Margareta E. Dafoe and Ronald A. Dafoe, Jr., were married on June 5, 1990. Theironly child, Nicholas, was born on May 19, 1991. The marriage was dissolved on January17, 1992, in cause No. 91-D-1349. At that time, both the mother and the father were activein the military, and the parties agreed that the mother would have sole custody of Nicholas. After the divorce, Nicholas and his mother lived in South Carolina for approximately fourmonths and then returned to Illinois and lived with the mother's parents, Nicholas'sgrandparents, John and Ursula Klapetzky. Except for a few brief periods in 1991 and 1992,Nicholas and his mother resided in Mascoutah with the grandparents. In January 1995 themother moved to Texas; however, Nicholas remained with the grandparents in Mascoutah. On February 17, 1995, the grandparents, with the written consent of the mother, wereappointed guardians of Nicholas in cause No. 95-P-15.

The father moved to upstate New York after he received his military discharge. Hehad little contact with Nicholas over the years and did not object to the grandparents beingappointed guardians. In fact, during Nicholas's first five years, the father barely sawNicholas. In 1992 the father only had Nicholas for a weekend. He did not see Nicholasagain until the spring of 1994. He next saw Nicholas in November 1996. On March 26,1997, the father filed a petition to modify custody and terminate guardianship. After that,he saw his son for two weeks in June 1997 and again at Christmas time in 1997. He marriedhis second wife on May 31, 1997, and they later had a son. The father's new wife wasinstrumental in the father's decision to seek custody and has been extremely supportive. Over the years, the father usually paid $300 per month in child support as originally agreedupon in the divorce decree. However, there were months when the payment was not madeor the checks bounced and had to be resubmitted for payment. The father failed to pay anyof Nicholas's medical bills even though he had agreed to do so as part of the dissolutionagreement.

The divorce case, No. 91-D-1349, and the guardianship case, No. 95-P-15, wereconsolidated on the father's motion. Discovery ensued in the matter. Both private and court-appointed mental health experts filed reports. After a three-day trial, the trial court enteredan order that stated in pertinent part as follows:

"B. That it was the burden of proof of the grandparents, JOHN and URSULAKLAPETZKY, to overcome the superior right of the natural parent, RONALDDAFOE, with regard to the custody of the minor child, NICHOLAS DAFOE.

C. That the factors the Court weighed most heavily in making its determinationherein were:

a) The minor child has for all, but a few months, of his life lived with the AdditionalRespondents, JOHN and URSULA KLAPETZKY, and has been integrated into astable, loving environment.

b) The minor child has special needs and difficulties, diagnosed in part as ADHD,which require a high degree of stability above and beyond normal parameters andwhich have been, and currently are better, met by the grandparents."

The trial court found that the grandparents overcame the presumption in favor of the fatherand met their burden of proof, and the court awarded sole custody to the grandparents. Thetrial court noted, inter alia, that it was in the best interest of Nicholas that his relationshipwith his mother and father continue to be as close as possible. The court, therefore, grantedthe mother visitation during the school year, as agreed upon with the grandparents, andgranted the father visitation, which included 10 weeks in the summer, as well as wheneverthe father is in the Mascoutah area, provided that he give the grandparents reasonabletelephone notice. Both the mother and the father were ordered to pay child support, and thegrandparents were ordered to maintain health insurance for Nicholas. Additional factsnecessary for an understanding of our determination herein will be discussed in the analysisportion of our opinion.

In this pro se appeal, the father asks us to reverse the award of custody to thegrandparents, to remand the matter to the trial court with directions to award custody to thefather, and to revise the visitation and financial components of the judgment. The father isadamant that the trial court applied the wrong burden of proof. The mother has not filed abrief, but she concurs with the brief filed by the grandparents and notes that she agrees withthe trial court's judgment granting custody to the grandparents. In this appeal, an order wasentered, on our own motion, granting the father 10 days to show cause why the reports ofproceedings that were filed out of time and without leave of court should not be stricken. The father has shown just cause, and therefore, we refuse to strike the reports ofproceedings, and we consider these reports as a part of the record below. The grandparentshave filed a motion to strike the argument section of the father's brief and a motion to strikethe statement of facts of the father's brief. This court ordered that these motions be takenwith the case. This court now denies both motions.

For the following reasons, we affirm.

The father cites to Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 147 L. Ed. 2d 49, 120 S. Ct. 2054(2000), in support of his proposition that a third-party nonparent, such as the grandparentsherein, must meet a "substantially heightened burden of proof" in order to be entitled to anaward of custody. The Troxel court pointed out that the due process clause "includes asubstantive component that 'provides heightened protection against government interferencewith certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.' " Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65, 147 L. Ed.2d at 56, 120 S. Ct. at 2059-60 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720, 138L. Ed. 2d 772, 787, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2267 (1997)). The father argues that Troxel "casts anew light upon the strength of the constitutional rights of a natural parent" and that, as a fitnatural parent, he was constitutionally entitled to custody.

The father also relies on Lulay v. Lulay, 193 Ill. 2d 455, 739 N.E.2d 521 (2000), inwhich the Illinois Supreme Court, relying on Troxel, found section 607(b)(1) of the IllinoisMarriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act) (750 ILCS 5/607(b)(1) (West 1998))unconstitutional as applied to the facts of that case. In Lulay, the parents were divorced andhad joint custody of their three minor children. The paternal grandmother filed a petitionpursuant to section 607(b)(1) of the Act, seeking visitation with her three grandchildren. Both parents agreed that they did not want the paternal grandmother to have visitation, andthey filed a motion to dismiss the petition. Lulay, 193 Ill. 2d at 458, 739 N.E.2d at 523. Oursupreme court agreed with the parents that section 607(b)(1), as applied to the facts of thecase, was an unconstitutional infringement on the parents' fundamental liberty interest inraising their children. Lulay, 193 Ill. 2d at 479-80, 739 N.E.2d at 534. The Lulay courtexplained as follows:

"[W]e cannot allow the state to use its power to impose its judgment that visitationmay be better for the grandchildren over the joint decision of two fit parents whohave determined that the visitation should not occur. The facts of this case do notwarrant the state's interference with the parents' joint decision regarding who mayhave visitation privileges with their children. To allow such interference wouldunconstitutionally infringe on the parents' well-established fundamental libertyinterest in making decisions regarding the upbringing of their children." 193 Ill. 2dat 479, 739 N.E.2d at 534.

Lulay did not address the issue of whether section 607(b)(1) of the Act was unconstitutionalon its face, but the court determined only that it was unconstitutional as applied to the factsof the case before it. Lulay was a fact-driven case and, in our estimation, has little relevanceto the instant case.

In fact, both Troxel and Lulay are inapplicable to the instant case because those casesconcerned grandparental visitation. Here, on the other hand, we are faced with a custodydispute between a natural parent (who, at the time of his divorce several years before, agreedthat he would only have limited visitation with his son), his ex-wife (who was given solecustody during the dissolution proceedings but later relinquished custody to her parents), andthe maternal grandparents (who virtually raised the child from the time he was four monthsold). We find that the father's reliance on Troxel and Lulay is misplaced.

We recognize that the right of a natural parent to maintain a relationship with his orher child is among the liberties protected through the due process clause of the fourteenthamendment (U.S. Const., amend. XIV). See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 31 L.Ed. 2d 551, 92 S. Ct. 1208 (1972). However, we disagree with the father's contention thatTroxel created a new, "substantially heightened burden of proof" in custody cases. Here iswhat the father fails to recognize: " 'Parental rights do not spring full-blown from thebiological connection between parent and child. They require relationships more enduring.'" (Emphasis omitted.) Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 260, 77 L. Ed. 2d 614, 103 S. Ct.2985, 2992 (1983) (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397, 60 L. Ed. 2d 297, 99S. Ct. 1760, 1770 (1979)).

In child custody disputes, there is a well-established presumption that the interest ofa natural parent in the care, custody, and control of their child is superior to the right orinterest claimed by a third person. In re Custody of Townsend, 86 Ill. 2d 502, 508, 427N.E.2d 1231, 1234 (1981). This presumption is, however, not absolute, but it serves as oneof several factors used by a court in determining the best interests of the child. In reAdoption of E.L., 315 Ill. App. 3d 137, 157-58, 733 N.E.2d 846, 862 (2000). It is importantto note that E.L. was decided by our colleagues in the First District after Troxel. While theFirst District specifically mentions Troxel (E.L., 315 Ill. App. 3d at 157, 733 N.E.2d at 862),it did not find that the burden of proof required in a custody case was in any way altered byTroxel. Certainly, there is a presumption in favor of the natural parent, but contrary to thefather's assertions herein, a court need not find that the natural parent is unfit or has forfeitedhis custodial rights before the court awards custody to a third person. Townsend, 86 Ill. 2dat 508, 427 N.E.2d at 1234. Instead, in order to retain custody of a child over the superiorright of the natural parent, a third party must demonstrate good cause or reason to overcomethe presumption that a parent has a superior right to custody, and the third party must alsoshow that it is in the child's best interests that the third party be awarded the care, custody,and control of the child. E.L., 315 Ill. App. 3d at 158, 733 N.E.2d at 862.

Child custody determinations rest largely within the broad discretion of a trial court,and the trial court's discretion will not be disturbed on appeal unless the award is contraryto the manifest weight of the evidence or unless the trial court is found to have abused itsdiscretion. E.L., 315 Ill. App. 3d at 157, 733 N.E.2d at 862. The result reached by the trialcourt in a child custody case is given great deference because it, rather than the reviewingcourt, is in a better position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and the needs of thechild. In re Lutgen, 177 Ill. App. 3d 954, 971, 532 N.E.2d 976, 986 (1988). In the instantcase, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion or that the award of custody tothe grandparents was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Here, the trial court correctly noted that the burden was on the grandparents todemonstrate good cause or reason to supersede the superior right of the father to the custodyof his son, Nicholas, and to show that it was in Nicholas's best interests that they retaincustody of him. The record provides more than adequate evidence to support the trial court'sdecision to award custody to the grandparents. For example, Dr. Cuneo, the court-appointedpsychologist who interviewed all the parties involved in this matter, opined that it would bein Nicholas's best interests if the grandparents retained guardianship and custody. Dr.Cuneo's opinion was "based upon the psychological functioning of each party, the ability ofeach party to provide for Nicholas' emotional and physical well[-]being, and Nicholas' ownwishes and needs."

The record reflects that Nicholas has special needs that must be addressed. Nicholassuffers from attention deficit disorder, for which he takes Ritalin. According to thegrandparents, they were aware early on that Nicholas was developmentally delayed andneeded special services. They started having Nicholas tested when he was approximately18 months old. The grandparents ensured that Nicholas received the necessary specialservices through a preintervention program offered by the local school district. Nicholas hasbeen enrolled in speech class, received special services for reading, and participated inoccupational therapy through the school district in order to improve his fine motor skills. The grandmother is extremely involved with Nicholas's school and teachers. She is nowemployed at Nicholas's school and does not work outside the hours Nicholas is in school.

The father, on the other hand, has not been involved in Nicholas's education andcannot accept the realities of his son's special needs. Dr. Cuneo reported on this matter asfollows:

"While Mr. Dafoe may love his son and now wants to care for him, he does not havea very good understanding of [Nicholas's] special needs. For example, when I askedhim about the programming for his son's special needs, he stated that Nicholas hasno problems physically and [he also stated:] 'Mentally-like challenged. He has noproblems. He needs to be challenged. He's a little bit faster than others.' When Iasked Mr. Dafoe specifically about his son's speech and language delays, heinsisted[:] 'No, he doesn't have them. He speaks like an adult. I feel he is aboveaverage. He picks up quick [sic].' Mr. Dafoe saw no need to have his son in specialclasses and stated he would end this immediately. He believes [that] whateverproblems his son may have are caused by the Klapetzkys overprotecting him andbabying him. His wife, Gina, also stated that she felt that Nicholas had no specialneeds other than[:] '[He] needs to learn to be a child more. He's too serious for aneight[-]year[-]old.' "

By the time the matter came to trial in the summer of 1999, the father and his new wife,Gina, were more willing to accept the fact that Nicholas has some special needs, and theydid take the time to explore what special services were available for Nicholas in their localschool district; however, it is clear from the record before us that the grandparents werebetter suited to act in Nicholas's best interests with regard to his education and medicalneeds.

The grandparents have cared for Nicholas virtually all of his life. Nicholas hasbonded with them and expressed his desire to stay with them. He has special needs that thegrandparents understand and are well-equipped to handle. While we applaud the father'sefforts to attempt to assume more of his parental responsibilities, we cannot ignore the factthat for the first several years of Nicholas's life, the father was content to let the grandparentsraise his son as he avoided the day-to-day responsibilities of being a parent. The biologicalbond between father and son simply does not overcome the actual, developed relationshipbetween Nicholas and his grandparents. The evidence in the instant case was sufficient torebut the presumption in favor of the father. Good reason exists to supersede the superiorright of the father to the custody of Nicholas.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in its entirety the judgment order of the circuitcourt of St. Clair County.

Affirmed.

CHAPMAN, P.J., and HOPKINS, J., concur.