Claimants appeal from the order of the trial court affirmingthe decision of the Industrial Commission and dismissing the causesof action. Respondent, the City of Rock Island (City), cross-appeals from the portion of trial court's order reversing the orderof the Commission as it pertains to petitioner Fred Jones. Weaffirm the trial court in all respects except its reversal of theCommission regarding Jones; in that instance, we reverse.

On February 8, 1993, the City of Rock Island (City) passed anordinance, pursuant to section 22-306 of the Illinois Pension Code(40 ILCS 5/22-306 (West 1992)) (the Code), whereby the Cityprovided for the medical care for police officers and firefightersinjured on the job. See Rock Island Municipal Code, Article III,Division 2, section 2-68 (amended February 8, 1993). Because theCity passed this ordinance, injured police officers andfirefighters were precluded from collecting benefits under theWorkers' Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 1992) (theAct)). See 40 ILCS 5/22-307 (West 1992). Claimants were allemployed as police officers or firefighters by the City and filedapplications for adjustment of claim with the Industrial Commissionbetween November 23, 1993 and May 15, 1998. In the case ofclaimant Jones, the City stipulated that it and Jones wereoperating under the provisions of the Act and proceeded to acontested hearing before an arbitrator on a section 19(b) petition.See 820 ILCS 305/19(b) (West 1992). The arbitrator found in favorof Jones. The City's appeal was dismissed. The City subsequentlyfiled motions to dismiss in all the cases, including Jones',alleging lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The arbitratorgranted the City's motions. The Commission affirmed and adoptedthe arbitrator's decisions. After consolidating all the cases, thetrial court affirmed the Commission except as to claimant Jones; inthat case, the court ruled that the City had made an election toproceed under the Act instead of under its ordinance and reversedthe Commission. This appeal by the claimants, except for Jones,and the cross appeal by the City, followed.

At the time relevant to this case, section 22-306 of thePension Code provided in part:

"The corporate authorities of any city or the [sic]village may provide by ordinance that in case of an accidentresulting in an injury to or death of a policeman or firemanin the employ of such city or village while in the performanceof his duties, the officer at the head of the department ...may secure and provide proper medical care and hospitaltreatment for any such policeman or fireman." 40 ILCS 5/22-306 (West 1992).

When a municipality enacted such an ordinance, "no common law orstatutory right to recover damages" against the municipality "shallbe available." 40 ILCS 5/22-307 (West 1992). This court, inVillage of Winnetka v. Industrial Comm'n, 232 Ill. App. 3d 351(1992), held that, once a municipality passed such an ordinance,the ordinance precluded an injured police officer or firefighterfrom recovering damages from the municipality under any common lawor statutory theory. In November, 1997, the General Assemblyamended section 22-307 and removed the bar to statutory recovery ofdamages by municipalities with populations under 500,000. See 40ILCS 5/22-307 (West 1998).

In each of these cases, the claimant was injured after theCity passed the ordinance pursuant to the Pension Code but beforethe General Assembly amended the Code in 1997. The Commissionfound that it lacked jurisdiction over the claims. The claimantscontend that the Commission erred in finding that it had nojurisdiction. Claimants argue that the passage of the ordinancegave the City the ability to "elect" to proceed either under theordinance or under the Act. Claimants cite no law for thisproposition. Indeed, the version of section 22-307 in effect atthe time of the injuries was "unambiguous...that an injuredfirefighter or police officer cannot pursue any common law orstatutory remedies against his municipal employer except for thoseprovided by ordinance enacted pursuant to section 22-306." Nelsonv. Industrial Comm'n, 305 Ill. App. 3d 651, 655 (1999). Thisargument is without merit.

Claimants next contend that the city is estopped from denyingthe Commission's jurisdiction because of its actions in theproceeding brought by claimant Jones. In that case, even thoughJones was injured after the passage of the ordinance, the City didnot raise the Commission's lack of jurisdiction when it appearedbefore the Commission's arbitrator. Indeed, the City stipulatedthat, on the dates of Jones' injuries, the parties were "operatingunder the provisions of the Workers' Compensation/OccupationalDisease Act [sic]," and, after a hearing, the arbitrator found thatthe City was "operating under and subject to the provisions of theIllinois Workers' Compensation Act." However, subject matterjurisdiction either exists or it does not. Klopfer v. Court ofClaims, 286 Ill. App. 3d 499, 507 (1997). It cannot be waived,stipulated to, or consented to by the parties (Eschbaugh v.Industrial Comm'n, 286 Ill. App. 3d 963, 967 (1996)), nor can it beconferred by estoppel. Klopfer, 286 Ill. App. 3d at 507. Subjectmatter jurisdiction can be raised at any time and may be raised suasponte if necessary. Eschbaugh, 286 Ill. App. 3d at 968. Thus,the other claimants have misplaced reliance on the City'sstipulation in the Jones case, and it is of no benefit to them. The City was not estopped from raising the issue of subject matterjurisdiction, and the Commission did not err in finding that it didnot have subject matter jurisdiction.

Claimants next contend that the Commission erred in findingthat it did not have jurisdiction over claims filed after the 1997amendment. Claimants Metscaviz, Rogers, Clark and Westphal wereinjured before the amendment became effective and filed theirclaims, in a timely manner pursuant to the Act, after the Code wasamended. The legislature can, in certain circumstances,constitutionally revive a previously barred statutory remedy;however, such a revival will not be found unless the legislatureclearly indicates that intention. Arnold Engineering, Inc. v.Industrial Comm'n, 72 Ill. 2d 161, 167 (1978). Our review of theamendment of section 22-307 reveals nothing to indicate an expressintent on the part of the legislature that previously barred claimsbe revived. Therefore we find no error here.

Claimants next contend that the City's motions to dismiss werenot timely, arguing that the City was required to file its motionsto dismiss before the effective date of the amendment of the Code. Claimants cite no authority for this proposition. Furthermore, inlight of our resolution of the prior issue, claimants were stillbarred from seeking relief under the Act even after the amendmentof the Code. Thus, this issue has no merit.

Claimants next contend that the amendment to the Code shouldhave been applied retroactively. We disagree.

It has been held that, as a general rule, workers'compensation proceedings are governed by the law in effect at thetime of the injury. See Wilson-Raymond Constructors Co. v.Industrial Comm'n, 79 Ill. 2d 45, 51 (1980); Westinghouse Airbrakev. Industrial Comm'n, 306 Ill. App. 3d 853, 857 (1999). Recently,our supreme court revisited the issue of the retroactiveapplication of statutes and adopted a new test to determine whethera statute is to be applied to antecedent events. In CommonwealthEdison Co. v. Will County Collector, 196 Ill. 2d 27 (2001), thecourt adopted the approach set forth in Landgraf v. USI FilmProducts, 511 U.S. 244, 128 L. Ed. 2d 229, 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994). The court set forth the test as follows:

"Under the Landgraf test, if the legislature has clearlyindicated what the temporal reach of an intended statuteshould be, then, absent a constitutional prohibition, thatexpression of legislative intent must be given effect. However, when the legislature has not indicated what the reachof a statute should be, then the court must determine whetherapplying the statute would have a retroactive impact, i.e.,'whether it would impair rights a party possessed when heacted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, orimpose new duties with respect to transactions alreadycompleted.' [Citation.] If there would be no retroactiveimpact, as that term is defined by the court, then the amendedlaw may be applied. [Citation.] If, however, applying theamended version of the law would have a retroactive impact,then the court must presume that the legislature did notintend that it be so applied. [Citation.]" Commonwealth EdisonCo., 196 Ill. 2d at 38.

In determining whether a statute operates retrospectively, a courtmust ask whether the new provision attaches new legal consequencesto events completed before its enactment; any such conclusion comesat the end of a process of judgment concerning the nature andextent of the change in the law and the degree of connectionbetween the operation of the new rule and a relevant past event. Commonwealth Edison Co., 196 Ill. 2d at 39, citing Landgraf, 511U.S. at 269-70, 128 L. Ed. 2d at 254-55, 114 S. Ct. at 1499.

We find no express legislative intent that the amended statuteapply to antecedent events. Public Act 90-525 merely states: "ThisAct takes effect upon becoming law." Pub. Act 90-525, sec.5, eff.November 12, 1997. With no indication of the intended temporalreach of the amendment, we must then determine if applying theamended statute to these claims would have a retroactive impact. We conclude that it would. Application of the amended statute wouldchange the City's liability for these claimants' injuries. TheCity was already liable for the claimants' medical care andhospital treatment pursuant to the ordinance. Application of theamendment might even allow claimants to recover from the City bothunder the ordinance and under the Act, as is demonstrated by thefollowing colloquy from the senate debate:

"SENATOR BUTLER:

Another question. It doesn't work as when we hadthe Scaffold Act? They can't sue under both and thencollect on the highest? There will be one remainingfund, so to speak, to collect from.

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SENATOR DUDYCZ:

Senator Butler, I've been told it does not prohibitthem from collecting from both, but they are hoping thatthe municipalities eliminate, by ordinance, theseprovisions so that they're not even afforded theopportunity." 90^th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings,October 30, 1997, at 8.

Thus, application of the amendment would have a retroactive impact,and we must presume that the legislature did not intend such aresult. See Commonwealth Edison Co., 196 Ill. 2d at 38.

This court was faced with a similar situation in Nelson. Inthat case, the arbitrator found that claims for injuries sustainedby a firefighter during the period of 1985 through 1987 were barredby section 22-307. It is unclear exactly when the claimant filedhis claim for recovery of workers' compensation benefits. Theclaimant argued on appeal, inter alia, that the 1997 amendment ofthe Code was designed to clarify section 22-307 and that this courtshould apply section 22-307 "as it would be with the 1997amendment." Nelson, 305 Ill. App. 3d at 654. The Nelson court didnot engage in a "retroactivity" analysis. However, the courtdetermined that the 1997 amendment was "a change in law and not aclarification" and the court "decline[d] to interpret the formerversion of section 22-307 as it now exists after the 1997amendment." Nelson, 305 Ill. App. 3d at 656. We, too, decline toapply the amendment retroactively, and find no merit to thisargument.

Claimants next contend that both section 22-307 and the City'sCode are unconstitutional. Claimants cite to no authority orconstitutional provision in this one-sentence argument. Thus, wedeem this point waived. See People v. Peeples, 155 Ill. 2d 422,449-50 (1993).

The City has cross-appealed the trial court's ruling in favorof claimant Jones, who did not file a brief on appeal. The trialcourt ruled that the City had made a knowing and binding electionto proceed under the Act when it stipulated that it was operatingpursuant to the Act, participated in a contested hearing before thearbitrator, and appealed the adverse ruling against it. However,the issue of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived,stipulated to or consented to, and it can be raised at any time. Eschbaugh, 286 Ill. App. 3d 967-68 (1996). The City's actionscould not confer subject matter jurisdiction where it is otherwiseabsent. See Eschbaugh, 286 Ill. App. 3d at 968. Therefore, thetrial court erred in entering judgment in Jones' behalf.

For these reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of RockIsland is affirmed as to all claimants except Fred Jones and isreversed as to Fred Jones.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

McCULLOUGH, P.J., and HOFFMAN, HOLDRIDGE and RARICK, JJ.,concur.