JUSTICE HOPKINS delivered the opinion of the court:

Donald Campbell was incarcerated at Big Muddy CorrectionalCenter for his conviction in 1996 of the offense of criminal sexual abuse (720ILCS 5/12-15 (West 1996)). Campbell also had a prior conviction in MadisonCounty in 1990 for criminal sexual assault (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par.12-13). The Department of Corrections (DOC) notified the Attorney General andthe State's Attorney of Saline County of Campbell's pending release pursuant tosection 10 of the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (the Act) (725 ILCS207/10 (West 1998)). The Attorney General and the Saline County State's Attorneyjointly filed a petition to have Campbell committed as a sexually violent personunder the Act. See 725 ILCS 207/15(a)(3) (West 1998). Also pursuant to statute,the circuit court appointed James Rodgers, Jr., the public defender for SalineCounty, to represent Campbell in these proceedings. See 725 ILCS 207/25(c)(1)(West 1998). Following a probable cause hearing and a commitment hearing, thecircuit court determined that Campbell is a sexually violent person and thatconditional release is an appropriate setting for him. See 725 ILCS 207/40(b)(3)(West 1998).

Subsequently, Rodgers filed a petition in which he assertedthat although he is the public defender for Saline County, his contract does notcover the type of representation he provided for Campbell. Rodgers submitted anitemized statement for his time and asked that he be awarded $6,383.50 asattorney fees. Rodgers stated in his petition that it is DOC's responsibility topay for his services to Campbell.

On September 16, 1999, the court entered an order awardingRodgers his fees. The court found the petition against Campbell to be apostconviction matter and held that DOC was liable for Rodgers' attorney fees.On behalf of DOC the Attorney General filed a response to Rodgers' petition andalternatively asked that his motion be considered a motion to reconsider thecourt's order. The court entered an amended order in which it allowed theAttorney General's motion to respond to Rodgers' petition for fees, denied theAttorney General's alternative motion to reconsider its previous order, andagain awarded Rodgers his attorney fees. The court's amended order also heldthat Saline County was to pay Rodgers' fees but that DOC was to reimburse SalineCounty for the payment of the fees. DOC appeals that portion of the court'sorder holding DOC liable for the payment of Rodgers' attorney fees. SalineCounty does not appeal the court's order.

ANALYSIS

On appeal, the only issue is whether DOC is liable for thepayment of the attorney fees for the representation of a respondent in aproceeding for the respondent's commitment as a sexually violent person. DOCasserts that this is a matter of statutory construction and that neither section3-6-5 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3-6-5 (West 1998)) nor theAct provides that DOC is legally responsible for the payment of attorney fees insuch a proceeding. Specifically, DOC argues that section 3-6-5 does not applybecause a commitment proceeding under the Act is not a postconvictionproceeding, that this is a civil case and not a criminal case, and that the Actitself makes no provision whatsoever for the payment of attorney fees. SalineCounty argues that because the agencies involved in these proceedings wereentities of the State, the State and not the county should be liable and thatequity and the "inherent authority" of the court allow the court toorder the State to pay attorney fees in these proceedings. Saline Countyconceded both in its brief and at oral argument that neither the Act nor anyother rule explicitly states which unit of government shall pay for appointedcounsel in cases such as this but that it follows that a court has thediscretion to decide how appointed counsel shall be paid. Saline County alsoadmitted in its brief that this is a civil case and not a criminal case.

DOC presents this case as one of statutory construction. DOCargues extensively that section 3-6-5 of the Unified Code of Corrections doesnot apply, and Saline County concedes that this is not a postconviction criminalproceeding but is a civil case to which section 3-6-5 does not apply. The lawsupports Saline County's concession, as the Act itself states that proceedingsunder the Act are civil in nature. 725 ILCS 207/20 (West 1998). Additionally,the Illinois Supreme Court in In re Detention of Samuelson, 189 Ill. 2d548 (2000), held that proceedings under the constitutionally valid Act are civilin nature rather than criminal. Samuelson, 189 Ill. 2d at 553. Thesupreme court determined that a proceeding under the Act is a new proceedingwhich is not based upon past conduct but is permissible only where a respondent"presently suffers from a mental disorder and the disorder creates asubstantial probability that he will engage in acts of sexual violence in thefuture." Samuelson, 189 Ill. 2d at 559. Thus, because Saline Countyhas conceded this point and because the statute and case law hold that thesecases are civil in nature, section 3-6-5, which applies to criminal cases, isinapplicable.

Instead, we must determine if the court's order awardingRodgers' attorney fees derives from any other source. In civil cases, attorneyfees are not allowed in the absence of a statute or in the absence of someagreement or stipulation specially authorizing attorney fees. Kadlec v.Illinois Department of Public Aid, 155 Ill. App. 3d 384 (1987). In the case subjudice, DOC asserts and Saline County concedes that the Act makes noprovision for the payment of attorney fees. Thus, the Act does not support thecircuit court's award in this case. Further, no other statute has been assertedas a basis for the court's award. A court does not have general or equitablediscretion to award attorney fees without a statutory basis. Kadlec, 155Ill. App. 3d at 390. Therefore, because the circuit court awarded attorney feesto Rodgers without a statutory basis, its actions were outside its authority.

A court must interpret and apply statutes as they are written,and a court must not rewrite statutes to make them consistent with a court'sidea of orderliness and public policy. City of East St. Louis v. East St.Louis Financial Advisory Authority, 188 Ill. 2d 474, 486 (1999).

Here, the circuit court acted outside any statutory authoritywhen it ordered DOC to reimburse Saline County for the payment of the attorneyfees. Therefore, we vacate the portion of the trial court's order that finds DOCliable to reimburse Saline County for the payment of Rodgers' attorney fees.

CONCLUSION

The portion of the judgment of the circuit court of SalineCounty that finds DOC liable to Saline County for reimbursement is thereforevacated.

Vacated.

CHAPMAN, P.J., and GOLDENHERSH, J., concur.