The respondent, Tammy D., appeals from an order of the circuit court of MadisonCounty denying her motion to vacate an agreed order that required her to attend outpatientmental health treatment for 90 days following her release from Alton Mental Health Center(Alton). On appeal, the respondent contends that the trial court's motion denying her motionto vacate must be reversed because the agreed order was the result of coercion, duress,mistake, and grossly disparate bargaining positions between the State and the respondent andcontravened both the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Code) (405 ILCS5/1-100 et seq. (West 2000)) and public policy. We affirm.

The respondent voluntarily admitted herself to Alton on August 8, 2001. On August14, 2001, she filed a written request for discharge. On August 15, 2001, the State filed apetition for involuntary admission. A hearing was held on the State's petition on August 23,2001. During the hearing, the State presented testimony that the respondent suffers fromschizoaffective disorder, bipolar type. Not only had the respondent been admitted to Altonon three previous occasions, but she had also been admitted to other community hospitals formental health treatment.

The respondent's symptoms include agitation, verbal aggression, paranoia, anddelusions. On August 14, 2001, the respondent threatened an Alton staff member with aclothes hanger, and on August 21, 2001, she threatened a psychiatrist. According to Dr.Lenora Brown, a clinical psychologist at Alton, the respondent took only some of hermedication and failed to attend all her treatment sessions. Dr. Brown opined that therespondent needed to stay at Alton until her acute symptoms could be better managed anduntil she could be placed in a less restrictive environment. At the time of the hearing, Dr.Brown did not believe that there was any less restrictive setting that was appropriate for therespondent. The projected date of the respondent's completion of treatment was September22, 2001.

At the end of Dr. Brown's testimony, the respondent moved to dismiss the petition forinvoluntary admission because it had not been set for a hearing within five days of her receiptof the petition, as required by section 3-403 of the Code (405 ILCS 5/3-403 (West 2000)). The trial court agreed with the respondent and dismissed the petition for involuntaryadmission. On August 24, 2001, the State filed a new petition for involuntary admission. On August 30, 2001, that petition was dismissed on the basis that it was filed following arequest for discharge but had not been filed within five days of the request for discharge, asrequired by section 3-403 of the Code.

On August 31, 2001, the respondent signed a request for voluntary admission andremained a voluntary recipient. On September 28, 2001, the State filed a petition foroutpatient treatment, after the respondent's treatment team decided that the respondent wasno longer in need of inpatient treatment and could function in a less restrictive setting if shereceived outpatient treatment, including counseling and medication. On October 2, 2001,that petition was withdrawn because the respondent's "housing situation [was] not resolvedas anticipated." On October 5, 2001, another petition for outpatient treatment was filed. Thefile also shows that on October 2, 2001, the respondent, through the Legal Advocacy Service,Guardianship and Advocacy Commission, Anthony Rothert, of counsel, moved to strike anddismiss the petition for outpatient treatment on the ground that the petition was insufficientin that there is no statutory authority that requires a voluntary recipient to comply withoutpatient treatment.

During the hearings on the petition for outpatient treatment, the respondent continuedto be represented by attorney Anthony Rothert of the Legal Advocacy Service, Guardianshipand Advocacy Commission. On October 11, 2001, the respondent and her attorney appearedbefore the trial court and agreed to an order for outpatient treatment. The order provided thatthe respondent would be treated at MidAmerica Behavioral Healthcare and by Dr. Tomas ofSt. Mary's Hospital for 90 days. The trial court specifically questioned the respondentregarding whether or not she agreed to this order:

"Q. [THE COURT:] You're in full agreement to [sic] this document?

A. Yes, sir, I am.

Q. Do you understand[,] by [the court] entering this order[,] that you will bedischarged, but you will be treated at MidAmerica Behavioral Healthcare located inBelleville, and this order will remain in effect for 90 days, correct?

A. Yes.

[THE COURT:] Okay, [t]hank you."

The trial court then signed the agreed order for outpatient treatment.

On November 1, 2001, the respondent, through her attorney, moved to vacate theagreed order. In the motion, the respondent set forth that while she was willing to participatein outpatient treatment, there was no statutory authority that could require her to do so. Ahearing was conducted on the motion on November 21, 2001. The respondent's attorney,Anthony Rothert, was present, but the respondent failed to appear. Rothert told the trial courtthat he had no idea why the respondent was not present. Rothert admitted that the respondenthad consented to the entry of the agreed order, but he explained that she had changed hermind and wanted the order vacated. He stated that the respondent simply did not want to beordered to undergo treatment, even though she had agreed to it. The State responded that theorder had not been forced upon the respondent and that it was a voluntary order agreed to bythe respondent and approved by the court and provided the respondent with a less restrictiveenvironment than Alton. The State further suggested that there might have been a differentoutcome if the respondent had not agreed to outpatient treatment: "[I]t's possible[] that thestaff would have taken the position that she should be declared an involuntary patient." Thetrial court denied the motion to vacate, stating in pertinent part as follows:

"The Court will note[] that[] and just for the record state that [the respondent] waspresent. I was the judge and approved the order. My recall was[-]I asked her if thisis her agreement which she desires to do, and she advised me yes[;] *** the time toraise a defense would have been at the time and prior to the entry of that order. Therehas to be some conclusion to litigation and a reasonable basis, and I believe thiswould be an unreasonable situation, and therefore I am denying the motion to vacatemotion and dismiss petition."

The respondent now appeals.

We first point out that the agreed order for outpatient treatment expired 90 days afterit was entered, which means the instant action has been moot since January 9, 2002. Nevertheless, a moot action is reviewable if (1) the duration of the challenged action madeit too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation and (2) there is a reasonable expectationthat the respondent could be subjected to the same action again. In re Cynthia S., 326 Ill.App. 3d 65, 66, 759 N.E.2d 1020, 1022 (2001). Because both criteria are met in the instantcase, we will review the challenged order.

The respondent contends that the trial court's order denying her motion to vacate theagreed order for outpatient mental health treatment must be reversed because she only agreedto the order in exchange for her release from Alton and that, thus, the agreement was theresult of coercion, duress, mistake, and grossly disparate bargaining positions between theparties and contravened both the Code and public policy. The respondent insists that the onlyinference that can be drawn from the totality of the circumstances is that her acceptance ofthe order was not voluntary and that the order is void. The State replies, and we agree, thatas a matter of law and public policy a respondent in a mental health proceeding has the rightto settle his or her case by agreeing to an order for outpatient treatment. The record in theinstant case simply fails to support the respondent's assertions that the agreed order was theresult of offensive conduct on the part of the State and that her acceptance of the agreementwas not voluntary.

Mental health proceedings are civil, not criminal, in nature. In re Nau, 153 Ill. 2d 406,429, 607 N.E.2d 134, 145 (1992). The public policy of Illinois favors settlements in civilcases, and settlements, once made, should be final. Johnson v. Hermanson, 221 Ill. App. 3d582, 585, 582 N.E.2d 265, 267 (1991). A settlement agreement is typically not subject toappellate review because an agreed order "is a recordation of the agreement between theparties and is not a judicial determination of the parties' rights." In re Haber, 99 Ill. App. 3d306, 309, 425 N.E.2d 1007, 1009 (1981). An agreed order cannot be set aside unless theparty seeking to set it aside shows that the order resulted from fraud, duress, coercion, unfairdealing, gross disparity in the position or capacity of the parties, or newly discoveredevidence. In re Haber, 99 Ill. App. 3d at 309, 425 N.E.2d at 1009. A trial court'sdetermination on the good-faith nature of a settlement is a matter within its discretion andwill be reversed on appeal only if the trial court abused its discretion. Dubina v. MesirowRealty Development, Inc., 197 Ill. 2d 185, 191-92, 756 N.E.2d 836, 840 (2001).

"[A settlement,] [i]n legal parlance, implies meeting of minds of parties to transactionor controversy; an adjustment of differences or accounts; a coming to an agreement.[Citation.] To fix or resolve conclusively; to make or arrange for final disposition." Black'sLaw Dictionary 1372 (6th ed. 1990). Contrary to the respondent's assertions, the agreedorder in the instant case fits within this definition and constitutes a settlement between therespondent and the State. Had the respondent not agreed to outpatient treatment, the Statecould have filed a petition for involuntary commitment. The State took that action on August14, 2001, after the respondent decided she no longer wanted to be a voluntary patient. TheState could have taken the same approach if the respondent had refused to agree to outpatienttreatment.

As for the good-faith nature of the settlement, the record here shows no sign of fraud,duress, unfair dealing, or wrongful conduct on the part of the State. The respondent has along history of mental illness and was treated at Alton on three prior occasions. In thisinstance, the respondent voluntarily admitted herself to Alton on August 8, 2001. On August14, 2001, the State filed a petition to have her involuntarily committed. The respondent wassuccessful in having that petition dismissed, but she followed by signing another voluntaryadmission form on August 31, 2001. If the respondent had not signed another petition forvoluntary admission after successfully having petitions for involuntary commitmentdismissed, then we would agree that the respondent had been illegally detained. However,under the circumstances presented here, we cannot say that the respondent was illegallydenied a discharge.

While we agree with the respondent that there was disparity between the parties'positions, we cannot agree that this necessitates that the order requiring her to complete 90days of outpatient treatment, to which she agreed, be set aside. The respondent wasrepresented by a qualified and competent attorney who specializes in mental health matters. When the motion in question came before the trial judge, the respondent's attorney madewhat he described as "a purely legal argument." The respondent's attorney did not contendthat the respondent had been subjected to fraud, duress, coercion, or any sinister methods onthe part of the State, but he simply explained that the respondent "just changed her mind"about treatment. However, because the respondent had previously agreed to outpatienttreatment, the disposition was final, and she was required to comply with the order thatsettled the case.

The record here also reveals that the respondent's treatment team acted in good faithand made considerable efforts to find the respondent the proper treatment and placement. By September 28, 2001, the respondent progressed to the point that inpatient treatment wasno longer necessary, and the State filed a petition for outpatient treatment. However, theState withdrew that petition on October 2, 2001, because the respondent's housing situationhad not been resolved. This action indicates that the State was taking into account therespondent's best interests and was acting in good faith. After the State filed another petitionfor outpatient treatment, the respondent agreed to 90 days of outpatient treatment. The trialcourt specifically remembers asking the respondent if she agreed to outpatient treatment andthe respondent assuring the court that she did. Neither the trial court nor the respondent'sattorney remembered the respondent expressing reservations about the order at the time sheagreed to it.

Allowing the respondent to rescind her agreement in the instant case would betantamount to holding that no settlement agreement could ever be reached in a mental healthproceeding. As a result, the State would be required to seek many more involuntarycommitment orders, which, as the Illinois Supreme Court has explained, are not as clinicallyeffective as voluntary treatment. See In re Hays, 102 Ill. 2d 314, 319-20, 465 N.E.2d 98, 100(1984). The settlement reached by the respondent and the State in the instant case appearsto have been made in good faith and cannot now be unilaterally altered by the respondent. The respondent has failed to convince us that the settlement was void or against publicpolicy.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Madison County ishereby affirmed.

Affirmed.

KUEHN and DONOVAN, JJ., concur.