PRESIDING JUSTICE HOPKINS delivered the opinion of the court:

The petitioner, Alisha Bowlby, appeals the trial court's judgment dissolving hermarriage with the respondent, William Matthew Bowlby (Matthew). On appeal, Alishaasserts that the trial court erred because it failed to award growing crops to either party andbecause it denied Alisha's pretrial motion to bar evidence concerning Matthew's debt to hisfather, Robert Bowlby. Alisha also contends that the trial court abused its discretion whenit divided the marital assets, awarded child support, and denied Alisha's petition for attorneyfees. We affirm as modified.

Alisha and Matthew were married on August 1, 1992, and resided together for eightyears until Alisha moved from the marital residence on August 15, 2000, and filed for adissolution of their marriage on August 18, 2000. Two children were born from the parties'union. At the time of the judgment, Alisha was 26 years old and Matthew was 28 years old.

During the parties' marriage, Matthew worked as a farmer, and during the summerof 1995, Matthew also worked at Asplundh Tree Service. Matthew and Robert farmtogether, although they own separate farming entities. During most of the marriage, Alishadid not work outside of the home. In 1999 she periodically worked at Asplundh TreeService. After May 2000, Alisha became a full-time groundsman at Asplundh Tree Serviceand received a gross income of $16,394.58 for the year.

The parties' adjusted gross incomes during their marriage, as revealed by their 1998,1999, and 2000 tax returns, was $9,141, $13,284, and $12,195, respectively. In 1999 and2000, the parties' cash-rented or leased acreage increased from 700 acres to 1,175 acres, andthe crops at the time of the judgment consisted of 400 acres of corn and 775 acres of beans. Grain sales of 1999 and 2000 crops in 2000 totaled $155,918, and government paymentsthrough various agricultural programs totaled $25,053. Deducting farm expenses of$167,849, the parties' net profit for 2000 equaled $13,122. The parties stipulated to thefollowing values for the parties' marital assets:

1993 Freightliner truck/tractor $13,500 to 14,000

Kinze 2600 23-row planter $36,000 to 36,500

John Deere soil conditioner $13,500 to 14,000

John Deere field cultivator $11,000 to 12,000

Farm King swing-away auger $ 2,550 to 2,750

1999 GMC Yukon utility truck $20,400

1995 Dodge Ram truck $10,300

At the hearing, Alisha offered into evidence statements prepared by Matthew tosecure financing. In the statements, Matthew listed the value of the parties' mobile home as$12,000 and $14,000, exceeding Matthew's submitted value of $9,500. Alisha alsointroduced statements in which Matthew estimated the value of the parties' grain bin as$15,000, even though Matthew's submitted appraisal and depreciation schedule at thehearing indicated a value of $6,450. In the statements, Matthew also listed various farmingequipment as collateral, which, as Matthew and Robert explained, Matthew did not own butlisted as collateral with the permission of Robert, who owned the equipment.

The record revealed the following marital debt:

Old National Bank secured by GMC Yukon $21,766.56

Old National Bank secured by field cultivator $12,305.57

Fifth Third Bank secured by grain bin $ 9,989.15

Fifth Third Bank farm operating loan $50,929.17

Farm Service Agency secured by Freightliner, $66,538.26

planter, and conditioner

Monsanto balance due from 2000 $11,052.42

Greenpoint Credit secured by 1988 mobile home $ 5,022.00

John Deere balance of lease for ag tractor $34,500.00

Batavia Leasing Company balance of lease for grain cart $16,216.00

IRS deficiency on taxes $ 2,353.00

Landlord cash rent due (2000 tax return) $53,599.00

Alisha filed a pretrial motion to bar evidence of debt to Robert because Matthew hadfailed to properly comply with discovery. The trial court denied Alisha's motion, and at thehearing, Robert explained that he prepays crop inputs for the following year, Matthew usesthe fertilizers, seed, and chemicals, and Matthew repays Robert after harvesting the crop. Robert entered into evidence a handwritten list that indicated expenses for the fertilizer,seed, chemicals, and equipment repairs and that revealed that Matthew owed Robert $9,000for 2000 crop expenses. Robert explained that he expects repayment by Matthew at the endof the 2001 harvest. Robert further testified that he loaned Matthew and Alisha $3,282.04to redeem the Yukon truck that had been repossessed by the bank.

Matthew resided in the parties' marital residence, a mobile home located on Robert'sproperty. Although title remained in Matthew's name, Robert paid the monthly paymentsto provide Matthew with better access to farming activity.

Matthew paid approximately $4,000 for attorney fees and costs during a criminalproceeding and during the divorce proceeding.

Prior to the hearing, Alisha filed a petition for the contribution of interim attorneyfees on May 15, 2001, which the trial court denied on May 22, 2001. At the hearing, Alishaattempted to introduce an evidence deposition, revealing an operating-loan debt thatMatthew did not disclose in discovery, and asserted that the deposition reflected a patternof withholding discovery and supported her petition for attorney fees. The trial court deniedAlisha's request to introduce the deposition.

During the hearing, the trial court rejected as unconvincing Alisha's evidenceconcerning the equipment and values listed on the financial statements. In its judgment, thetrial court awarded the custody of the two children to Alisha and ordered Matthew to pay$300 per month for child support. The court held that the 120 billable hours of Alisha'scounsel was unreasonable given the nature of the proceedings and the situation of theparties, and it denied Alisha's request for attorney fees. The court awarded Alisha the 1995Dodge Ram pickup truck, free of debt, and assigned Alisha all debts held in her name. Thecourt awarded Matthew all personal property in his possession, all farming equipment, themobile home, the Yukon truck, and the four-wheeler. The court assigned to Matthew hispersonal debt and the debt associated with the farm, the mobile home, and the Yukon truck.

On November 2, 2001, Alisha filed her timely notice of appeal.

Alisha argues that the trial court abused its discretion because its division of maritalassets was unjust, failed to account for Matthew's dissipation of assets, relied on Matthew'sinadmissible hearsay and self-serving, undocumented assertions, and failed to provide theparties with comparable opportunities for the future acquisition of capital assets and income. We disagree.

A trial court's distribution of marital property should not be reversed absent an abuseof the trial court's discretion, i.e., where no reasonable person could adopt the trial court'sposition. In re Marriage of Schmidt, 242 Ill. App. 3d 961, 966 (1993). The touchstone ofthe apportionment of marital property is whether the distribution is equitable in nature. Inre Marriage of Schmidt, 242 Ill. App. 3d at 966. Section 503(d) of the Illinois Marriage andDissolution of Marriage Act (Act) provides that marital property shall be divided in "justproportions" considering all relevant factors. 750 ILCS 5/503(d) (West 2000). "Justproportions" does not mean equal amounts, and the trial court is not obligated to makespecific findings as the reasons for its award. In re Marriage of Schmidt, 242 Ill. App. 3dat 966. We do not consider the fairness of the distribution of marital assets on a piecemealbasis but determine if the distribution as a whole is in just proportions. In re Marriage ofSteele, 212 Ill. App. 3d 425, 432 (1991).

The trial court awarded the following:

Assets Value Alisha Matthew

Matthew's personal property $ 1,075 $ 1,075

Alisha's personal property $ 975 (approx.) $ 975

Fifth Third Bank account $ 28,500 $ 28,500

First National Bank account $ 838 $ 838

First National Bank account $ 1,400 $ 1,400

1995 Dodge Ram pickup $ 10,300 $ 10,300

Farm equipment $ 83,000 (approx.) $ 83,000

Freightliner $ 13,500 to 14,000

row planter $ 36,000 to 36,500

conditioner $ 13,500 to 14,000

cultivator $ 11,000 to 12,000

auger $ 2,550 to 2,750

grain bin $ 6,450

Mobile home $ 9,500 $ 9,500

Yukon $ 20,400 $ 20,400

Four-wheeler $ 1,000 $ 1,000

TOTAL ASSETS $156,988 $ 12,675 $144,313

Liabilities

Farm debt, including equipment, $264,129.57 $264,129.57 

Monsanto balance,

operating expenses,

and $9,000 debt to Robert

1999 GMC Yukon truck $ 21,766.56 $ 21,766.56

Robert (repossess Yukon) $ 3,282 $ 3,282

Mobile home $ 5,022 $ 5,022

IRS $ 2,353 $ 2,353

TOTAL DEBT $296,553.13 $ 0 $296,553.13

TOTAL NET ASSETS $ 12,675 $(152,240.13)

Alisha asserts that the total value of Matthew's assets was greater than indicatedbecause it included farm equipment that Matthew undervalued or denied owning. Credibility is an issue for the trial court (Chicago Investment Corp. v. Dollins, 107 Ill. 2d120 (1985)), and the trial court did not err in relying on Matthew's purported values, inrejecting Alisha's purported values, or in determining that Matthew listed as collateral farmequipment owned solely by Robert.

Assuming Matthew dissipated assets in the asserted value of $4,000 (his attorneyfees), the trial court allocated Matthew great liability in comparison to Alisha. We do notconsider the fairness of the distribution of marital assets on a piecemeal basis but determineif the distribution as a whole is in just proportions. In re Marriage of Steele, 212 Ill. App.3d at 432. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to allocate additional fundsto Alisha for Matthew's dissipation of assets. See Head v. Head, 168 Ill. App. 3d 697, 702-03 (1988).

Even if we were to accept Alisha's asserted personal debts of $18,600, $3,600 ofwhich Alisha claimed as the use of her father's truck, the trial court did not abuse itsdiscretion in distributing the marital property, and Alisha's arguments are unavailing. Thetrial court's award was in "just proportions." See 750 ILCS 5/503(d) (West 2000).

Alisha argues that the trial court erred in failing to award to either party 1,175 acresof the 2001 growing crops. Alisha calculates the crops at a net value, after expenses, of$124,394.23, and Alisha requests this court to award her half of that value. We decline todo so.

Future income is a marital asset where the income derives from efforts or productsproduced during the marriage. In re Marriage of Heinze, 257 Ill. App. 3d 782, 785 (1994). Crops grown even on nonmarital property can be considered in determining marital incomeand marital property. In re Marriage of Mohr, 260 Ill. App. 3d 98, 103 (1994). Farmincome derives from the sale of crops, and the labor may precede the income by manymonths. In re Marriage of Mohr, 260 Ill. App. 3d at 104. In farming, the income-the yieldand the price-is uncertain and beyond control. In re Marriage of Mohr, 260 Ill. App. 3d at104.

The future income from the growing crops derived from Matthew's efforts during themarriage is marital property. In its judgment, the trial court did not allocate the futureincome of the growing crops. However, the trial court allocated the considerable farmingdebt to Matthew, including the debt incurred to produce the crops, and Matthew will incurthe debt to harvest the crops.

The value of the growing crops is speculative, as is the farming business. Alishavalues the crops at $124,394.23 and argues that awarding the entire future income from thegrowing crops to Matthew results in a greatly disproportionate award. However, Alisha'spurported value ignores the previous year's crop income of $13,122 and is thereforeuntenable. Further, even if Alisha's purported value was accepted and added entirely toMatthew's distribution award in the judgment, Matthew's net income after distributionremains in the negative while Alisha's remains in the positive. After Matthew is awardedthe entirety of the 2001 growing crop, the distribution remains equitable in nature and in justproportions. See 750 ILCS 5/503(d) (West 2000). Pursuant to our powers under SupremeCourt Rule 366(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 366(a)), we modify the trial court's order and award thefuture income from the 2001 growing crops to Matthew. See In re Marriage of Smith, 122Ill. App. 3d 213, 217 (1984) (farm debts and assets should remain in one person).

Alisha next argues that Matthew's persistent refusal to produce explicitdocumentation concerning the debt owed to Robert deprived her of the opportunity to checkthe accuracy of the claim and that, therefore, the trial court erred when it allowed Robert totestify concerning the debt. We disagree.

Under Supreme Court Rule 219(c) (166 Ill. 2d R. 219(c)), a trial court may bartestimony or other evidence if one party unreasonably refuses to comply with the relevantdiscovery rules, so long as the sanction imposed is just. Shelbyville Mutual Insurance Co.v. Sunbeam Leisure Products Co., 262 Ill. App. 3d 636, 641 (1994). "The decision ofwhether to impose sanctions pursuant to Rule 219(c) [citation] and, if so, the type ofsanction[] is largely within the sound discretion of the trial court, and that decision will notbe disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion." Shelbyville Mutual Insurance Co., 262 Ill.App. 3d at 641.

Alisha filed a pretrial motion to bar evidence of Matthew's debt to Robert on the basisof Matthew's discovery abuses. The trial court denied the motion, and at the hearing, Roberttestified that Matthew owed him $9,000 for 2000 crop expenses, and Robert provided ahandwritten list of items he had supplied to Matthew, along with quantities and values. Contrary to Alisha's assertion, the record reveals that Matthew did not act contumaciouslyin failing to disclose evidence prior to the hearing, and the trial court's refusal to bar theevidence was not an abuse of discretion.

Alisha asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding child supportbecause it failed to account for Matthew's parents' assistance, Matthew's standard of living,and Matthew's earning potential. We disagree.

The trial court may order a supporting parent to pay child support in an amount thatis reasonable and necessary for the child's well-being. 750 ILCS 5/505(a) (West 2000). Theaward of child support lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be setaside absent an abuse of that discretion, i.e., where no reasonable person would take theview adopted by the trial court. In re Marriage of Partney, 212 Ill. App. 3d 586, 590(1991). The factors to be considered in exercising that discretion are set forth in section505(a)(2) of the Act. 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(2) (West 2000). Generally, the Act guides the trialcourt to award 25% of the supporting party's net income to support two children. 750 ILCS5/505(a)(1) (West 2000). When the supporting parent's income fluctuates, the court mayreasonably average income for the previous three years to determine child support. In reMarriage of Nelson, 297 Ill. App. 3d 651, 655 (1998) (trial court properly averaged threeyears of farmer's income to determine income for purposes of child support).

In this case, the trial court had wide discretion to ensure that the needs of the minorchildren were met, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding child supportpayments of $300 per month. The parties' joint tax returns for 1998, 1999, and 2000revealed yearly total incomes of $9,141, $13,284, and $12,195, respectively. The averageincome for the three years was $11,540 per year, or $961.67 per month, 25% of whichequaled a child support payment of $240.42. The trial court was within its discretion inawarding child support payments of $300 per month.

Citing In re Marriage of Sweet, 316 Ill. App. 3d 101 (2000), Alisha contends thatMatthew's choice to farm, earning less than $15,000 per year, should not be at the expenseof the parties' children. Alisha asserts that because Matthew worked for Asplundh TreeService for three months in the summer of 1995 and because his health allows him to customcombine or custom spray for pay, he should be charged with greater income for purposes ofchild support.

In In re Marriage of Sweet, the trial court increased the respondent's child supportobligation, noting that the respondent entered an enterprise producing little income andeither misrepresented his income or willfully refused to support his children. In re Marriageof Sweet, 316 Ill. App. 3d at 107. The respondent became self-employed after the originaldissolution proceedings, made less each year after the divorce, and did not act in good faithwhen making the career change. In re Marriage of Sweet, 316 Ill. App. 3d at 107.

Unlike In re Marriage of Sweet, Matthew has supported his family by farmingthroughout the parties' marriage, and no evidence suggests he acted in bad faith whilecontinuing to farm. Matthew testified that he did not have the equipment to custom sprayand custom combine, and we dismiss Alisha's suggestion that because Matthew is in goodhealth, he should pursue employment with Alisha's employer to earn greater income.

Citing In re Marriage of Heil, 233 Ill. App. 3d 888 (1992), Alisha asserts thatRobert's assistance, paying for Matthew's mobile home, redeeming the Yukon truck, payingfor a vacation to Las Vegas, and allowing the use of his equipment at no cost, should beconsidered to increase Matthew's child support. We reject Alisha's argument concerning theredemption of the Yukon truck and the use of equipment because the record reveals thatMatthew's father expects payment for these items, and the trial court awarded liability forthese items to Matthew in its judgment.

In In re Marriage of Heil, to determine income for child support purposes, the trialcourt considered benefits, including a hunting lodge and the payment of taxes and insurancefor the hunting lodge, that the respondent received from his company. In re Marriage ofHeil, 233 Ill. App. 3d at 889. Unlike In re Marriage of Heil, however, Matthew's andRobert's farming entities are separate so that the gifts, including the vacation to Las Vegasand payment for the mobile home, derived from Robert personally. Alisha fails to citeauthority to support the proposition that gifts are to be considered when a court determinesnet income for child support purposes. See In re Marriage of Harmon, 210 Ill. App. 3d 92,95 (1991).

Alisha argues that the vast majority of her attorney's expenses were caused byMatthew's lack of cooperation and that the trial court incorrectly restricted Alisha's evidenceon this issue. We disagree.

Section 508 of the Act provides that the court, after considering the financialresources of the parties, may order either party to pay attorney fees. 750 ILCS 5/508 (West2000). An award of attorney fees in a dissolution proceeding rests in the sound discretionof the trial court, and we will reverse only for an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage ofHillebrand, 258 Ill. App. 3d 835, 841 (1994).

To justify an award of attorney fees, the party seeking such an allowance mustestablish an inability to pay those fees and the ability of the other spouse to do so. In reMarriage of Uphoff, 80 Ill. App. 3d 145, 147 (1980). Allowing attorney fees is neverautomatic, nor is it mandated simply upon a showing that one spouse has a slightly greaterability to pay the fees. In re Marriage Uphoff, 80 Ill. App. 3d at 147. The trial courtconsiders the circumstances of the judicial proceedings and the identity of the spouse whoprecipitated the need for the current legal fees. Roth v. Roth, 52 Ill. App. 3d 220, 228(1977). The trial court also considers the nature of the controversy, the complexity of theissues, and the significance of the subject matter. Green v. Green, 41 Ill. App. 3d 154(1976).

In 2000, Alisha's earned income was greater than Matthew's, and Matthew's financialcircumstances were not so much better than Alisha's that he should be required to payAlisha's attorney fees. Further, we agree with the trial court that the expenses incurred wereunreasonable considering the nature of the proceedings and the limited monetary resourcesof the parties. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to award Alishapayment for her attorney fees.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm as modified the judgment of the circuit court ofJackson County.

Affirmed as modified.

GOLDENHERSH and KUEHN, JJ., concur.

Opinion Filed: April 25, 2003

Justices: Honorable Terrence J. Hopkins, P.J.

Honorable Richard P. Goldenhersh, J., and

Honorable Clyde L. Kuehn, J.,

Concur

Attorney Joni Beth Taylor, 1004 Walnut Street, P.O. Box 243, Murphysboro, IL 62966

for

Appellant

Attorney John D. Foley, P.O. Box 567, Murphysboro, IL 62966

for

Appellee