Hill v. Walker

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Hill v. Walker

State: Illinois

Court: 5th District Appellate

Docket No: 5-07-0426 Rel

Case Date: 02/24/2010

Preview:NO. 5-07-0426
N O T IC E Decision filed 02/24/10. The text of this dec ision m ay b e changed or corrected prior to the P e t i ti o n for filing of a or the

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

Re hea ring

FIFTH DISTRICT ________________________________________________________________________ WILLIAM R. HILL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROGER E. WALKER, JR., Director of Corrections, and JORGE MONTES, Chairman, Illinois Prisoner Review Board, ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of Alexander County. No. 06-MR-29

disposition of the same.

Honorable Mark H. Clarke,

Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge, presiding. ________________________________________________________________________ JUSTICE CHAPMAN delivered the opinion of the court: The plaintiff, William R. Hill, is a prisoner at Tamms Correctional Center serving two concurrent prison terms of 30 to 90 years each for murder. Hill was sentenced in 1980 and became eligible for parole in 1983. In 2006, he filed this civil complaint seeking a declaratory judgment and a writ of mandamus. In it, he alleged that (1) the law permitting his parole hearings to be scheduled less frequently than once a year is an ex post facto law, (2) the way the Illinois Prisoner Review Board has interpreted one of the statutory criteria for parole, "the seriousness of the offense," has changed since he was sentenced in 1980, and this change violates both ex post facto principles and separation-of-powers principles, and (3) the Prisoner Review Board deprived him of fair parole hearings in 2002 and 2006 by taking into consideration improper criteria. Hill now appeals an order of the trial court dismissing his complaint. We affirm. In 1974, Dr. Max Murphy Kaye hired Hill to murder pharmacist Robert Fields. On August 23, 1974, Hill shot and killed a pharmacist he believed to be Fields. He later
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learned, however, that he had killed the wrong pharmacist. Instead of shooting Fields, he had killed 61-year-old Allen Zipperstein. Hill promised Dr. Kaye that he intended to finish the job, and on January 18, 1975, he shot and killed Robert Fields. Hill was tried before a jury, was found guilty, and was sentenced to death. On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed his convictions and remanded the case for a new trial. People v. Hill, 78 Ill. 2d 465, 401 N.E.2d 517 (1980). The court found that a reversal was required because the trial court had erred by admitting inculpatory statements that Hill had made during the course of plea negotiations. Hill, 78 Ill. 2d at 469-74, 401 N.E.2d at 51922. The court went on to consider whether Hill could be sentenced to death on remand for crimes committed in 1974 and 1975, prior to the enactment of the death penalty statute in 1977. Hill, 78 Ill. 2d at 474, 401 N.E.2d at 522. The court found that the legislature did not intend for the death penalty statute to be applied retroactively, and it ruled that on remand Hill could not be sentenced to death. Hill, 78 Ill. 2d at 476, 401 N.E.2d at 522. On remand, Hill pled guilty to the crimes. The court sentenced him to a concurrent prison sentence of 30 to 90 years for each murder. Under the sentencing laws then in effect, he became eligible to be considered for parole in 1983. The Prisoner Review Board (the Board) held annual parole hearings for Hill in May 1983, March 1984, January 1985, April 1986, and April 1987. Each time, the Board denied parole, basing its decision primarily on the seriousness of the offense. In 1988, the Illinois legislature amended the law governing parole. Under the new law, parole hearings can be set as much as three years apart, as long as the Board finds that it is not reasonably likely to grant parole prior to that time. Subsequent to this change, the Board held parole hearings for Hill in February 1988, February 1991, February 1992, May 1993, May 1994, May 1995, May 1996, November 1997, November 1998, October 1999, December 2002, and January 2006. Again, the Board denied parole each time primarily on
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the basis that granting parole would deprecate the seriousness of the offense. In the 2002 and 2006 decisions, the Board noted several disciplinary infractions that had occurred in 2000. Hill contends that these were all based on accusations made against him by a Department of Corrections official who was not impartial. This claim forms the basis of some of his arguments on appeal. On May 5, 2006, Hill filed a pro se complaint seeking a writ of mandamus. He named as defendants Roger E. Walker, Jr., Director of Corrections, and Jorge Montes, the chairman of the Illinois Prisoner Review Board. (For the sake of simplicity, we will refer to the defendants collectively as "the Board.") Hill alleged that members of the Board "failed to perform their legally mandated duties in conformance" with the state and federal constitutions. On May 31, Hill filed a memorandum of law supporting his complaint. On July 25, 2006, the Board filed a motion to dismiss, arguing, among other things, that mandamus is not an appropriate remedy where the plaintiff seeks to compel actions that are discretionary. On August 8, 2006, with the Board's motion still pending, Hill filed an amended complaint seeking both a declaratory judgment and a writ of mandamus. Hill alleged that in each decision denying parole, the Board mentioned the fact that he had been initially sentenced to death but that the death sentence had been overturned. This, he contended, overrode any consideration of his rehabilitative efforts. He argued that the consideration of his overturned death sentence as a "factor" in denying him parole violated due process. Hill next alleged that at the time he was sentenced on remand in 1980, parole was granted to approximately 50% to 60% of prisoners who came before the Board. In 2006, however, the Board granted parole to only 10% of prisoners eligible to be considered for parole. According to Hill, this was because former Illinois Governor Jim Thompson and former Cook County State's Attorney Richard Daley had directed the Board to adopt a new
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interpretation of the term "seriousness of the offense." He argued that applying this "reinterpretation" to him violated both ex post facto principles and separation-of-powers principles. In addition, he alleged that the Board's decisions to set some of his parole hearings at intervals of longer than one year violated the ex post facto clauses of the state and federal constitutions. Finally, Hill alleged that the Board based its 2002 and 2006 decisions denying parole on 12 disciplinary violations that had occurred in 2000. As previously mentioned, he contended that these infractions were the result of a biased correctional officer. More specifically, Hill alleged in his complaint that the corrections officer involved in investigating the incidents was a drug user who appeared to be under the influence. He argued that the Board's reliance on the disciplinary recommendations of an "unimpartial [sic] decision[]maker" violated his right to the due process of law. Count I of the amended complaint sought a declaratory ruling that the 2002 and 2006 decisions to deny parole violated principles of due process. Count II requested a writ of mandamus ordering the Board to provide Hill with a parole hearing and render a decision under the statutory and regulatory criteria for parole "as they were utilized" when his crimes were committed in the 1970s. On November 16, 2006, the Board filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2006)). On December 26, Hill filed a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. The court granted that motion, and the second amended complaint was filed with the court on December 28. The allegations of the second amended complaint were essentially identical to those of the first amended complaint. In addition to those allegations, Hill alleged that the reasons given by the Board in its various decisions denying him parole were not sufficient to meet the requirements of due process. He further alleged that the Board has a
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nondiscretionary duty to follow its own regulations, thus making mandamus an appropriate remedy. On May 4, 2007, Hill filed a motion for a judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the Board had failed to respond to his second amended complaint or comply with his discovery requests. On May 15, the Board filed a response to Hill's motion, arguing that the court did not grant leave to file the second amended complaint and that, therefore, it was never filed. On May 31, the court entered an order. The court found that the Board apparently did not get a copy of the December 28 order granting leave to file the second amended complaint. The court ordered the Board to respond to the second amended complaint, denied the November 16 motion to dismiss on the grounds that it was moot, and denied Hill's motion for a judgment on the pleadings. On June 12, 2007, the Board filed a motion to dismiss Hill's second amended complaint, which the court granted on July 12. This appeal followed. Before considering Hill's arguments on their merits, we must address the Board's contention that laches bars Hill's claims with respect to all but the most recent parole hearing. Laches is an equitable doctrine that bars a party from bringing a claim if the opposing party can show that (1) the party bringing the claim delayed unreasonably and (2) the delay prejudiced the opposing party. Hynes v. Snyder, 355 Ill. App. 3d 394, 398, 823 N.E.2d 231, 235 (2005). The Board argues that it would be impossible to find all the members who had served on the Prisoner Review Board and had participated in Hill's parole hearings from 1983 through 2002. Thus, the Board argues, it would suffer actual prejudice if these claims were allowed to go forward. We note that the Board does not contend that laches bars any claims related to the January 2006 hearing and February 2006 decision to deny parole. In light of the nature of the relief sought, we do not find it necessary to resolve this question. Hill has requested a declaration that the procedures he alleges the Board has
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followed (such as scheduling his parole hearings for intervals longer than a year and using "reinterpreted" criteria) violate various constitutional provisions. Although he phrases his request in terms of past allegations, as a practical matter, were the trial court to grant the relief Hill seeks and make a declaratory ruling, the ruling would only serve to outline how the Board must proceed in future parole hearings. There is no other effective relief that can be granted. Hill also seeks a writ of mandamus directing the Board to conduct future hearings in a certain manner. Thus, we find that this issue is moot. We now turn our attention to Hill's contentions. Hill's first argument is that as a factor in denying him parole the Board improperly considered the fact that he had been initially sentenced to death. This argument appears to be threefold. First, Hill contends that because the death sentence was imposed pursuant to a statute that had not yet been enacted at the time he killed the two pharmacists, any consideration of that sentence as a factor in denying him parole contravenes the ex post facto clauses of the federal and state constitutions. Second, he argues that mention of the previously imposed death sentence is insufficient to support the Board's rationale in denying him parole. See Tiller v. Klincar, 138 Ill. 2d 1, 14-15, 561 N.E.2d 576, 581-82 (1990) (declining to decide whether an inmate has a constitutionally protected interest in parole release and finding that the Board's determination that granting parole would deprecate the seriousness of the offense was sufficient to satisfy due process, assuming that this interest exists), overruled on other grounds by Fletcher v. Williams, 179 Ill. 2d 225, 236, 688 N.E.2d 635, 641 (1997). Third, he argues that the Board's decision to focus on the death sentence caused it to overlook his rehabilitative efforts. We need not consider these arguments in detail. The allegation that the Board considered Hill's overturned death sentence as a factor in denying parole is speculative and contradicted by the record. Although the death sentence was mentioned in each of the
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decisions to deny parole, it appeared each time in a paragraph outlining the procedural background of the case. Moreover, in each decision, the Board expressly stated that it was denying parole because it found that granting parole would deprecate the seriousness of the offense. This rationale, standing alone, is sufficient to deny parole. See Tiller, 138 Ill. 2d at 15, 561 N.E.2d at 582. We also note that the Board appears to have considered substantial evidence that Hill made rehabilitative efforts. Decisions outline Hill's

educational achievements, successful completion of an anger-management class, and commendations for assisting injured inmates. Hill next contends that the Board reinterpreted the statutory criteria for parole at some point after he had been sentenced in 1980. As previously mentioned, he supports this contention with allegations that the percentage of inmates convicted of murder who were granted parole dropped from more than 50% to just 10%. He contends that this change violates the ex post facto clauses of the state and federal constitutions. We disagree. Both the United States Constitution and the Illinois Constitution prohibit the enactment of ex post facto laws. Fletcher v. Williams, 179 Ill. 2d 225, 229, 688 N.E.2d 635, 638 (1997) (citing U.S. Const., art. I,

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