Decision filed 01/30/03. The text of this decision may be changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for Rehearing or the disposition of the same. |
In re Michelle J., Alleged to be a Person | ) | Appeal from the Circuit Court |
Subject to Involuntary Admission | ) | of Madison County. |
) | ||
(The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner- | ) | No. 01-MH-158 |
Appellee v. Michelle J., Respondent- | ) | Honorable Ralph J. Mendelsohn, |
Appellant). | ) | Judge, presiding. |
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In re Sam S., Alleged to be a Person Subject to | ) | Appeal from the Circuit Court |
Involuntary Admission | ) | of Madison County. |
) | ||
(The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner- | ) | No. 97-MH-49 |
Appellee v. Sam S., Respondent-Appellant). | ) | Honorable Ralph J. Mendelsohn, |
) | Judge, presiding. |
PRESIDING JUSTICE HOPKINS delivered the opinion of the court:
On August 23, 2001, Michelle J. and Sam S. (collectively respondents) were personsfound to be subject to involuntary admission at Alton Mental Health Center. At the hearingsfor involuntary admission, the expert witnesses for the State testified that neither of themwere able to interview respondents prior to the hearing and that their opinion testimonyrelied upon observations of respondents, a review of respondents' charts and records, priorknowledge of respondents, and discussions with hospital staff who regularly interacted withrespondents. Both Michelle J. and Sam S. appeal the orders finding them subject toinvoluntary admission. They contend that the experts' testimony did not conform withsection 3-807 of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Code) (405 ILCS5/3-807 (West 2000)). Respondents claim that because section 3-807 requires a psychiatrist,clinical social worker, or clinical psychologist to "examine" a respondent and because theexperts did not interview respondents, the requirement of section 3-807 was not met and thecourt's orders must be reversed. We affirm.
Dr. Lenora Brown, a licensed clinical psychologist employed at Alton Mental HealthCenter, testified that she knew Michelle J. and had been a consultant to Michelle J.'streatment team. Dr. Brown stated that she observed Michelle J. on August 20, 2001, the dayof her admission to Alton Mental Health Center. Additionally, Dr. Brown attempted tointerview Michelle J. on August 22, 2001, for the purpose of Michelle J.'s hearing forinvoluntary admission. On August 22, before conducting the interview, Dr. Brownattempted to advise Michelle J. of her rights, but Michelle J. could not respond, so Dr.Brown discontinued the interview. Dr. Brown stated that because of Michelle J.'sdeteriorated clinical condition, Dr. Brown did not believe that Michelle J. could make aninformed decision concerning her rights. However, Dr. Brown stated that she had reviewedMichelle J.'s chart and records and talked with staff about Michelle J.'s condition andbehavior.
Dr. Brown testified that Michelle J. has a diagnosis of schizophrenia, paranoid type. Dr. Brown stated that Michelle J. has had prior admissions to Alton Mental Health Center,the last one being in August 2000. Michelle J. has also had multiple mental healthadmissions to St. Mary's Hospital, the most recent being July 2001. Dr. Brown reported thatat the time of Michelle J.'s admission to Alton Mental Health Center on August 20, MichelleJ.'s sister, with whom Michelle J. lives, reported that Michelle J. had inserted a metal pipeinto her vagina and stated that she wanted to kill herself. When Michelle J. was admittedto Alton Mental Health Center, she was unkempt, disoriented, and suspicious. Michelle J.was talking to herself and laughing inappropriately. When Michelle J. was at the emergencyroom of the hospital, she was restless, wandering in and out of the room. Michelle J. wasalso somewhat hostile and had an occasional temper outburst. Dr. Brown was aware thatMichelle J. suffered from postpartum depression following the recent birth of her child.
Dr. Brown also testified that Michelle J. hears voices, has paranoid ideations,demonstrates an unstable mood, and is anxious and agitated. Michelle J. also paces andmakes bizarre gestures. On the day of Michelle J.'s admission to Alton Mental HealthCenter, Michelle J. was given "stat medication" and was placed in restraints for self-injurious behavior. On August 21, 2001, Michelle J. complained of insomnia and of snakesin her bed. It was Dr. Brown's opinion that Michelle J. is in need of involuntary admissionto Alton Mental Health Center because Michelle J. is a danger to herself.
Michelle J. also testified at the hearing. Michelle J. stated that she is 19 years old andthat she lives with her sister and her father. Michelle J. also stated that her sister and herfather make sure she takes her medication, although Michelle J. was not sure whatmedications she takes. Michelle J. stated that she takes medications for her "nerves" and forher emotions when she becomes "moody like this." Michelle J. admitted that she sometimeshears voices and that she sometimes sees things that other people do not see.
Michelle J. stated that she has two children who are "with the State" until she can getherself together. Michelle J. also stated that she is going crazy because she is afraid she willnever see her baby.
At Sam S.'s hearing for involuntary admission, Sam S.'s attorney presented Sam S.'ssigned waiver of his presence at the hearing. Although Sam S.'s hearing was held at AltonMental Health Center, Sam S. had recently been transferred to Chester Mental HealthCenter. Sam S.'s attorney stated that it was his opinion that Sam S.'s current state is such thatSam S.'s presence at the hearing would cause Sam S. severe emotional harm. The courtaccepted the waiver of Sam S.'s presence and indicated that Sam S.'s hearing on August 23was for a 180-day review.
Dr. Debra Ferguson, the chief psychologist at Alton Mental Health Center, testifiedthat she is not directly involved with Sam S.'s treatment but that she had reviewed Sam S.'sprogress notes and that she is familiar with the "significant features of his treatment." Dr.Ferguson also testified that she had reviewed Sam S.'s chart and records and that she hadtalked to staff concerning Sam S.'s condition and behavior. Dr. Ferguson attempted to meetwith Sam S. for the purpose of interviewing him for his upcoming hearing for involuntaryadmission, but she was unable to interview him because Sam S. was in restraints at the time.
Dr. Ferguson stated that Sam S. has been continuously admitted at Alton MentalHealth Center since 1995. Sam S. has been an involuntary admission since 1997. At thetime of Sam S.'s initial involuntary admission in 1997, Sam S.'s clinical condition haddeteriorated significantly, and Sam S. was actively psychotic and delusional. Dr. Fergusonstated that Sam S.'s diagnosis is "schizophrenia paranoid type continuous."
Dr. Ferguson testified that Sam S.'s behavior had recently become increasinglyaggressive. Dr. Ferguson's review of Sam S.'s records from Chester Mental Health Centerestablished that Sam S. continues to be actively psychotic and threatening to others and thatthese behaviors had required Sam S. to be in full restraints or in seclusion for a period of 10days. Dr. Ferguson opined that Sam S. presents a substantial danger to others, as evidencedby his violent and aggressive acting-out behavior, while Sam S. is unable to take care of hisown basic medical needs.
Sam S.'s records indicate that Sam S. is diabetic and mentally ill but that he deniesboth maladies. Sam S. refuses to take insulin for his diabetes and refuses to take medicationfor his mental illness. Additionally, the most recent petition for involuntary admission filedin Sam S.'s case indicates that Sam S. is very paranoid and delusional and that Sam S.attacked another patient on July 21, 2001, while the patient slept, causing a total loss of thepatient's right eye. It was also reported in the certificates of need attached to the petition forSam S.'s involuntary admission that Sam S. is unable to sleep at night because he is afraidsomeone might attack him.
The court determined from the records and the testimony at respondents' hearings thatboth were in need of mental health treatment and were subject to involuntary admission, andit ordered that they be hospitalized in the Department of Human Services.
As noted previously, respondents were found subject to involuntary admission onAugust 23, 2001, and both have appealed their orders. Counsel for respondents moved toconsolidate their cases because both cases raise the same issue-that the requirement ofsection 3-807 (that an expert who testifies at a hearing for involuntary admission must"examine" a respondent before the hearing) was not met because the experts did not "interview" either respondent. This court granted the motion to consolidate. Essentially,respondents claim that an examination of a respondent by an expert, as contemplated bysection 3-807 of the Code, means a one-on-one interview with the respondent. Respondentscite to In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d 482 (1998), to support their claim.
Section 3-807 states as follows:
"No respondent may be found subject to involuntary admission unless at leastone psychiatrist, clinical social worker, or clinical psychologist who has examinedhim testifies in person at the hearing. The respondent may waive the requirement ofthe testimony subject to the approval of the court." 405 ILCS 5/3-807 (West 2000).
Based on this language, respondents contend that "examine" means an interview with therespondent.
Mental health proceedings are for the benefit of both the public and the patient. Inre Collins, 102 Ill. App. 3d 138 (1981). For an involuntary admission of a respondent, theState must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the person is in need of mentaltreatment and that the person is reasonably expected to harm herself or others. In re Dukes,57 Ill. App. 3d 618 (1978). A doctor who testifies at a respondent's hearing for involuntaryadmission can base his or her testimony upon observations of a respondent's condition. SeeIn re Dukes, 57 Ill. App. 3d at 620; In re Whitehouse, 56 Ill. App. 3d 245, 249 (1977). InIn re Pritchett, 148 Ill. App. 3d 746 (1986), the reviewing court did not find the expert'sopinion invalidated because there was no communication between the doctor and therespondent, but the court instead found that the doctor's opinion, which was based upon thedoctor's examination of letters written by the respondent, other medical staff's observationsrecorded in the respondent's charts, petitions signed by residents in the community wherethe respondent lived, and a consultation with another physician, was sufficient for the courtto find the respondent subject to involuntary admission. In re Pritchett, 148 Ill. App. 3d at750.
Based on the foregoing authorities, we find that an examination of a respondent, ascontemplated in section 3-807, is not limited to an interview of the respondent. Anexamination can include the expert's observations of the respondent, a review of therespondent's charts and records, a consultation with others involved in the day-to-day careof the respondent, and whenever possible an interview with the respondent. While it ishighly desirous that an expert interview a respondent prior to a hearing for involuntaryadmission, a respondent's mental illness does not always permit an interview. Where, ashere, the expert's testimony, combined with the other evidence, clearly and convincinglyestablished that Michelle J. and Sam S. were persons in need of mental treatment and weresubject to involuntary admission, we do not find that an expert's interview with a respondentis absolutely required by section 3-807 of the Code, where the experts examine therespondent's medical records and talk to workers intimately involved with the respondent'sday-to-day behaviors and conditions. Our decision is influenced by the fact that the expertsin these cases attempted to interview respondents but were unsuccessful due to respondent'simpaired conditions. These experts did examine respondents and found them in suchpsychiatric conditions that verbal interrogation was impossible and that respondents lackedthe capacity to consent to the verbal interrogations.
We find that respondents' cases are inapposite to the case relied on by respondents,In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d 482. In In re Barbara H., the Illinois Supreme Courtdetermined that "[Barbara H.'s] primary argument *** was that section 3-806 of the ***Code (405 ILCS 5/3-806 (West 1996)), which allowed the public defender to waive herpresence at the August 2 hearing, was unconstitutional." In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d at488. The court held that there was no showing that the public defender who had purportedto act on Barbara H.'s behalf had such authority, and it reversed the findings of the trial courtbecause the requirements of the Code regarding such waivers of a respondent's right to bepresent were not satisfied. In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d at 488. In dicta, the court furtherstated that Barbara H.'s hearing for involuntary admission was defective because the State's"entire case was predicated on the testimony of a physician who had not personallyexamined her." In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d at 497. "Although the doctor had treatedBarbara H. in the past, he admitted on direct examination that he had not had an opportunityto perform a psychiatric examination on her in connection with this case and her presentsituation." (Emphasis added.) In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d at 497. From the supremecourt's statement, it is unclear what the doctor actually testified to at the hearing or if he evenattempted to talk to the respondent. In comparison, both of the experts in respondents' casesattempted to interview respondents, but because of respondents' mental illnesses, the expertswere not able to conduct a successful interview. This differs from In re Barbara H.
It is also noteworthy that in respondents' cases, counsel does not contend that theywere not found subject to involuntary admission by clear and convincing evidence. Theysimply contend that the language of section 3-807 mandates an examination in order for aninvoluntary admission to occur. We find that the trial court's orders finding respondents subject to involuntary admission were based on clear and convincing evidence and that therequirement of section 3-807 of the Code has been met.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the circuit court of Madison Countyconcerning respondents are affirmed.
Affirmed.
MAAG and WELCH, JJ., concur.
In re Michelle J., Alleged to be a Person | ) | Appeal from the Circuit Court |
Subject to Involuntary Admission | ) | of Madison County. |
) | ||
(The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner- | ) | No. 01-MH-158 |
Appellee v. Michelle J., Respondent- | ) | Honorable Ralph J. Mendelsohn, |
Appellant). | ) | Judge, presiding. |
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In re Sam S., Alleged to be a Person Subject to | ) | Appeal from the Circuit Court |
Involuntary Admission | ) | of Madison County. |
) | ||
(The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner- | ) | No. 97-MH-49 |
Appellee v. Sam S., Respondent-Appellant). | ) | Honorable Ralph J. Mendelsohn, |
) | Judge, presiding. |
Opinion Filed: January 30, 2003
Justices: Honorable Terrence J. Hopkins, P.J.
Honorable Gordon E. Maag, J., and
Honorable Thomas M. Welch, J.,
Concur
Attorneys Jeff M. Plesko, Director, Anthony E. Rothert, Staff Attorney, Legal Advocacy
for Service, Guardianship and Advocacy Commission, Metro East Regional Office,
Appellant 4500 College Avenue, Suite 100, Alton, IL 62002
Attorneys Hon. William Haine, State's Attorney, Madison County, 157 North Main,
for Edwardsville, IL 62025; Norbert J. Goetten, Director, Stephen E. Norris, Deputy
Appellee Director, Kevin D. Sweeney, Staff Attorney, Office of the State's Attorneys
Appellate Prosecutor, Route 15 East, P.O. Box 2249, Mt. Vernon, IL 62864