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JUSTICE HOPKINS delivered the opinion of the court:

Union Pacific Railroad Company (defendant), appeals a jury verdict for JonathanIsbell (plaintiff) as administrator of the estate of Steven A. Kelso, in plaintiff's cause ofaction for negligence against defendant. Plaintiff's counts against Donald F. Cain andMissouri Pacific Railroad Company were dismissed at the trial, so defendant and plaintiffare the only parties in this appeal. Plaintiff's cause of action arose out of a fatal collision onDecember 12, 1995, as Steven drove his employer's truck south on Springfield Road. Steven's truck was struck by defendant's eastbound train at the Springfield Road crossing,which also is owned by defendant. The jury found that defendant was negligent andawarded plaintiff $2.5 million in damages; however, the jury reduced the award by 50%because of Steven's negligence. Defendant appeals.

On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant its motionfor judgment notwithstanding the verdict (a) because plaintiff's claim that there wereinadequate warning signs at the crossing was preempted by Federal law and (b) becauseplaintiff failed to prove that defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of Steven'sdeath. In addition, defendant contends that the trial court erred in numerous evidentiaryrulings, that the trial court failed to take judicial notice of statutes regulating crossings, thatreversible errors occurred during closing arguments, that the court erred in allowing andrefusing certain jury instructions, that the cumulative effect of the trial errors depriveddefendant of a fair trial, and that the jury's verdict was excessive. We affirm for the reasonsset forth below.

The following evidence pertinent to the issues was adduced at the trial: ThomasAllen, a contractor, testified that his business and his residence are located at the corner ofSpringfield Road and Miller Road, about one-half mile north of the Springfield Roadcrossing. On December 12, 1995, Steven delivered automotive parts to Allen's place ofbusiness.

Allen stated that he is very familiar with the Springfield Road crossing as he has livedand worked in the area since 1964. Allen described the crossing as deceiving, and heexplained: "[I am] not quite sure what it is about [the crossing], but it seems like you're onthe crossing [before you know it]. There is quite a grade change there. And if you're goingfrom north to south, you can see the train cars off in the distance to your right. But I thinkyou tend to lose focus of where the engine is."

Allen also testified that one of his employees had an accident in 1988 at theSpringfield Road crossing, while the employee was driving one of Allen's trucks. After theaccident, Allen told his employees not to go over the Springfield Road crossing. Allenstated that when crops are growing, the crops visually obstruct the crossing. Allen alsostated that it is more difficult to see a train when traveling north on Springfield Road thanwhen driving south, because there are some buildings, trees, a residence, and shrubbery onthe right side of the road, south of the crossing, that obstruct the view. Allen knew of twoother prior accidents involving a train and motor vehicle at the Springfield Road crossing. On cross-examination, Allen admitted that he did not witness the two other accidents.

Sergeant Michael Strong of the Madison County sheriff's office testified that he wasdispatched to Steven's accident on December 12, 1995, about 2:11 that afternoon. OfficerStrong inspected the area to determine the cause of the accident. Officer Strong noted thatthe railroad tracks are about eight feet lower than the road as you approach the crossing. Officer Strong found nothing that would totally obstruct Steven's view of the train, but hestated that there were a few tall weeds in the farmer's field to the west of the crossing. Officer Strong also thought that the sun "possibly" affected Steven's view, as the sun waslow in the sky and fairly bright. Officer Strong did not know why Steven did not stop forthe train. Officer Strong found skid marks north of the crossing that could have been madeby Steven's pickup truck.

Ronald Stubblefield, a locomotive engineer for the Burlington Northern Railroad in1994, testified that he occasionally used defendant's Springfield Road crossing. Stubblefieldexplained that when he uses defendant's railroad tracks, he notifies defendant's dispatcherso that defendant knows that he is on its tracks. In June 1994, Stubblefield was involved ina collision with a pickup truck at the Springfield Road crossing. Stubblefield reported theaccident to defendant.

Carl Smith, an employee of Norfolk Western for approximately 27 years, testified thata speed tape from a locomotive is equivalent to a black box on an airplane because it is anevent recorder that gives data that occurred during a given period. Smith stated that from1979 until he retired in 1995, he reviewed speed tapes about once a week. Smith explainedthat speed tapes are used to determine if an engineer contributed to an accident or if theengineer performed his duties properly.

Smith reviewed the speed tape from defendant's train that collided with Steven'struck. He determined that in the 16 seconds immediately before the collision, the locomotivetraveled at 62 miles per hour for eight seconds and 61 miles per hour for another eightseconds. Smith stated that the train was placed in full emergency when it was traveling 62miles per hour. Smith also explained that a train's speed can be converted into feet persecond. According to Smith, if the train had been going 60 miles per hour, the maximumspeed allowed for a train on these tracks, for the 16 seconds that the train was going morethan 60 miles per hour, there would have been a 35.12-feet difference.

On cross-examination, Smith admitted that it takes a long time for a train to slowdown, because of the length of a train. Smith also admitted that the train traveled at 58 milesper hour for four seconds shortly before the collision.

Donald Cain, the engineer who operated defendant's train on December 12, 1995,testified that he did not see Steven's truck prior to the collision. Cain became aware of aproblem when Charles Cudworth put the train in emergency. Cain was sitting in the frontseat on the right side of the locomotive, the opposite side from Steven's path of travel, andCudworth was sitting in the front seat on the left side of the locomotive. Although there arewindows on each side and in the front of the locomotive, Cain could not see to the left asCudworth blocked his view.

Cain explained that an engineer of a train operates the throttle, brake, and whistle ofthe locomotive. On December 12, 1995, Cudworth was learning the route, and Cain wasshowing Cudworth the terrain and informing him where the signal locations were.

Cain stated that he would not have done anything differently even if he had knownthe prior accident history of the Springfield Road crossing. Cain also stated that he has morethan 80 crossings in his territory and that he does not know what has happened at any of thecrossings.

Cain testified that he was watching the speedometer on December 12, 1995, and hedid not see the speedometer exceed 60 miles per hour. Cain stated that the grade of the trackat this crossing is downhill. In addition to watching the speedometer, Cain was soundingthe whistle and watching two crossings, Smith Road and Springfield Road, which are lessthan a quarter of a mile apart, to make sure there was no oncoming traffic and that thecrossings were clear. Cain explained that as a train approaches a crossing, the view is morelimited and restricted.

Cain saw hunters along the tracks near the crossing on December 12, 1995. Cainblew the train whistle to warn the hunters of the train's approach.

Bobby Williams, the conductor on defendant's train on December 12, 1995, testifiedthat he did not see Steven's truck before the collision as he was watching for the next signalto see if the train was cleared to proceed. Williams sat behind Cudworth on the left side ofthe locomotive. Williams had to lean to the right to see around Cudworth and out of thefront of the train. Williams saw Steven's truck after Cudworth grabbed the emergency brake. According to Williams, the train stopped about a half to three-quarters of a mile past thecrossing.

Williams did not personally believe that 2 miles per hour over the 60 miles-per-hourspeed limit would have made a difference in this accident because even at 60 miles per hourit would have taken a long time to stop the train. Williams also did not think that it wasimportant for him to know the accident history of a crossing, as he has the same duties toperform at every crossing.

Cudworth testified that he has been a locomotive engineer since 1968. Cudworth sawSteven's truck when Steven was about 400 feet from the crossing. It appeared to Cudworththat Steven was braking, but then Steven "gunned" his truck and pulled in front of the train. At that time, Cudworth reached for the emergency brake. When Cudworth saw Steveninitially brake, he presumed that Steven was going to stop. Cudworth stated that all he cando to avoid an accident is place a train in emergency.

Cudworth acknowledged that trains have speed restrictions. Cudworth also statedthat he treats all crossings as dangerous. Cudworth explained that the grade of the land, theweight on the train, and the locomotive's power affect a train's stopping time. Cudworthstated that even at 60 miles per hour, it takes a normal train about a mile to stop.

John Leick, senior claims specialist for defendant, investigated Steven's accident. Leick stated that approximately 278 of defendant's trains and 106 Burlington Northern trainsused the Springfield Road crossing during the 30 days prior to Steven's accident.

Stanley McLaughlin, vice president of defendant's quality and process improvements,testified through an evidence deposition. McLaughlin's testimony established that defendanthas no independent program for inspecting and evaluating crossings to determine if thewarning devices at a crossing are adequate, if additional warning devices are needed, orwhat type of warning device should be installed.

Dr. John Baerwald, a traffic engineer, testified as an expert witness concerningwhether crossings are extrahazardous and whether warning devices at a crossing areadequate. Dr. Baerwald stated that there are two types of warning devices available forcrossings, passive and active. Dr. Baerwald described passive warnings ascrossbucks-circular, yellow signs with an "X" and "RR" on it-and stop signs. Dr. Baerwaldstated that passive warnings do not advise a motorist if a train is coming or is on the crossingbut only tell the motorist that there are train tracks ahead. In contrast, active warnings notifya motorist if a train is coming or is on the crossing. Active warnings are flashing lights orflashing lights accompanied by short-arm gates. Dr. Baerwald stated that active warningsgive a driver "positive guidance." Dr. Baerwald testified that a 1989 report indicated thatif flashing lights are placed at railroad crossings, accidents are reduced by 77% and thatwhen both flashing lights and gates are installed at a crossing, accidents are reduced by 86%. Dr. Baerwald explained that a train whistle is a supplementary warning that depends upona driver's ability to hear it and to discern from what direction a train is coming.

Dr. Baerwald stated that in evaluating a crossing, the visual obstructions in all fourquadrants of a crossing must be considered, and ideally, a driver should have a straight,unobstructed approach well in advance of a crossing. Sharp turns, angles, or curves presenta problem. Also, a driver should be able to see a sufficient distance down a railroad trackso that at a certain decision point a driver can decide if a train is coming. Dr. Baerwaldexplained that State and Federal tables have been developed to determine how far a motoristshould be able to see so he can decide whether he should stop at a crossing. In the case subjudice, where the motorist has a maximum speed of 55 miles per hour and the train has amaximum speed of 60 miles per hour, a driver should be able to see 700 feet down therailroad tracks when he is 565 feet from the outer rail of the crossing.

Dr. Baerwald formed his opinion regarding the Springfield Road crossing after hereviewed depositions, statements, the accident report of this accident, accident reports ofprevious accidents, communications from government bodies, the traffic-count informationprovided by the county, and the train traffic information provided by the railroad. Dr.Baerwald also made three visits to the accident scene. In Dr. Baerwald's opinion, theSpringfield Road crossing is extrahazardous. According to Dr. Baerwald, any crossingwhere a train and a motor vehicle can be at a crossing at the same time is a hazard. Thehazard increases as the number of vehicles and trains using the crossing increases. At theSpringfield Road crossing, approximately 400 vehicles per day and 8 to 18 trains per dayused the crossing. Both the trains (60 miles per hour) and the vehicles (55 miles per hour)travel at high speeds at the crossing. Additionally, the angle of the train tracks to the roadis 61 degrees rather than the desired angle of 90 degrees, which contributes to the hazard. The train tracks are at a lower elevation than the surrounding land, allowing a motorist tosee only part of the train at 565 feet from the crossing.

The Springfield Road crossing contains view obstructions in all four quadrants: inthe southeast quadrant there are residential and other buildings and trees; in the northeastquadrant there is a line of trees that are 31 feet high approximately 600 feet from the tracks;and in all quadrants there are crops, a seasonal obstruction. Dr. Baerwald explained that amotorist must be concerned with at least two quadrants, the right and the left, because untilthe train is seen, a motorist does not know from which direction the train is coming even ifthe driver hears the train's whistle. Another factor Dr. Baerwald considered was that theplacement of the crossbucks on the north side of the tracks was 39 feet from the rail. Federalregulations require crossbucks to be 12 to 15 feet from the rail, while State regulationsrequire crossbucks to be 8