Emma Ford, Steve Ford, Sherri Ford, Mark Ford, Ronna Martin, Scott Ford, andAnthony Ford (collectively respondents) appeal an order of the circuit court of Perry Countyrequiring them to return funds to the estate of Louis J. Miller and to Albert Miller. ThomasMiller (petitioner), as the special administrator of the estate of Louis Miller, filed a cross-appeal for funds that Emma Ford was allowed to retain. Albert Miller filed a brief as aninterested person for funds that the court determined were his personal property. This appealraises the following issues: (1) whether the court erred in requiring respondents to returnproceeds from certificates of deposit that had been held by Louis Miller individually, (2)whether the court erred in requiring respondents to return proceeds from checking accountsthat had been held by Louis Miller, (3) whether the court erred in allowing Emma Ford toretain the proceeds from certificates of deposit she had held jointly with Louis Miller, (4)whether the trial court had jurisdiction to award funds to Albert Miller, and (5) whether thetrial court erred in failing to award prejudgment interest. We affirm.

On March 27, 1996, Louis Miller, at the age of 86 years old, signed a form giving hisyoungest sister, Emma Ford, a power of attorney pursuant to the Statutory Short Form Powerof Attorney for Property Law (755 ILCS 45/3-1 et seq. (West 1996)). Between that date andMiller's demise a year later, numerous transactions occurred which benefited Emma Ford.

On March 29, 1996, Emma Ford's name was added to Louis Miller's checking accountat DuQuoin National Bank. On April 3, 1996, Emma Ford inspected Louis Miller's securitydeposit box. In the lockbox, she found several certificates of deposit and Louis Miller's lastwill and testament. The certificates of deposit were held separately in Louis Miller'sindividual name, the joint names of Louis Miller and Albert Miller, the joint names of LouisMiller and Emma Ford, and the joint names of Louis Miller and Clara Hottes. On April 25,1996, she redeemed a certificate of deposit that had been held jointly in the names of EmmaFord and Louis Miller for $10,000, and she deposited the proceeds in her personal account.

In early May 1996, Louis Miller was discharged from the nursing home and came tolive at Emma Ford's home. On May 9, 1996, Emma Ford used her power of attorney tosurrender four certificates of deposit that had been held by Louis Miller individually. Shedeposited the proceeds of these certificates in an account at DuQuoin State Bank in her nameand the name of her son, Steve Ford. She then distributed four checks from the account, eachin the amount of $10,000, to Steve, to her daughter-in-law Sherri Ford, and to Emma's grandchildren, Mark Ford and Anthony Ford. On May 28, 1996, Emma Ford redeemed acertificate of deposit that had been held in the names of Louis Miller and Emma Ford jointly. The proceeds of the certificate were distributed to Emma's grandchildren Ronna Martin andScott Ford, in the amount of $5,000 each.

In June 1996, Emma Ford redeemed a certificate that had been held in the joint namesof Emma Ford and Louis Miller for $10,086.87. She then distributed $5,000 each to RonnaMartin and Scott Ford and retained the remainder.

On July 17, 1996, Emma Ford delivered to Citizens Bank in Du Quoin a signaturecard signed by her and Louis Miller. The signature card added her name to a checkingaccount at that bank. After Miller's death, she closed this account and received $32,502.80. On July 26, 1996, she delivered a deposit agreement signed by her and Miller adding hername to Miller's checking account at First National Bank of Pinckneyville. After Miller'sdeath, she closed the account and received $48,498.89. On August 1, 1996, she deliveredto Murphy-Wall State Bank & Trust Co. (Murphy-Wall Bank) a new signature card signedby both herself and Miller. After Miller's death, she closed this account and received$19,725.62.

On September 4, 1996, Emma Ford redeemed a certificate of deposit held in her andLouis Miller's names at First National Bank of Pinckneyville for $10,156.85. On December13, 1996, she directed DuQuoin State Bank to reissue a certificate that had previously beenheld in her name and Miller's. She had the bank delete Miller's name from the new certificateand had it reissued in her name and the names of her two sons. The certificate was valuedat $10,020.50.

Between January 6, 1997, and January 27, 1997, using her power of attorney, EmmaFord surrendered six certificates of deposit held in the joint names of Louis Miller and AlbertMiller. The proceeds of these certificates totaled $60,063.54. On February 10, 1997, shesurrendered a certificate of deposit at Charter Bank for $9,904.19 that had been held in LouisMiller's name only.

On March 19, 1997, Emma Ford surrendered for payment a certificate held at CharterBank in the name of "Louis Joe Miller, Trustee for Albert J. Miller." She endorsed thecertificate using her power of attorney for Louis Miller, and she received $20,238.40.

On March 26, 1997, she surrendered three certificates of deposit at Murphy-WallBank. The certificates were held in Louis Miller's individual name. These certificates wereendorsed by Emma Ford as Miller's attorney-in-fact, and she received $30,190.65.

Louis Miller died on March 27, 1997. In April 1997, a petition for probate of will andfor letters of testamentary was filed, and an order admitting the will to probate andappointing Emma Ford as the representative of the estate was entered. A notice that the willhad been admitted to probate was sent to the heirs and legatees. Clara Hottes, Albert Miller,and petitioner filed a petition to terminate the independent administration and a petition fora citation on behalf of the estate and for the appointment of a special administrator. Theindependent administration was terminated on July 23, 1998, and Thomas Miller wasappointed the special administrator. On January 20, 2000, petitioner, as the specialadministrator, filed a petition for a citation to recover property and related relief againstrespondents to recover certain money pursuant to the Probate Act of 1975 (Act) (755 ILCS5/16-3 (West 1998)).

A bench trial was held on August 4, 2000. At the hearing, Emma Ford testified thatin private conversations, Louis Miller had stated that he wanted her to have the certificatesand his funds. Emma Ford admitted that she did not disclose the transfers to other membersof Louis Miller's family.

Louis Miller's attorney, Roger Seibert, testified that he had consulted with Millerabout Miller's estate plan and had prepared Miller's will. Seibert testified that, as a part ofhis estate plan, Miller had established a number of joint accounts in order to avoid probate. He testified that Miller intended for several relatives to benefit from his estate but that he wasprimarily concerned about Emma Ford. Seibert testified that the transactions made by EmmaFord were consistent with his perception of Miller's concern for her and his desire to avoidprobate.

After the proceedings, the court entered an order finding, in part as follows:

"(3) That a fiduciary relationship existed between Louis Miller and therespondent, Emma Ford, from March 27, 1996, until Louis Miller's death. That thetransfers made by Emma Ford between March 27, 1996, and March 27, 1997, arepresumed to be fraudulent since Emma Ford and her family profited from saidtransactions.

(4) That Emma Ford failed to produce clear and convincing evidence to thisCourt that the challenged transactions were, in fact, gifts to herself and her family.

(5) That equity require[s] that Emma Ford, the estate of Louis Miller[,] andAlbert Miller should be returned to the financial status prior to March 27, 1996."

The trial court ordered Steve Ford, Anthony Ford, Mark Ford, and Sherri Ford to payback sums of $10,000 each to the estate for benefits they received in May 1996. RonnaMartin and Scott Ford were each ordered to pay back $5,000 to the estate in regard to thecertificate of deposit surrendered on June 16, 1996. Emma Ford was ordered to pay to theestate $141,294.16 for various transactions made in 1996 and 1997.

In regard to the certificates of deposit that were in the name of both Louis Miller andEmma Ford prior to Emma Ford gaining the power of attorney, the court found that jointtenancies had existed at that time and the court ordered that Emma Ford be allowed to retainthe sum of $40,177.30 as the surviving joint tenant.

The court found fraud in the transfers of the six certificates of deposit that had beenheld in joint tenancy between Louis Miller and Albert Miller and in the transfer of thecertificate of deposit that Louis Miller had held as the trustee for Albert Miller. The courtfound that equity required that the money from these transfers should not be returned to theestate but should be the personal property of Albert Miller. The court, therefore, ordered thata judgment be entered in favor of Albert Miller and against Emma Ford in the sum of$80,301.94.

The parties classified the funds into four separate groups according to their conditionprior to Emma Ford obtaining the power of attorney: (1) the certificates of deposit held byLouis Miller individually, (2) the certificates of deposit held jointly by Louis Miller andEmma Ford, (3) the certificates of deposit held jointly by Louis Miller and Albert Miller, and(4) the checking accounts. The trial court's order adopted this classification, and we,likewise, do so for our analysis.

The record supports the trial court's finding that a confidential relationship existedbetween Emma Ford and Louis Miller. As a matter of law, a fiduciary relationship wasestablished when Ford obtained the power of attorney on March 27, 1996. See Lemp v.Hauptmann, 170 Ill. App. 3d 753, 757, 525 N.E.2d 203, 205-06 (1988); White v. Raines, 215Ill. App. 3d 49, 59, 574 N.E.2d 272, 279 (1991); Apple v. Apple, 407 Ill. 464, 470, 95 N.E.2d334, 338 (1950).

Because Emma Ford was Louis Miller's fiduciary and benefited from the surrenderof certificates Miller held individually, a presumption of fraud arose. The amount ofevidence needed to overcome a presumption established by law is related to the strength ofthe presumption, and the procedural effect of the presumption is to dissolve once the burdenof production is met. Franciscan Sisters Health Care Corp. v. Dean, 95 Ill. 2d 452, 463, 448N.E.2d 872, 877 (1983). If a petitioner shows that a fiduciary relationship exists, anytransaction between parties in which the agent profits is typically presumed to be fraudulentand the agent has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the transactionwas fair and equitable and did not result from the agent's undue influence over the principal. In re Estate of Teall, 329 Ill. App. 3d 83, 87, 768 N.E.2d 124, 129 (2002); Lemp, 170 Ill.App. 3d at 757, 525 N.E.2d at 206. Three significant factors that have been recognized asovercoming the presumption of fraud are (1) a showing that the fiduciary made a frankdisclosure, (2) the fiduciary proves that he or she paid the fair value for property obtained,and (3) the fiduciary proves that the principal received competent and independent advice. In re Estate of Teall, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 88, 768 N.E.2d at 130; Rizzo v. Rizzo, 3 Ill. 2d 291,304-05, 120 N.E.2d 546, 553 (1954).

The record supports the trial court's finding that Emma Ford violated her fiduciaryduties when she surrendered the certificates that were held by Louis Miller individually. Respondents emphasize that there was a close relationship between Ford and Miller. Respondents argue that Miller was legally competent and had negotiated the sale of his farmduring this time. Legal competency, however, does not by itself rebut the presumption offraud. Pottinger v. Pottinger, 238 Ill. App. 3d 908, 919, 605 N.E.2d 1130, 1139 (1992). Respondents also argue that petitioner never presented any testimony that Miller had statedhe did not wish to make the transfers. The burden, however, was upon respondents topresent clear and convincing evidence.

Emma Ford's testimony did not establish that the transfers were not fraudulent. Fordtestified on her own behalf that Louis Miller desired that she make the transactions. The trialcourt could have found this testimony to be self-serving. See Pottinger, 238 Ill. App. 3d at919, 605 N.E.2d at 1139; In re Estate of Nelson, 132 Ill. App. 2d 544, 549, 270 N.E.2d 65,68 (1971); In re Estate of La Rue, 53 Ill. App. 2d 467, 474, 203 N.E.2d 47, 50 (1964). Thelack of independent verification through testimony by a disinterested party that Millerexpressed such a desire weakens respondents' claim. See Klaskin v. Klepak, 126 Ill. 2d 376,388, 534 N.E.2d 971, 976 (1989) (the lack of having a disinterested attorney question thedecedent regarding his understanding of a transaction meant that the presumption was notovercome).

Similarly, the testimony of Louis Miller's attorney does little to support respondents'case. Respondents point out that Seibert was Miller's attorney throughout this period and wasnot troubled upon learning of the transactions. Seibert testified that Emma Ford contactedhim on several occasions regarding her abilities to use the power of attorney, including herability to cash certificates of deposit. Seibert testified that Miller had expressed a desire totake care of Ford and had absolute confidence in her. Nonetheless, Seibert's testimony didnot indicate that a full and frank disclosure had occurred or that Miller had receivedindependent advice. Seibert testified:

"Q. MR. PROSSER [petitioner's attorney]: Okay. Now for the 12 months ofthe existence of the power of attorney from March 27[], 1996, to the date of Mr.Miller's death on March 27[], 1997, Mrs. Ford contacted you how many times todiscuss the quantum and nature of her authority over Mr. Miller's property?

A. I would guess maybe a half a dozen times.

Q. But at no time in those six contacts did she ever inform you that she wassurrendering property of Mr. Miller and taking the proceeds[,] is that right?

A. That's correct.

Q. And at no time in those six contacts were you advised by her that she wasadding her name to accounts that he had maintained?

A. No.

Q. And at no time were you informed that she was surrendering certificates ofdeposit that he had established in his name and that of siblings of Louis Miller andkeeping the proceeds for herself[,] is that right?

A. That's right."

The trial court simply found the evidence insufficient to overcome the strongpresumption of undue influence. The issue before this court is whether the trial court'sfinding was against the manifest weight of the evidence. See Klaskin, 126 Ill. 2d at 389, 534N.E.2d at 976. The trial court, as the trier of fact, is obligated to weigh and evaluate theevidence. As an appellate court sitting in review, we must defer to the findings of the trialcourt unless they are clearly against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Estate ofFerguson, 313 Ill. App. 3d 931, 938, 730 N.E.2d 1205, 1211 (2000). A review of the recordsupports the trial court's conclusion that, regarding the certificates held by Millerindividually, respondents failed to rebut the presumption of fraud with clear and convincingevidence.

Respondents contend that the creation of joint bank accounts is a separate matter fromthe alleged abuse of the power of attorney, because Emma Ford did not use that power tocreate the accounts. Ford's name was added to Louis Miller's accounts at Citizens Bank, FirstNational Bank of Pinckneyville, and Murphy-Wall Bank. Petitioner responds that apresumption of fraud exists because Ford was Miller's fiduciary, even if she did not use herpower of attorney to open the accounts.

In In re Estate of Teall, a neighbor became a decedent's fiduciary after the decedenthad fallen at home. In re Estate of Teall, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 85, 768 N.E.2d at 127-28. Theneighbor helped care for the decedent after the accident, helping with dressing and bathing,shopping, and household chores. After the neighbor became the caregiver, she discoveredthat the decedent had not paid bills, maintained her house, or managed her affairs adequately. The neighbor then converted some of the decedent's accounts to joint tenancy.

The conversions took place over a period of time. The court noted that some of thesignature cards were signed by the decedent before she returned home from the accident andbefore the neighbor held a power of attorney. In some instances, the decedent filled outsignature cards in person at the bank. In some instances, the neighbor brought signaturecards to the decedent. The neighbor did not contribute any money to the accounts. Theneighbor testified that she had never discussed whether the decedent wished for the accountsto have a right of survivorship.

In affirming the trial court's decision that the funds belonged to the estate, theappellate court discussed the conflicting presumptions that were present. The court firstacknowledged that a presumption of fraud exists when a fiduciary benefits from atransaction. The court recognized, on the other hand, that a presumption of donative intentarises when a joint tenancy is created. In re Estate of Teall, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 87, 768N.E.2d at 129 (relying on In re Estate of Harms, 236 Ill. App. 3d 630, 634, 603 N.E.2d 37,41 (1992)). The court ruled that when the joint tenancy is created after the fiduciaryrelationship is established, the controlling presumption is one of fraud. In re Estate of Teall,329 Ill. App. 3d at 88, 768 N.E.2d at 13. The court ruled that the trial court's finding was notagainst the manifest weight of the evidence, and consequently, the court affirmed on thisissue.

The record supports the trial court's finding that a presumption of fraud existed inregard to the checking accounts. Similar to In re Estate of Teall, Louis Miller had reliedupon Emma Ford and had given her a power of attorney. The fact that the power of attorneywas not necessary for the checking account transactions, as was the case in In re Estate ofTeall, does not diminish the fact that a fiduciary relationship existed. As with the transferof the certificates of deposit held by Miller individually, the record does not indicate that thispresumption was overcome.

On cross-appeal, petitioner contends that the trial court erred in allowing Emma Fordto keep the proceeds from four certificates of deposit that she had held jointly with LouisMiller prior to her obtaining the power of attorney. The formation of a statutory joint tenancycreates a presumption of donative intent, and a party claiming adversely has the burden ofproving by clear and convincing evidence that a gift was not intended. In re Estate of Harms,236 Ill. App. 3d at 634, 603 N.E.2d at 41; Murgic v. Granite City Trust & Savings Bank, 31Ill. 2d 587, 589, 202 N.E.2d 470, 471-72 (1964). The fact that the certificates werediscovered by Ford after she had the power of attorney does not negate the presumption thata gift was intended by Miller when the certificates were created. The trial court correctlyfound that the presumption of fraud did not control, because Ford's interest in the certificateswas created prior to her becoming Miller's fiduciary. See In re Estate of Harms, 236 Ill. App.3d at 634, 603 N.E.2d at 41; In re Estate of Rybolt, 258 Ill. App. 3d 886, 890, 631 N.E.2d792, 795 (1994); In re Estate of DeJarnette, 286 Ill. App. 3d 1082, 1088, 677 N.E.2d 1024,1029 (1997).

In Simon v. Wilson, 291 Ill. App. 3d 495, 684 N.E.2d 791 (1997), a husband becamethe fiduciary of his wife during her declining years. After he became her fiduciary, thehusband transferred property that had been held in joint tenancy with his wife into a trust ofwhich he was the sole beneficiary. The trial court dismissed the husband on the ground thathe would have succeeded to his wife's interest upon her demise if the transfer had notoccurred. The First District reversed on this issue, ruling that the transaction waspresumptively fraudulent in that the husband breached a duty as a fiduciary by engaging ina transaction in which he benefited. Simon, 291 Ill. App. 3d at 503, 684 N.E.2d at 797 (citingIn re Estate of Rybolt, 258 Ill. App. 3d at 889, 631 N.E.2d at 794).

Due to an issue not presented to that court, we distinguish Simon. The Simon courtrelied upon a decision out of the Fourth District, In re Estate of Rybolt, 258 Ill. App. 3d 886,889, 631 N.E.2d 792, 795 (1994). In In re Estate of Rybolt, the court found that thepresumption of fraud present when a fiduciary duty is violated outweighed the presumptionof donative intent that arises from the creation of a joint tenancy; however, In re Estate ofRybolt also found the question of when the joint tenancy was created to be crucial:

"We have an interesting conflict of presumptions in this case. Our court in Inre Estate of Harms [citation] held that where such conflicting presumptions exist[,]they cancel each other out, leaving the trial court free to make a determination basedupon facts and credibility of the witnesses. In Harms, the argument related toaccounts which were created prior to the fiduciary relationship and also involvedincome from other sources being deposited to the joint accounts while the fiduciaryrelationship existed. In holding for the fiduciary, our court recognized that thedeposits to the accounts followed a procedure used prior to the fiduciary relationship." In re Estate of Rybolt, 258 Ill. App. 3d at 889-90, 631 N.E.2d at 794.

The court then noted that the amount of evidence needed to meet a presumption dependsupon the circumstances of the case. In re Estate of Rybolt, 258 Ill. App. 3d at 889, 631N.E.2d at 795 (citing Franciscan Sisters Health Care Corp., 95 Ill. 2d at 463, 448 N.E.2d at877). In In re Estate of Rybolt, the joint accounts were created after the respondent hadgained the power of attorney. The court found that the presumptions should not cancel eachother out whenever a joint account is created after the fiduciary relationship has beenestablished, because this would tempt fiduciaries to fatten their pockets through creativefinancial arrangements. In re Estate of Rybolt, 258 Ill. App. 3d at 889, 631 N.E.2d at 795.

The distinction between In re Estate of Rybolt and In re Estate of Harms wasrecognized by the First District in In re Estate of Teall. In In re Estate of Teall, the courtstated:

"But in a later case, In re Estate of Rybolt [citation], the court limited Harmsto apply only where the joint accounts were created before the fiduciary relationshipbegan and where deposits made during the fiduciary relationship followed a procedureestablished before the relationship. '[W]here the attorney-in-fact actively uses hisposition to create the joint tenancies[,] the presumptions do not cancel; instead, thecontrolling presumption is the presumption of fraud, which requires strong evidenceto overcome.' " In re Estate of Teall, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 88, 768 N.E.2d at 129-30(quoting In re Estate of DeJarnette, 286 Ill. App. 3d at 1089, 677 N.E.2d at 1029).

We find the distinction to be crucial. If the joint tenancy was formed prior to thefiduciary relationship, the opportunity for abuse is not as great and, accordingly, thepresumption of fraud does not need to be as strong. In such situations, as in In re Estate ofHarms, the presumptions of donative intent and fraud cancel each other. Becauserespondents did not have a burden to prove this claim by clear and convincing evidence, thetrial court's decision to allow Emma Ford to retain this property is supported by the record.

Respondents and petitioner contend that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to award ajudgment in favor of Albert Miller. This contention raises the related questions of whetherthe order was consistent with the proceedings and whether the trial court had statutoryauthority to enter its order based on the citation. Respondents contend that the relief awardedwas not properly pled because Albert Miller was not a named party in the citationproceedings, did not request any relief in the citation, and did not personally participate inthe proceedings. Albert Miller contends that the issue was properly before the court.

Albert Miller was an interested person under the Act. See 755 ILCS 5/1-2.11 (West1998). Albert had a financial interest in the citation and was one of the petitioners whosought to have a special administrator appointed. The issue was properly raised in the trialcourt. Respondents were informed that the trial court would be determining the title to thecertificates. The certificates were attached to the petition, and the certificates werespecifically addressed in the petition. The petition asked the court to find the transfers to befraudulent and for any relief the court deemed equitable. At the trial, testimony waspresented regarding the transfers and Albert Miller's interest.

Respondents claim that the petition must specifically request the relief sought. SeeSchlieper v. Rust, 46 Ill. App. 3d 319, 325, 360 N.E.2d 1192, 1197 (1977); Lombardi v.Lepkowicz, 28 Ill. App. 3d 79, 81, 328 N.E.2d 328, 330 (1975). The Act allows a citationpetition to be an instrument for discovery or to be an instrument for a petitioner to requestthe court to determine what property belongs to the estate. 755 ILCS 5/16-1 (West 1998). The cases cited by respondents stand for the proposition that if a petition only asks the courtto gather information regarding property, the respondent would be prejudiced if the courtdetermined title.

The court acted within its statutory authority in entering the order. Respondents andthe special administrator point out that the judgment in favor of Albert Miller represented thesum of the values of the certificates that were the personal property of Albert Miller and thatthe sum was not awarded as a part of the property of the estate. The court was not limitedto determining what belonged to the estate. The Act gives broad powers to the court:

"The court may examine the respondent on oath whether or not the petitionerhas proved the matters alleged in the petition, may hear the evidence offered by anyparty, may determine all questions of title, claims of adverse title[,] and the right ofproperty[,] and may enter such orders and judgment as the case requires." 755 ILCS5/16-1(d) (West 1998).

The order was required by the court's finding. The court found that the transfers byEmma Ford were fraudulent and that the transfers were nullities. The formation of a jointtenancy was indicative of donative intent. See In re Estate of Harms, 236 Ill. App. 3d at 634,603 N.E.2d at 41. Prior to the fraudulent transactions, Albert Miller would have received thecertificates upon the survival of Louis Miller. The court placed Albert and the other partiesin the position they would have occupied if Louis had met his demise at the moment priorto the fraudulent transactions. To hold otherwise, the court would have allowed thefraudulent transfers to affect the parties' rights.

The Act gives the court the authority to determine rights to property. Similar to thecourt's determination that respondents were entitled to the proceeds of the certificates thatEmma Ford had held in joint tenancy with Louis Miller, the court exercised its authority todetermine the disposition of the certificates that Albert Miller held in joint tenancy withLouis Miller and the certificate that Louis held as a trustee for Albert.

Petitioner contends that the court erred by not requiring respondents to payprejudgment interest. Petitioner relies upon In re Estate of Wernick, 151 Ill. App. 3d 234,245-46, 502 N.E.2d 1146, 1154 (1986), aff'd in part & rev'd in part, 127 Ill. 2d 61, 535N.E.2d 876 (1989). Although petitioner's argument would be supportable had the trial courtordered prejudgment interest to be paid, In re Estate of Wernick does not stand for theproposition that prejudgment interest is mandatory. The Illinois Supreme Court recognized,on its review of In re Estate of Wernick, that this is a matter within the sound discretion ofthe trial court and that the trial court will not be reversed unless the discretion was abused. In re Estate of Wernick, 127 Ill. 2d at 87, 535 N.E.2d at 888.

Whether equity requires an award of interest is a matter within the sound discretionof the trial court. Progressive Land Developers, Inc. v. Exchange National Bank of Chicago,266 Ill. App. 3d 934, 944, 641 N.E.2d 608, 616 (1994). A court of equity has broaddiscretion in awarding interest and may give or withhold interest as is deemed equitable. NCIllinois Trust Co. v. First Illini Bancorp, Inc., 323 Ill. App. 3d 254, 265, 752 N.E.2d 1167,1178 (2001); Zokoych v. Spalding, 123 Ill. App. 3d 921, 938, 463 N.E.2d 943, 954 (1984). The determination is a question of fact based on the circumstances of the case. ProgressiveLand Developers, Inc., 266 Ill. App. 3d at 944, 641 N.E.2d at 616.

In this case, petitioner fails to point to any document in the record where the issue ofprejudgment interest was specifically addressed to the court. Prejudgment interest was notspecifically pled or argued before the trial court. No testimony was presented on the subjector on the harm that would be done to the petitioner by a failure to award prejudgmentinterest. The court order is silent on the issue. Also, this case involved numeroustransactions, some of which were found not to be fraudulent, as well as testimony that thefiduciary was a caregiver for the decedent. Given the equities of the case, the trial court'sfailure to award prejudgment interest cannot be said to be an abuse of discretion.

Accordingly, the order of the circuit court is hereby affirmed.

Affirmed.

MAAG, P.J., and WELCH, J., concur.