This is an appeal from an order granting a default judgment and awarding$204,497.23 in damages. The issues for review are whether the trial court erred in failingto vacate the default judgment because the plaintiff did not provide the defendant withimmediate notice pursuant to section 2-1302(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735ILCS 5/2-1302(a) (West 2000)), whether the trial court erred in failing to vacate the defaultjudgment pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2000)),whether the trial court's award of damages was against the manifest weight of the evidence,whether the trial court erred in failing to vacate the assessment of damages because thedefendant was not given notice of the hearing on damages, and whether the court erred inassessing damages because the defendant was not provided notice of the plaintiff's waiverof a jury. We affirm.

On February 4, 1999, Nancy J. Johnson (plaintiff) filed a complaint against Wal-MartStores, Inc. (defendant), seeking damages against defendant for personal injuries sheincurred on defendant's premises in Carmi, Illinois. Plaintiff demanded a jury trial. OnFebruary 18, 1999, the sheriff of Sangamon County, Illinois, served the summons and a copyof the complaint on defendant's registered agent.

Over six months later, on October 12, 1999, plaintiff sought a default judgmentagainst defendant because defendant had neither filed an answer nor entered an appearancein the case. In her motion for default judgment, plaintiff provided an itemization of herexpenses, court costs, and the amount sought for pain and suffering. A letter from plaintiff'sorthopedic surgeon, Dr. Robert Meyers, was attached to the motion for default judgment anddescribed plaintiff's injury, past treatment, and prognosis for the future. An itemization ofplaintiff's out-of-pocket expenses was also attached to the motion. At the time of thehearing, defendant had not entered its appearance or otherwise filed a responsive pleadingto plaintiff's complaint. No notice was sent to defendant prior to the date or time for thehearing.

After testimony at the hearing on the motion, the court entered a default judgment infavor of plaintiff on October 12, 1999. The court awarded plaintiff out-of-pocket expensesof $44,351.43, future expenses of $10,000, pain and suffering calculated at $150,000, andcosts of $145.80. On November 23, 1999, plaintiff wrote defendant's legal department toinquire about the payment of the judgment.

On December 27, 1999, defendant filed a motion to vacate and set aside defaultjudgment pursuant to section 2-1305 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-1305 (West 1998)), whichwas denied on April 10, 1999. Defendant filed a timely appeal.

Defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing to vacate the default judgment

because plaintiff disregarded the requirement of providing immediate notice pursuant tosection 2-1302(a) and defendant was thus deprived of the opportunity to move to vacate thejudgment under section 2-1301 (735 ILCS 5/2-1301 (West 2000)). Defendant alleges thatplaintiff secured the judgment with unclean hands and that fundamental fairness requiresthat the default judgment be vacated. Plaintiff argues that because defendant had not enteredan appearance by the time of the entry of the default, no notice was required.

Section 2-1302(a) provides: "Upon the entry of an order of default, the attorney forthe moving party shall immediately give notice thereof to each party who has appeared,against whom the order was entered, or such party's attorney of record. However, the failureof the attorney to give the notice does not impair the force, validity[,] or effect of the order."(Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/2-1302(a) (West 2000). A lack of notice alone does notinvalidate a default. The Illinois Supreme Court has held that the failure to provide adefendant with notice of the entry of a default order does not by itself invalidate the default. Kaput v. Hoey, 124 Ill. 2d 370, 379, 530 N.E.2d 230, 234 (1988). An alleged failure tonotify a defendant of the entry of a default judgment will not render such a judgment void.La Rabida Children's Hospital & Research Center v. Harrison, 263 Ill. App. 3d 790, 635N.E.2d 575 (1994). The purpose of the statute is to alleviate the injustice that would resultif a default is entered without notice to a party who has appeared. Carlstedt v. Kaufmann,119 Ill. App. 2d 322, 327, 256 N.E.2d 146, 148 (1970). It is to alert a party so that he canact within the time provided for by law and move to set aside a default. Carlstedt, 119 Ill.App. 2d at 326-27, 256 N.E.2d at 148.

In the instant case defendant had not filed a responsive pleading even though oversix months had elapsed since an answer from defendant was due. Defendant did not enteran appearance, nor was there an attorney of record for defendant at the time the defaultjudgment was entered. Under these facts we cannot, and do not, find that the trial courteither erred or abused its discretion in failing to vacate the default judgment againstdefendant for the lack of notice provided to defendant by plaintiff.

Defendant also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying its motionto vacate the default judgment pursuant to section 2-1401. Section 2-1401 provides astatutory procedure for vacating a final judgment after 30 days from its entry. To be entitledto relief under section 2-1401, the petitioner must affirmatively set forth specific factualallegations supporting each of the following elements: (1) the existence of a meritoriousdefense or claim, (2) due diligence in presenting this defense or claim to the circuit court inthe original action, and (3) due diligence in filing the section 2-1401 petition for relief. Smith v. Airoom, Inc., 114 Ill. 2d 209, 220-21, 499 N.E.2d 1381, 1386 (1986). The quantumof proof necessary to sustain a section 2-1401 petition is a preponderance of the evidence.Smith, 114 Ill. 2d at 221, 499 N.E.2d at 1386. A section 2-1401(a) petition must besupported by affidavit or other showing of matters not contained in the record. 735 ILCS5/2-1401(b) (West 2000); Cruz v. Columbus-Cuneo-Cabrini Medical Center, 264 Ill. App.3d 633, 639, 636 N.E.2d 908, 911 (1994). The question of whether a section 2-1401petition should be granted lies within the sound discretion of the circuit court, dependingupon the facts and equities presented. Smith, 114 Ill. 2d at 221, 499 N.E.2d at 1386. Acourt of review is justified in disturbing the judgment of the circuit court only if it finds thatthe court abused its discretion. Smith, 114 Ill. 2d at 221, 499 N.E.2d at 1386; AmericanAmbassador Casualty Co. v. Jackson, 295 Ill. App. 3d 485, 492, 692 N.E.2d 717 (1998). The trial court cannot be said to have abused its discretion if reasonable persons could differas to its decision. Merchants Bank v. Roberts, 292 Ill. App. 3d 925, 930, 686 N.E.2d 1202(1997).

In the instant appeal, the circuit court denied defendant's motion to vacate the defaultjudgment. The court found that defendant had neither suggested the existence of ameritorious defense nor shown due diligence in presenting a defense to the circuit court inthe original action. The court recalled that defendant was served with the summons and acopy of the complaint and neither provided a response nor filed an answer for six months. The court found that there had been no showing or presentation of any indication why therewas such a delay and no showing of why defendant did nothing with regard to the originalaction. Due diligence requires that the section 2-1401 petitioner have a reasonable excusefor failing to act within the appropriate time. Smith, 114 Ill. 2d at 222, 499 N.E.2d at 1386. Since section 2-1401 does not afford a litigant a remedy whereby he may be relieved of theconsequences of his own mistake or negligence, a party relying on section 2-1401 is notentitled to relief unless he shows that the error of fact or the existence of a valid defense wasnot made to appear to the trial court through no fault or negligence of his own. Smith, 114Ill. 2d at 222, 499 N.E.2d at 1387. Specifically, a petitioner must show that his failure todefend against the lawsuit was the result of an excusable mistake and that under thecircumstances he acted reasonably, and not negligently, in failing to initially resist thejudgment. Smith, 114 Ill. 2d at 222, 499 N.E.2d at 1386.

The court found that defendant's arguments of a meritorious defense were merelyconclusions because they lacked specific allegations and that defendant did not providesupporting documents as required. A petition under section 2-1401 must be supported byaffidavit or other showing of matters not contained in the record. 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(b)(West 2000); Cruz, 264 Ill. App. 3d at 639, 636 N.E.2d at 911. The record establishes thatdefendant did not demonstrate due diligence in that it never, at any time, offered a reasonfor its six-month delay in presenting its defenses to plaintiff's claims in the original action. Though it had ample opportunity to avoid the default judgment by filing its answer orappearance, defendant chose instead to ignore its available legal rights and obligations. Relief under section 2-1401 is available only to those who diligently pursue their legaldefenses and remedies in court, not those who disregard these procedures on the gamble thatbetter results may be obtained through other procedures or at a cheaper cost. Abbell v.Munfield, 76 Ill. App. 3d 384, 388, 395 N.E.2d 78 (1979). If defendant had kept abreast ofthe litigation, it would have known of the entry of the judgment. Smith, 114 Ill. 2d at 225,499 N.E.2d at 1388. The circuit court was correct in concluding that defendant's petitionwas insufficient as it failed to demonstrate a meritorious defense or due diligence indefending against plaintiff's claims.

However, defendant also argues that the trial court erred in failing to use its equitablepowers under section 2-1401 to grant it relief and that equitable consciousness requires usto set aside the default judgment and allow the matter to proceed on the merits. A petitionunder section 2-1401 does invoke the equitable powers of the circuit court to prevent theenforcement of a default judgment when it would be unfair, unjust, or unconscionable. Smith, 114 Ill. 2d at 225, 499 N.E.2d at 1388. Because a section 2-1401 petition isaddressed to equitable powers, courts have not considered themselves strictly bound byprecedent, and where justice and good conscience may require it, a default judgment maybe vacated even though the requirement of due diligence has not been satisfied. Smith, 114Ill. 2d at 225, 499 N.E.2d at 1388; American Consulting Ass'n v. Spencer, 100 Ill. App. 3d917, 923, 427 N.E.2d 579, 584 (1981). We are convinced that this is not a case where theallegedly unfair, unjust, or unconscionable conduct of plaintiff's failure to provide defendantwith notice of the default judgment within 30 days of its entry softens the rigorousapplication of the standards in section 2-1401 applied by the circuit court.

Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in awarding damages at the defaulthearing because the assessment of damages was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Defendant contends that the evidence offered by plaintiff to prove her damages wasincompetent, inadmissible hearsay and failed to substantiate the award. Defendant contendsthat it is unfair to allow plaintiff to collect damages that defendant had no knowledge of. Plaintiff argues that her sworn testimony at the hearing and the submission of a letter fromher orthopedic surgeon concerning damages, which was attached to her motion as anexhibit, provided a sufficient basis for the court to award the damages sought. Plaintiffargues that the prayer in her complaint for damages in excess of $15,000, coupled with thecontemporaneous filing of an affidavit swearing that the damages sought exceeded $50,000,was sufficient to apprize defendant of the amount of damages sought.

Section 2-1301(d) of the Code provides, "Judgment by default may be entered forwant of an appearance, or for failure to plead, but the court may[,] in either case, requireproof of the allegations of the pleadings upon which relief is sought." 735 ILCS 5/2-1301(d) (West 2000). Where the plaintiff's complaint explicitly seeks relief or expenses andfees associated with the action, an affidavit filed by the plaintiff in support of the damagesclaimed may satisfy section 2-1301(d)'s requirement for proof of the allegations in thepleadings. Ward v. Rosenfeld, 204 Ill. App. 3d 908, 910, 562 N.E.2d 674, 676 (1990). Thismay be a satisfactory proof even where the amounts claimed were not specificallydetermined at the time the plaintiff filed the complaint. Ward, 204 Ill. App. 3d at 910, 562N.E.2d at 676.

Defendant relies on Stickler v. McCarthy, 64 Ill. App. 2d 1, 212 N.E.2d 723 (1965),aff'd as modified, 37 Ill. 2d 48, 224 N.E.2d 827 (1967), for the general proposition thatwhere an action is in tort or for an unliquidated claim or amount, a default does not admitthe amount of damages to which the plaintiff is entitled. However, in Stickler the courtaddressed a situation where the trial court did not consider an affidavit or exhibits at ahearing for judgment on the pleadings, though the court's order said that it had consideredsuch evidence. Stickler, 64 Ill. App. 2d at 21, 212 N.E.2d at 732. In Stickler, the court heldthat a judgment for unliquidated damages cannot be entered without evidence establishingthe fair amount of those damages and that a default for want of an answer does not admit theallegations of damages. The record here indicates that the trial court considered testimonypresented by plaintiff. The instant case being a tort action, the court properly consideredevidence of plaintiff's injuries, expenses, and costs for the amount of damages claimed. Thecourt's judgment in the amount of $204,497.23 was not unreasonable in view of defendant'snotice from the pleadings that the amount sought by plaintiff would be in excess of $15,000,indeed, in excess of $50,000 as indicated by plaintiff's affidavit. In addition, we note thatplaintiff's treating orthopedic surgeon provided that plaintiff underwent an arthroscopy andreceived a total knee replacement as a result of her injuries. Plaintiff's surgeon furtherpredicted that plaintiff may require further surgery as the life expectancy of her total kneereplacement is only 10 to 15 years.

Finally, defendant argues that the court erred in failing to vacate the assessment ofdamages because, even though defaulted, it had a right to participate in the hearing ondamages. Defendant argues that the award of damages to plaintiff was unfair as it was notafforded an opportunity to contradict the claims asserted or the ability to present evidenceof its own in regard to damages. Defendant, relying on Elfman v. Evanston Bus Co., 27 Ill.2d 609, 190 N.E.2d 348 (1963), contends that where damages are unliquidated, thedefaulting defendant must be given at least informal notice of the assessment proceedings. Further, defendant cites Smith v. Dunaway, 77 Ill. App. 2d 1, 221 N.E.2d 665 (1966), a casefollowing Elfman, for the proposition that a defaulted party does not admit that the plaintiffis entitled to damages in the amount claimed.

The supreme court characterized the issue presented in Elfman as follows: "whetherthe amended petition [to vacate a default judgment] and its supporting exhibits andaffidavits, not denied and therefore taken as true, adequately set forth sufficient facts toshow that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the petition." Elfman, 27 Ill. 2d at610, 190 N.E.2d at 349. We consider that case inapplicable because, in Elfman, the plaintiffhad sought to gain an unconscionable advantage over the defendant by precipitatelyempaneling a jury before a visiting county judge, two months before the defendant believedthat a pretrial conference on the matter was to be held, without notice to the defendant; byintroducing evidence of damages unrelated to the accident with the defendant; and bydeliberately delaying the execution of the judgment until the expiration of the 30-day periodafter the judgment. Elfman, 27 Ill. 2d at 612-13, 190 N.E.2d at 350. We are aware thatbasic fairness might require at least informal notice to a defaulted defendant of the plaintiff'sintention to prove-up damages. However, in this case defendant was served with plaintiff'scomplaint and summons on February 18, 1999, plaintiff waited over six months afterdefendant's responsive pleading was due before filing her motion for default judgment onOctober 12, 1999, and the motion included an itemization of her expenses, court costs, andthe amount sought for pain and suffering, as well as a letter from her orthopedic surgeondescribing her injury, past treatment, and prognosis for the future. The petition to vacate didnot include supporting exhibits or affidavits. Here, there is no suggestion of fraud orunconscionable behavior on the part of the litigants or the court. In the absence of ashowing of fraud, we are of the opinion that the trial court was correct in its assessment ofdamages. See Esczuk v. Chicago Transit Authority, 39 Ill. 2d 464, 469, 236 N.E.2d 719,721 (1968).

In supplemental briefing requested by this court, defendant argues that the trial courterred in assessing unliquidated damages in tort against it because plaintiff initially made ajury demand and then waived her jury demand without advising defendant. Defendantargues that plaintiff's failure to provide notice of her waiver of a jury denied it theopportunity to request a trial by jury for the assessment of damages and that it had a right tonotice of plaintiff's waiver.

Defendant relies on Manaster v. Kioebge, 257 Ill. 431, 100 N.E. 989 (1913), for theproposition that a defaulted defendant maintains the right to demand that the assessment ofdamages be made by a jury. The statute involved in Manaster was enacted in 1893, itconsisted of one section, and that section was entitled, "An act to provide a trial by jury inall cases where a judgment may be satisfied by imprisonment." Manaster, 257 Ill. at 434,100 N.E. at 990; Hurd's Rev. Stat. 1911, ch. 110,