JUSTICE MAAG delivered the opinion of the court:

The respondent, Linda W., was involuntarily admitted into a psychiatric facility inDecember 2002. The State's first petition for involuntary admission was dismissed by thecircuit court. The State immediately filed a second petition. A hearing was held on the secondpetition. The circuit court determined that the respondent was a person subject to involuntaryadmission and ordered that she be hospitalized in the Department of Human Services. Therespondent filed a timely notice of appeal. We reverse.

The relevant facts are as follows. According to the respondent, she had been receivingmedication for mental illness for 28 years. She had been diagnosed with schizoaffectivedisorder. Although the respondent had been in and out of several mental health institutionsover the years, she apparently did not believe that she had a mental illness and she refused totake medication for her condition.

The respondent was involuntarily admitted to Gateway Regional Medical Center(Gateway) on December 6, 2002. On December 9, 2002, a petition for involuntary admissionwas filed in Madison County case No. 02-MH-103. According to a certificate that wasattached to the petition, the respondent had refused to take her psychiatric medication for twoweeks. The respondent was angry and belligerent toward "KK and ex[-]husband." Therespondent's ex-husband was attempting to care for her, but due to his own physical problems,he was unable to do so. The respondent was "morbidly obese" and unable to meet her basicneeds of food, clothing, and personal hygiene without assistance. The respondent refused avoluntary placement in shelter care and offers for assistance in the home. The respondent was"exceedingly paranoid" and "delusional" about her family and anyone in the medical professionand believed that they were only trying to "control her."

The petition was involuntarily dismissed on December 19, 2002. Although the recorddoes not show why the petition was dismissed, the respondent states that the petition wasdismissed "for failure to comply with statutory pleading requirements."

On the same date, at 2:40 p.m., the State filed another petition for involuntary admissionto a facility, in Madison County case No. 02-MH-106. The respondent tore up that copy ofthe petition and hit a nurse in the face with her fist. The first certificate to support the secondpetition was executed by another registered nurse following an examination on December 19,2002, at 4 p.m. The first certificate stated that the respondent was "extremely angry, agitated,cursing, yelling, [and] throwing papers" when she was presented with a copy of the petition. The respondent tore up the petition and threw it in the nurse's face. She proceeded to strikethe nurse's cheek with her fist. The respondent threatened to kill the nurse. She alsothreatened another nurse and told her that she would "burn in hell for a million years." Therespondent physically pushed security personnel and verbally abused them. The respondent wasunable to stay on one topic and screamed and yelled. She made irrational statements such as"I bleed for my kids, but they will not bleed for me," and "Why don't you kill me? I would bebetter off." The respondent also claimed that the hospital staff was sending air through thevents that caused all the respondent's medical problems. The respondent was later observed"shouting out" and then denied wanting anything. She claimed that she needed medicalassistance and that the staff at Gateway was incompetent. She then refused medical help. Therespondent told her psychiatrist that "they enjoy controlling [her]" and later told Carol DuganFaulk, a licensed clinical social worker, that she and the Gateway staff were poisoning her. Thecertificate stated that the respondent required immediate hospitalization due to her inabilityto care for herself and the failure to comply with both medical and psychiatric medications. For all these reasons, the certificate stated that the respondent is "at risk to self and others." A second certificate was signed by a psychiatrist, Dr. Narishma Muddasani, on December 19,2002, at 10 p.m. Dr. Muddasani stated in the certificate that the respondent had delusionalbeliefs that "people are trying to poison her with the vents." He also said that the respondentwas in denial about her mental illness despite her 30 years of psychiatric treatment. Dr.Muddasani stated that the respondent also had delusional beliefs that her ex-husband was"trying to kill her" and she is unable to care for herself.

The respondent filed a motion to dismiss the second petition. She claimed that it wasvoid because she had been unlawfully detained between the time that she was served with acopy of the second petition on December 19, 2002, at 2:40 p.m. and the time that the firstcertificate to support the petition was executed on December 19, 2002, at 4 p.m. The circuitcourt denied the motion and conducted a hearing on whether the respondent was subject toinvoluntary admission and involuntary administration of psychotropic medication.

The testimony at the hearing was as follows. Faulk testified that the respondent hadbeen diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder. Faulk stated that the respondent was veryparanoid and disorganized. She said that the respondent threatened to kill one of the nurses. The respondent believed that the staff at Gateway was poisoning her by piping somethingthrough the air vents. The respondent also claimed that the doctors were giving her siliconeand that it caused her to have medical problems. The respondent stated that her current doctoris reincarnated. The respondent also believed that the food that Gateway fed her caused hermedical problems. The respondent threatened the staff and the doctor, and she almost hit apatient. She threatened to kill a nurse. Faulk recommended that the respondent continue toreside at Gateway until her condition was stabilized with medication. Faulk stated that if therespondent complied with the medication orders, she would be released on February 3, 2003.

Faulk testified that no less-restrictive facility than Gateway was available to serve therespondent's needs. Faulk opined that the respondent was unable to care for herself and wasdangerous to herself and others. The respondent refused to participate in treatment or takemedication.

Faulk also stated that on December 19, 2002, when the first petition was dismissed, therespondent's attorney called a cab for her. When the cab arrived, the respondent refused to getin. The respondent asked to go upstairs and gather her belongings. By the time that therespondent was ready to go, the second petition was finished, and she was readmitted. Wenote, however, that the petition states that within 12 hours after admission, the respondent wasgiven a copy of the petition. Hence, the respondent was readmitted prior to 2:40 p.m., whenthe petition was given to her.

The respondent testified that she was 59 years old at the time of the hearing. Therespondent stated that she had four admissions to psychiatric hospitals within the previous twoyears. She said that her legs were semiparalyzed and that she had "awful pain" in her legs dueto the Haldol injections. The respondent stated that the stiffness in her legs was "severe" andthat she was fearful of falling and getting hurt. She said that she was unable to get out of abathtub. Prior to her current admission, the respondent had been staying with her ex-husbandbecause he had a shower.

The respondent testified that she had not been overweight prior to the time that thedoctors began giving her shots. She claimed that after the shots, she weighed 300 pounds. Therespondent agreed that she was loud but denied that she was vicious or ferocious. She deniedthat she threatened to kill anyone and denied that she thought about harming herself or anyoneelse.

Dr. Muddasani testified that he was the respondent's treating psychiatrist. He stated thatthe respondent suffered from schizoaffective disorder. He opined that her disease wascharacterized by depression and paranoid delusions. Dr. Muddasani stated that the respondentdoes not believe that she has a mental illness and that, therefore, she does not understand theneed for the medication. The respondent had been given Haldol and other medications for hercondition. Because the respondent was refusing medication, Dr. Muddasani wanted toadminister Haldol because it could be given by injection once a month. Although therespondent claimed that Haldol caused her leg paralysis, Dr. Muddasani stated that it was nota side effect of the medication. Even though the respondent was having problems with herweight, Dr. Muddasani stated that it could be controlled by diet, exercise, and good judgment. Dr. Muddasani's treatment goal was to stabilize the respondent so she could leave the hospital. He stated that the benefits of the medication outweighed the risks and that the respondent didnot have the capacity to make a reasoned and informed decision regarding whether she shouldtake the medication.

After Dr. Muddasani testified, the respondent took the stand again. She testified thatprior to her admission to Gateway, she had been taking Celexa, Topamax, and Zyprexa. Thesemedications were prescribed by Dr. McCormick after she was released from Alton MentalHealth Center. The respondent stopped taking the medications approximately one to twoweeks prior to her admission to Gateway. The respondent claimed that she had been forcedto take shots for 28 years. She stated that her problems with pain and paralysis in the legsbegan when she started Haldol injections in 1993.

The circuit court determined that the respondent was subject to the involuntaryadministration of psychotropic medication and to involuntary admission. The hearing was heldon January 2, 2003, and the circuit court's order was filed the same day.

The respondent was discharged from Gateway on January 23, 2003, and released to theCherrywood Health Care Center in Vandalia, Illinois. The respondent filed a timely notice ofappeal on February 3, 2003. We note parenthetically that the State claims that the respondent'snotice of appeal was untimely. We find no merit to the State's argument. See Mentesana v.LaFranco, 73 Ill. App. 3d 204, 207, 391 N.E.2d 416, 419 (1979) (the court determined thatwhen the last day to file a notice of appeal falls on a Saturday, the notice of appeal is timelyif filed on the following Monday).

Before addressing the merits of the respondent's appeal, we note that this case is moot. The circuit court's order authorizing involuntary admission could only be in effect for up tosix months. See 405 ILCS 5/4-611(a) (West 2002). The respondent was legally dischargedfrom Gateway on January 23, 2003. Nevertheless, since this case involves an event of shortduration that is capable of repetition yet evades review, we will address the issues raised by therespondent. See In re Robert S., 341 Ill. App. 3d 238, 247, 792 N.E.2d 421, 427 (2003).

Initially, the respondent claims that the circuit court's order should be reversed becauseshe was unlawfully detained for 1 hour and 20 minutes. We agree.

Pursuant to section 3-602 of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code(Code) (405 ILCS 5/3-602 (West 2002)):

"The petition shall be accompanied by a certificate executed by a physician,qualified examiner, or clinical psychologist which states that the respondent is subjectto involuntary admission and requires immediate hospitalization. The certificate shallindicate that the physician, qualified examiner, or clinical psychologist personallyexamined the respondent not more than 72 hours prior to admission. It shall alsocontain the physician's, qualified examiner's, or clinical psychologist's clinicalobservations, other factual information relied upon in reaching a diagnosis, and astatement as to whether the respondent was advised of his rights under [s]ection 3-208." (Emphasis added.)

Hence, a person alleged to be subject to involuntary emergency admission cannot be taken intocustody, admitted, or otherwise detained unless both a petition and a certificate have beenexecuted. While we recognize that section 3-603 of the Code (405 ILCS 5/3-603 (West2002)) sets forth a procedure whereby an individual can be detained until a certificate isobtained, the State failed to comply with those procedures in the instant case. While anyonecan complete the petition, the requirement of a certificate ensures that a physician, qualifiedexaminer, or clinical psychologist has recently examined the respondent and that therespondent is subject to involuntary admission and requires immediate hospitalization. 405ILCS 5/3-602 (West 2002).

Although a circuit court's decision in an involuntary admission proceeding is given greatdeference (In re Bennett, 251 Ill. App. 3d 887, 888, 623 N.E.2d 942, 944 (1993)), the Code'sprocedural safeguards are not mere technicalities. Rather, they are essential tools to safeguardthe liberty interests of respondents in mental health cases. In re George O., 314 Ill. App. 3d1044, 1046, 734 N.E.2d 13, 16 (2000). The need for strict compliance with the statutoryrequirements is compelling in mental health cases since commitment is involuntary and libertyinterests are involved. In re Lanter, 216 Ill. App. 3d 972, 974, 576 N.E.2d 1219, 1220(1991). Because involuntary admission proceedings pose a grave threat to an individual'sliberty interests, the Code's procedural safeguards should be strictly construed in favor of therespondent. In re George O., 314 Ill. App. 3d at 1046, 734 N.E.2d at 16. Any noncompliancewith the statutorily prescribed involuntary commitment procedures renders the judgmententered in such a case erroneous and of no effect. In re Nancy A., 344 Ill. App. 3d 540, 549-50, 801 N.E.2d 565, 575 (2003).

In the case at hand, the first petition for involuntary admission was filed on December9, 2002, and was accompanied by two certificates signed by psychiatrists showing that therespondent needed hospitalization for the treatment of her mental illness. On December 19,2002, the first petition was dismissed. At 2:40 p.m. the same day, the second petition forinvoluntary admission was served on the respondent. The first certificate that was filed tosupport the petition was signed about 4 p.m., and the second certificate was signed atapproximately 10 p.m. A period of approximately 1 hour and 20 minutes elapsed between thetime that the second petition was served and the time that the first certificate to support thatpetition was executed. The State claims that the record is silent regarding whether therespondent was detained during that period of time. We note, however, that a review of therecord shows that Margaret Merrell, a registered nurse, signed the second petition onDecember 19, 2002, at 2:40 p.m., stating that the respondent had already been readmitted toGateway. Hence, the respondent was unlawfully detained between 2:40 p.m. and 4 p.m., whenthe first certificate to support the petition was signed.

For this reason, the circuit court's order finding that the respondent was a personsubject to involuntary admission and ordering her to be hospitalized in the Department ofHuman Services is erroneous. See In re Nancy A., 344 Ill. App. 3d at 549-50, 801 N.E.2d at575.

Reversed.

KUEHN, J., concurs.

JUSTICE WELCH, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent. It is true, as the majority points out, that section 3-603 of theCode (405 ILCS 5/3-603 (West 2002)) outlines the procedure whereby an individual may bedetained pending a certificate (slip op. at 7), and I believe that the State should be admonishedfor failing to comply strictly with that procedure in this case. However, I do not believe thatthe State's failure to comply should result in a reversal under the circumstances of this case. It is clear from the record that the respondent was subject to involuntary admission onDecember 19, 2002. Accordingly, had the State complied with the requirements of section3-603, the result would have been the same: the respondent would have been involuntarilyadmitted. I believe that under these circumstances, and given the respondent's 28-year historyof mental illness, the State's responsibility to protect and care for individuals who are subjectto involuntary admission, as well as to safeguard innocent bystanders who might suffer fromthe actions of released individuals who are subject to involuntary admission, outweighs anyharm caused by the State's failure to strictly comply with the procedures of section 3-603. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the majority's decision to reverse the circuit court.