JUSTICE DONOVAN delivered the opinion of the court:

Respondent, Mark W., appeals from an order of the circuit court of Madison Countygranting the State's petition to involuntarily administer psychotropic medication to Mark W. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court's finding that section 2-107.1 of theMental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Mental Health Code) (405 ILCS 5/2-107.1 (West 2002)) is constitutional as applied to pretrial detainees generally and torespondent specifically, but we reverse the order granting the State's request to involuntarilyadminister psychotropic medication.

On December 19, 1999, Mark W. was arrested in Peoria County and charged with theaggravated battery of two police officers. The record reveals that on the evening ofDecember 19, 1999, the police were summoned to a bar where Mark W. was alleged to havebeen removing beer bottles from the garbage and drinking the remaining beer from thediscarded bottles. The police found Mark W. a short distance from the tavern. Mark W.admitted going through the garbage and indicated that he was entitled to do so because heowned the property. He also told the police that he was their "commander" and a "priest ofthe high order." In the process of Mark W.'s arrest, he allegedly struggled with and struckthe two arresting officers.

On December 28, 1999, Mark W. was indicted on two charges of having "madephysical contact of an insulting or provoking nature" with two police officers. On June 5,2000, a judge of the Tenth Judicial Circuit in Peoria County found Mark W. unfit to standtrial pursuant to section 104-10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/104-10 (West 2002)). Mark W. was admitted to Alton Mental Heath Center on June 19, 2000.While at Alton Mental Health Center, Mark W. received various antipsychotic drugs,including Zyprexa, which was replaced with Risperdal, which was ultimately replaced withClozaril. On May 25, 2001, the Peoria County trial court found Mark W. fit to stand trial andhe was released on bond.

Mark W. stopped taking his medication after his release on bond. On February 8,2002, Mark W. was again found unfit to stand trial by the trial court in Peoria County. OnApril 3, 2002, Mark W. was remanded to the custody of Department of Human Services(DHS) for inpatient treatment. On April 9, 2002, Mark W. was readmitted to Alton MentalHealth Center.

On April 19, 2002, Dr. Kanwal Mahmood, Mark W.'s treating psychiatrist, filed apetition for involuntary treatment, which is the subject of this appeal. The petition soughtto force Mark W. to receive antipsychotic medication, Clozaril, on a nonemergency basis. The petition indicated that Mark W. was suffering from schizophrenia, was delusional, andhad deteriorated in his ability to care for himself. The petition opined that the administrationwould make Mark W. "more in touch with reality" so that he could "function in thecommunity." The petition made no mention of his status as unfit to stand trial or a goal ofmaking him fit for trial. The court ordered the petition set for a hearing on April 25, 2002. The case was continued on Mark W.'s motion to allow him to be examined by a mental healthprofessional not employed by DHS.

On May 16, 2002, Mark W. filed a motion to dismiss, contending, inter alia, thatsection 2-107.1 of the Mental Health Code was unconstitutional as applied to pretrialdetainees in general and to him specifically. Mark W. filed three affidavits, whichincorporated pertinent documents and exhibits. One of these was a report of Dr. BryceSullivan, a licensed clinical psychologist, who examined Mark W. on two occasions. Hisreport provided a review of Mark W.'s mental health records as well as his opinions, withina reasonable degree of psychological certainty, regarding the potential effects of forcingnonemergency drugs upon Mark W.

Dr. Sullivan noted that Mark W. had a history of psychiatric problems which datedback to at least 1990 and also had a history of noncompliance with treatment for psychiatricproblems. Dr. Sullivan stated: "[T]he risk of [Mark W.] causing serious physical harm tohimself or others, like all clinical predications of dangerousness, is difficult to ascertain. Heclearly has the potential of behaving in a manner that could cause injury to others[,] asindicated by the police report of 12/19/99 in which [Mark W.] was alleged to have causedinjury to two police officers which required medical attention. However, the mere existenceof prior episodes of aggressive behavior does not, by itself, predict future similar behaviors." Dr. Sullivan went on to state that Mark W. "does have the capacity to inflict serious physicalharm upon himself or another person" and that a "facility with the authority to administeremergency psychotropic medication and physical restrains [sic] would, through their use, beable to protect [Mark W.] and those with whom he has contact from physical harm if [MarkW.] were ever at imminent risk of causing serious physical harm to himself or others."

Dr. Sullivan's report listed the numerous side effects of Clozaril, such asagranulocytosis (a blood disease that can lead to death that is characterized by a reductionin a certain type of white blood cells), seizures, adverse cardiovascular and respiratoryeffects, neuroleptic malignant syndrome, tardive dyskinesia, drowsiness, sedation, fatigue,dizziness, vertigo, headache, tremor, syncope, restlessness, agitation, rigidity, akathasia,confusion, fatigue, hyperkinesia, amnesia/memory loss, loss of speech, stuttering, and manyothers. Dr. Sullivan opined that if Mark W. were administered Clozaril, these side effectscould impact trial-related issues, such as making it more difficult for Mark W. to focus onthe testimony of witnesses at his criminal trial and making it more difficult for Mark W. tocommunicate with his counsel and assist his counsel with his defense. Additionally, the sideeffects could negatively impact jurors' perceptions of his credibility and character and thecontent of his testimony at his criminal trial. Finally, Dr. Sullivan opined that if Mark W.were administered Clozaril and the effects of the medication resulted, he would appear moresane at his trial than if he did not receive the effects of the medication.

On July 3, 2002, the trial court heard and considered Mark W.'s motion to declaresection 2-107.1 of the Mental Health Code unconstitutional as applied to pretrial detaineesin general and Mark W. specifically. The trial court found that the statute was constitutional,and the court denied the motion.

The court then proceeded to hear the State's motion for the involuntary administrationof psychotropic medication. The parties chose not to present the testimony of any witnessesbut simply presented a stipulation regarding what their testimony would be if called to testify. (The content of the stipulation will be provided and discussed later in this opinion.) The trialcourt then signed an order prepared by the State to involuntarily administer psychotropicmedication to Mark W. The order for the administration of psychotropic medication was ineffect for 90 days. Mark W. appeals the July 3, 2002, order for the involuntaryadministration of psychotropic medication.

Subsequent to the filing of the notice of appeal, on February 7, 2003, the trial courtin Peoria County found that Mark W. had been in the custody of DHS for one year and thatMark W. remained unfit. A discharge hearing was set on May 9, 2003. On May 9, 2003,Mark W. was found not guilty by reason of insanity on both counts.

In undertaking our review, we begin by finding that this case is moot. The durationof the order entered on July 3, 2002, was 90 days. Mark W. was found not guilty by reasonof insanity on May 9, 2003. Because the order for the involuntary administration ofpsychotropic drugs has expired and Mark W. is no longer a pretrial detainee, any relief wemay provide is essentially an advisory opinion. Appellate courts generally lack jurisdictionto render advisory opinions. See In re Mary Ann P., 202 Ill. 2d 393, 401, 781 N.E.2d 237,242 (2002). However, we find that the constitutional issue raised in Mark W.'s appeal fallswithin the public-interest exception to the mootness doctrine. The criteria for this exceptionare (1) the public nature of the issues presented, (2) the desirability of an authoritativedetermination for the purpose of guiding public officials, and (3) the likelihood that thequestion will recur. In re Mary Ann P., 202 Ill. 2d at 402, 781 N.E.2d at 242-43; see also Inre Evelyn S., 337 Ill. App. 3d 1096, 1101-02, 788 N.E.2d 310, 315 (2003). The procedurescourts must follow to authorize the involuntary medication of mental health patients are amatter of "substantial public concern." In re Mary Ann P., 202 Ill. 2d at 402, 781 N.E.2d at243. Because of the short duration of orders authorizing involuntary treatment, it is likelythat the circumstances present in the case at bar will recur without the opportunity to belitigated before the case is rendered moot by the expiration of the order. In re Mary Ann P.,202 Ill. 2d at 402-03, 781 N.E.2d at 243. For those reasons, we deny the State's motion todismiss, and we will address the constitutional issue raised by Mark W.

Initially, we note that in In re Evelyn S., 337 Ill. App. 3d 1096, 788 N.E.2d 310(2003), we found that the Mental Health Code governs the administration of psychotropicmedication to pretrial detainees found unfit to stand trial. In re Evelyn S., 337 Ill. App. 3dat 1102, 788 N.E.2d at 315; see also In re Robert S., 341 Ill. App. 3d 238, 792 N.E.2d 421(2003). The Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 includes procedures for the involuntarycommitment of defendants found unfit to stand trial, but it does not contain provisions fordetermining whether the treatment of a pretrial detainee found unfit to stand trial may includethe involuntary administration of psychotropic medication. In re Evelyn S., 337 Ill. App. 3dat 1103-04, 788 N.E.2d at 316-17. In the absence of the procedural safeguards provided bythe Mental Health Code, there would be no procedural safeguards at all. In re Robert S., 341Ill. App. 3d at 257, 792 N.E.2d at 436.

Next, the statute we are analyzing, section 2-107.1, allows for the involuntaryadministration of psychotropic medication on a nonemergency basis if certain criteria areestablished by clear and convincing evidence. At the time of the events herein, the statuteprovided as follows:

"(A) That the recipient has a serious mental illness or developmental disability.

(B) That because of said mental illness or developmental disability, therecipient exhibits any one of the following: (i) deterioration of his or her ability tofunction, (ii) suffering, or (iii) threatening behavior.

(C) That the illness or disability has existed for a period marked by thecontinuing presence of the symptoms set forth in item (B) of this subdivision (4) orthe repeated episodic occurrence of these symptoms.

(D) That the benefits of the treatment outweigh the harm.

(E) That the recipient lacks the capacity to make a reasoned decision about thetreatment.

(F) That other less restrictive services have been explored and foundinappropriate.

(G) If the petition seeks authorization for testing and other procedures, thatsuch testing and procedures are essential for the safe and effective administration ofthe treatment." 405 ILCS 5/2-107.1(a-5)(4) (West 2002).

Our review of the merits of Mark W.'s unconstitutionality claim is guided by thefollowing principles. "Legislative enactments carry a strong presumption of constitutionality,and a party challenging the constitutionality of a statute has the burden of clearly establishingits invalidity." People v. Thurow, 203 Ill. 2d 352, 367, 786 N.E.2d 1019, 1027 (2003); seealso People v. Falbe, 189 Ill. 2d 635, 727 N.E.2d 200 (2000); People v. Inghram, 118 Ill. 2d140, 514 N.E.2d 977 (1987). It is our duty to affirm a statute's constitutionality if reasonablypossible, and any doubts must be resolved in favor of the validity of the challengedenactment. Falbe, 189 Ill. 2d at 639, 727 N.E.2d at 204; Inghram, 118 Ill. 2d at 146, 514N.E.2d at 980.

The Illinois Supreme Court has previously determined that the provisions of theMental Health Code authorizing the forced administration of psychotropic medication to amental patient did not violate the patient's substantive due process rights and that theprovision authorizing the forced administration of drugs to patients exhibiting disruptive orthreatening behavior was not unconstitutionally vague. In re C.E., 161 Ill. 2d 200, 641N.E.2d 345 (1994). In re C.E. involved an adult male whom the circuit court found subjectto involuntary admission to a hospital for treatment and evaluation. C.E.'s guardian filed apetition for declaratory relief and requested that the trial court declare section 2-107.1unconstitutional. The trial court held that section 2-107.1 was facially unconstitutional andtherefore held the section null and void. Upon review, the Illinois Supreme Court stated,"[P]ersons who are mentally ill or developmentally disabled have a Federal constitutionallyprotected liberty interest to refuse the administration of psychotropic drugs." In re C.E., 161Ill. 2d at 214, 641 N.E.2d at 351; see Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 108 L. Ed. 2d178, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990) (the United States Supreme Court held that a state prisoner hasa liberty interest, under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the UnitedStates Constitution, in refusing the administration of psychotropic medication). After adetailed analysis of how section 2-107.1 addresses the State's concern for the well-being ofthose who are not able to make a rational choice regarding the administration of psychtropicmedication, the court concluded, "[S]ection 2-107.1 does not, on its face, impermissiblyburden the Federal constitutional liberty interests of C.E." In re C.E., 161 Ill. 2d at 219, 641N.E.2d at 354. As a result, the court found that section 2-107.1 was constitutional as appliedto C.E. and similarly situated individuals.

In this case, Mark W. contends that when applied to him and other pretrial detainees,section 2-107.1 neither requires nor allows any inquiry whatsoever into whether itsapplication would force a respondent to take medication that would, in effect, involuntarilysacrifice his right to a fair trial. Mark W. contends that the side effects from the medicationmay make it difficult, if not impossible, for him to focus on the testimony of witnesses or tocommunicate and assist his counsel, the medication would negatively impact jurors'perceptions of his credibility and character, and finally, the medication could rob him of theopportunity to present an effective insanity defense.

After Mark W.'s argument was presented to this court, the United Supreme Courtrendered its opinion in Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 156 L. Ed. 2d 197, 123 S. Ct.2174 (2003), holding that the government may involuntarily administer antipsychotic drugsto a mentally ill defendant to render that defendant competent to stand trial under certain"rare" circumstances. The Court in Sell recognized that it previously had held that adefendant has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in avoiding the involuntaryadministration of psychotropic drugs. Sell, 539 U.S. at 178-79, 156 L. Ed. 2d at 211, 123 S.Ct. at 2183 (citing Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 118 L. Ed. 2d 479, 112 S. Ct. 1810(1992)). The Court found that only an " 'essential' " or " 'overriding' " state interest couldovercome this liberty interest. Sell, 539 U.S. at 178-79, 156 L. Ed. 2d at 211, 123 S. Ct. at2183 (quoting Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135, 118 L. Ed. 2d at 489, 112 S. Ct. at 1815). The Courtstated:

"[T]he Constitution permits the Government involuntarily to administerantipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill defendant facing serious criminal charges in orderto render that defendant competent to stand trial, but only if the treatment is medicallyappropriate, is substantially unlikely to have side effects that may undermine thefairness of the trial, and, taking account of less intrusive alternatives, is necessarysignificantly to further important governmental trial-related interests. This standardwill permit involuntary administration of drugs solely for trial competence purposesin certain instances." Sell, 539 U.S. at 179-80, 156 L. Ed. 2d at 211, 123 S. Ct. at2184.

The Court in Sell went on to state:

"[T]he court applying these standards is seeking to determine whetherinvoluntary administration of drugs is necessary significantly to further a particulargovernmental interest, namely, the interest in rendering the defendant competent tostand trial. A court need not consider whether to allow forced medication for thatkind of purpose, if forced medication is warranted for a different purpose, such as thepurposes set out in Harper related to the individual's dangerousness[] or purposesrelated to the individual's own interests where refusal to take drugs puts his healthgravely at risk. [Citation.] There are often strong reasons for a court to determinewhether forced administration of drugs can be justified on these alternative groundsbefore turning to the trial competence question." (Emphasis in original.) Sell, 539U.S. at 181-82, 156 L. Ed. 2d at 213, 123 S. Ct. at 2185.

See also In re Robert S., 341 Ill. App. 3d at 258, 792 N.E.2d at 436.

We can only assume that Mark W.'s argument after Sell would be that section 2-107.1is unconstitutional because it does not "require or allow for" the trial court to consider theprotections provided for pretrial criminal defendants contained in Sell. The court in In reC.E. provides the necessary guidance to resolve this issue. The respondent in In re C.E.contended that section 2-107.1 was unconstitutional because it did not specifically requirethe application of the "substituted judgment" test. In re C.E., 161 Ill. 2d at 219, 641 N.E.2dat 354. The "substituted judgment" analysis was adopted in In re Estate of Longeway, 133Ill. 2d 33, 549 N.E.2d 292 (1989), and In re Estate of Greenspan, 137 Ill. 2d 1, 558 N.E.2d1194 (1990), in which the court found that in certain specifically limited circumstances, aguardian may lawfully exercise a ward's common law right to refuse the administration oflife-sustaining medical treatment. In re C.E., 161 Ill. 2d at 220, 641 N.E.2d at 354. Underthe substituted judgment analysis, the " 'surrogate decision-maker attempts to establish, withas much accuracy as possible, what decision the patient would make if he were competentto do so.' " In re C.E., 161 Ill. 2d at 220, 641 N.E.2d at 354 (quoting In re Estate ofLongeway, 133 Ill. 2d at 49, 549 N.E.2d at 299). In In re C.E. the court observed as follows:

"Initially, we note that section 2-107.1 does not explicitly adopt the 'bestinterests' or the 'substituted judgment' test. Neither phrase appears explicitly orverbatim in the language of section 2-107.1[.] We also find it noteworthy that section2-107.1, by its terms, does not foreclose the court's consideration of the wishesexpressed by the mental health recipient while the recipient was competent. Section2-107.1 requires proof that the benefits of the psychotropic medication will outweighits harms, and that other treatment alternatives have been considered and foundineffective. (405 ILCS 5/2-107.1(d)(4), (d)(5) (West 1992).)" In re C.E., 161 Ill. 2dat 220, 641 N.E.2d at 354.

The court went on to find as follows:

"Section 2-107.1 requires a showing, by clear and convincing proof, that theinvoluntary administration of the medication will outweigh the harms that may becaused by the medication. (405 ILCS 5/2-107.1(d)(4) (West 1992).) The recipient'ssubjective perceptions may well be an integral part of this proof. Thus, the factorsspecified in the statute may often require that the trial court take into account thesubjective attitudes of the recipient while the recipient was competent.

Consequently, we conclude that section 2-107.1 permits the court'sconsideration of the 'substituted judgment' of the mental health recipient, and that thecourt respect the wishes expressed by the mental health patient when the patient wascapable of making rational treatment decisions in his own behalf." In re C.E., 161 Ill.2d at 221, 641 N.E.2d at 355.

As a result, the court found no error, "under Federal constitutional law, in the legislature'sfailure to expressly include the 'substituted judgment' test in section 2-107.1." In re C.E., 161Ill. 2d at 224, 641 N.E.2d at 356.

Consistent with the reasoning in In re C.E., we find that section 2-107.1 isconstitutional. Section 2-107.1(a-5)(4)(D) (405 ILCS 5/2-107.1(a-5)(4)(D) (West 2002))(which requires a showing, by clear and convincing proof, that the involuntary administrationof the medication will outweigh the harms that may be caused by the medication) allows thetrial court to consider the factors identified in Sell when deciding whether to order theinvoluntary administration of psychotropic drugs to a pretrial defendant. As Mark W.correctly contends, one of the harms that may be caused by the medication is the involuntarysacrifice of his right to a fair trial.

In compliance with Sell, when considering whether to involuntarily administerpsychotropic drugs to a mentally ill and unfit person with pending criminal charges, the trialjudge must consider the following factors: (1) that important governmental interests are atstake, (2) that involuntary medication will significantly further those concomitant stateinterests, (3) that involuntary medication is necessary to further those state interests, and (4)that the administration of the drugs is medically appropriate, i.e., in the patient's best medicalinterest in light of his medical condition. Sell, 539 U.S. at 180-81, 156 L. Ed. 2d at 211-12,123 S. Ct. at 2184-85; see also United States v. Gomes, 305 F. Supp. 2d 158 (D. Conn. 2004). Alternatively, the United States Supreme Court has directed trial courts to determine whetherforced medication may be warranted for a purpose other than returning a defendant tocompetence to stand trial, such as "purposes *** related to the individual's dangerousness[]or purposes related to the individual's own interests where refusal to take drugs puts hishealth gravely at risk." Sell, 539 U.S. at 182, 156 L. Ed. 2d at 213, 123 S. Ct. at 2185; seealso Gomes, 305 F. Supp. 2d 158. The court's findings must be determined on the basis ofcurrent circumstances, because the defendant's medical condition may have changed overtime. Sell, 539 U.S. 166, 156 L. Ed. 2d 197, 123 S. Ct. 2174. Given our interpretation ofsection 2-107.1(a-5)(4)(D), we find that the trial judge was correct in finding that section 2-107.1 is constitutional as applied to pretrial criminal defendants and Mark W. specifically.

After the constitutional issue was decided by the trial judge, the court proceeded tothe hearing on the petition to involuntarily administer psychotropic drugs to Mark W. Ratherthan call witnesses before the court, the parties chose to present evidence in the form of astipulation regarding what the witnesses would testify to if called. The stipulation waspresented to the court as follows:

"[Defense Attorney:] I've discussed the situation with [Mark W.] several times,and based on his interest in not wanting to be called to testify and not wanting to haveto testify, he's going to follow my advice and not testify in this proceeding. Based onthat, we'll have no evidence to dispute the [S]tate's witnesses, so we're willing tostipulate that the State would offer evidence that Mark has a serious mental illness,that because of his illness he suffers by suffering from pervasive delusions, [that] hissymptoms have persisted for a marked period of time, that they believe that thebenefits of the treatment would outweigh the harm, that he lacks the capacity to makea reasoned decision about his treatment, and that less restrictive services areinappropriate.

We don't necessarily agree with all of that evidence, but we stipulate that it willbe presented, and we have nothing to controvert it.

THE COURT: You're not going to rebut it?

[Defense Attorney:] So based on that, even though I reserve the argument that[section] 2-107.1 should not apply, under [section] 2-107.1 an order certainly couldand should be entered.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Rothert. Is that accurate, Mr. Barberis?

[Assistant State's Attorney:] The State would accept his stipulation, and basedupon the order that we presented, we believe that if called to testify, the State [sic]would be able to call the treating physician, Dr. Mahmood, and that we would be ableto establish that the requested psychotropic medications are needed, and that the Courtwould concur and enter the order.

THE COURT: All right. Under the circumstances, the Court will find that[Mark W.] is a person who is subject to the involuntary administration of psychotropicmedication, that being [C]lozaril up to a maximum of 900 milligrams per day, and thatthe [C]lozaril laboratory examinations are also authorized."

Initially, we observe that although stipulations are to be encouraged, clarity andprecision of thought should be encouraged as well. "These goals can be obtained by ensuringthat the stipulation to which the parties agree is both accurate and complete." People v.Durgan, 346 Ill. App. 3d 1121, 1132, 806 N.E.2d 1233, 1242 (2004). The stipulation doesnot include the report of Dr. Sullivan and is extremely general regarding Dr. Mahmood'stestimony. Of course, the parties and the court did not have the benefit of the Sell decisionwhen this stipulation was agreed to by the parties and accepted by the court. The stipulationfails to adequately address the factors identified in Sell-(1) that important governmentalinterests are at stake, (2) that involuntary medication will significantly further thoseconcomitant state interests, (3) that involuntary medication is necessary to further those stateinterests, and (4) that the administration of the drugs is medically appropriate, i.e., in thepatient's best medical interest in light of his medical condition (Sell, 539 U.S. 180-81, 156L. Ed. 2d at 213, 123 S. Ct. at 2184-85)-which are to be considered when a court decideswhether an individual charged with a crime is, prior to trial, subject to the involuntaryadministration of psychotropic drugs. In addition, as we now know, forced medication mayalso be warranted for a purpose other than returning a defendant to competence to stand trial,such as "purposes *** related to the individual's dangerousness[] or purposes related to theindividual's own interests where refusal to take drugs puts his health gravely at risk." Sell,539 U.S. at 182, 156 L. Ed. 2d 197, 123 S. Ct. at 2185. The stipulation also fails to addressthis alternate ground for granting the State's petition. As a result, we find that it wasmanifestly erroneous for the trial court to grant the State's petition to involuntarily administerpsychotropic medication to Mark W., considering that, at the time, he was charged with acriminal offense and he was awaiting trial. See In re Jennifer H., 333 Ill. App. 3d 427, 430-31, 775 N.E.2d 616, 619 (2002) (an appellate court will reverse a trial court's order toinvoluntarily administer psychotropic medications only if it is manifestly erroneous).

For the foregoing reasons, we deny the motion to dismiss this appeal as moot, weaffirm the trial court's finding that section 2-107.1 of the Mental Health Code isconstitutional as applied to pretrial detainees generally and to Mark W. specifically, but wereverse the order granting the State's request to involuntarily administer psychotropicmedication to Mark W. Because of Mark W.'s current status and the duration of the order,there is no need to remand this matter.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

CHAPMAN, P.J., and KUEHN, J., concur.

Opinion Filed: June 8, 2004

Justices: Honorable James K. Donovan, J.

Honorable Melissa A. Chapman, P.J., and

Honorable Clyde L. Kuehn, J.,

Concur

Attorneys Jeff M. Plesko, Director, Anthony E. Rothert, Staff Attorney, Legal Advocacy

for Service, Guardianship and Advocacy Commission, Metro East Regional Office, 4500

Appellant College Avenue, Suite 100, Alton, IL 62002

Attorneys Hon. Bill Mudge, State's Attorney, Madison County Courthouse, 157 N. Main

for Street, Edwardsville, IL 62025; Norbert J. Goetten, Director, Stephen E. Norris,

Appellees Deputy Director, Kevin D. Sweeney, Staff Attorney, Office of the State's Attorneys

Appellate Prosecutor, 730 E. Illinois Highway 15, P.O. Box 2249, Mt. Vernon, IL

62864 (for The People of the State of Illinois-Petitioner-Appellee)

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Jan E. Hughes, Assistant Attorney General,

State of Illinois, 100 W. Randolph Street, 12th Floor, Chicago, IL 60601 (for The

Department of Human Services-Intervenor-Appellee)