JUSTICE KUEHN delivered the opinion of the court:

Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company appeals on an interlocutory basis fromthe trial court's May 25, 2001, order denying its motion to compel an appraisaland to stay the individual claims of plaintiff Collette Cloyd.

This case is a putative class action concerning the use of automotive repairparts manufactured by companies other than the original automobile manufacturers(non-OEM parts). This appeal involves only the individual claims of ColletteCloyd, a Chicago-area resident.

The case was originally filed by an Illinois resident, Shannon Hobbs, onNovember 2, 1999, and alleged that Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company(Liberty Mutual) and other insurers provided inferior automobile parts insettling claims. Thereafter, on January 13, 2000, Liberty Mutual filed motionsto dismiss but did not raise the appraisal clause at issue in this appeal. OnApril 14, 2000, with leave to amend granted, a Mr. and Mrs. Holder of Louisianawere added as plaintiffs. They alleged that Liberty Mutual specified an"inferior quality replacement part" in estimating their automobile'sdamages. Liberty Mutual filed a motion to dismiss this amended complaint butagain did not reference the appraisal clause. The trial court largely deniedthat motion. Ultimately, the trial court dismissed the Holders' claim on forumnon conveniens grounds. On March 2, 2001, the complaint was againamended to add Collette Cloyd as a plaintiff and class representative.

Collette Cloyd insured her 1997 Pontiac Grand Prix with defendant LibertyMutual. She was involved in a motor vehicle accident in March 1999 in theChicago area. Pursuant to her coverage with Liberty Mutual, she was providedwith a repair estimate. She alleges that this estimate was partly based upon theuse of non-OEM parts, including a tail lamp assembly and a rear bumper cover.

The Liberty Mutual automobile policy at issue provides in its collisioncoverage section that, for its limits of liability, it will pay the lesser ofthe actual cash value of the damaged car or the amount necessary to repair orreplace the car with property of "like kind and quality."

In a variety of theories, Collette Cloyd's complaint alleges that the non-OEMparts utilized in its repair estimate are not of a like kind and qualitycompared to OEM parts. Count I alleges that this practice violates the ConsumerFraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (815 ILCS 505/1 et seq. (West 1996)).Count II alleges a breach of contract. Count III alleges that Liberty Mutual isa coconspirator for the alleged tortious conduct of its codefendants. Count IVseeks declaratory relief for future claims. At issue in this appeal are countsI, II, and IV.

The collision coverage within Liberty Mutual's policy includes an appraisalclause, which provides as follows:

"If we and you do not agree on the amount of loss, either may demand anappraisal of the loss. In this event, each party will select a competentappraiser. The two appraisers will select an umpire. The appraisers will stateseparately the actual cash value and the amount of loss. If they fail to agree,they will submit their differences to the umpire. A decision agreed to by anytwo will be binding."

In a different part of the policy-the general conditions-there is a clausethat provides as follows: "No legal action may be brought against us untilthere has been full compliance with all the terms of this policy."

Collette Cloyd did not join this lawsuit as a party plaintiff until March 2,2001. The pleading served upon Liberty Mutual at that time was the third amendedcomplaint. The third amended complaint was the first version of this lawsuit toallege that the use of non-OEM parts to calculate Collette Cloyd's loss breachedthe terms of the insurance policy.

On March 8, 2001, Liberty Mutual communicated with Collette Cloyd's attorneyin writing and demanded that the parties resolve the dispute pursuant to theappraisal clause. On March 30, 2001, Collette Cloyd's attorney, acting on herbehalf, refused to comply with Liberty Mutual's demands. In this letter,Collette Cloyd asserts as follows:

"In this case there is no dispute regarding the amount of loss, nor isthis a circumstance where there is a question as to the actual cash value ofproperty. The only question in this litigation is if Liberty Mutual, havingelected to repair Ms. Cloyd's vehicle, has complied with its contractualobligation to provide sufficient amounts of money to replace damaged parts with'like kind and quality'. Because there is no dispute as to the amount of a loss,but instead whether the replacement parts specified by Liberty Mutual are of'like kind and quality,' the appraisal provision is irrelevant to Ms. Cloyd'sclaims against Liberty Mutual. Nor would comparison of the quality of non-OEMreplacement parts to OEM parts be within the qualifications of appraisers."

Following its receipt of this letter, Liberty Mutual filed a motion to compelan appraisal and to stay counts I, II, and IV pending the completion of thatappraisal. Without explanation, the trial court denied the motion.

Each side proposes a standard of review. Liberty Mutual argues that thestandard to be applied is de novo. To the extent that this appeal requires us todetermine the meaning of some aspect of an insurance policy, then thatconstruction would be subject to de novo review,because insurance policy construction involves a question of law.American States Insurance Co. v. Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d 473, 480,687 N.E.2d 72, 75 (1997). However, with respect to the review of a denial of arequested appraisal, we agree with Collette Cloyd's attorneys and conclude thatwe must determine whether there is a sufficient showing to sustain the trialcourt's order denying the relief sought. Lundy v. FarmersGroup, Inc., 322 Ill. App. 3d 214, 218, 750 N.E.2d 314, 318 (2001)(citing J & K Cement Construction, Inc. v. MontalbanoBuilders, Inc., 119 Ill. App. 3d 663, 667, 456 N.E.2d 889, 892-93(1983)).

Initially we need to address Collette Cloyd's argument that Liberty Mutualwaived its right to an appraisal. She contends that since the case wasoriginally filed 16 months before Liberty Mutual filed its motion seeking anappraisal, too much time had elapsed and we should consider the point waived.

An appraisal clause can be waived. Lundy, 322Ill. App. 3d at 219, 750 N.E.2d at 319. However, "waiver is disfavoredbecause of the public policy preference for conserving judicial resourcesthrough arbitration or appraisal." Lundy, 322Ill. App. 3d at 219, 750 N.E.2d at 319 (citing J. Wise Smith& Associates, Inc. v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 925 F.Supp. 528, 530-31 (W.D. Tenn. 1995)). Waiver occurs when a party's conduct is soinconsistent with the appraisal clause that it constitutes an abandonment of theright. Lundy, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 220, 750N.E.2d at 319. In Lundy v. Farmers Group, Inc., FarmersGroup, Inc., requested an appraisal pursuant to its policy 10 months after theplaintiff filed suit. Lundy, 322 Ill. App. 3d at220, 750 N.E.2d at 320. In concluding that Farmers Group, Inc., waived its rightto invoke the appraisal clause, the court concluded that its participation inthe litigation was not merely responsive. Lundy, 322Ill. App. 3d at 220, 750 N.E.2d at 320.

It is true that Liberty Mutual was involved in this case for 16 months priorto seeking to enforce its appraisal rights. But Collette Cloyd was not aplaintiff for all of those 16 months. In fact, Collette Cloyd was not named as aplaintiff until March 2, 2001. Six days later, Liberty Mutual wrote ColletteCloyd's attorney a letter invoking its appraisal-clause rights. Her attorneyreplied on March 30, 2001. On April 5, 2001, Liberty Mutual filed the motion atissue.

Given Collette Cloyd's late introduction into this suit and because themotion is specific to her claim, we cannot say that Liberty Mutual'sparticipation in the litigation relative to her claim was more than merelyresponsive. Accordingly, we find that Liberty Mutual has not waived its right toinvoke the appraisal clause for this claim.

We now turn to the primary question at issue in this case. Liberty Mutualcontends that its policy clearly provides for Collette Cloyd's claim to beappraised. Collette Cloyd contends that appraisal clauses are different fromarbitration clauses. She argues that her claims are not merely about the amountof her loss. She believes that relevant cases dealing with appraisals involveonly an issue as to the amount of a loss. Because she claims that appraisalclauses can only address the amount of a loss, she reasons that the appraisalclause at issue is unenforceable.

Illinois courts have held that an arbitration clause and an appraisal clauseare similar in nature and that an appraisal clause is enforceable.Beard v. Mount Carroll Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 203 Ill. App.3d 724, 727, 561 N.E.2d 116, 118 (1990). We have already stated that suchclauses are a preferred option to litigation. After it is determined that anappraisal clause exists, the court must next determine if the parties' disputeis covered by the particular clause. J & K CementConstruction, Inc., 119 Ill. App. 3d at 669, 456 N.E.2d at 894.Additionally, such a clause should be broadly interpreted. Schuttv. Allstate Insurance Co., 135 Ill. App. 3d 136, 143-44, 478 N.E.2d644, 650 (1985). Because the trial judge did not enunciate his reasons fordenying Liberty Mutual's motions, we do not know the manner in which thisquestion was considered.

As authority for the enforcement of its appraisal clause, Liberty Mutualcites a case previously decided by this court. In Beard v.Mount Carroll Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 203 Ill. App. 3d 724, 561N.E.2d 116 (1990), following the total destruction of her rental house by fire,Velma Beard sought to recover under a fire policy. Beard,203 Ill. App. 3d at 726, 561 N.E.2d at 117. That policy contained anappraisal clause very similar to the one contained within Liberty Mutual'spolicy. That clause stated that in the event that the insured and the insurancecompany could not agree on "the actual cash value or the amount ofloss," then either party could demand an appraisal. Beard,203 Ill. App. 3d at 726, 561 N.E.2d at 117. Each party would select anappraiser, and then the appraisers would select an umpire. Beard,203 Ill. App. 3d at 726, 561 N.E.2d at 117. Each appraiser would appraisethe loss, and if they could not agree, then they would submit their differencesto the umpire for a final resolution. Beard, 203Ill. App. 3d at 726, 561 N.E.2d at 117. Mount Carroll Mutual Fire InsuranceCompany filed a motion to compel an appraisal, which the trial judge denied onthe basis that because the house was a total loss, there was nothing to beappraised. Beard, 203 Ill. App. 3d at 727, 561N.E.2d at 117-18. On appeal, this court concluded that there was no ambiguity inthe insurance policy and that, therefore, however difficult it might be toappraise a total loss, an appraisal had to be conducted. Beard,203 Ill. App. 3d at 729, 561 N.E.2d at 119.

Liberty Mutual's position is that the clauses at issue are unambiguous andshould be enforced. We agree with Liberty Mutual that the clauses at issue areunambiguous. Collette Cloyd's policy covered her for damages to her automobile.If the parties could not come to an agreement relative to the amount of such aloss, then appraisers would be appointed and decide the matter. The policy alsounambiguously provides that there can be no legal action filed unless and untilthere has been full compliance with all policy terms.

With respect to Collette Cloyd's breach-of-contract and declaratory judgmentclaims, her attorneys contend that whether or not Liberty Mutual utilizednon-OEM automobile parts is not an issue relating to the amount of the loss. Sheclaims that Liberty Mutual breached its contract with her by estimating theamount of her loss based upon the utilization of non-OEM parts. Theoretically,one could argue that factoring non-OEM parts into a car-damage estimate is notabout the amount of the loss. But that argument is illogical. The use of non-OEMparts has everything to do with the amount of the loss. The price of non-OEMparts is generally lower than the price of original parts, thus saving theinsurance companies money. That is why the non-OEM parts are used in estimatesand subsequent repairs. The use of non-OEM parts could potentially lower thevalue of the automobile-another monetary issue. The nature of Collette Cloyd'sclaims clearly involves the amount of her loss.

We conclude that if the trial court based its ruling relative to counts IIand IV on the theory that the use of non-OEM parts does not impact the amount ofthe loss, then that ruling was erroneous.

Collette Cloyd also argues that an appraisal is inappropriate because anappraiser could not provide an opinion as to whether the estimate provided forparts of "like kind and quality." In essence, she contends that adetermination of whether the parts are of "like kind and quality"requires a policy interpretation. In support of her argument, she cites to Lundyv. Farmers Group, Inc. From the Second District Appellate Courtopinion, it appears that plaintiff Ruth Lundy filed her non-OEM class actionlawsuit alleging common law and statutory fraud. Lundy,322 Ill. App. 3d at 215-16, 750 N.E.2d at 316. In that context, hercomplaint was in numerous counts, including a count seeking declaratory reliefand alleging a breach of contract. Lundy, 322Ill. App. 3d at 217, 750 N.E.2d at 317. Upon the consideration of her fraudclaims and the insurer's appraisal request, the appellate court stated asfollows:

"The resolution of plaintiff's claims will require a determination ofwhether Farmers misrepresented to its policyholders the quality of repair partsthat Farmers would pay for under its policies. This question requires aninterpretation of the policy language, in particular, the phrase 'like kind andquality.' These issues cannot be resolved through the appraisal process." Lundy,322 Ill. App. 3d at 219, 750 N.E.2d at 319.

Bearing in mind that the Second District's analysis involved claims of fraud,and not necessarily a breach-of-contract claim, we disagree with the conclusionthat applying the phrase "like kind and quality" to a determination ofthe amount of a loss requires a special interpretation. The phrase containsterms that are simple, unambiguous, and have but one meaning. An appraiserdetermining the amount of a loss will be creating his or her estimate eitherwith or without non-OEM parts. Creating an estimate requires careful analysis.Each party can select an appraiser with expertise to address the possible use ofnon-OEM parts. Those appraisals, by their express purpose, will necessarilyinclude a determination of the type of parts to be utilized in the repair.

If the Second District analysis related to more than claims of fraud, wedisagree with their analysis. The opinion of another district of the Illinoisappellate court does not necessarily bind us in reaching our decision. MorrisB. Chapman & Associates, Inc. v. Kitzman, 307 Ill. App. 3d 92,102, 716 N.E.2d 829, 838-39 (1999), aff'd, 193Ill. 2d 560, 739 N.E.2d 1263 (2000). Again, if the trial court based itsdecision on the declaratory judgment and breach-of-contract claims on the basisof Lundy v. Farmers Group, Inc., we concludethat the trial court erred.

Collette Cloyd also argued to the trial court that appraisers would beincompetent to determine whether non-OEM parts are of "like kind andquality" compared to the parts they replaced. In her appellate brief, shecites to a Liberty Mutual employee's deposition testimony. In part, theemployee's job involves writing appraisals regarding damaged vehicles. Theemployee acknowledged that he would not be able to determine the differences inthe quality of parts and that such an opinion would probably come from anengineer.

The problem with this argument is that the employee appraiser only does aninitial assessment of the damage. While that employee may well be incompetent totestify as to the differences in the quality of parts, that does not mean thatthe insured could not select an appraiser who could so testify. It is theinsured's right to select whomever she believes is necessary to adequatelyaddress the quality issue.

We do not know whether the trial court based its order denying LibertyMutual's appraisal request in whole or in part because of the argument that anappraiser is incompetent to determine whether the parts specified in an estimateare of "like kind and quality." If this argument was partially orcompletely the basis of the order, then the trial court's decision waserroneous.

With respect to the conspiracy claims, Collette Cloyd argues that anappraisal cannot address those issues. Apparently, Liberty Mutual agrees withthis argument, because that issue was not raised on appeal.

Lastly, we must determine if the appraisal clause applies to theconsumer-fraud claim-count I. Liberty Mutual argues that it does apply becausethe consumer-fraud claim is connected to the other claims. Collette Cloyd reliesupon Lundy v. Farmers Group, Inc., whichinvolved a consumer-fraud count and which concluded that an appraisal would beinappropriate.

Collette Cloyd's consumer-fraud claim alleges that Liberty Mutual and theother defendants misrepresented the quality of non-OEM parts and reduced theircoverage obligations because the non-OEM parts were monetarily cheaper. As aresult of the misrepresentations and the resulting coverage reduction, ColletteCloyd and others in her purported class claim that they sustained damages.

Damages must be shown in a consumer-fraud case. See Martinv. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 163 Ill. 2d 33, 59, 643 N.E.2d 734,747 (1994); Warren v. LeMay, 142 Ill. App. 3d550, 569, 491 N.E.2d 464, 476 (1986).

As stated earlier, appraisal clauses and arbitration clauses are similar innature. Beard, 203 Ill. App. 3d at 727, 561 N.E.2d at 118. Both types of clausesare favored because they promote judicial economy. Lundy,322 Ill. App. 3d at 219, 750 N.E.2d at 319; Board ofManagers v. IKO Chicago, Inc., 183 Ill. 2d 66, 76, 697 N.E.2d 727,732 (1998). In an arbitration case, the Illinois Supreme Court held that if theissues and relationships of the parties are "sufficientlyinterrelated," then the arbitration of those issues should be undertaken.Board of Managers, 183 Ill. 2d at 76, 697 N.E.2d at 732.

The manner in which Collette Cloyd's consumer-fraud claim is allegednaturally intertwines the claim with the breach-of-contract and declaratoryjudgment claims. The claims involve damages-whether Liberty Mutual saved moneyby specifying non-OEM parts in its estimates and subsequent repairs.Consequently, even with the consumer-fraud claim, the issue involves theparties' disagreement regarding the amount of the loss. That issue is covered bythe appraisal clause. If the appraisal process determines that the use ofnon-OEM parts did not damage Collette Cloyd, then all of those claims would beresolved without the need of a court process.

The Second District contends that this argument is an oversimplification ofthe issue. Lundy, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 219, 750N.E.2d at 319. Perhaps the difference between our analysis and their analysislies in the consumer-fraud allegations at issue. To the extent thatLundy v. Farmers Group, Inc., stands for the proposition that anappraisal clause can never be valid in the face of a consumer-fraud claim, werespectfully disagree. Such a broad-based holding is contrary to the publicpolicy that favors judicial economy by the enforcement of appraisal andarbitration clauses.

We find that the allegations of this particular consumer-fraud claim areintertwined with the breach-of-contract and declaratory judgment claims. LibertyMutual's appraisal clause is simple and applicable. The consumer-fraud claim canproperly be a subject of an appraisal. If the appraisers determine that LibertyMutual paid Collette Cloyd's body shop a sufficient sum of money to repair hercar with parts of like kind and quality, she has no consumer-fraud claim as itis presently alleged. Judicial economy concerns dictate this inexpensivealternative.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of MadisonCounty is hereby reversed, and the cause is remanded.

Reversed; cause remanded.

SHANNON HOBBS, on Behalf of Himself and All Others ) Appeal from the Circuit

Similarly Situated, ) Court of Madison County.

Plaintiffs, )

v. ) No. 99-L-1068

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE )

COMPANY, STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY )

COMPANY, STATE FARM INDEMNITY COMPANY, )

CNA CASUALTY, CONTINENTAL CASUALTY, )

NATIONAL FIRE INSURANCE OF HARTFORD, )

TRANSCONTINENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY, )

VALLEY FORGE INSURANCE COMPANY, AMERICAN )

CASUALTY COMPANY, ALLSTATE INSURANCE )

COMPANY, ALLSTATE INDEMNITY COMPANY, )

SAFECO CORPORATION, GENERAL INSURANCE )

COMPANY OF AMERICA, LIBERTY MUTUAL )

INSURANCE COMPANY, LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE )

INSURANCE COMPANY, LIBERTY INSURANCE )

CORPORATION, FIRST LIBERTY INSURANCE )

CORPORATION, USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE )

COMPANY, USAA GENERAL INDEMNITY )

COMPANY, UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE )

ASSOCIATION, d/b/a USAA, GOVERNMENT )

EMPLOYEE INSURANCE COMPANY, d/b/a GEICO, )

GEICO CASUALTY COMPANY, GEICO GENERAL )

INSURANCE COMPANY, and GEICO INDEMNITY )

COMPANY, )

Defendants ) Honorable

(Collette Cloyd, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Liberty Mutual Fire ) Nicholas G.Byron,

Insurance Company, Defendant-Appellant). ) Judge, presiding.

Opinion Filed:                                                     March 8, 2002

Justices: Honorable Clyde L. Kuehn, J.

Honorable Gordon E. Maag, P.J., and

Honorable Philip J. Rarick, J.,

Concur