JUSTICE DONOVAN delivered the opinion of the court:

On August 31, 2004, we entered an order affirming the circuit court in this matter andstated that our opinion would follow. An opinion is now rendered, with a specialconcurrence by Justice Kuehn and with a dissent by Justice Welch..

On May 7, 2004, appellant, Todd P. Bittle, filed nomination papers to fill a vacancyin nomination for the Republican candidate for Saline County State's Attorney. Appellee,Kenneth J. McSparin, filed a petition objecting to Bittle's nomination papers. The SalineCounty Electoral Board (Board) convened and heard the objections of McSparin. On June22, 2004, the Board reconvened and rendered its decision. The Board held that Bittle'snomination papers were legally insufficient and that the vacancy sought to be filled had notbeen filled in accordance with section 7-61 of the Election Code (Code) (10 ILCS 5/7-61(West 2002)). The Board ruled that Bittle's name was not to be listed on the ballot for theNovember 2, 2004, general election.

Bittle sought judicial review of the Board's decision in the circuit court of SalineCounty, Illinois. McSparin also sought judicial review. On July 26, 2004, the circuit courtfiled its order affirming the ruling of the Board, but it gave a different reason than the onegiven by the Board. Bittle filed his notice of appeal on August 2, 2004. We denied hismotion to stay the circuit court's order, but we granted his motion for an expedited appeal. We affirm.

On August 27, 2004, Bittle filed in this court a motion to strike all the portions ofMcSparin's appellee's brief that addressed the reason the Board had denied Bittle access tothe ballot. In his motion Bittle contends that because his brief in this matter raised only oneissue-whether the trial court erred in finding that his nomination papers were invalid becausehe had voted in the Democratic primary in March 2004-McSparin could not raise the issuehe lost in the circuit court-whether Bittle's nomination papers are invalid because the dateof his selection does not appear on the face of the resolution. We disagree and deny Bittle'smotion to strike. An appeal from a final judgment draws into issue all prior nonfinal ordersthat produced the judgment. Steinberg v. System Software Associates, Inc., 306 Ill. App. 3d157, 713 N.E.2d 709 (1999). It is well established that the findings of a lower tribunal thatare adverse to an appellee do not require the appellee to cross-appeal if the final decision wasnot at least in part against the appellee. Citizens Utilities Co. of Illinois v. Pollution ControlBoard, 265 Ill. App. 3d 773, 639 N.E.2d 1306 (1994).

During the March 2004 primary election, no Republican candidate for Saline CountyState's Attorney was listed on the ballot. Thereafter, Bittle filed his nomination papers to fillthe vacancy in nomination as the Republican candidate for Saline County State's Attorney.

On May 24, 2004, McSparin filed his objector's petition pursuant to section 10-8 ofthe Code (10 ILCS 5/10-8 (West 2002)). McSparin objected to the listing of Bittle as acandidate for Saline County State's Attorney for the following reasons:

"A. Mr. Bittle's nomination papers are invalid because in his sworn statement ofcandidacy he claims to be a qualified primary voter of the Republican Partywhile in fact he voted in the March 16, 2004, Democratic primary.

B. The date of Mr. Bittle's selection by the Republican Party does not appear onthe face of the resolution filed with the nomination papers, as required bylaw."

The Board convened on May 28, 2004, and attended to only procedural matters onthat date. It reconvened on June 3, 2004, and heard testimony and accepted documents intoevidence. During that hearing, Bittle testified on his own behalf. He stated he had alwaysvoted Republican and that the March 2004 primary election was the first time he had votedDemocrat. He did so because he was an attorney practicing criminal law in the county, andsince there was no Republican candidate, he felt he should have a say in the election for thenext State's Attorney. After the primary, he was approached by members of the SalineCounty Republican Central Committee about running as the Republican nominee for State'sAttorney.

Thereafter, Bittle was invited to attend a meeting of the Republican central committeeand on April 17 or 18, 2004, was appointed as a Republican precinct committeeman. He waseventually nominated as the Republican candidate for State's Attorney.

Bittle stated that, when he filled out his statement of candidacy, he was already aRepublican precinct committeeman. He had always voted Republican. He consideredhimself a Republican and felt that on May 7, 2004, when he signed his statement ofcandidacy, he was a Republican.

The Board issued its decision on June 22, 2004. The Board overruled McSparin's firstobjection, which complained that Bittle had voted in the Democratic primary but now seeksoffice as a Republican. The Board did, however, sustain McSparin's second objection, whichrelated to the date of Bittle's selection not appearing on the resolution filed by the RepublicanParty. The Board based its decision entirely on Zerante v. Bloom Township Electoral Board,287 Ill. App. 3d 976, 679 N.E.2d 459 (1997). Because it sustained one of the objections, itruled that the vacancy had not been filled in accordance with section 7-61 of the Code, thatBittle's nomination papers were invalid, and that he should not be listed on the ballot for theNovember 2, 2004, general election.

Bittle filed his petition for judicial review on July 1, 2004, seeking to have the circuitcourt overturn the decision of the Board. McSparin also filed a petition for judicial reviewon the same date. The circuit court filed its decision July 26, 2004, sustaining the ruling ofthe Board not to allow Bittle's name on the general election ballot. The circuit court'sdecision, however, was based on a different reason than the one on which the Board hadbased its decision. The circuit court held that because Bittle had voted in the Democraticprimary and his statement of candidacy stated he was a "qualified primary voter of theRepublican party," his statement of candidacy could not comply with the requirements of theCode. Bittle filed his notice of appeal on August 2, 2004.

Section 7-61 of the Code provides in pertinent part as follows:
"Any vacancy in nomination under the provisions of this Article 7 occurringon or after the primary and prior to certification of candidates by the certifying boardor officer[] must be filled prior to the date of certification. Any vacancy innomination occurring after certification but prior to 15 days before the generalelection shall be filled within 8 days after the event creating the vacancy. Theresolution filling the vacancy shall be sent by U.S. mail or personal delivery to thecertifying officer or board within 3 days of the action by which the vacancy was filled;provided, if such resolution is sent by mail and the U.S. postmark on the envelopecontaining such resolution is dated prior to the expiration of such 3[-]day limit, theresolution shall be deemed filed within such 3[-]day limit. Failure to so transmit theresolution within the time specified in this Section shall authorize the certifyingofficer or board to certify the original candidate. ***

The resolution to fill a vacancy in nomination shall be duly acknowledgedbefore an officer qualified to take acknowledgements of deeds and shall include, uponits face, the following information:

(a) the name of the original nominee and the office vacated;

(b) the date on which the vacancy occurred; [and]

(c) the name and address of the nominee selected to fill the vacancy and thedate of selection." (Emphasis added.) 10 ILCS 5/7-61 (West 2002).

This case cannot be distinguished from Zerante. As in Zerante, the resolution filedby Bittle with his nomination papers did not contain the date upon which he was selected tofill the vacancy in nomination. As the court found in Zerante:

"[S]ection 7-61 of the Code provides that failure to transmit a resolution to thecertifying authority within three days of the date that a vacancy in nomination is filled'shall authorize the certifying officer or board to certify the original candidate.' 10ILCS 5/7-61 (West 1994). Consequently, the failure of a resolution to specify thedate of selection renders it impossible for the certifying authority to determine if theperson selected to fill the vacancy in nomination, or the original candidate, is to becertified to the election authority authorized to prepare the ballot. It is this inabilityof the certifying authority to determine its statutory duties under such circumstancesthat leads us to conclude that the provision of section 7-61 that states that aresolution shall contain the date of selection is mandatory." (Emphasis added.) Zerante, 287 Ill. App. 3d at 980, 679 N.E.2d at 461-62.

Bittle concedes that the resolution does not contain the date of his selection, but hetries to distinguish Zerante by arguing that the resolution that he submitted to the Boardcontained two dates and that, by implication, one of the dates should be considered the dateof the resolution. The first date he refers to is the date the party chairman and secretarysigned the resolution, and the second date refers to the date the document was notarized. This argument was specifically addressed in Zerante, wherein the court stated:

"The acknowledgement of the resolutions before the notary satisfied theacknowledgement requirement of the statute[] but did not satisfy the requirement thata resolution 'include, upon its face, *** the date of selection.' 10 ILCS 5/7-61 (West1994). We know of no case which holds that the events related in a signed documentare presumed to have occurred on the date that the document was signed." (Emphasis added.) Zerante, 287 Ill. App. 3d at 979, 679 N.E.2d at 461.

Although it would be considered judicial dicta, we have previously followed theholding in Zerante, when we addressed a similar issue in Forcade-Osborn v. MadisonCounty Electoral Board, 334 Ill. App. 3d 756, 778 N.E.2d 768 (2002). In Forcade-Osbornwe stated:

"It is true that Illinois courts favor ballot access for candidates who wish to runfor public office. This does not mean, however, that mandatory requirements can becircumvented. See Zerante v. Bloom Township Electoral Board, 287 Ill. App. 3d 976,980, 679 N.E.2d 459, 461-62 (1997) (the failure to specify the date of the resolutionupon which the candidate was selected to fill the vacancy in nomination prevented adetermination of whether the resolutions were transmitted to the certifying authorityin a timely fashion).

Petitioner had three different statutory mechanisms for gaining access to theballot. Petitioner chose not to subject herself to two of those options, both of whichrequired a showing of 'grass roots' support. Petitioner's nomination was made by justthree individuals. Under those circumstances, we cannot fault the legislature forbeing very specific on the manner in which one's name is placed on the ballot whenone has chosen not to follow the 'customary' procedures for nomination. It is theconduct of petitioner's representatives, by failing to timely file the nomination withinthree days, that serves to deny petitioner access to the ballot for the November 2002election. The rules are not hypertechnical as petitioner suggests but are designed toensure the integrity of the election process in general." Forcade-Osborn, 334 Ill.App. 3d at 760, 778 N.E.2d at 771-72.

Having found the provision of section 7-61 of the Code requiring a resolution tospecify the date upon which an individual was selected to fill a vacancy in nomination to bemandatory, and because the resolution filed by Bittle with his nomination papers on May 7,2004, did not specify the date of his selection, we find that the Board correctly found Bittle'snomination papers to be legally insufficient. Accordingly, we need not address the otherissues raised by Bittle directed to the additional ground relied upon by the trial court indeclaring his nomination papers deficient.

Affirmed.

JUSTICE KUEHN, specially concurring:

A desire to allow Saline County voters a choice about who should be their chief lawenforcement officer for the next four years is understandable. So is Todd Bittle's desire totake advantage of the opportunity to seek public office under the Republican Party bannerthis fall. I wish that I could, in good conscience, concur with my friend who registers dissentin this case. A vote for ballot access, instead of blind adherence to the rules of electoralengagement, always feels like the right and fair thing to do when we are presented cases likethe one at hand. After all, we know that Todd Bittle and the Saline County Republicans whowanted him on the Republican ticket were trying to comply with the election laws when theyfiled the resolution that they hoped would launch a Republican candidacy for State'sAttorney.

However, before anyone can seek public office, the mandatory requirements of thelaws established to guide our electoral process must be met with strict compliance."[S]ubstantial compliance [in good faith] is no longer sufficient." Knobeloch v. ElectoralBoard for the City of Granite City, 337 Ill. App. 3d 1137, 1140, 788 N.E.2d 130, 133 (2003).

Upon further reflection, perhaps a fairer thing to do in cases like the one at hand isto trust the wisdom and fairness reflected in our earlier decisions. If we follow our precedentand apply the law in the same manner for everyone, we should treat Todd Bittle nodifferently than we treated Debra Powell or Richard Fancher, when they substantiallycomplied with the electoral law's mandates. Perhaps it is wiser to adhere to the standard thatour high court has told us to apply when deciding what to do in the face of election lawviolations.

A little over a year ago, we barred the mayor of East St. Louis from standing forreelection because she had not included a county clerk receipt evidencing the date on whichshe had filed her statement of economic interests when she filed nominating papers forreelection. Mayor Powell had a statement of economic interests on file, but she did not havethe receipt that recorded the date of filing. We confronted an argument that the mayor hadsubstantially complied with the election laws and that the date upon which her economicinterest statement had been filed would contribute little, if anything, to the integrity of theselection process. We held:

"While we may agree with petitioners' argument that they 'substantially and in goodfaith complied with the applicable election laws,' the argument that substantialcompliance is sufficient was specifically rejected by the Illinois Supreme Court inDeFabio v. Gummersheimer [citation]. Gummersheimer held that a mandatoryprovision of the Election Code must be enforced even where parties agree there is noknowledge or evidence of fraud or corruption. We are bound by the holding ofGummersheimer." Powell v. East St. Louis Electoral Board, 337 Ill. App. 3d 334,338, 785 N.E.2d 1014, 1017 (2003).

We denied ballot access to the sitting mayor of East St. Louis for failing to tell votersthe date on which she filed her economic interest statement. Powell, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 338,785 N.E.2d at 1017.

One month later, we decided a case where a Madison County judge permitted RichardFancher, a would-be candidate for the office of Granite City superintendent of streets, toremain on the election ballot despite a technical flaw in his filing papers. We againconfronted an argument that the office seeker had substantially, and in good faith, compliedwith the Election Code's requirements.

We adhered to our earlier position in Powell and held that "substantial compliance isno longer sufficient." Knobeloch, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 1140, 788 N.E.2d at 133. We held:

"Although we are sympathetic to Fancher's situation, we cannot overlook petitioner'sstatement that an opposing view 'effectively permits a candidate's ignorance of Illinoislaw to insulate himself or herself from the consequences of any and all violations ofmandatory legal requirements.' Here, even though the parties agree that there is noknowledge or evidence of fraud or corruption and that Fancher, at the time of hissigning and oath, fully believed that he was certifying said papers before anauthorized notary and therefore subjecting himself to the laws of perjury, we believethat we are bound by the supreme court's decision in Gummersheimer." (Emphasisadded.) Knobeloch, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 1140, 788 N.E.2d at 133.

We ordered Fancher's name stricken from the ballot.

None of the justices who unanimously decided the political fate of Debra Powell andRichard Fancher liked having to follow the supreme court's edict. Nonetheless, we wereduty-bound to do so.

No one failed to see how a statutorily required date could substantially contribute tothe selection process's integrity when we decided that the voters of East St. Louis would nothave the right to decide whether to keep their mayor in office for another term. We cannotnow turn a blind eye to the importance of a statutorily required date that is absolutely criticalto the integrity of the selection process. There is no way for the certifying authority toproperly certify the election ballot without the required date. The certifying authority'schoice of what should appear upon the ballot depends upon the required date of selection tofill the vacancy.

The Election Code reads, in pertinent part:

"The resolution to fill a vacancy in nomination shall *** include, upon its face,the following information:

(c) the name and address of the nominee selected to fill the vacancy and thedate of selection." 10 ILCS 5/7-61(c) (West 2002).

There is absolutely no question that a statement of the date on which a candidate wasselected to fill a vacancy in the nomination process is a mandatory requirement of theElection Code-as necessary to a valid resolution to fill a vacancy in nomination as the nameof the selected nominee and the address of the selected nominee. See 10 ILCS 5/7-61(c)(West 2002).

Since it is undisputed that the resolution seeking to nominate Todd Bittle did not statethe date upon which he had been selected to fill the vacancy, a piece of information thatBittle and his Republican cohorts were legally obligated to supply, our decision here is aneasy one. When the law requires strict compliance, noncompliance cannot be tolerated. Theonly thing peculiar about today's decision is that, unlike our earlier decisions, it is notunanimous. Unfortunately, we are divided in a way that will suggest that political partyaffiliation, rather than the law, guides our decisionmaking in cases like this.

Why should we disagree over Judge Spomer's ruling in light of the well-settledstandard that we set forth and employed last year when we decided the political fate of DebraPowell and Richard Fancher? The answer to this question appears to be found in the use ofa form provided to the Saline County Republican Party and its would-be candidate for State'sAttorney by the Saline County election authority. The resolution-to-fill-vacancy-in-nomination form provided to Todd Bittle had been sent to Saline County's election authorityby the Illinois State Board of Elections, the agency that presumably drafted it. It had nospecific blank in which to fill in the date on which Todd Bittle had been selected to fill thevacancy in nomination.

If the form was provided to be used by political parties trying to fill vacancies innomination, it should have provided appropriate fill-in blanks for all the informationnecessary to comply with the Election Code. Because the form did not do so, our dissentingcolleague believes that Todd Bittle exercised good faith and substantially complied with theElection Code. I respectfully disagree. Even though substantial compliance is no longersufficient, a position of this court that controls the inquiry, I will explain my disagreement. I recognize a simple truth in Todd Bittle's argument-a truth that no one doubts. Hadthe State Board of Elections drafted a better form, one that made it easier to comply with thelaw, Bittle would have complied with the law. Here is the argument that the dissent iswilling to accept.

Todd Bittle's failure to comply with the law rests upon the fact that the State Boardof Elections failed to provide him with a form that contained a space designated "date ofselection." The form provided did not contain an easy, ready, and complete guide to electionlaw compliance. Because the form did not have an obvious fill-in blank for the selectiondate, Bittle was not apprised of the fact that his date of selection was mandated. Bittle tried,but failed, to comply with the law's mandatory requirements. His compliance was substantialand his efforts were in good faith because he relied upon a shabbily drafted form.

Alas, the statutory provision requiring a statement of the date of selection was not metdue to, none other than, sheer ignorance of the law.

I am reminded of a passage from the Knobeloch decision, a passage that I earlierplaced in italics. Although I am sympathetic to Bittle's plight, we cannot overlook the factthat taking an opposing view would " 'effectively permit[] a candidate's ignorance of Illinoislaw to insulate himself or herself from the consequences of any and all violations ofmandatory legal requirements.' " (Emphasis added.) Knobeloch, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 1140,788 N.E.2d at 133.

Todd Bittle's argument boils down to this-an effort to insulate himself from theconsequences of the law's violation by professing ignorance of the law. Debra Powell andRichard Fancher would have welcomed a receptive ear when they tendered similar pleas forballot access. However, we unanimously dispatched their arguments in recognition of thefact that acceptance of such a position would vitiate the need to comply with any of theelection law's mandatory requirements.

Powell and Fancher were not schooled in the law. They lacked training in how toopen, read, and understand a statute book in order to comply with the law's requirements. We expect nonlawyers to know what the law requires and to strictly comply with thoserequirements. Why then should we not expect lawyers to know what the law requires? Should we really carve an exception for lawyers who rely upon Illinois bureaucrats to tellthem what the law is and how its requirements can be met?

Justice Donovan did not deem it necessary to address a second problem with ToddBittle's selection as the Republican nominee for Saline County State's Attorney. The dissentcomments upon it, and I again disagree with the dissent.

Bittle professes that he has always voted Republican-that he has always been, andremains today, a Republican Party faithful. While I have no doubt that he speaks the truth,that is not what makes him a qualified primary voter of the Republican Party under theprovisions of the Election Code.

Todd Bittle is not a "qualified primary voter of the Republican Party." He cannotmeet a requirement necessary to the postprimary selection process by which a vacancy in theRepublican nomination for State's Attorney is filled. His beliefs to the contrary, Bittle is aqualified primary voter of the Democratic Party because he chose to vote a Democraticprimary ballot on March 16, 2004. He will remain a qualified primary voter of theDemocratic Party until the next primary, when he will again choose what kind of qualifiedprimary voter he is.

According to Bittle, he wanted to play a role in who would be the Democraticnominee for State's Attorney in Saline County. He wanted to vote for one of the twocandidates seeking that nomination because he practices criminal law in the county. We aretold that his vote in the Democratic primary was not a calculated prelude to his owncandidacy as the Republican nominee for the same office. Bittle claims that he was notapproached by Republican Party operatives until after the primary election.

Despite his professed affiliation with the Republican Party, and his loyalty to it, Bittledid not want to have a say in who would be the Republican nominee for the United StatesSenate this year. For that matter, he did not care to help shape the Republican ticket at all,by voting from a ballot that selected Republican Party hopefuls for candidacy in the generalelection. Instead, he wanted to help pick the Democratic nominee for Saline County State'sAttorney.

I take Todd Bittle at his word. His choice of a Democratic ballot, and subsequent votefor one of the two Democratic candidates for State's Attorney, was not an effort to select aweaker opponent for himself but an effort to elect the person who he thought would bestserve the public interest as a holder of that office. While that is the case here, it might notalways be the case.

A less honorable and more devious band of Republican loyalists might attempt tocorrupt the electoral process, in an effort to defraud Democrats out of an honest primaryelection of their nominees, by taking Democratic primary ballots and voting for the weakestcandidates. While nothing in the law could prevent such chicanery, the law would preventany one of those loyalists from being caucused onto the ballot in the same election cycle. After taking Democratic primary ballots, none of them would be qualified primary voters ofthe Republican Party.

Bittle may have voted Republican in the past, but he took a Democratic ballot andvoted in the Democratic primary this year. He can become a qualified primary voter of theRepublican Party by taking a Republican primary ballot and voting for Republican nomineesin the next primary election. Until that time, he can do everything expected of a Grand OldParty faithful, including seeking his party's nomination as a candidate through the primaryelection process, but he cannot call himself a qualified primary voter of the RepublicanParty.

This view of the phrase "qualified primary voter" is entirely consistent with the publicpolicy that underlies the party-switching statutory provisions mentioned by the dissent. Ibelieve that the law does prohibit someone from voting in one political party's primaryelection and, thereafter, being selected to fill a vacancy in the other party's selection process,because only qualified primary voters of that party can fill such vacancies.

If a "qualified primary voter" is not someone who most recently voted in a particularpolitical party's primary, who is a qualified primary voter? Legislators do not have to singleout only qualified primary voters for the selection process, if their understanding of whatconstitutes a qualified primary voter is no more than a person registered to vote in the nextprimary election. The term "qualified primary voter" would be meaningless if everyoneregistered to vote can become a qualified primary voter of either party by a statement offuture intention rather than a commitment to a past deed.

The legislature used the phrase "qualified primary voter" for a reason. We must giveit meaning. The only reasonable interpretation of the term disqualifies Bittle from thepostprimary selection process for Republican Party nominees. Bittle cannot be slated as aRepublican candidate, nominated by party caucus after the primary election, because he isnot a qualified primary voter of the Republican Party. Saying that he will, in all likelihood,vote in the next Republican primary election does not make him a qualified primary voterof the Republican Party.

For the reasons stated, I specially concur.

I respectfully dissent. If it is true, as this court so recently has stated and as themajority itself acknowledges, that Illinois courts favor ballot access for candidates who wishto run for public office (Forcade-Osborn v. Madison County Electoral Board, 334 Ill. App.3d 756, 760 (2002)), then I do not believe that either of the objections entered by Mr.McSparin to the candidacy of Mr. Bittle is sufficient to prevent the voters of Saline Countyfrom making their own decision in the November 2, 2004, general election about who shouldbe their State's Attorney, rather than having this court make that decision for them, as themajority does today.

As to the objection that "[t]he date of Mr. Bittle's selection by the Republican Partydoes not appear on the face of the resolution filed with the nomination papers, as requiredby law," I agree with the trial court that because Mr. Bittle was provided a fill-in-the-blankform by the county election authority, which form had in turn been provided to the countyelection authority by the State Board of Elections, Mr. Bittle substantially complied with thestatute and acted in good faith, and I do not believe that he should now be penalized for usingthe very form provided him by the election authorities. I believe the majority's holding tothe contrary is both unwise and unfair, particularly when the form issued by the State Boardof Elections and used in this case does not contain a blank for "date of selection" oranywhere on its face even use the term "date of selection." Furthermore, I fail to see howthe requirement that the resolution must contain a "date of selection" on its face can be saidto "contribute substantially to the integrity of the election process," a prerequisite the IllinoisSupreme Court has said must be met before a statutory provision regulating elections will befound to be mandatory rather than directory. Craig v. Peterson, 39 Ill. 2d 191, 196 (1968).

As to the objection that "Mr. Bittle's nomination papers are invalid because in hissworn statement of candidacy he claims to be a qualified primary voter of the RepublicanParty while in fact he voted in the March 16, 2004, Democratic primary," that argument isa nonstarter, with absolutely no basis in existing Illinois precedent, and the majority is wiseto steer around it. Thirty years ago the Illinois Supreme Court decisively determined that astatutory restriction against changing political parties by candidates was an invalidrestriction. Sperling v. County Officers Electoral Board, 57 Ill. 2d 81 (1974). In the 30years since that decision, the General Assembly has failed to enact any legislation prohibitingthe conduct which the circuit court in this matter found to be prohibited. In fact, the onlyprohibitions regarding party affiliation for candidates are contained in section 7-61 of theElection Code, which prohibits (1) a defeated primary candidate of one party from runningas the candidate of another party in the general election and (2) a defeated caucus candidateof one party running as another party's candidate in the general election. 10 ILCS 5/7-61(West 2002). Neither prohibition applies to the case at bar. Put simply, there is no currentstatute prohibiting a candidate from voting in one political party's primary election and thenrunning as a candidate of another political party in the general election.

In sum, I find no merit to either of the objections to the candidacy of Mr. Bittle raisedby Mr. McSparin. Accordingly, I would reverse the decision of both the Board and thecircuit court and would order that Mr. Bittle's name be placed on the general election ballotas the Republican candidate for Saline County State's Attorney, affording the voters of SalineCounty the opportunity to decide for themselves whom they want to be their State's Attorney. I believe it is unfortunate that a party of voters in Saline County will be disenfranchised by,as the majority sets out, a technicality. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.