | ) Appeal from the | ||||||
| ) Circuit Court of | |||||||
| Petitioner-Appellee, | ) Madison County. | ||||||
| ) | |||||||
| v. ) | |||||||
| ) No. 97-MR-392 | |||||||
| ) | |||||||
| FRED BATHON, Madison County Treasurer, | ) | ||||||
| as Trustee for the Indemnity Fund, | ) Honorable | ||||||
| ) Ann Callis, | |||||||
| Respondent-Appellant. | ) Judge, presiding. | ||||||
____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH delivered the opinion of the court:
Patricia Hedrick (petitioner) lost her home after she failed to pay real estate taxesassessed against her property located at 5802 Dogwood Lane in Godfrey. Petitioner's homewas sold for the nonpayment of taxes on December 16, 1992, and the tax deed to petitioner'sproperty was issued to SI Securities on February 14, 1996. Thereafter, petitioner soughtcompensation for the loss of her property by filing a petition for indemnity against FredBathon (respondent), the Madison County Treasurer, in his capacity as the trustee for thecounty's indemnity fund (Indemnity Fund), pursuant to section 21-295 of the Property TaxCode (Code) (35 ILCS 200/21-295 (West 1996)). Petitioner was awarded $50,000 pluscosts as indemnity by the circuit court of Madison County. On appeal, respondent contendsas follows: (1) petitioner failed to plead that she was barred or precluded from bringing anaction for the recovery of her property, an essential element of her cause of action, (2) thetrial court erred in refusing to enter a judgment against petitioner because she failed tointroduce any evidence in support of the above- mentioned essential element of her causeof action, (3) the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that the equities favored anaward from the Indemnity Fund to compensate petitioner for the loss of her home, and (4)the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the amount of money previously paid into theIndemnity Fund and the amounts paid to claimants. We affirm.
Petitioner filed her petition for indemnity against respondent on August 21, 1997. Petitioner alleged that she failed to pay property taxes due to her "inability to manage herown affairs due to mental illness" and not due to her own fault or negligence. Petitionersought from the Indemnity Fund the value of her house and the costs of her suit. On August28, 1997, respondent filed a motion to dismiss, arguing, inter alia, that petitioner failed toallege facts indicating that petitioner was barred or otherwise precluded from bringing anaction to recover her property. The trial court denied respondent's motion. Petitioner lateramended her petition, and respondent filed a second motion to dismiss, again arguing thatpetitioner failed to allege facts indicating that she was barred or precluded from bringing anaction to recover her property. The trial court again denied this motion.
Prior to the hearing on the matter, the parties stipulated that the value of petitioner'shome was $50,000. Petitioner filed a trial memorandum in which she argued that she wasequitably entitled to compensation from the Indemnity Fund because the fund was solvent. Respondent objected to the introduction of evidence concerning the financial state of thefund, but the trial court allowed the evidence, stating that it would take the evidence "at itsweight." The information provided to the trial court was that in Madison County in 1992,the fund contained $600,857.48. Pursuant to statute, that amount was transferred to thegeneral fund. Thereafter, an additional $60,060 was collected in 1994, $48,540 in 1995,$55,680 in 1996, and $115,620 in 1997. Out of these funds, Madison County paid$43,516.47 in 1997 and $20,949.21 in 1998.
Barrett Rochman is the chief executive officer of SI Securities, the entity thatobtained the tax deed to petitioner's house on February 14, 1996. Rochman testified that SISecurities normally attempts to enter into a contract for deed with the person in possessionof the house when the tax deed is issued. Rochman contacted petitioner about setting up acontract for deed, but he found petitioner to have "a general inability to work within therealm of financial structure." Rochman described petitioner as "erratic" and "unable tofollow through" on her promises. Rochman concluded that petitioner did not have controlover her financial situation, and he was reluctant to force petitioner out of her house. Rochman recommended that petitioner contact an attorney in order to pursue a claim againstthe Indemnity Fund. Rochman specifically suggested SI Securities' attorney, LawrenceTaliana, because he knew that Mr. Taliana possessed the knowledge to handle such a matter. Even though Mr. Taliana prepared the legal documents in the underlying matter againstpetitioner, he agreed to handle petitioner's claim.
Petitioner was born on June 18, 1935. Petitioner moved back to Illinois in 1989. Foreight years prior to that, she lived in California taking care of her grandmother. When hergrandmother died, she left her house in California to petitioner. Petitioner sold the housein California and used the proceeds to purchase the house in question. There was nomortgage on the Illinois house, and it was petitioner's only asset. Petitioner admitted thatshe received a notice that the real estate taxes were due on her property, but she failed to paythem. Petitioner found the taxes "shocking" and "just put them away to deal with later." Petitioner also admitted that she received notices that the taxes were delinquent, but againshe just tucked the notices "away until later" but never got around to dealing with them.
Petitioner explained that she does not handle problems well. In the past, her mainway of coping was by drinking. Petitioner testified that over the course of the past 10 to 20years, she has struggled with anxiety problems and that on some days she was simply soanxious that she could not leave her house. Over respondent's objection, petitioner testifiedthat she is now undergoing counseling. At one point in her testimony, petitioner was sooverwhelmed that a short pause was necessary in order for petitioner to collect herself. Petitioner had no backup plan in case she was unable to stay in the house.
On cross-examination, petitioner admitted she was her grandmother's caregiver andpaid her grandmother's bills. When she moved back to Illinois, she worked part-time for theAlton-Telegraph. Petitioner liked the job, but she quit after a year because her employerrefused to give her a raise that she had previously been promised. Petitioner admitted thatin 1992, the year her property was sold for back taxes, she was in serious financial distress,owing her creditors $16,000. At that time, she went to Consumer Credit Counseling forassistance in managing her finances. She went back again in 1995 for additional assistancemanaging her finances. On both occasions, petitioner acknowledged that she owed realestate property taxes. Petitioner agreed that her financial inability to pay her property taxeswas definitely part of the problem as to why the taxes were not paid.
Petitioner's daughter, Catherine McDaniel, testified that she knew that her mother hada drinking problem, but she was unaware how extensive her mother's problems were untilthe last two years. McDaniel explained that her mother has an anxiety disorder. Shetestified that her mother is getting better because of the counseling she now receives. McDaniel testified that she would help monitor the payment of real estate taxes on theproperty in the future.
Dr. Alexander James, a clinical psychologist, testified by way of evidence depositionon behalf of petitioner. Dr. James evaluated petitioner for the present litigation. He notedthat petitioner canceled her first appointment at the last minute, failed to show up for thesecond appointment, and arrived with a friend for the third appointment. Dr. James believedthat the only reason petitioner agreed to stay for the evaluation was that her friend wassitting next to her. Petitioner was extremely anxious. For example, she paced, burst intotears on a number of occasions, and was agitated throughout the evaluation.
Petitioner was drinking heavily at the time of the evaluation and explained to Dr.James that the amount of alcohol she consumed was dependent on her mood. If petitionerwas extremely anxious when she woke up in the morning, she would medicate herself withbeer until she fell back to sleep. Only after that could she get up and face the day. Shesuffered from panic attacks and was basically homebound. She avoided social situations dueto her fear of humiliation and rejection. At the time, she was smoking "upwards of fourpacks of cigarettes a day." Dr. James administered the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventorytest to petitioner. The results indicated that petitioner has a poor self-image, which wouldaccount for her avoidance of social contact and intimate involvement. The test also revealedthat even though petitioner is extremely needy, she is reluctant to seek help from anyone. Her pattern of responses to the test questions also showed that she is highly reactive toemotional stimuli, and if anything goes wrong in her life, she takes it particularly hard, andit becomes extremely difficult for her to continue functioning.
Dr. James diagnosed petitioner with panic disorder, agoraphobia, avoidant personalitydisorder, and alcohol abuse with suspected alcohol dependence. He believes that petitioner'spanic attacks started in adulthood, while the avoidant personality disorder most likely startedin childhood. Dr. James opined that petitioner's condition would have interfered with herability to pay her taxes on time and her ability to deal with the resulting problems caused byfailing to pay the taxes on time. Dr. James did not have access to petitioner's medicalrecords, nor did he interview anyone but petitioner. Dr. James' opinions were based solelyon the history petitioner provided him, his impressions of her, and the results of the test headministered.
Respondent produced no evidence but, rather, relied solely on challenging petitioner'sevidence. Ultimately, the trial court found in favor of petitioner in the amount of $50,000plus costs. Respondent now appeals.
Respondent first contends that petitioner failed to plead and prove an essentialelement of her cause of action. Respondent insists that an essential element of this cause ofaction requires petitioner to plead and prove that she was barred or in some way precludedfrom bringing an action for the recovery of the property. Respondent also argues thatbecause petitioner failed to introduce any evidence to show that she was barred or in someway precluded from bringing an action for the recovery of her property, the trial court shouldhave entered a judgment against petitioner. We disagree.
Section 21-295 of the Code is designed to alleviate the harsh consequences of a taxforeclosure in certain situations. It provides that each person purchasing property incounties of less than three million inhabitants shall pay a fee of $20, and in counties ofgreater than three million inhabitants shall pay a fee of $80, to the county collector for thecreation of an indemnity fund. 35 ILCS 200/21-295 (West 1996). Section 21-305 of theCode specifically provides as follows:
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