JUSTICE RARICK delivered the opinion of the court:

The plaintiff, Patricia Johnson, brought an action in the circuit court of St. ClairCounty against State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm). Johnsonwas injured in an automobile collision with an uninsured motorist. As a result, she incurredmedical expenses totaling $12,528.99. Johnson submitted a claim to State Farm for paymentof medical expenses under the medical payment provisions of her policy. In response, StateFarm paid the medical payment coverage (MPC) limit of $5,000. Johnson subsequentlymade a claim under the uninsured-motorist (UM) provision of her policy, and she made ademand for arbitration. The arbitrators awarded $22,000. State Farm offset the $5,000 ithad already paid Johnson and issued her a check in the amount of $17,000.

Johnson and attorney Rich thereafter filed a four-count complaint against State Farm. In count I of her third amended complaint, Johnson asserted a claim under Illinois'scommon-fund doctrine. In count II, Johnson alleged that State Farm failed to pay her thefull amount due on the arbitration award. In counts III and IV, attorney Rich asserted thatState Farm owed attorney fees under the common-fund doctrine.

State Farm moved to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of CivilProcedure (725 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 1998)). On March 12, 1999, the trial court dismissedcount I with prejudice, dismissed count II, but declined to dismiss counts III or IV. Withrespect to count I, the trial court ruled that Johnson, a nonattorney, could not recover underthe common-fund doctrine. With respect to count II, the trial court reasoned that State Farmwas entitled to deduct the $5,000 MPC benefits from the arbitration award pursuant to theterms of the nonduplication and reimbursement provisions of the MPC. With respect tocounts III and IV, the trial court found that the plaintiff had adequately alleged a common-fund fee claim against State Farm. The trial court reasoned that the application of thecommon-fund doctrine would place the parties in the same position they would be in if twopolicies or another insurer were involved. The court noted that State Farm took anadversarial role in the arbitration proceedings and was seeking to benefit from the servicesof Johnson's attorney.

The trial court subsequently entered an order pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308(134 Ill. 2d R. 308), finding that its March 12, 1999, order involved certain questions of lawas to which there are substantial grounds for difference of opinion and that an immediateappeal might advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. The questions are:

"1. *** [W]hether the equitable 'common fund' doctrine in Illinois isapplicable to require a defendant insurer to pay fees to its policyholder's lawyerwhere:

(a) the lawyer has represented the defendant insurer's policyholder inarbitration of the policyholder's claim against the defendant insurer forUninsured Motorist benefits; and

(b) the defendant insurer was actively represented by its own retainedcounsel in the arbitration of the uninsured motorist claim.

2. The issues for interlocutory appeal raised by plaintiffs are:

A. In an uninsured/underinsured motorist arbitration, do thearbitrators in determining the question, 'What amount, if any[?]', under thepolicy[] have the authority to consider other policy provisions that effect [sic]the total arbitration amount awarded?

B. Under the policy, does the arbitration award in anuninsured/underinsured claim include an award of medical expenses?

C. In an uninsured/underinsured motorist claim does the insurerrepresent the uninsured/underinsured tortfeasor?" (Emphasis in original.)

This court granted both parties' applications for leave to appeal, and the parties filed separateappeals. In case No. 5-99-0599, Johnson appealed the trial court's dismissal of count II ofher complaint. In case No. 5-99-0597, State Farm appealed the trial court's refusal todismiss counts III and IV of Johnson's complaint. On the court's own motion, these caseswere consolidated for disposition under case No. 5-99-0597.

Generally, an appeal under Rule 308 is limited to the question that is identified by thetrial court. Jones v. City of Carbondale, 217 Ill. App. 3d 85, 576 N.E.2d 909 (1991). Wherenecessary, however, this court can go beyond the certified question to consider theappropriateness of the order giving rise to the appeal. In re Lawrence M., 172 Ill. 2d 523,670 N.E.2d 710 (1996); Billerbeck v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 292 Ill. App. 3d 350, 685N.E.2d 1018 (1997). In the present case, we find it necessary to address the appropriatenessof the trial court's order.

Johnson argues that the $22,000 awarded by the arbitrators was in excess of the$5,000 State Farm had already paid under the MPC and that State Farm improperly deductedthe $5,000 from the arbitration award. She maintains that the authority of the arbitrators toenter an award was limited by the terms of the policy to enter an award for bodily injury onlyand that bodily injury, as defined by the policy, does not include medical expenses. Johnsoncontends that because a UM award cannot include medical expenses, the arbitrators'determination that she suffered damages in the amount of $22,000 could not have includedthe same $5,000 in medical bills that State Farm had already paid under her MPC. Johnsonalso argues that in determining the amount of damages, the arbitrators had the authority toconsider other policy provisions that affect the total amount awarded. Specifically, shemaintains that in determining the amount of damages for bodily injury, the arbitrators musthave considered the nonduplication and setoff provisions contained in other sections of thepolicy.

Before addressing the merits of Johnson's arguments, we will set forth the relevantpolicy provisions:

"Bodily Injury - means bodily injury to a person and sickness, disease[,] or deathwhich results from it.

Insured - means the person, persons[,] or organization defined as insureds in thespecific coverage.

Person - means a human being.

***

MEDICAL EXPENSES

We will pay reasonable medical expenses[] for bodily injury caused by accident ***.

If There Are Other Medical Payments Coverages.

1. Non-Duplication

No person for whom medical expenses are payable under this coverage shallrecover more than once for the same medical expense under this or similarvehicle insurance.

When Someone May Be Legally Liable For the Bodily Injury

***

2. When we pay medical expenses under this coverage, we are entitled to be paidout of any subsequent recovery for bodily injury from a liable party or suchparty's insurer ***.

3. The liability, uninsured motor vehicle[,] and underinsured motor vehiclecoverages shall be excess over and shall not pay again any medical expensespaid under this coverage.

SECTION III - UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE - COVERAGE U,
UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE - COVERAGE UI AND
UNDERINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE - COVERAGE W
UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE - COVERAGE U

***

We will pay damages for bodily injury an insured is legally entitled to collect fromthe owner or driver of an uninsured motor vehicle. The bodily injury must be causedby accident arising out of the operation, maintenance[,] or use of an uninsured motorvehicle.

Deciding Fault and Amount

Two questions must be decided by agreement between the insured and us:

1. Is the insured legally entitled to collect damages from the owner ordriver of the uninsured motor vehicle or underinsured motor vehicle;and

2. If so, in what amount?

If there is no agreement, these questions shall be decided by arbitration.

Coverages U and W

1. Any amount payable under these coverages shall be reduced by any amountpaid or payable to or for the insured:

a. by or for any person or organization who is or may be held legallyliable for the bodily injury to the insured;

b. for bodily injury under the liability coverage;

***

2. Any payments made to a person for bodily injury under these coverages shallreduce any amount payable to that person under the bodily injury liabilitycoverage." (Emphasis in original.)

When construing the language of an insurance policy, our primary objective is toascertain and give effect to the intentions of the parties as expressed in their agreement. Elson v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 295 Ill. App. 3d 1, 691 N.E.2d 807 (1998). Termsthat are reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning will be considered ambiguous andwill be construed strictly against the insurer. Fuller's Car Wash, Inc. v. Liberty MutualInsurance Co., 298 Ill. App. 3d 167, 698 N.E.2d 237 (1998). If the terms of the policy areclear and unambiguous, however, they will be given their plain and ordinary meaning. General Insurance Co. of America v. Robert B. McManus, Inc., 272 Ill. App. 3d 510, 650N.E.2d 1080 (1995).

The terms of the policy in the present case are clear and unambiguous. If the partiesare unable to reach an agreement regarding an uninsured-motorist claim, the matter will besubmitted to arbitration and the arbitrators will determine whether the insured is entitled tocollect damages from an uninsured motorist and, if so, the amount of those damages. Johnson is correct in arguing that a UM award can only be for bodily injuries. However,there is nothing in the language of the policy that excludes medical expenses from theamount of those damages. Indeed, statutory provisions relating to UM coverage clearlycontemplate that damages will include the insured's medical expenses. See 215 ILCS5/143a(1)(A) (West 1998). In the present case, we note that the arbitrators' award states thatJohnson's medical bills were introduced into evidence and were considered in determiningthe amount of the award. This further demonstrates that the arbitrators' award of $22,000was not for bodily injury only. It is evident from the policy language that the arbitratorscould consider all damage elements in determining the total amount of the award and thatthey considered Johnson's medical expenses in making their award.

With respect to Johnson's argument regarding the setoff and nonduplicationprovisions, it is well-settled that the scope of the arbitrators' authority is strictly limited bythe language of the contract. Smagala v. Owen, 307 Ill. App. 3d 213, 717 N.E.2d 491(1999). As noted above, the arbitration provision authorizes the arbitrators to determinewhether the insured is entitled to collect damages from an uninsured motorist and theamount thereof. Nothing in the arbitration provision in the present case authorized thearbitrators to consider any setoff or nonduplication provisions that may be contained in otherprovisions of the policy.

We conclude that, as a matter of law, State Farm was entitled to deduct from the$22,000 award the $5,000 it had paid Johnson pursuant to her MPC. Thus, count II ofJohnson's third amended complaint should have been dismissed with prejudice.

State Farm argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion to dismiss counts IIIand IV, wherein attorney Rich alleged common-fund fee claims. State Farm maintains thatthe lawyer-plaintiff did not serve any benefit for State Farm.

The common-fund doctrine is based upon the equitable concept that an attorney whoperforms services in creating a fund should in equity and good conscience be allowedcompensation out of the whole fund from those who seek to benefit from the creation of thefund. Brase v. Loempker, 267 Ill. App. 3d 415, 642 N.E.2d 202 (1994). In order to recoverfees under the common-fund doctrine, the attorney must show (1) that the fund was createdas the result of legal services performed by an attorney, (2) that the subrogee did notparticipate in the creation of the fund, and (3) that the subrogee benefited out of the fund thatwas created. Meyers v. Hablutzel, 236 Ill. App. 3d 705, 603 N.E.2d 91 (1992). However,a plaintiff may not recover attorney fees under the doctrine while rendering services for anunwilling recipient. Tenney v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 128 Ill. App. 3d121, 470 N.E.2d 6 (1984).

The premise of the lawyer-plaintiff's common-fund claim in the present case is thatattorney Rich, through his efforts at the arbitration hearing, created a fund of $22,000, a fundfrom which State Farm had the right to be reimbursed for the $5,000 it had already paidJohnson pursuant to her MPC. The lawyer-plaintiff claims that State Farm had nocontractual right to deduct from the $22,000 arbitration award the $5,000 already paid andthat the only provision by which State Farm could have claimed the $5,000 from thearbitration award was the subrogation/reimbursement provision contained in paragraph 2(a)of the section on the MPC, which provides that if State Farm paid medical expenses forwhich someone else was liable, it was entitled to be paid out of any subsequent recovery forbodily injury from the liable party. Thus, the lawyer-plaintiff contends, they created a fundout of which State Farm benefited.

As noted above, under the clear and unambiguous language of the policy, thearbitrators were authorized to determine the total amount of damages, and State Farm wasauthorized to set off the $5,000 it had paid Johnson pursuant to her MPC. The lawyer-plaintiff in the present case did not create any fund out of which State Farm "reimbursed"itself. Because the lawyer-plaintiff did not create any fund from which State Farm benefited,it is not entitled to recovery fees pursuant to the common-fund doctrine.

The lawyer-plaintiff takes the position that State Farm should be treated as if it werethe insurer of the negligent uninsured motorist who injured Johnson and that State Farm'sobligation to pay UM benefits to its own insured should be equated with the obligation ofthe liability insurer of an at-fault driver. This argument was rejected by the court in Terryv. State Farm Automobile Insurance Co., 287 Ill. App. 3d 8, 677 N.E.2d 1019 (1997),wherein the court held that payments made under underinsured-motorist coverage were notmade by or on behalf of the underinsured motorist and do not discharge the liability of suchmotorist.

Finally, the lawyer-plaintiff contends that the arbitrators in an uninsured/underinsuredarbitration have the authority to determine the validity of a right to setoff and/orreimbursement. Again, as noted above, nothing in the arbitration provision in the presentcase authorized the arbitrators to consider any setoff or nonduplication provisions that mightbe contained in other provisions of the policy.

For the foregoing reasons, and pursuant to this court's authority under Supreme CourtRule 366 (134 Ill. 2d R. 366), it is ordered that counts II, III, and IV of Johnson's thirdamended complaint be dismissed with prejudice.

Opinion affirmed in part and reversed in part; case dismissed.

GOLDENHERSH and KUEHN, JJ., concur.