Rule 23 order filed
June 12, 2003;
Motion to publish granted
August 5, 2003.

JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH delivered the opinion of the court:

The respondent, Nancy A., appeals from an order of the circuit court of MadisonCounty that found her to be a person subject to involuntary admission pursuant to a petitionunder the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (the Code) (405 ILCS 5/1-100 et seq. (West 2000)) and committed her to the Alton Mental Health Center (Alton). Therespondent contends that certain procedural defects require a reversal of the trial court'sorder, including (1) the State's failure to provide notice to the respondent of the involuntarycommitment proceedings within 12 hours of her admission as required by section 3-609 ofthe Code (405 ILCS 5/3-609 (West 2000)) and (2) the State's failure to file the petition andpaperwork within 24 hours of the respondent's admission to Alton as required by section3-611 of the Code (405 ILCS 5/3-611 (West 2000)). The respondent also raises the issueof whether the petition for involuntary admission should have been barred under the doctrineof res judicata. These contentions present disputed questions of law that we review de novo. See In re Jones, 318 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 1025, 743 N.E.2d 1090, 1092 (2001). Because weconclude that the State's noncompliance with the statutorily prescribed involuntarycommitment procedures renders the circuit court's judgment erroneous, we reverse.

On April 12, 2002, a petition seeking the involuntary admission of the respondentpursuant to section 3-600 of the Code (405 ILCS 5/3-600 (West 2000)) was apparently filedin Madison County and docketed as cause No. 02-MH-32. This petition alleged that therespondent had been admitted to Alton on April 8, 2002, at 1:40 p.m. The record on appealdoes not contain this first petition; however, it does contain a motion to dismiss the firstpetition. The motion to dismiss was filed by the respondent on April 16, 2002. In thatmotion to dismiss, the respondent claimed that the April 12, 2002, petition should bedismissed because it had not been served within the time limits contained in the Code, beingserved on the respondent 11 hours too late and being filed with the court 34 hours too late. See 405 ILCS 5/3-609, 3-611 (West 2000). On April 18, 2002, the respondent's motion todismiss was called for a hearing before the trial court. There is no transcript of that hearingin the record on appeal. The record does contain an order dated April 18, 2002, signed bythe trial judge dismissing the April 12, 2002, petition for involuntary admission in cause No.02-MH-32. The State did not file an appeal from this order.

After the first petition was dismissed, the respondent was not discharged nor did sheremain voluntarily at Alton. Instead, she was named in a new emergency petition that wasprepared and filed the same day that the first petition was dismissed. This April 18, 2002,petition also sought the involuntary admission of the respondent pursuant to section 3-600of the Code (405 ILCS 5/3-600 (West 2000)) and was docketed as cause No. 02-MH-37. It is this second petition that is the subject of this appeal. On April 19, 2002, the dayfollowing the filing of the second petition, the State's Attorney filed a motion to continue. This motion advised the court that the respondent had been admitted to Alton on April 18,2002, rather than April 8, 2002. On April 23, 2002, the circuit court allowed the State'smotion to continue the case to April 25, 2002.

On April 25, 2002, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss the second petition. Priorto hearing evidence on the petition, the court heard the respondent's motion to dismiss thepetition based on the State's failure to file the petition within 24 hours of the respondent'sentry to the mental health facility. After argument, the motion to dismiss the second petitionfor involuntary admission was denied. The matter then proceeded to an immediate hearingon the petition for involuntary admission. The respondent refused to attend the hearing, andher attorney waived her presence. The only witness to testify was Dr. Daolong Zhang, apsychiatrist at Alton. He testified that the respondent suffered from schizophreniaaccompanied by paranoia and delusions. Dr. Zhang testified that when the respondent cameto Alton, she was dirty, disheveled, and homeless. She erroneously believed that she couldreturn to an apartment from which she had been evicted for the nonpayment of rent. Shealso had the delusional belief that she owned the apartment. Dr. Zhang testified that therespondent suffered from hypertension and refused to take any medication for her mentalor physical condition. He testified that her mental condition caused her to be violent andaggressive and that on April 8, 2002, the respondent had threatened violence against variousstaff members at Alton. In Dr. Zhang's opinion the respondent was dangerous to herself andothers. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial judge found the respondent subject toinvoluntary admission and ordered her hospitalized in the Department of Human Services. On May 6, 2002, the respondent filed a motion to reconsider.

On May 2, 2002, the State filed a petition naming the respondent for the involuntaryadministration of psychotropic medication pursuant to section 2-107.1 of the Code (405ILCS 5/2-107.1 (West 2000)). This petition was set for a hearing on May 9, 2002. On May8, 2002, the State moved to continue the hearing. The trial court continued the hearing onthe petition for involuntary admission of psychotropic medication, as well as the hearing onthe respondent's motion to reconsider the involuntary admission order, to May 16, 2002. The May 16, 2002, proceedings were conducted before a different judge, and as a result therespondent's motion to reconsider was not considered until June 27, 2002, at which point itwas denied. The respondent thereafter filed a timely notice of appeal on July 12, 2002. TheIllinois Guardianship and Advocacy Commission was appointed to represent the respondenton appeal.

Before we address the respondent's claims, we must first consider whether this appealis moot. The State argues that an appeal from an involuntary commitment order may bedismissed as moot when a respondent who has been previously committed on an involuntarybasis subsequently applies for voluntary admission. As authority for this argument, the Statecites In re Wathan, 104 Ill. App. 3d 64, 432 N.E.2d 670 (1982).

Generally, the mootness doctrine does not apply to mental health cases. In reBarbara H., 183 Ill. 2d 482, 702 N.E.2d 555 (1998); In re Garcia, 59 Ill. App. 3d 500, 375N.E.2d 557 (1978). However, in In re Wathan the appellate court held that the mootnessdoctrine should be applied. In that case the respondent was found to be subject toinvoluntary admission and was ordered hospitalized. Two months later a second petitionfor involuntary admission was filed. After a hearing, the respondent was again found to besubject to involuntary admission and was again ordered hospitalized. It was from the secondorder of involuntary admission that the respondent appealed. The appellate court found themootness doctrine applicable. The court reasoned that since the first commitment had notbeen appealed, there could be no collateral consequences emanating from the respondent'ssecond involuntary admission. In re Wathan, 104 Ill. App. 3d at 66, 432 N.E.2d at 672; Inre Meek, 131 Ill. App. 3d 742, 476 N.E.2d 65 (1985).

In the instant case, the record suggests that the respondent had been admitted fivetimes prior to the admission now being contested. Under In re Wathan, if those prioradmissions had been involuntary, the mootness doctrine might apply. Under In re Meek, ifthose prior admissions had been voluntary, the mootness doctrine would not apply. Therecord in this case does not indicate whether the prior admissions were voluntary orinvoluntary. In any event, we will not dismiss this appeal as moot. When reviewing mentalhealth cases, courts have traditionally applied an exception to the mootness doctrine. In reMarquardt, 100 Ill. App. 3d 741, 743, 427 N.E.2d 411, 413 (1981). This is becausereviewing such orders allows a body of case law to develop that can provide guidance to thecircuit court when it is faced with similar or identical issues. In re Marquardt, 100 Ill. App.3d at 744, 427 N.E.2d at 413. The exception to the mootness doctrine has been appliedwhere the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to itscessation and where there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party wouldbe subjected to the same action again. In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d at 491, 702 N.E.2d at559. Both of these factors are present in the instant case. Because the challenged order hasalready expired and there is a reasonable expectation that the respondent will be subjectedto the same action again, we shall apply the exception to the mootness doctrine. See In reBarbara H., 183 Ill. 2d at 491, 702 N.E.2d at 559. Although the State contends that thiscase is different because the respondent signed a voluntary admission form subsequent tothe involuntary commitment order at issue in this appeal, suffice it to say that we shalladdress the issues raised by the respondent on appeal.

We turn now to the respondent's contentions on appeal. The respondent initiallycontends that the trial court should have dismissed the current petition on the basis of resjudicata. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 273; DeLuna v. Treister, 185 Ill. 2d 565, 573, 708 N.E.2d 340,344 (1999). The State responds that there had been no adjudication on the merits of theprevious petition and that there is no identity of causes of action for the petitions. SeePeople v. Valentine, 201 Ill. App. 3d 10, 12, 558 N.E.2d 807, 809 (1990). Although therecord is not clear, we find that the dismissal of the first petition in this case was withoutprejudice. Accordingly, further discussion of this issue is not necessary. See ForestPreserve District of Will County v. Vanderlaan, 226 Ill. App. 3d 692, 695, 589 N.E.2d 599,601 (1992); Norris v. Estate of Norris, 143 Ill. App. 3d 741, 748, 493 N.E.2d 121, 126(1986). From the confusing state of the record it appears that at the same time the courtdismissed the first petition, it was entertaining a new petition for involuntary admission filedin the same proceeding in which the prior petition had been dismissed.

This does not mean that the petition for involuntary admission filed in this case wasvalid. The respondent argues that the circuit court's order granting the petition forinvoluntary admission must be reversed because the State failed to comply with the noticeand filing requirements set forth in section 3-611 of the Code (405 ILCS 5/3-611 (West2000)). Section 3-611 provides as follows:

"Within 24 hours, excluding Saturdays, Sundays[,] and holidays, after therespondent's admission under this [a]rticle, the facility director of the facility shallfile 2 copies of the petition, the first certificate, and proof of service of the petitionand statement of rights upon the respondent with the court in the county in which thefacility is located. Upon completion of the second certificate, the facility directorshall promptly file it with the court." (Emphasis added.) 405 ILCS 5/3-611 (West2000).

The failure to timely file the petition is an error that cannot be waived or consideredharmless. In re Demir, 322 Ill. App. 3d 989, 994, 751 N.E.2d 616, 620 (2001); In re Stone,249 Ill. App. 3d 861, 865-66, 619 N.E.2d 1345, 1347-48 (1993). Section 3-611 of the Codecreates a bright-line test with which the facility director must strictly comply. Sassali v.DeFauw, 297 Ill. App. 3d 50, 53, 696 N.E.2d 1217, 1219 (1998). This section requires thatthe petition must be filed and notice must be given to a detainee within 24 hours of anadmission for any petition filed under article VI of the Code (405 ILCS 5/3-600 through 3-611 (West 2000)). A failure to comply with the notice and filing requirements justifies adismissal of a petition. In re Demir, 322 Ill. App. 3d 989, 994, 751 N.E.2d 616, 620 (2001). The State contends that when the first petition in this case was dismissed forprocedural reasons, the statutory time limits set forth in section 3-611 of the Code (405 ILCS5/3-611 (West 2000)) for notice, filing, and service of a subsequent petition did not beginto run until the previous petition was dismissed. In other words the State maintains that anew clock for purposes of section 3-611 began to run when the first petition was dismissedand the second petition was filed. Continuing, the State concludes this holds true eventhough the respondent was never discharged in this case, inferring that the respondent's dateand time of admission changed after the first petition was dismissed. The respondentmaintains that she was never discharged and that therefore the time and date of heradmission (April 8, 2002) remained unchanged. Since she was not discharged after thedismissal of the first petition, the respondent contends that the time during which the Statecould comply with sections 3-609 and 3-611 of the Code also remained unchanged and thatthe time did not start over.

To support its position, the State relies primarily upon three opinions, In re Shaw, 153Ill. App. 3d 939, 506 N.E.2d 456 (1987), In re Clark, 220 Ill. App. 3d 1024, 581 N.E.2d 408(1991), and People v. Read, 228 Ill. App. 3d 664, 592 N.E.2d 1178 (1992) (Goldenhersh,P.J., dissenting). In Read, an initial petition for involuntary admission was dismissedbecause the respondent had not been examined within 24 hours of the admission. A secondpetition was executed the same day as the order of dismissal and filed the next day. Therespondent was involuntarily admitted on the second petition. On appeal, the respondentargued that the order of involuntary admission was void because he had not been physicallyreleased from the facility after the first petition. Rejecting the respondent's claim, the courtdescribed the factual basis for the ruling as follows:

"In this case the actual physical release of Read from the facility was notnecessary in order to comply with the statutory definition of a 'discharge'. The'Notice of Change in Status' indicates that Read was in fact discharged and released,albeit to himself, on August 30, 1990, the same day the court ordered it. There isnothing in the record to indicate the exact time of day that the petition in cause No.90-MH-224 was filed. Furthermore, there is nothing in the record showing that Readtried to leave the facility or that he wanted to leave or that he was prevented fromleaving. Under the circumstances herein[,] we do not find that the failure tophysically release Read from Choate Center precluded the State from subsequentlyfiling an involuntary commitment petition. Based on the facts of this case, requiringRead to physically leave Choate Center before filing the second petition wouldrequire that we construe the statute as requiring the performance of an emptyformality when the legislative intent has been otherwise achieved." Read, 228 Ill.App. 3d at 667, 592 N.E.2d at 1180.

The majority in Read relied upon In re Shaw. In In re Shaw, a mental patient whohad initially been admitted voluntarily sought his discharge. The mental health facility failedto file a petition for involuntary commitment within the five-day period after a patientrequest for discharge pursuant to section 3-403 of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 91