JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH delivered the opinion of the court:

R.W. (respondent) appeals from an order of the circuit court of Randolph Countyauthorizing the involuntary administration of psychotropic medications, as well as theperformance of certain testing and other procedures for a period of 90 days pursuant to theMental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Code) (405 ILCS 5/1-100 et seq. (West2000)). On appeal, respondent raises the following issues regarding his right to a fair trial: (1) whether the court failed to define "clear and convincing evidence," (2) whether the trialjudge submitted a verdict form that failed to specify medications, dosages, and who couldadminister medications, (3) whether the instructions failed to address an amendment to theCode, and (4) whether he was improperly denied his right to a court-appointed examiner. Weaffirm.

A petition for the administration of authorized involuntary treatment was filed againstrespondent by the Chester Mental Health Center. In the petition, the State sought theauthority to administer olanzapine or risperidone. In the alternative, the State sought toadminister Haldol or decanoate. Finally, the State sought to administer Benztropine-Cogentin for side effects. The petition also sought authorization for certain forms of testing.Respondent requested a jury trial, and the matter was continued to a jury docket. On the datethe jury selection was to begin, respondent informed the court that he previously had onlyminimal contact with his court-appointed attorney and had been uncertain when he couldrequest an independent examiner. Respondent stated that he had contacted a privateexaminer in Chicago but that no arrangements had been made. Respondent indicated hewould be willing to be examined that afternoon. The court denied respondent's motion andthe hearing was held.

Dr. Gesmundo, a treating psychiatrist, was called as the sole witness for the State. Dr.Gesmundo diagnosed respondent as schizophrenic and described him as suspicious, paranoid,delusional, uncooperative, agitated, and aggressive. Dr. Gesmundo testified that whenrespondent was taking medication, he was more cooperative and manageable. According toDr. Gesmundo, respondent made threats and attacks after he stopped taking medications. Dr.Gesmundo described the proposed treatment:

"MR. BURKE [Assistant State's Attorney]: Doctor, in your opinion[,] basedon a reasonable degree of psychiatric certainty, would psychotropic medication bebeneficial for [respondent] at this time?

DR. GESMUNDO: I would like to try him on olanzapine or Zyprexa and[/]orRisperdal again.

Q. And in what dosages would you like to try him?

A. I would like to try him as much to [sic] a size twenty milligrams ofolanzapine or Zyprexa or a size six milligrams of risperidone.

Q. Are there any other medications you would like to be able to give him atthis time?

A. If he refuses because this [sic] medications are only available in oral forms,tablet forms[,] or concentrate forms[-][t]hey're not available [in] injection form-Iwould like to try him on [the] Haldol shot whenever [he] refuses to take thisolanzapine or Zyprexa or risperidone.

Q. And are there any medications you would like to be able to give him to dealwith side effects or possible side effects?

A. Yes, I will give him also Cogentin or [inaudible] for side effects."

Dr. Gesmundo stated that she would need to do testing to measure the effects of themedication. Dr. Gesmundo testified that she believed that the benefits of the medicationoutweighed the harm and that respondent lacked the capacity to make a reasoned decisionregarding medication.

Respondent testified that when he had taken medication previously, it made his feetbreak out in black spots and made him dizzy. Respondent denied that he was mentally ill orthat he had been aggressive to staff.

The matter was submitted to the jury on instructions submitted by the State, withoutobjection. Dr. Gesmundo was recalled outside of the presence of the jury, where she wasagain questioned regarding the medications:

"MR. BURKE: Okay. Doctor, I just want you to go through the medicationsand the dosage ranges you would like the Court to allow you to administer to therecipient[.]

DR. GESMUNDO: Okay. My first choice would be olanzapine or Zyprexa,five milligrams to twenty milligrams per day. The second choice would berisperidone or Risperdal, two milligrams to six milligrams per day[,] or if he refusesto take either one of these two, Haldol oral or injection or decanoate, ten to fiftymilligrams in oral equivalent dose, and side[-]effect medication like benztropine orCogentin injection prn for side effects, one to four milligrams per day.

Q. And the testing procedures that would allow you to administer them safelyto [respondent]?

A. Okay. CBC, blood chemistry, serum electrolytes, liver function test[,] andurinalysis.

MR. BURKE: I don't have any other questions, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Fricke.

MR. FRICKE [Defense counsel]: No questions, Your Honor. I canunderstand what the doctor just said.

THE COURT: Okay. That's all I need on the record."

The jury returned with a general verdict for the administration of psychotropic medications. The court then entered an order authorizing the administration of medication as outlined inthe petition: olanzapine, risperidone, Haldol, or decanoate, and Benztropine-Cogentin forside effects, for a period of 90 days. Respondent appeals.

Respondent contends that he was denied his right to a court-appointed examiner. Respondent first made his request on the date of jury selection for the hearing. The courtdenied this request as untimely and as a de facto motion for a continuance. The recordreflects that respondent made no request during the several weeks after the filing of thepetition or at a previous pretrial hearing. Respondent's request was also vague, in that he didnot recommend who should conduct the examination or a timeline for the procedure;respondent only stated that he had contacted an unknown Chicago practitioner. Thecontinuance of a matter in order to obtain an expert is a matter of trial court discretion, andthere was no abuse here. See In re Bert W., 313 Ill. App. 3d 788, 793, 730 N.E.2d 591, 596(2000); People v. Rodgers, 288 Ill. App. 3d 167, 171, 680 N.E.2d 437, 440-41 (1997).

Respondent argues that the jury instructions were faulty in several respects. First,respondent contends that the jury was improperly instructed that an involuntary admissionwas appropriate if, because of mental illness, respondent exhibited "threatening or disruptivebehavior," despite the amendment of the Code to delete the reference to disruptive behavior,effective June 2, 2000 (Pub. Act 91-726 (2000 Ill. Laws 1043); see 405 ILCS 5/2-107.1(a)(4)(West 2000)). In addition, respondent contends that the court erroneously failed to instructthe jury on the meaning of "clear and convincing evidence." Respondent contends that theinstructions were also erroneous for failing to have the jury decide whether the benefits ofeach particular recommended medication outweighed the harm of the medication.

Respondent declined to present opposing jury instructions. Thus, we find thatrespondent has waived his argument that the instructions failed to account for the amendmentto the Code deleting the reference to disruptive behavior. See Vojas v. K-Mart Corp., 312Ill. App. 3d 544, 549, 727 N.E.2d 397, 401 (2000); Aguinaga v. City of Chicago, 243 Ill.App. 3d 552, 575, 611 N.E.2d 1296, 1313 (1993).

Nonetheless, we are compelled to address the other two issues because our positionis divergent from cases in the Second District-In re Timothy H., 301 Ill. App. 3d 1008, 704N.E.2d 943 (1998); In re Nancy M., 317 Ill. App. 3d 167, 739 N.E.2d 607 (2000); and In reFrances K., 322 Ill. App. 3d 203, 749 N.E.2d 1082 (2001). Like the Second District foundin Timothy H. and Nancy M., we find that this case falls within the exception to the mootnessdoctrine. See Timothy H., 301 Ill. App. 3d at 1012, 704 N.E.2d at 945; Nancy M., 317 Ill.App. 3d at 172, 739 N.E.2d at 612.

In Timothy H., the trial court authorized the involuntary administration ofpsychotropic medication pursuant to a jury verdict. No instruction defining "clear andconvincing evidence" was offered by either party, and no such instruction was given to thejury. The Second District found that the trial court had abused its discretion and that therespondent had been denied a fair trial because the court failed to offer, sua sponte, adefinition of "clear and convincing evidence." The appellate court began its discussion byrecognizing that in the history of the term "clear and convincing," the phrase has been givendifferent definitions by different courts and that some courts have found the term best leftundefined. Timothy H., 301 Ill. App. 3d at 1014-15, 704 N.E.2d at 947; see Lines v. Willey,253 Ill. 440, 449, 97 N.E. 843, 847 (1912); Hotze v. Schlanser, 410 Ill. 265, 269, 102 N.E.2d131, 133 (1951); Johnson v. Johnson, 1 Ill. 2d 319, 324, 115 N.E.2d 617, 619 (1953); In reEstate of Ragen, 79 Ill. App. 3d 8, 14, 398 N.E.2d 198, 203 (1979); In re Estate of Hutchins,120 Ill. App. 3d 1084, 1087, 458 N.E.2d 1356, 1358 (1984); In re Estate of Casey, 155 Ill.App. 3d 116, 123, 507 N.E.2d 962, 966 (1987); Washington Courte Condominium Ass'n-Four v. Washington-Golf Corp., 267 Ill. App. 3d 790, 820, 643 N.E.2d 199, 219 (1994);Bazydlo v. Volant, 164 Ill. 2d 207, 213, 647 N.E.2d 273, 276 (1995). The court pointed out,however, that in response to a recent statutory amendment changing the burden of proof fora defendant wishing to present a defense of not guilty by reason of insanity, the IllinoisSupreme Court Committee on Pattern Jury Instructions added a new instruction defining"clear and convincing evidence" (Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 4.19 (3ded. Supp. 1996) (hereinafter IPI Criminal 3d No. 4.19 (Supp. 1996))). Timothy H., 301 Ill.App. 3d at 1015, 704 N.E.2d at 947-48.

The court found that, without being instructed on the definition of "clear andconvincing," the jurors could conceivably apply the wrong standard, such as one they werefamiliar with from another trial for which they served as jurors. The court concluded that therespondent was denied a fair trial because the court failed to provide, sua sponte, the Illinoispattern instruction defining the applicable burden of proof. Timothy H., 301 Ill. App. 3d at1016, 704 N.E.2d at 948 (" '[I]t is essential that jurors receive a definition or description ofthe applicable burden of proof' ") (quoting Rikard v. Dover Elevator Co., 126 Ill. App. 3d438, 441, 467 N.E.2d 386, 388 (1984)).

We disagree with the holding in Timothy H. In contrast to the quotation from Rikardrelied upon in Timothy H., this court has not called for a definition of "clear and convincing"to be given. In Rikard, we held that a trial court should have informed the jury of therelevant burden of proof by issuing Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, No. 21.01 (2d ed.1971), which informs the jury that the phrase "burden of proof" means that a propositionmust be shown to be more probably true than not true.

The development of a definition of "clear and convincing" for use in an insanitydefense does not resolve the problems with defining the phrase. The possibility of confusionthat occurs when a definition of "clear and convincing evidence" is given has led severalcourts to recommend not defining the phrase. See, e.g., Washington Courte CondominiumAss'n-Four, 267 Ill. App. 3d at 820, 643 N.E.2d at 219; In re Estate of Casey, 155 Ill. App.3d at 123, 507 N.E.2d at 966. Indeed, the committee recognized that defining "clear andconvincing" is problematic-it recommended that no such instruction be given in actions forfraud and deceit. Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, No. 800.03, Comment, at 739 (2000ed.) (hereinafter IPI Civil 2000 No. 800.03). As the committee explained in its comment:

"The expression 'clear and convincing' has sometimes been defined in termsof 'reasonable doubt.' However, such a definition seems to lack clarity and couldeasily be confused with criminal matters in the minds of a jury. Definitions arediscussed in the case of Parsons v. Winter, 142 Ill. App. 3d 354, 491 N.E.2d 1236,1240, 96 Ill. Dec. 776, 780 (1st Dist. 1986). That court, after discussing a definitionof 'clear and convincing' which included the words 'reasonable doubt,' concluded that'highly probably true' would be a clearer statement of the concept. The court alsorelied on In re Estate of Ragen, 79 Ill. App. 3d 8, 13-14, 398 N.E.2d 198, 202-03, 34Ill. Dec. 523, 527-28 (1st Dist. 1979)." IPI Civil 2000 No. 800.03, Comment, at 739.

The committee considered both the term "reasonable doubt" and the term "highlyprobably true." The conclusion the committee reached is that the expression "clear andconvincing" is more understandable than any definition that could be framed using"reasonable doubt" or "highly probably true." The expression "clear and convincing"includes terms that are readily understandable and in common, everyday usage, and an effortto define those terms might very well create confusion and misunderstanding. IPI Civil 2000No. 800.03, Comment, at 739.

The issuance of IPI Criminal 3d No. 4.19 (Supp. 1996) did not eliminate the problemswith defining "clear and convincing evidence." Instead, the instruction was developed fora situation where the jury is presented with contrasting burdens of proof. The instruction wasspecifically delineated as follows: "New Instruction To Reflect Statutory Amendment." IPICriminal 3d No. 4.19, at 24 (Supp. 1996). The committee described how the definitionaddresses the specific problem in insanity-defense cases:

"P.A. 89-404, effective August 20, 1995, changed the burden of proof on adefendant asserting the insanity defense from 'preponderance of the evidence' to 'clearand convincing evidence.' (See 720 ILCS 5/6-2(e) (West 1994) (formerly Ill. Rev.Stat. ch. 38,