JUSTICE WELCH delivered the opinion of the court:

In this consolidated appeal, John R., Helen S., and Diana L. appeal from orders of thecircuit court of Madison County, entered December 13, 2001, December 20, 2001, andDecember 27, 2001, respectively, finding them subject to the involuntary administration ofpsychotropic medications. The respondents argue that the trial court's findings that they metthe statutory criteria for forced medication are against the manifest weight of the evidence. For reasons that follow, we reverse all three orders.

Initially, we acknowledge that the issues raised on appeal from the orders entered inthis case, which orders expired 90 days after their entry (405 ILCS 5/2-107.1(a-5)(5) (WestSupp. 2001)), could be considered moot. Nevertheless, we will address the questions raisedin this appeal because they are capable of repetition yet might evade review because of theshort duration of the orders. See In re Richard C., 329 Ill. App. 3d 1090, 1093 (2002).

Psychotropic medications may not be administered to an adult recipient of mentalhealth services against his will unless it has been established by clear and convincingevidence that each of the following factors is present:

A. The recipient has a serious mental illness.

B. Because of that mental illness the recipient exhibits a deterioration ofhis ability to function, suffering, or threatening behavior.

C. The illness has existed for a period marked by the continuing presenceof the above symptoms or the repeated episodic occurrence of these symptoms.

D. The benefits of psychotropic medication will outweigh the harm.

E. The recipient lacks the capacity to make a reasoned decision about themedication.

F. Other less restrictive services have been explored and foundinappropriate. 405 ILCS 5/2-107.1(a-5)(4)(A) through (a-5)(4)(F) (West Supp.2001).

Clear and convincing evidence has been defined as that quantum of proof that leaves noreasonable doubt in the mind of the fact finder about the truth of the proposition in question. Bazydlo v. Volant, 164 Ill. 2d 207, 213 (1995). Although stated in terms of reasonabledoubt, courts consider clear and convincing evidence to be more than a preponderance,while not quite approaching the degree of proof necessary to convict a person of a criminaloffense. Bazydlo, 164 Ill. 2d at 213. A reviewing court will not reverse an order allowingthe involuntary administration of psychotropic medication unless the trial court's findingsare against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Jakush, 311 Ill. App. 3d 940, 944(2000). A judgment is considered against the manifest weight of the evidence only whenan opposite conclusion is apparent or when the findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary,or not based on evidence. In re Jakush, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 944.

While each respondent challenges the trial court's findings with respect to one ormore of the factors enumerated in section 2-107.1(a-5) of the Mental Health andDevelopmental Disabilities Code (Code) (405 ILCS 5/2-107.1(a-5) (West Supp. 2001)), allchallenge the trial court's findings with respect to the question of whether the respondentslacked the capacity to make a reasoned decision about the medication. Because we concludethat the trial court's findings in this regard are contrary to the manifest weight of theevidence, we reverse on that basis. The respondents argue that the State failed to proveby clear and convincing evidence that the respondents lacked the capacity to make areasoned decision about the medication because the State failed to prove that it had compliedwith section 2-102(a-5) of the Code (405 ILCS 5/2-102(a-5) (West 2000)). Section 2-102(a-5) of the Code requires the treating physician to "advise the recipient, in writing, ofthe side effects, risks, and benefits of the treatment, as well as alternatives to the proposedtreatment, to the extent such advice is consistent with the recipient's ability to understand theinformation communicated." 405 ILCS 5/2-102(a-5) (West 2000). The respondents arguethat a necessary predicate to making a reasoned decision about whether to take psychotropicmedication is being informed about the medication's risks and benefits. Thus, before a trialcourt can determine whether a respondent lacked the capacity to make a reasoned decisionabout the medication, it must determine by clear and convincing evidence that therespondent was advised of the risks, benefits, and side effects of the medication. Accordingto the respondents, this evidence was lacking in the instant case.

In In re Israel, 278 Ill. App. 3d 24, 37 (1996), this court set forth the followingfactors that a court must consider in determining whether an individual lacks the capacityto make a reasoned decision concerning the administration of psychotropic medication:

1. The person's knowledge that he has a choice to make.

2. The person's ability to understand the available options and theiradvantages and disadvantages.

3. Whether the commitment to a mental health facility is voluntary orinvoluntary.

4. Whether the person has previously received the type of medication ortreatment at issue.

5. If the person has received similar treatment in the past, whether he candescribe what happened as a result and how the effects were beneficial or harmful.

6. The absence of any interfering pathologic perceptions or beliefs orinterfering emotional states that might prevent an understanding of legitimate risksand benefits.

None of these factors are dispositive, nor are they exclusive. In re Israel, 278 Ill. App. 3dat 37.

"An individual has the capacity to make treatment decisions for himself when, basedupon conveyed information concerning the risks and benefits of the proposed treatment andreasonable alternatives to treatment, he makes a rational choice to either accept or refusethe treatment." (Emphasis added.) In re Israel, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 36. There are manysituations in which the administration of drugs to an individual is clearly in that individual'sbest interest. In re Israel, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 39. However, there is also a competingconstitutionally protected liberty interest to refuse the administration of psychotropic drugs. In re Israel, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 39. Thus, where an individual has the capacity to make thetreatment decision for himself, psychotropic medication may not be forced upon him evenif it is clearly in that individual's best interest.

As pointed out in In re Israel, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 36, before one can make a reasoneddecision regarding medication, it is first necessary to be informed about the risks andbenefits of the proposed course of medicine. In re Edward S., 298 Ill. App. 3d 162, 166(1998); In re Cathy M., 326 Ill. App. 3d 335, 341 (2001). Thus, section 2-102(a-5) of theCode requires that the patient be informed in writing about the side effects, risks, andbenefits of proposed medication. 405 ILCS 5/2-102(a-5) (West 2000). If the patient is notinformed of the risks and benefits of the proposed medication, an order for the involuntaryadministration of medication must be reversed because the respondent has not been providedwith the necessary information from which he could make a reasoned decision. In reEdward S., 298 Ill. App. 3d at 166; In re Cathy M., 326 Ill. App. 3d at 342; see also In reBontrager, 286 Ill. App. 3d 226, 231-32 (1997) (whether the physician discussed orreviewed written explanations of benefits/side effects with the respondent as required bysection 2-102 of Code (405 ILCS 5/2-102 (West 1992)) and, if so, whether the respondentfailed to understand her options are important factors in determining whether the respondentlacked the capacity to make a reasoned decision about the medication).

Even where the physician has verbally advised the patient of the benefits and sideeffects of the medication and the patient has informed the physician that he chooses not totake the medication, the patient is still entitled to receive the written notification required bysection 2-102 of the Code (405 ILCS 5/2-102 (West 2000)). In re Richard C., 329 Ill. App.3d at 1095. Verbal notification is not enough to ensure a respondent's due process rights. In re Richard C., 329 Ill. App. 3d at 1095.

Nor is harmless error analysis appropriate to this question. In re Richard C., 329 Ill.App. 3d at 1095. The procedural safeguards of the Code must be strictly construed in favorof the respondent, and strict compliance therewith is compelling, because liberty interestsare involved. In re Richard C., 329 Ill. App. 3d at 1095. The failure to comply with theprocedural rules requires the reversal of court orders authorizing involuntary treatment. Inre Richard C., 329 Ill. App. 3d at 1095.

Furthermore, a respondent cannot waive, by refusing to discuss his treatment with hisphysician, his right to receive the written advisories required by section 2-102 of the Code. In re Cathy M., 326 Ill. App. 3d at 342-43. The rights provided in the statute were notplaced in the Code to ensure that a respondent understands a medication's side effects butto ensure that a respondent's due process rights are met and protected. In re Cathy M., 326Ill. App. 3d at 343. Where a patient refuses to discuss the risks and benefits of proposedmedications with his physician, it is even more important that he receive the writtennotification so that he will at least have the minimal amount of notice that is required underthe Code. In re Cathy M., 326 Ill. App. 3d at 343.

In the instant case, there is no evidence that the State complied with section 2-102(a-5) of the Code with respect to any of the respondents. The petitions themselves do not averthat the written notice required by section 2-102(a-5) of the Code was provided to therespondents.

With respect to John R., he testified that he was given a written notice with respectto one of the medications sought to be forced on him but not with respect to the othermedications for which an order was sought. John R. testified that no one had ever evenverbally explained to him the risks, benefits, or side effects of any of the medications. WhenJohn R.'s physician was asked whether she had informed John R. of the risks and benefitsof the proposed medications, she responded, "I think so."

With respect to Helen S., her treating physician testified that she had been unable toexplain to Helen S. the potential side effects of the proposed medication because Helen S.refused to listen and walked away. There was no evidence that Helen S. had been given anywritten notification of the risks, benefits, or side effects of the proposed medications, asrequired by section 2-102(a-5) of the Code.

With respect to Diana L., her physician testified that Diana L. was very uncooperativeand was not willing to listen when the physician tried to explain to her the side effects of thevarious medications. When asked if she had taken any other steps to try to explain to DianaL. the side effects of the medications, the physician stated, "She has not really cooperated." There is no evidence that Diana L. was given the written notice required by section 2-102(a-5) of the Code.

The trial court in these cases did not have sufficient evidence to find that theserespondents lacked the capacity to make a reasoned decision about the proposedpsychotropic medications. In the absence of evidence that the respondents were informedof the risks and benefits of the proposed medications, as required by section 2-102(a-5) ofthe Code, the orders authorizing the involuntary administration of psychotropic medicationmust be reversed.

We are not unaware of In re Barry B., 295 Ill. App. 3d 1080 (1998), in which thiscourt held that the failure to give the written notification required by section 2-102(a-5) ofthe Code did not require the reversal of an order authorizing the involuntary administrationof psychotropic medication. We note, however, that In re Barry B. was decided prior tosubsequent decisions by the same district of this court, cited above, which unequivocallyhold that the failure to give the required notification mandates the reversal of an orderauthorizing forced medication. We choose to follow these subsequent cases. In re EdwardS., 298 Ill. App. 3d 162 (1998); In re Cathy M., 326 Ill. App. 3d 335 (2001); In re RichardC., 329 Ill. App. 3d 1090 (2002).

Because of our resolution of this issue, we need not consider the respondents'remaining arguments. However, we wish to add a word of caution to attorneys and trialjudges involved in proceedings under the Code. These proceedings should not be conductedpro forma. Fundamental liberty interests are involved in proceedings under the Code. Inre Cynthia S., 326 Ill. App. 3d 65, 68 (2001). The Code's procedural safeguards are notmere technicalities but essential tools to safeguard these liberty interests. In re Cynthia S.,326 Ill. App. 3d at 69. Accordingly, those procedural safeguards are construed strictly infavor of the respondent and must be strictly complied with. In re Cynthia S., 326 Ill. App.3d at 69. The petitioner bears a substantial burden of proof that the trial judge should forcethe petitioner to meet with real, clear, and convincing evidence before the court enters anorder infringing on the respondent's important liberty interests. We believe that every partyinvolved in these proceedings has the best interests of the patient/respondents in mind. Nevertheless, the system can be, and has been, abused, and mistakes have no doubt beenmade. Accordingly, we remind the parties involved in these proceedings to be ever vigilantto protect the rights of the respondents as reflected in the Code.

For the foregoing reasons, the orders of the circuit court of Madison Countyauthorizing the involuntary administration of psychotropic medications are hereby reversed.

Reversed.

HOPKINS, P.J., and CHAPMAN, J., concur.

Opinion Filed:  June 11, 2003

Justices: Honorable Thomas M. Welch, J.

Honorable Terrence J. Hopkins, P.J., and

Honorable Melissa A. Chapman, J.,

Concur

Attorneys Anthony E. Rothert, Staff Attorney, Elvis C. Cameron, Managing Attorney, Jeff M.

for Plesko, Director, Legal Advocacy Service, Guardianship and Advocacy Commission,

Appellants Metro East Regional Office, 4500 College Avenue, Suite 100, Alton, IL 62002

Attorneys Hon. Bill Mudge, State's Attorney, Madison County Courthouse, 157 N. Main Street,

for Edwardsville, IL 62025; Norbert J. Goetten, Director, Stephen E. Norris, Deputy

Appellee Director, Kevin D. Sweeney, Staff Attorney, Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate

Prosecutor, 730 E. Illinois Highway 15, P.O. Box 2249, Mt. Vernon, IL 62864