JUSTICE CHAPMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

The Ramseys married in 1969 and divorced in 1989. Pursuant to John's request, thetrial court reserved jurisdiction to divide his pension upon his retirement. Neither the partiesnor the court contemplated then that John would be offered an early retirement incentivepackage. John retired in 2000 at the age of 55, taking advantage of early retirementincentives which required that both he and his employer make one-time monetarycontributions to the Teachers' Retirement System of the State of Illinois (TRS). Shortly afterJohn's retirement, Mary filed a motion seeking a qualified Illinois domestic relations order(QILDRO). The trial court granted Mary's motion. John appeals, arguing that the trial courterred by ordering him to pay to Mary a portion of his pension benefits attributable to hisnonmarital monetary contributions. We reverse in part.

John Ramsey and Mary Ramsey, now known as Mary Cornell, were married in June1969. Throughout the marriage, John was employed as a school teacher and participated inthe TRS pension plan. The circuit court in Massac County entered an order dissolving theRamseys' marriage in March 1989. Pursuant to that order, the court found the present valueof John's pension to be $35,000 and awarded it to John, with an offsetting award of othermarital property to Mary. On April 14, 1989, however, John filed a posttrial motion inwhich he requested that the court instead reserve jurisdiction to divide his pension upon hisretirement. The court entered an order granting John's motion on November 9, 1989. Thecourt ruled that the marital portion of the benefits actually paid was to be determined bymultiplying the amount in "each benefit check issued" by a fraction with a numerator of 234(the number of months John contributed to his retirement plan during the marriage) and adenominator of the total number of calendar months in which John contributed to the planduring his career. Mary would be entitled to half of this amount.

In 1998, the legislature created an early retirement incentive program for teachers. Without the early retirement incentives, the pension benefits of a teacher who chooses toretire prior to reaching age 60 or earning 34 years of credited service are reduced by 6% foreach year the teacher's age at retirement is below age 60 (the early retirement discount). Anearly retirement option allows a teacher with at least 20 years of service to retire at age 55;however, to avoid the early retirement deduction, both the teacher and his employer mustmake a one-time contribution to TRS as follows: the teacher must contribute 7% of hishighest annual salary multiplied by either the number of years until he reaches age 60 or thedifference between the number of years of service he actually has and 35, whichever numberis smaller, and the employer must contribute 20% of the teacher's highest salary multipliedby the number of years until he reaches age 60. See 40 ILCS 5/17-116.1(d) (West 1998).

A second early retirement incentive allows a teacher to augment his pension benefitsby making a one-time contribution called a 2.2 upgrade. This payment allows the teacherto receive 2.2% of his average salary (defined as the average of his salary during his fourhighest-paid years) multiplied by his total years of service. See 40 ILCS 5/17-116(b)(3), 17-119.1 (West 1998). Without the 2.2 upgrade, the pension would be calculated as (1) 1.67%of his average salary multiplied by the first 10 years of service, (2) 1.9% multiplied by thenext 10 years of service, (3) 2.1% multiplied by the third 10 years of service, and (4) 2.3%multiplied by the years of service in excess of 30. See 40 ILCS 5/17-116(b)(1) (West 1998).

John opted to take advantage of both the early retirement option and the 2.2 upgrade. On July 5, 2000, he made a one-time lump-sum payment of $7,397.46 for the earlyretirement option and a payment of $6,390.60 for the 2.2 upgrade. His employer, theCentury Unit No. 1 School District, made a one-time contribution of $35,226 for the earlyretirement plan on his behalf.

On June 29, 2000, John retired. He was 55 years old and had 32 years of creditedservice, including 31 years of actual service plus one year of unused sick leave and vacationpay. Because of the payments both he and his employer made to the fund, however, hereceived his full pension, without the early retirement discount, as augmented by the 2.2upgrade. The total pension John receives is $1,980 per month.

On August 2, 2000, Mary filed a motion to modify the dissolution judgment by theentry of a QILDRO directing TRS to pay her portion of John's pension directly to her. OnAugust 15, John filed a motion asking the court to determine the amount Mary was due.

On November 14, 2001, the trial court entered a QILDRO. The court found that Johnhad voluntarily enhanced his pension knowing that Mary was entitled to a fixed percentagethereof and that the amounts attributable to John's nonmarital monetary contributions couldnot be readily severed from the rest of the pension. The court found that the properdenominator for the fraction in the formula was 384 (31 years, or 372 months, of actualservice plus 1 year, or 12 months, of unused sick leave and vacation pay) and that, therefore,Mary was entitled to 30.47% of John's pension, or $603.31 per month. This appealfollowed.

Mary initially argues that this court lacks jurisdiction to hear John's appeal. We must,of course, dismiss an appeal if we find we lack jurisdiction. Hwang v. Tyler, 253 Ill. App.3d 43, 45, 625 N.E.2d 243, 245 (1993). We find, however, that Mary's contention is withoutmerit. She claims that John's notice of appeal does not ask for specific relief from theNovember 14, 2001, order because it states, "Defendant/Appellant prays that the Orderentered on November 28, 2000[,] [sic] be reversed ***." The notice of appeal also statesthat John "hereby appeals to [this court] from the Order entered on November 14, 2001, in[this] cause" and includes a copy of the November 14, 2001, order as an attachment. Marycites three cases for the proposition that an appellate court lacks jurisdiction to considerissues not specified in the notice of appeal (Atkinson v. Atkinson, 87 Ill. 2d 174, 177-78, 429N.E.2d 465, 466-67 (1981)) or appeals seeking relief from orders other than the orderspecified in the notice of appeal (Ferguson v. Riverside Medical Center, 111 Ill. 2d 436,441, 490 N.E.2d 1252, 1254 (1985); Place v. Improvement Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n,24 Ill. 2d 245, 247, 181 N.E.2d 94, 95 (1962)). We think that only the most contrivedreading of John's notice of appeal leads to the conclusion that the relief sought is from anorder other than the November 14 order, as specified in the notice. We conclude that noticeof appeal was effective and that we therefore have jurisdiction.

Because no factual determinations are at issue and the case presents only a questionof law, we review the trial court's ruling de novo. In re Marriage of Peters, 326 Ill. App. 3d364, 366, 760 N.E.2d 586, 588 (2001). We note that the parties agree this is the applicablestandard of review.

John argues that he purchased the early retirement option and the 2.2 upgrade withhis postdissolution earnings and that, therefore, Mary should not be entitled to any portionof his pension attributable to these early retirement incentives. He contends that the trialcourt should have (1) deducted the pension benefits attributable to the enhancements fromthe rest of the pension check prior to applying the formula to calculate Mary's share, (2)added 60 months to the denominator of the fraction in the formula, or (3) ordered Mary topay her proportionate share of the lump-sum contributions required to give John theenhancements.

Mary, by contrast, argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to do anything butmechanically apply the formula set out in its November 1989 order. Noting that John'sargument relies on the court's equitable power to prevent "unjust enrichment," Mary citesStrukoff v. Strukoff, 76 Ill. 2d 53, 389 N.E.2d 1170 (1979), in which our supreme courtstated, " '[Courts in dissolution cases] may exercise their powers within the limits of thejurisdiction conferred by the statute[;] the jurisdiction depends upon the grant of the statuteand not upon general equity powers.' " Strukoff, 76 Ill. 2d at 60, 389 N.E.2d at 1172-73(quoting McFarlin v. McFarlin, 384 Ill. 428, 431, 51 N.E.2d 520, 521 (1943)). We believethat Mary cites this language out of context. In Strukoff, the trial court that had dissolvedthe Strukoffs' marriage held the hearing with respect to the grounds for the dissolution in themorning and the hearing on the ancillary issues the same afternoon. Strukoff, 76 Ill. 2d at57, 389 N.E.2d at 1171. In so doing, the trial court violated section 403(e) of the IllinoisMarriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Dissolution Act), which at that time required aperiod of 48 hours between the two hearings, to allow the parties to settle their disputesamicably if possible. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 40, par. 403(e) (now see 750 ILCS 5/403(e)(West 2000)). The supreme court noted that a dissolution of marriage is an entirely statutorycreation (Strukoff, 76 Ill. 2d at 60, 389 N.E.2d at 1172) and that, therefore, the trial courtlacked authority to enter an order not in compliance with the statutory provisions of theDissolution Act (Strukoff, 76 Ill. 2d at 61-62, 389 N.E.2d at 1173).

We do not read Strukoff to prohibit trial courts from exercising equitable powersconsistent with the Dissolution Act. Indeed, as John points out, this court has held thatwhere no prior remedy exists, courts are empowered to create equitable remedies. In reMarriage of Tollison, 208 Ill. App. 3d 17, 20, 566 N.E.2d 852, 854 (1991) (a formerhusband who overpaid both maintenance and child support "cannot be denied relief simplybecause no procedural mechanism or current legal theory exists to undo the error"). Maryargues that In re Marriage of Tollison is distinguishable from the instant case because itinvolved child support, rather than a property division, and child support is something courtsalways have jurisdiction to modify. In re Marriage of Tollison involved both maintenanceand child support, however (In re Marriage of Tollison, 208 Ill. App. 3d at 20, 566 N.E.2dat 854), and the maintenance involved was for a limited time period that expired prior to thecourt discovering the overpayment (In re Marriage of Tollison, 208 Ill. App. 3d at 18-19,566 N.E.2d at 853). More importantly, this court did not base its holding on the trial court'scontinuing jurisdiction to determine child support issues but, rather, on its equitable powers. In re Marriage of Tollison, 208 Ill. App. 3d at 20, 566 N.E.2d at 854 ("The law is repletewith legal theories ***, the underlying principle of which is that one person should notprofit at the expense of another because of a wrong or a mistake.").

In the case at bar, the trial court retained jurisdiction to divide the pension accordingto a previously determined proportion. We note that the order left open the denominator ofthe fraction, to be determined upon the receipt of the pension benefits, as, indeed, it had todo. When the time came to divide the pension, the court was presented with variables itcould not possibly have foreseen in 1989 but which do impact the enforcement of the clearintent of the 1989 order. Although the order states that "each benefit check" is to be divided,it was contemplated that the pension itself would be divided. Indeed, the trial court lackedthe authority to divide anything other than the pension the parties owned at the time of theirdissolution even if some additional benefits are included in the checks. If the pensionenhancements are a separate and distinct benefit that came into existence after thedissolution, they are not a part of the pension to be divided regardless of the fact that theyare contained within one benefits check. See, e.g., Hannan v. Hannan, 761 So. 2d 700, 706(La. App. 2000) (finding enhancements to a pension to be an asset acquired after themarriage ended and therefore not subject to division along with the rest of the pension). Thus, we turn to the substance of John's contention that the pension enhancements are nota marital asset.

In general, marital assets are to be divided at the time of the dissolution. In reMarriage of Whiting, 179 Ill. App. 3d 187, 191, 534 N.E.2d 468, 470 (1989). Pension plansare often difficult to value because the amount of benefits that will actually be receiveddepends on future contingencies. The length of time the employee-spouse actually works,the salary he earns at the end of his career, and any changes to the terms of the pension plannecessarily impact the amount actually received. The pension involved in the case at barprovides an excellent example of the valuation problem. Although the trial court valuedJohn's pension in 1989 at $35,000, it heard conflicting opinions of the parties' expertwitnesses, whose valuations differed by 300%. It was precisely because of this valuationdifficulty that the trial court granted John's motion seeking a reserved-jurisdiction division.

Because of this difficulty, Illinois courts have developed two different methods ofdividing pensions. The first is the present-value method, whereby the court determines thepresent value of the pension plan, awards the entire pension to the employed party, andawards the other party enough other marital property to offset the pension award. In reMarriage of Hunt, 78 Ill. App. 3d 653, 663, 397 N.E.2d 511, 519 (1979). Often this methodis impractical either because of valuation difficulties or because the couple lacks sufficientreadily divisible assets to provide an offsetting property award. In re Marriage of Hunt, 78Ill. App. 3d at 663, 397 N.E.2d at 519.

The second method is the reserved-jurisdiction method. In this method, the trial courtreserves jurisdiction to divide the pension " 'if, as[,] and when' the pension becomespayable." In re Marriage of Hunt, 78 Ill. App. 3d at 663, 397 N.E.2d at 519. The courtdetermines the marital interest in the pension using a fraction, the numerator of which is thenumber of years or months that the employee-spouse contributed to the pension plan duringthe marriage and the denominator of which is the total number of years or months theemployee-spouse contributes to the plan. In re Marriage of Hunt, 78 Ill. App. 3d at 663, 397N.E.2d at 519. Once the employee-spouse begins to receive pension benefits, the amountactually received is multiplied by this fraction to determine the marital interest in eachpayment, which is then divided according to the property division determined at the time ofthe dissolution (in this case, 50% to each party). In re Marriage of Hunt, 78 Ill. App. 3d at663, 397 N.E.2d at 519.

For the most part, Illinois courts have rejected the argument that nonpensionerspouses are only entitled to an amount determined by applying the proportionality formulato the pension their former spouses would have received had they retired upon dissolutionrather than the pension they actually receive when they retire years after dissolution. Thebasis for this argument is that the pension received is ultimately determined by salaryincreases earned after the dissolution. See In re Marriage of Wisniewski, 286 Ill. App. 3d236, 244, 675 N.E.2d 1362, 1368 (1997); In re Marriage of Alshouse, 255 Ill. App. 3d 960,963, 627 N.E.2d 731, 733 (1994); In re Marriage of Whiting, 179 Ill. App. 3d at 191, 534N.E.2d at 470. We hasten to point out that John does not raise this argument. A review ofthe policy behind rejecting it, however, is helpful to understanding the character of theenhanced pension benefits here at issue.

By postponing the division of the pension until it is received, both parties share therisk that the employee-spouse will change jobs or die before retiring, which may reduce thepension substantially or forfeit the benefits completely. See In re Marriage of Hunt, 78 Ill.App. 3d at 664, 397 N.E.2d at 519. Given that the parties necessarily share these inherentrisks when the division of the pension is postponed, it is only equitable that they share in thebenefits of unforseen increases in the value of the pension as well. See In re Marriage ofWisniewski, 286 Ill. App. 3d at 246, 675 N.E.2d at 1370. Moreover, by postponing thereceipt of the funds, the nonemployee-spouse forgoes the benefits of having the asset at thetime of the dissolution. See In re Marriage of Wisniewski, 286 Ill. App. 3d at 246, 675N.E.2d at 1370 ("the salary in 1981 may be roughly equivalent to the salary in 1994""because the cost of living has increased"). Further, the higher-paid later years in anemployee's career would not be possible without the lower-paid earlier years during themarriage. See In re Marriage of Wisniewski, 286 Ill. App. 3d at 245, 675 N.E.2d at 1369;see also Berrington v. Berrington, 534 Pa. 393, 408-09, 633 A.2d 589, 597 (1993) (Cappy,J., dissenting) ("[T]he time and energy that participant spouse devoted to the job during themarriage and the work skills developed during that period ***, rather than increased effortsor work skills developed after marriage, are the most significant factors explaining increasedpost[]marital earnings ***.").

John contends that this court departed from these holdings in In re Marriage ofBlackston, 258 Ill. App. 3d 401, 630 N.E.2d 541 (1994). In re Marriage of Blackstoninvolved a direct appeal from a dissolution order that included a reservation of jurisdictionto divide the former husband's pension plan when he began drawing retirement benefits. Inre Marriage of Blackston, 258 Ill. App. 3d at 404, 630 N.E.2d at 544. This court merelyheld that the trial court had been presented with insufficient evidence from which it coulddetermine that such a method of division was the most appropriate one. In re Marriage ofBlackston, 258 Ill. App. 3d at 407-08, 630 N.E.2d at 546. Although the reserved-jurisdiction method is not the only acceptable way to value a pension, when it is used, theamount divided is the amount actually received. Helber v. Helber, 180 Ill. App. 3d 507,511, 536 N.E.2d 110, 112-13 (1989).

One reason that the division of benefits actually received based on the proportionalityrule is equitable is that the pension benefits generally grow larger the longer the spousecovered by the pension continues to work. However, as they do, the portion of the pensionto which the former spouse is entitled diminishes. Therefore, the former spouse is entitledto "a smaller percentage of a bigger pie." Stouffer v. Stouffer, 10 Haw. App. 267, 278, 867P.2d 226, 231 (1994). Early retirement incentives turn this assumption on its head. Although such incentives can vary dramatically in how they are accomplished, theyessentially allow employees to retire with full pension benefits without working all of theyears originally anticipated. For an early retiree like John, whose pension plan is subject todivision under a reservation of jurisdiction, the pie becomes larger without the piece towhich the former spouse is entitled becoming smaller.

Surprisingly few cases address the issue of early retirement incentives. Because weare aware of no Illinois cases directly on point, we must look to the decisions of otherjurisdictions for guidance, some of which follow community property law rather than maritalproperty law. Therefore, we first note that the two forms of marital law have evolved similarenough rules for the distribution of property to allow a comparison. In re Marriage of Hunt,78 Ill. App. 3d at 659, 397 N.E.2d at 516 (noting the similarities between Illinois's statutorydefinition of marital property and the concept of community property); see also In reMarriage of Lehman, 18 Cal. 4th 169, 184 n.7, 955 P.2d 451, 459 n.7, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 825,833 n.7 (1998).

The Court of Appeals of New York considered the issue of early retirementincentives in Olivo v. Olivo, 82 N.Y.2d 202, 624 N.E.2d 151, 604 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1993), aconsolidated appeal. There, two previously divorced Kodak employees opted to takeadvantage of an early retirement incentive plan that included, among other things, anenhanced pension benefit allowing the employees to receive 100% of the retirement benefitsfor which they would be eligible were they not to retire early. (The plan included additionalincentives not analogous to those offered to John in the instant case.) The incentives wereonly available to employees whose years of service with the company added to their agestotaled at least 75 years, and the incentives were financed entirely by Kodak. Olivo, 82N.Y.2d at 205, 624 N.E.2d at 153, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 25. Like the early retirement incentivesoffered to John, the incentives offered to the retirees in Olivo did not exist when theirmarriages were dissolved. Olivo, 82 N.Y.2d at 208, 624 N.E.2d at 154, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 26.

In holding that the former wives were entitled to the previously determined fractionalshares of the entire pensions, including the enhancements, the court explained: "By its verynature, a pension right jointly owned as marital property is subject to modification by futureactions of the employee. Should the employed spouse retire early, both parties receive asmaller benefit than they would have otherwise." Olivo, 82 N.Y.2d at 209, 624 N.E.2d at155, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 27. Likewise, the court explained, "[B]oth parties' rights are generallysubject to changes in the terms of a retirement plan, as well as to circumstances largelybeyond their control, such as the salary level finally achieved by the employee and used tocalculate the pension benefit." Olivo, 82 N.Y.2d at 209-10, 624 N.E.2d at 155, 604N.Y.S.2d at 27. Thus, the court found that the pension-enhancement component of the earlyretirement incentive package was "a modification of an asset[,] not the creation of a newone." Olivo, 82 N.Y.2d at 210, 624 N.E.2d at 155, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 27. Because theenhancement was merely a change in the terms of the Kodak retirement plan, it was subjectto division with the rest of the pension as previously determined.

A Hawaii appellate court followed Olivo in Stouffer, 10 Haw. App. at 280, 867 P.2dat 232. There, the parties' agreement to divide the husband's retirement benefits in agreed-upon proportions when received was incorporated into their divorce decree. Stouffer, 10Haw. App. at 270, 867 P.2d at 227. Subsequently, the husband's employer, BaxterHealthcare Corp., offered him an early retirement incentive package. Stouffer, 10 Haw. App.at 271, 867 P.2d at 228. The husband opted to accept the incentive offer and retire early. Stouffer, 10 Haw. App. at 272, 867 P.2d at 229. The early retirement incentive programenhanced his pension by adding five years to both his age and his credited years of service. Stouffer, 10 Haw. App. at 271, 867 P.2d at 228. The five years added to his age reduced theamount by which his pension was reduced due to an early retirement discount, and the fiveyears added to his credited service increased the dollar amount of the pension because it wascalculated based on years of service. Stouffer, 10 Haw. App. at 271, 867 P.2d at 228-29.

The court noted that Hawaii law calls for pension benefits to be divided upon receiptaccording to the same formula that Illinois law uses, a formula which "recognizes that eachyear of employment played an integral part in acquiring the right to the retirementpayments." Stouffer, 10 Haw. App. at 277, 867 P.2d at 231. The court held that the fact thatMr. Stouffer's retirement benefits were enhanced by an early retirement incentive did notchange this method of division. Stouffer, 10 Haw. App. at 278, 867 P.2d at 231.

Likewise, the California Supreme Court followed Olivo in In re Marriage of Lehman,18 Cal. 4th at 183-84, 955 P.2d at 459, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 833. There, the former husbandtook advantage of an early retirement incentive program offered by his employer, PacificGas and Electric Company (PG&E), which enhanced his retirement benefits both byremoving the early retirement discount and by crediting him with three additional years ofservice. In re Marriage of Lehman, 18 Cal. 4th at 175, 955 P.2d at 453, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d at827. The court found that once a former spouse owns an interest in a pension, she also ownsan interest in the retirement benefits as enhanced. In re Marriage of Lehman, 18 Cal. 4that 179, 955 P.2d at 456, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 830. This is so, the court reasoned, because theright to receive retirement benefits at all (earned, in part, during the marriage) underlies theright to the enhanced benefits. In re Marriage of Lehman, 18 Cal. 4th at 179-80, 955 P.2dat 456, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 830. Moreover, all the parties own at the dissolution is a right todraw retirement benefits from a "stream of income" that will begin to flow when thepensioner-spouse retires. In re Marriage of Lehman, 18 Cal. 4th at 177, 955 P.2d at 454,74 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 828. "The stream's volume at retirement may depend on various eventsor conditions after *** dissolution. [Citations.] Such events and conditions include ***changes in the retirement-benefit formula ***." In re Marriage of Lehman, 18 Cal. 4th at178, 955 P.2d at 455, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 829. In essence, the early retirement incentives atissue both there and here are changes in the way retirement benefits are calculated.

We find the reasoning of these three courts persuasive. We note, however, that theirconclusion is not universal. For example, a Louisiana court held that early retirementincentives much like those involved in In re Marriage of Lehman were the separate propertyof the spouse who acquired them. Hannan, 761 So. 2d at 706. The court treated the rightto receive the enhancements as separate and distinct from the right to receive the pensionitself. Thus, the court found that because the incentive package did not come into existenceuntil after the dissolution, the enhancements obtained as a result were the separate propertyof the pensioner. Hannan, 761 So. 2d at 706. The court also pointed out, "By virtue of herearly retirement, [the pensioner-spouse] agreed to forego continued job benefits andcompensation that would have been classified as separate property." Hannan, 761 So. 2dat 707. Although this is undoubtedly true, early retirement also provided her with theopportunity to seek new employment if she so desired-the compensation for which wouldbe classified as her separate property-or simply to enjoy free time earned sooner thanoriginally anticipated, an intangible benefit that would not accrue to her former husband. Moreover, the right to receive an early retirement incentive package necessarily dependsupon the right to receive the pension. The right to pension enhancements can have noexistence independent of the right to receive a pension. We therefore hold that, in general,to the extent pension benefits are a marital asset, they are a marital asset as enhanced.

The In re Marriage of Lehman court noted that there may be exceptions to the ruleit annunciated. Specifically, the court stated, "It is conceivable that, in a given case, anonemployee spouse who owns a community property interest in an employee spouse'sretirement benefits might not own a community property interest in the latter's retirementbenefits as enhanced, as perhaps where the right to the enhancement is not derivative." (Emphasis added.) In re Marriage of Lehman, 18 Cal. 4th at 180 n.2, 955 P.2d at 456 n.2,74 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 830 n.2. The early retirement incentive programs at issue in all of thecases we have discussed did not require the early retirees to do anything more than retireearly to qualify for the enhanced benefits at issue. The enhancements were, therefore,entirely derivative. In the instant case, by contrast, the enhancements were largely derivativeof the retirement benefits earned throughout John's career, but they were partially earned byJohn's monetary contributions to the TRS retirement fund, which were unquestionably madefrom nonmarital funds.

Mary essentially argues that the enhancements are entirely derivative and should,therefore, be apportioned between the parties the same way the nonenhanced portion ofJohn's benefits is apportioned. She cites In re Marriage of Hunt, 78 Ill. App. 3d at 661-62,397 N.E.2d at 518, for the proposition that monetary contributions to a pension plan haveno impact on the characterization of the benefits as marital or nonmarital. However, therationale underlying the In re Marriage of Hunt court's holding demonstrates the flaw inMary's position. The court quoted a Washington appellate court as follows:

" '[T]here is no distinction between a retirement plan financed throughemployee salary deduction[s] and one financed exclusively by the employer. If theemployee is married, the plan is financed and rights are being purchased either bycommunity funds or community labor.' " (Emphasis added.) In re Marriage of Hunt,78 Ill. App. 3d at 661, 397 N.E.2d at 518 (quoting DeRevere v. DeRevere, 5 Wash.App. 741, 745-46, 491 P.2d 249, 252 (1971)).

The contributions here at issue were one-time payments of substantial amounts ofmoney. We cannot say that a lump-sum payment of $13,788 by a teacher earning $35,226per year is de minimis. Unlike the employee contributions to the profit-sharing program atissue in In re Marriage of Hunt or the pension plan at issue in DeRevere, the cash paymentsat issue here were not paid by regular deductions from John's paychecks over time. Thepayments thus are not accounted for in the proportionality fraction. Therefore, we agreewith John that the November 2001 order gives Mary the benefit of his nonmaritalcontribution to the pension fund beyond that contemplated by the 1989 reservation ofjurisdiction. For the reasons that follow, however, we do not agree with his contentionsabout the extent to which Mary is overcompensated by the order.

John contends that the enhancements are entirely nonderivative. He points out thathad he not made the payments, he would not have received the enhanced benefits. Hecontends that the pension was enhanced by $256 per month because he opted for the 2.2upgrade (the $1,980 he actually receives minus the $1,724 he would have received withoutthe augmentation). Similarly, he contends that his benefits are enhanced $517.20 per monthby virtue of the early retirement option (representing a 30% deduction from his $1,724nonaugmented full pension). As a result, he contends, $773.20 per month is directly andsolely attributable to his nonmarital monetary contributions and not subject to division. Hadhe not made the payments and retired when he did, he would have received only $1,206.80per month.

The problem with John's argument is that his entitlement to the enhanced benefitsflows both from his entitlement to receive pension benefits in the first place and from thelump-sum contributions. For one thing, we seriously doubt that any investment of $13,788,standing alone, would lead to immediate annuity proceeds of $9,278.40 annually ($773.20per month). Had he not contributed to the plan through teaching for 31 years, he would notbe eligible for the enhancements no matter how much money he paid into TRS. Moreover, the amount by which the early retirement option and 2.2 upgrade increased his pension wasdetermined by the length of his service and the salary he ultimately obtained in a career thatwas worked 60% during the marriage. Therefore, although the pension was enhanced bythese payments, John's years of service both during and after the marriage were essential todetermining the amount. Even his eligibility to receive the enhanced benefits was earnedduring the marriage. Had John begun teaching after the dissolution, he would not have hadthe 20 years of service necessary for early retirement.

We can think of no principled way to detangle the portion of these enhancementsattributable to John's efforts during his career (60% of which was marital) from thatattributable to the lump-sum payments he made. Thus, we think the most rational andequitable way to do justice to both parties is to require Mary to pay her proportionate shareof the contributions necessary for John to qualify for the enhancements. Were we to holdthat John's monetary contribution was de minimis and that, therefore, Mary is not requiredto compensate him for her share of the enhancements, we think our holding woulddiscourage pensioners in John's position from electing to contribute to such enhancements. His decision to pay for the incentives is economically advantageous to both parties. On theother hand, were we to hold that the enhancements are entirely nonmarital and should besubtracted from the amount of "each benefit check" subject to division, Mary would bedeprived of a substantial portion of an asset earned in large part through her support duringthe marriage.

Nor do we think adding to the denominator of the proportionality fraction would yielda fair or accurate result. We note that the Stouffer court, in calculating the amount of Mr.Stouffer's pension to which Mrs. Stouffer was entitled, held that she was entitled to a portionof the total pension he actually received and that the denominator of the fraction in theformula was the total years credited to his retirement plan, including the five years added bythe early retirement incentive program. Stouffer, 10 Haw. App. at 279, 867 P.2d at 231-32. The In re Marriage of Lehman court, however, reached the opposite result. The courtexplained why it refused to credit the pensioner-spouse with the three additional years ofservice his employer added in calculating his benefits: "Such years are fictive-they have noindependent existence[] but are merely a means by which the employer effects theenhancement. *** Neither the community nor the employee spouse supplied the putativeservice credit ***. The employer did." (Emphasis omitted.) In re Marriage of Lehman, 18Cal. 4th at 188, 955 P.2d at 462, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 836.

At first blush, these cases would seem to provide support for John's suggestion thatthe denominator of the fraction used to determine the marital share of his pension should beincreased. Essentially, John could earn the enhanced benefits either by working for anadditional period of time or by making the contributions. Therefore, theoretically, it wouldmake sense to treat his contribution as the equivalent of working for the period of timenecessary to earn the same benefits without making the monetary contributions. Becausethe early retirement discount does not apply to teachers who retire before age 60 with 34years of creditable service (40 ILCS 5/17-116(c)(4) (West 1998)), that period of time is twoyears. Therefore, we think the monetary contributions theoretically bought John twoadditional years of service rather than five. Further, because the school district paid five-sixths of the monetary contribution that eliminated the early retirement penalty, just asPG&E provided Mr. Lehman's 3 years of putative service, we think John's contribution onlybought 4 additional months, the remaining 20 being bought by the school district'scontribution.

There is, however, a significant difference between the early retirement plans at issuein Stouffer and In re Marriage of Lehman and the one at issue in the case at bar: John'sretirement account was not credited with an additional two or five years. His benefits werecalculated based on 32 years of service, not 34 or 37. The enhancement was accomplished,much as the enhancement in Olivo, simply by removing the penalty for early retirement. Thus, the correlation between the amount of time added to the fraction's denominator andthe amount by which the pension benefits are enhanced is substantially less direct than inStouffer and In re Marriage of Lehman. We note that the Stouffer court did not add to thedenominator the five years added to Mr. Stouffer's age to reduce the early retirementdiscount. In short, John received no putative years of service to add to the denominator.

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that when an early retirement incentive enhancespension benefits, to the extent that such enhancements are derivative of the right to receive the pension as deferred compensation, the proportion of the enhancement that is maritalproperty is exactly the same as the proportion of the pension as a whole that is marital. Inthe unusual case where the entitlement to such enhancements is not purely derivative,however, that portion of the enhancement not derived from the right to receive the pensionitself is the pensioner's sole property. We note that because early retirement incentives comein a multitude of forms, the decision we reach concerning the most equitable method ofapportionment in the circumstances present in the case at bar may not be the most equitableor logical method in all cases where this problem arises. We therefore decline to hold thattrial courts must always apportion partially derivative pension enhancements throughrequiring reimbursements.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the order of the trial court. We remand withdirections to enter an order directing Mary to pay to John $4,201.22, representing her30.47% interest in the pension enhancements. The court may, in its discretion, order thepayments made in installments over a period of time as it deems just.

Reversed; cause remanded with directions.

HOPKINS, P.J., and DONOVAN, J., concur.

Opinion Filed: June 10, 2003

Justices: Honorable Melissa A. Chapman, J.

Honorable Terrence J. Hopkins, P.J., and

Honorable James K. Donovan, J.,

Concur

Attorney Richard Kruger, Kruger, Henry & Hunter, 110 West 5th Street,

for P.O. Box 568, Metropolis, IL 62960

Appellant

Attorney Joseph J. Neely, The Neely Law Firm, 1001 Market Street,

for P.O. Box 428, Metropolis, IL 62960

Appellee