PRESIDING JUSTICE CHAPMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

Linda Janes (plaintiff), individually and as the administrator of the estate of PhillipErnest Janes, filed a declaratory judgment action in the circuit court of Williamson Countyregarding her underinsured-motorist coverage through Transamerica Indemnity Company, alsoknown as TIG Insurance Group (defendant). On cross-motions for summary judgment, thecourt entered judgment in part for plaintiff and in part for defendant. Plaintiff appeals anddefendant cross-appeals. The appeal raises numerous issues.

Plaintiff and her husband, Phillip Ernest Janes, were policyholders of an insurancepolicy on a Nissan van. On October 1, 1993, Phillip was driving the van and plaintiff was apassenger. There were four other occupants: Cleo Harris and her husband, Jerry Harris, andConnie Church and her husband, Charles Church. A vehicle driven by Alice Phelps crossedthe center line and collided with the van. Plaintiff suffered serious injuries. Plaintiff claimsthat she was in intensive care until October 21, 1993, and that her medical bills total$162,226.43. All the other occupants of the van died. Defendant concedes that the damagesexceed all alleged policy limits. Phelps's liability insurance provider tendered her policy limitsof $50,000.

Plaintiff and her husband were the named insureds on two separate insurance policies.One policy was issued by Western States Insurance Company (Western States), the other bydefendant.

The insuring-agreement section for the underinsured-motorist coverage of the policyissued by defendant provided, "We will pay under this coverage only after the limits of liabilityunder any applicable bodily injury bonds or policies have been exhausted by payment ofjudgment or settlements."

Defendant issued a document entitled "Split Underinsured Motorists Limits" instructingplaintiff that the first paragraph of the limit of liability in the original endorsement was replacedby the following:

"LIMIT OF LIABILITY

The limit of liability shown in the Schedule or in the Declarations for each personfor Underinsured Motorists Coverage is our maximum limit of liability for all damages,including damages for care, loss of services[,] or death[] arising out of 'bodily injury'sustained by any one person in any one accident. Subject to this limit for each person,the limit of liability shown in the Schedule or in the Declarations for each accident forUnderinsured Motorists Coverage is our maximum limit of liability for all damages for'bodily injury' resulting from any one accident. This is the most we will pay regardlessof the number of:

1. 'Insureds;'

2. Claims made;

3. Vehicles or premiums shown in the Declarations; or

4. Vehicles involved in the accident."

The schedule did not list the limit of liability.

The declarations page has a section entitled "Coverages & Limits," which listshorizontally across the top a Nissan GXE van, a Dodge Shadow, and a Dodge pickup. Listedin the first column are the coverages provided: bodily injury liability, property damage,medical payments, uninsured/underinsured motorists, property damage/uninsured motorists,other than collision, and collision. In this column, after the listing of bodily injury liability andafter the listing of uninsured/underinsured motorists, there is an asterisk (*). In the left margin,alongside the first column, is this legend: "* PER PERSON/PER ACCIDENT OROCCURRENCE PER POLICY PROVISION; 000 OMITTED." The remaining columns listdollar amounts for the limits of coverage and for premiums.

For each vehicle there are two columns, one listing the limits of coverage and the otherlisting the premium. For example, on the line for uninsured/underinsured motorists, thecolumns read $50/100 and $14 (under Nissan GXE van), $50/100 and $13 (under DodgeShadow), and $50/100 and $13 (under Dodge pickup). At the bottom of the columns listingthe premiums, the premiums for each vehicle are subtotaled. These subtotals are referred toas "PREMIUM PER CAR" (e.g., $178 under Nissan GXE van). Under this section, on theright side of the page, there is a box listing the "TOTAL SEMI[]ANNUAL PREMIUM" at$513.

On September 29, 1995, plaintiff filed a 16-count complaint for declaratory judgmentagainst Western States and defendant. Plaintiff asked that the coverage given by defendant bestacked, for a total of $300,000 in coverage. Plaintiff asked, in the alternative, that ifdefendant's coverage were deemed to be $100,000, it still be stacked with the coverage fromWestern States. Western States tendered its policy limits of $50,000 after the declaratoryjudgment action was filed.

On July 17, 1998, defendant filed a petition for leave to deposit proceeds, seeking todeposit $50,000 with the circuit clerk. Plaintiff filed an objection, conceding that defendantcould deposit the funds but objecting to a deposit that would relieve defendant of any liabilitybeyond the deposit. In a docket entry, the court ordered as follows:

"The Petition will be granted. Order to be submitted. Deposit allowed but not to beconstrued as any determination of any of the issues pending between parties[,] such asstacking, interest, set[]off, etc. Order to be submitted."

There is no indication in the record that a proposed order was submitted or a deposit made.

Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, and defendant filed a cross-motion. OnApril 8, 1999, the court entered an order finding that the policy issued by defendant "stacked,"making the total coverage from defendant $300,000. The court also found that defendant'spolicy should be aggregated with Western States' coverage of $50,000, for a total of $350,000. The issues regarding applicable setoffs were reserved pending further hearing. Plaintiff thenfiled a motion asking for sanctions for vexatious and unreasonable failure to pay. See 215ILCS 5/155 (West 1998); 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(a) (West 1998). On October 19, 1999, thecourt entered an order denying all claims against defendant for bad faith. The court alsogranted defendant a setoff for the total amount of $50,000 paid by Phelps's insurer. The courtruled that all the insurance proceeds should be divided equally among the six claimants (onefor each occupant of the Janes vehicle). The court awarded each of the six claimants $8,333.33from the deposit previously made by Western States and $41,666.66 from defendant.

Plaintiff appeals. Defendant cross-appeals.

Plaintiff contends that defendant's delay in payment is vexatious and unreasonable ascase law clearly establishes that the policy allows coverages to be stacked. Defendant contendsthat the policy was unambiguous and that the trial court, therefore, erred in stacking thecoverage. We find that case law has directly addressed the arrangement of this policy formatsuch that there is no bona fide dispute that stacking is permissible.

In Allen v. Transamerica Insurance Co., 128 F.3d 462 (7th Cir. 1997), the SeventhCircuit allowed the plaintiff to stack underinsured-motorist coverages. In Allen, the plaintiffhad two vehicles, each having an underinsured-motorist liability limit of $50,000 per personand $100,000 per incident. Allen, 128 F.3d at 464. The policy also contained a limit-of-liability provision identical to the one in this case. As in the case at hand, the schedule was leftblank, and the declarations page was the only place that set forth the limits of the policy.

As a federal court having jurisdiction through diversity, the Allen court interpretedIllinois law. The court found that "the precise factual scenario" before it had been addressedin Bruder v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 156 Ill. 2d 179, 620 N.E.2d 355 (1993). Allen,128 F.3d at 467. In Bruder, the plaintiff attempted to stack the underinsured-motorist coveragefor two pickup trucks. The Bruder court held that the antistacking clause, when read togetherwith the declarations page, was unambiguous because the limit of underinsured-motoristcoverage was listed only once above the columns in the middle of the page and was notrepeated in the columns. The Bruder court analyzed the columnar arrangement of thedeclarations page and made clear that its decision hinged on the limits not being repeated inthe columns. The Allen court quoted Bruder:

" 'Understanding the arrangement of entries in the columns is important indetermining the effect of what is not there included. Specifically, the limits of liabilityare not set out within the column arrangement in the same manner as the page lists thepremium amounts and totals. That is, there is no column for which the limit of liabilityfor bodily injury is to be listed like a premium amount so that the $100,000 limit foreach person would appear in both sentence-like lines for the pickup trucks.

It would not be difficult to find an ambiguity created by such a listing of thebodily injury liability limit for each person insured. It could easily be interpreted thatan insured should enjoy a total limit of $200,000 in coverage because a figure of$100,000 would be shown for each pickup truck. There would be little to suggest insuch a listing that the parties intended that coverage was to be limited to that providedfor only one of the two pickup trucks. It would be more reasonable to assume that theparties intended that, in return for the two premiums, two $100,000 coverage amountswere afforded.' " (Emphasis omitted.) Allen, 128 F.3d at 465 (quoting Bruder, 156 Ill.2d at 192, 620 N.E.2d at 362).

The Allen court found Bruder dispositive on the issue and stacked the insurance coverage.

The Allen court pointed out that the antistacking clause did not prevent stacking,because the clause did not erase the ambiguity created by the declarations sheet. The casescited by the defendant in Allen, the same cases cited by defendant in the case at hand, weretherefore found to be irrelevant: Frigo v. Motors Insurance Corp., 271 Ill. App. 3d 50, 648N.E.2d 180 (1995); Menke v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 78 Ill. 2d 420, 401 N.E.2d 539(1980); and Obenland v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 234 Ill. App. 3d 99, 599 N.E.2d 999(1992). These cases are similarly irrelevant to our decision here.

Defendant contends that the Allen court failed to address a feature of the declarationssheet. According to defendant, the asterisk on the declarations sheet instructs the policyholderthat the limits in each column are "per policy provision." The Allen court did not deliberate onthe presence of an asterisk, so we cannot be certain whether the defendant raised this argumentin its previous round as appellee. In any event, we find the argument to be far from credible. The asterisk does not remove the ambiguity. A reasonable person could still read the coveragesas cumulating when the declarations page is read laterally. In fact, the asterisk itself could beseen as adding to the confusion. In order to find the answer that defendant contends is meant,the policyholder must refer back to the endorsement "provision" that first referred him to thedeclarations page (and the schedule). This complicated process certainly does not clear up theambiguity.

Plaintiff contends that because it is so clearly established that the coverage of this policystacks, defendant's failure to pay is vexatious conduct prohibited by the Illinois Insurance Code(215 ILCS 5/155 (West 1998)). The refusal to settle is not vexatious per se. The statute is notviolated merely because an insurance company is unsuccessful in contesting the scope ofcoverage or the magnitude of the loss. McGee v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 315 Ill.App. 3d 673, 681, 734 N.E.2d 144, 150 (2000). The determination is based on the insurer'sattitude, considering the totality of circumstances. Green v. International Insurance Co., 238Ill. App. 3d 929, 935, 605 N.E.2d 1125, 1129 (1992). Whether an insurer's conduct isvexatious and unreasonable is a question of fact, and a trial court's determination on the issuewill not be reversed unless an abuse of discretion is demonstrated in the record. Millers MutualInsurance Ass'n v. House, 286 Ill. App. 3d 378, 387, 675 N.E.2d 1037, 1043 (1997). A delayin settling a claim may be vexatious if there is no bona fide dispute about coverage. Keller v.State Farm Insurance Co., 180 Ill. App. 3d 539, 555, 536 N.E.2d 194, 204 (1989).

Defendant contends that there was a bona fide dispute. Defendant points out that Allenwas a federal case. Defendant also contends that the language from Bruder relied upon inAllen, and in our decision here, was dictum. Therefore, defendant argues, Allen and Bruderare not controlling authority. The resemblance to Allen and the clarity of Bruder beliedefendant's position.

Defendant's emphasis on Allen being a federal case ignores the closeness of Allen to thecase at hand. Allen is not just similar to the case at hand; it is virtually identical. The limit-of-liability clauses are the same, and the declarations sheets use the same format. Indeed,Transamerica Indemnity Company is the defendant in both cases.

Defendant correctly contends that since Allen was tried in federal court, it is notcontrolling in this case. It is, however, incredibly persuasive authority. The fragility ofdefendant's claim is exposed by reading the Allen opinion. The Allen court was not strainedto find Illinois law. The court relied heavily on Bruder, quoting the same language we haveused above. Bruder provided clear precedent for the Allen court. Bruder is also controllingof this case. Defendant contends that the relevant language in Bruder is dictum and, therefore,not controlling. Nonetheless, the directness of the language in Bruder leaves no doubt as towhat the law is in Illinois.

In Pekin Insurance Co. v. Estate of Goben, 303 Ill. App. 3d 639, 707 N.E.2d 1259(1999), this court addressed the Bruder decision. In Goben, as in this case, there was no limitof liability printed in the endorsement, and the insured was instructed to refer to thedeclarations page to determine the limits of coverage. The declarations page listed thecoverage for several vehicles in separate columns. In citing to Allen and Bruder, we held thatthe policy was ambiguous and, therefore, allowed stacking.

Goben itself establishes clear precedent which leaves no bona fide dispute that stackingis allowed under the policy in the case at hand. The fact that our opinion in Goben wasreleased over a year prior to the filing of defendant-appellee's brief appears to be sufficientindication that defendant's delay was unwarranted. Defendant should not be able to claim thatthe delay was caused by plaintiff not more aggressively pursuing her claim or that plaintiff'spleading alternative amounts of recovery precludes a finding of vexatious delay. See McGee,315 Ill. App. 3d at 685, 734 N.E.2d at 151 (delay on part of the plaintiff does not prohibit afinding of unreasonable and vexatious delay).

Goben also illustrates that Bruder established that the columnar declarations sheet in thedefendant's policy stacked. In Goben we emphasized the clear precedent that Bruder hadprovided. In Goben we held, "[T]he language from the Bruder decision was central to thecourt's rationale for why the insurance policy at issue in Bruder was not ambiguous." Goben,303 Ill. App. 3d at 649, 707 N.E.2d at 1266. We then continued by pointing out that even ifthe language was dictum, Bruder would be controlling. Defendant's dubious contention thatBruder was not controlling is erased by Goben.

Even absent the clear precedent provided on the issue, the conduct by defendant in thiscase would still be somewhat disturbing. According to defendant, it made an offer of $66,000in September 1995. The record does not document defendant's contention, and plaintiffcontends that no such offer was made. According to plaintiff, defendant made its first offeron July 17, 1998, nearly five years after the wreck and more than 2